New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • Gelman v. Kroll Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08075 (2016): Duty of Care for Negligent Drug Testing

    Gelman v. Kroll Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08075 (2016)

    A laboratory that performs drug testing owes a duty of reasonable care to the individual being tested, where a positive test result could foreseeably lead to adverse consequences for that individual.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a drug testing laboratory owes a duty of care to an individual whose sample it tests, potentially leading to adverse consequences based on the results. Gelman, a probationer, sued Kroll after a positive drug test led to probation violation proceedings, which were later dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that Kroll owed Gelman a duty of reasonable care in conducting the drug test because it was foreseeable that a false positive could harm him. This decision clarifies the scope of duty for third-party testing labs and balances the need for accurate testing with potential liabilities.

    Facts

    Gelman was a probationer subject to mandatory drug testing. The Orange County Probation Department contracted with Kroll Laboratory Specialists to analyze Gelman’s oral fluid sample for illicit substances. Kroll reported that Gelman’s sample contained cannabinoids exceeding the cutoff level, leading the Probation Department to file a violation of probation (VOP) petition against him. Later tests (blood and urine) came back negative, and eventually, the VOP was dismissed.

    Procedural History

    Gelman sued Kroll for negligent testing. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding Kroll owed no duty to Gelman. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kroll did indeed owe Gelman a duty of care. The certified question from the Second Circuit regarding the duty of care was answered in the affirmative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a drug testing laboratory owes a duty of care to the individual being tested when the laboratory’s testing errors could foreseeably lead to the individual’s loss of liberty.

    Holding

    Yes, because a drug testing laboratory owes a duty of reasonable care to the individual being tested, where a positive test result could foreseeably lead to adverse consequences for that individual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Kroll owed Gelman a duty of care because it was foreseeable that a negligent drug test could lead to the deprivation of Gelman’s liberty. The court applied the principle that a duty of care extends to those who may be foreseeably injured by a defendant’s actions. The court analogized to existing cases where a duty was found to exist between parties not in direct contractual privity, emphasizing that Kroll’s actions directly impacted Gelman’s legal standing. The Court noted that “Kroll was aware that its testing would directly affect plaintiff’s liberty interest as a probationer” and that this awareness created a duty to perform the testing with due care. The court emphasized the potential for harm from a false positive, distinguishing this case from situations where the connection between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s injury is more attenuated. The dissent argued that imposing a duty on the lab would open the floodgates to litigation and that the primary issue was with the Probation Department’s actions, not Kroll’s testing. The dissent highlighted that the contract was between Kroll and the County, and Kroll fulfilled its contractual obligations. The majority countered that its holding was in line with decisions in other jurisdictions and that it was not creating a new cause of action but applying existing negligence principles to a specific set of facts.

  • People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013): Judge’s Participation in Testimony Readback

    People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013)

    While a trial judge should generally avoid participating in readbacks of testimony to the jury, doing so is not a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal absent preservation, unless the judge’s actions demonstrate bias that deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    James Alcide was convicted of murder and weapon possession. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony from two key witnesses. The trial judge, in an effort to expedite the process, participated in the readbacks by reading either the questions or the answers. Alcide argued that this participation constituted a mode of proceedings error, requiring reversal even without an objection. The New York Court of Appeals held that while it’s generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias, and that Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Alcide was convicted of fatally shooting a man in a grocery store. Key evidence included testimony from a bystander who identified Alcide as the shooter and the victim’s friend who saw Alcide fleeing the scene with a gun. The defense attacked the reliability and credibility of these witnesses, citing inconsistencies and potential biases. During deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of the testimony of the bystander and the first police officer on the scene.

    Procedural History

    Alcide was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial judge committed mode of proceedings errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Alcide appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial judge’s participation in the readback of testimony to the jury, by reading either the questions or answers, constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal even in the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because while it is generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks of testimony, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama, where the trial judge withheld the contents of a jury note from counsel. Here, the content of the jury’s requests for readbacks was disclosed in open court, and defense counsel had the opportunity to object to the judge’s proposed procedure. Because counsel did not object, the claim was unpreserved. The Court acknowledged the Second Department’s dictum in People v. Brockett that a trial judge should not participate as a reader during a read-back of testimony, as it might convey the impression that the court is aligned with a particular party. However, the Court clarified that such participation, while generally inadvisable, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it creates a situation analogous to People v. De Jesus, where the judge’s conduct demonstrated clear bias against the defense. The court noted, “Not every procedural misstep in a criminal case is a mode of proceedings error”; rather, this narrow exception to the preservation rule is “reserved for the most fundamental flaws.” Here, the judge’s stated reasons for participating in the readbacks were to expedite the process and make it easier for the jury to follow, not to demonstrate bias. Because defense counsel failed to object to the judge’s participation in the readbacks at a time when the error could have been cured, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming Alcide’s conviction.

  • Soto v. J. Crew Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013): Defines Cleaning Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    21 N.Y.3d 562 (2013)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes liability on building owners and contractors for failing to provide safety devices to workers exposed to elevation-related risks, does not extend to routine maintenance tasks such as dusting a shelf in a retail store.

    Summary

    Jose Soto, a commercial cleaner, was injured when he fell from a ladder while dusting a shelf in a J. Crew store. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that dusting a shelf was routine maintenance, not “cleaning” under the statute. The Court established a four-factor test to determine whether an activity qualifies as cleaning under § 240(1), focusing on the routine nature of the task, the need for specialized equipment, the elevation risks involved, and the connection to construction-related activities. Because Soto’s activity did not meet these criteria, his claim was dismissed.

    Facts

    Jose Soto, an employee of Whelan Cleaning Services, was assigned to clean a J. Crew retail store. His duties included daily maintenance such as vacuuming, mopping, and dusting. On the day of the incident, a J. Crew employee asked Soto to dust a six-foot-high display shelf. Soto, using a four-foot ladder, fell while dusting the shelf, sustaining injuries. The ladder was in proper working order.

    Procedural History

    Soto sued J. Crew and the building owner under Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the dusting constituted routine maintenance and wasn’t protected by the statute. Soto appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the dusting of a display shelf in a retail store constitutes “cleaning” within the meaning of New York Labor Law § 240(1), thereby entitling the injured worker to the protections of the statute.

    Holding

    No, because the dusting of a display shelf is considered routine maintenance and does not involve the type of heightened elevation-related risks that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect against.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that not all cleaning activities fall under the protection of Labor Law § 240(1). While commercial window washing is covered, routine maintenance is not. The Court established a four-factor test to determine whether an activity qualifies as “cleaning” under the statute. These factors are: (1) whether the task is routine and recurring; (2) whether it requires specialized equipment or expertise; (3) whether it involves insignificant elevation risks; and (4) whether it is related to any ongoing construction or renovation project. The Court stated, “Outside the sphere of commercial window washing (which we have already determined to be covered), an activity cannot be characterized as “cleaning” under the statute, if the task: (1) is routine… (2) requires neither specialized equipment or expertise… (3) generally involves insignificant elevation risks… and (4)…is unrelated to any ongoing construction…project.” Applying these factors, the Court found that Soto’s dusting activity was routine, required no special skills or equipment, involved minimal elevation risks, and was unrelated to any construction project. Therefore, Soto was not engaged in “cleaning” as defined by Labor Law § 240(1). The court referenced the example in Dahar v Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., stating this case presented a scenario analogous to the bookstore employee who climbs a ladder to dust off a bookshelf, which the legislature never intended to cover.

  • People v. Thompson, 21 N.Y.3d 557 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Peremptory Challenges

    People v. Thompson, 21 N.Y.3d 557 (2013)

    A defense attorney’s failure to use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who had a long-standing friendship with the prosecuting attorney does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, especially if the overall fairness of the trial was not demonstrably impaired.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter after a trial where a juror was seated who had a 40-year friendship with the District Attorney. Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause, but the challenge was denied. Despite having peremptory challenges available, counsel did not use one to remove the juror. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defense counsel’s failure to use a peremptory challenge, while questionable, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant failed to show that the fairness of the trial was impaired. The Court emphasized that a single error by otherwise competent counsel must be egregious and prejudicial to warrant reversal.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder. During jury selection, a prospective juror, William Peters, disclosed that he had been friends with the District Attorney for over 40 years, knew his wife, and socialized with him occasionally. Peters stated that the friendship would not affect his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Defense counsel questioned Peters, who stated he had known the District Attorney to be wrong before.

    Procedural History

    The defense challenged Peters for cause, which the trial court denied. The defense did not use a peremptory challenge to remove Peters, who then sat on the jury. The jury acquitted the defendant of second-degree murder but convicted him of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to exercise a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who had a long-standing friendship with the prosecuting attorney constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thus depriving the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the fairness of the trial was impaired by the juror’s presence, and the attorney’s decision, while potentially questionable, did not constitute an egregious and prejudicial error that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the defense counsel’s decision not to use a peremptory challenge was questionable, especially considering the potential for bias or the lost opportunity to preserve the for-cause challenge for appeal. However, the Court reasoned that defense counsel may have had strategic reasons for keeping Peters on the jury, such as believing Peters would be favorable to the defense or would bend over backwards to be fair. The Court emphasized that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a single error, the defendant must show that the error was so serious that it deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Citing People v. Turner, the Court stated that such error must be “a defense as clear-cut and completely dispositive as a statute of limitations.” Here, the Court held that the relationship between the juror and the prosecutor, while raising concerns, did not reach that level of egregiousness. While it might have been wiser for the trial judge to excuse Peters, the Court found it debatable whether the court committed reversible error. The Court highlighted the lack of evidence showing the juror’s presence prejudiced the defendant. Thus, the Court concluded that the defense counsel’s representation, taken as a whole, was not ineffective.

  • Cunningham v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013): GPS Tracking of Employee’s Car and Workplace Exception

    Cunningham v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013)

    A public employer’s warrantless GPS tracking of an employee’s car is a search, subject to constitutional reasonableness, and must be reasonably limited in scope to work-related activities to be permissible.

    Summary

    The New York State Department of Labor suspected an employee, Cunningham, of falsifying time records and attached a GPS device to his car without a warrant to track his movements. The Court of Appeals held that while the GPS tracking constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution, it fell within the workplace exception to the warrant requirement. However, the Court found the search unreasonable in its scope because it tracked Cunningham’s movements 24/7, including evenings, weekends, and vacation time, which was excessively intrusive. As a result, evidence obtained solely from the GPS tracking was suppressed, and the case was remanded for a redetermination of the appropriate penalty.

    Facts

    The New York State Department of Labor began investigating Cunningham, the Director of Staff and Organizational Development, for alleged unauthorized absences and falsified time records. After Cunningham evaded an investigator, the Department referred the matter to the Office of the State Inspector General. The Inspector General attached a GPS device to Cunningham’s car without his knowledge while it was parked near his office. The device tracked all of the car’s movements for a month, including evenings, weekends, and vacation time. The department then used the GPS data to support disciplinary charges against Cunningham, alleging discrepancies between his reported work hours and his car’s location.

    Procedural History

    The Department of Labor brought disciplinary charges against Cunningham. A Hearing Officer sustained 11 charges, four of which relied on GPS evidence. The Commissioner of Labor affirmed the Hearing Officer’s determination and terminated Cunningham’s employment. Cunningham filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the termination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s determination. Cunningham appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless GPS tracking of a public employee’s vehicle by their employer constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 12 of the New York Constitution when the tracking occurs 24/7, including during non-work hours and vacation time, even if a reasonable suspicion of misconduct exists.

    Holding

    No, because while the GPS tracking of an employee’s car falls under the workplace exception to the warrant requirement, the search was unreasonable in its scope due to its excessively intrusive nature of tracking Cunningham’s movements 24/7 for a month. The evidence obtained solely from the GPS data should be suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and tracking its movements constitutes a search under both the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution, citing People v. Weaver and United States v. Jones. However, the Court found that the “workplace exception” to the warrant requirement, as established in O’Connor v. Ortega and Matter of Caruso v. Ward, applied in this case because the employer had a reasonable suspicion of employee misconduct. The Court reasoned that tracking the location of an employee’s car during working hours is analogous to other workplace searches deemed permissible without a warrant.

    Despite the applicability of the workplace exception, the Court determined that the scope of the search was unreasonable. The GPS tracking was deemed “excessively intrusive” because it monitored Cunningham’s movements at all times, including evenings, weekends, and during his vacation. The court stated, “The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.” The Court emphasized that the State failed to make a reasonable effort to limit the tracking to business hours, despite having the ability to remove the device. The Court held that, “Where an employer conducts a GPS search without making a reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of business hours, the search as a whole must be considered unreasonable.”

  • People v. Rudolph, 22 N.Y.3d 497 (2013): Court’s Duty to Determine Youthful Offender Status

    People v. Rudolph, 22 N.Y.3d 497 (2013)

    A sentencing court has a mandatory duty to determine whether an eligible youth should receive youthful offender status, regardless of whether the defendant requests it or waives the right to be considered for it.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a sentencing court “must” determine whether an eligible youth should be treated as a youthful offender (YO), even if the defendant doesn’t request it or attempts to waive the right. Defendant Rudolph, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to felony drug possession and purportedly waived his right to appeal. The prosecutor stated YO treatment was off the table due to the crime’s severity. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s affirmance, overruling its prior decision in People v. McGowen. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “must” reflects a policy choice that a YO determination is required in every eligible case, emphasizing the value of a judicial assessment of a young person’s potential for rehabilitation.

    Facts

    Defendant Rudolph, 17 years old at the time, was charged with felony drug possession. He pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. During the plea, the prosecutor stated that youthful offender treatment was not an option due to the crime’s seriousness, to which neither the defendant nor the court responded. At sentencing, the court did not address Rudolph’s eligibility for youthful offender status.

    Procedural History

    The County Court sentenced Rudolph to five years in prison plus two years of post-release supervision. On appeal, Rudolph argued that the sentencing court erred by not considering him for youthful offender treatment. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating Rudolph waived his right by failing to request YO consideration. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentencing court is required to determine if an eligible youth should receive youthful offender status, even if the defendant does not request it or attempts to waive the right.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 720.20(1) mandates that the court “must” determine whether an eligible youth is a youthful offender, reflecting a policy choice that this determination be made in every eligible case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted CPL 720.20(1), which states that upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court “must” determine whether the youth is a youthful offender. The Court found this mandatory language reflects a deliberate policy choice by the legislature. The Court reasoned that while defendants can typically waive rights, the opportunity for a fresh start without a criminal record, based on a judge’s assessment of rehabilitation potential, is too valuable to be sacrificed in plea bargaining. The court acknowledged potential concerns about prosecutors being less willing to offer plea bargains but noted that prosecutors can still oppose YO treatment and, in unusual situations, bargain for the right to withdraw consent to the plea if YO treatment is granted. The court explicitly overruled People v. McGowen, which had held that a defendant waives the right to YO status by not requesting it. The court limited the holding’s impact to cases still on direct review, preventing collateral attacks on already final sentences. The court clarified that the decision does not allow defendants to withdraw their guilty pleas, as the plea was not rendered unknowing or involuntary by the court’s interpretation of the statute.

  • People v. Castillo, 22 N.Y.3d 991 (2013): Examining Confidential Informant Testimony for Probable Cause in Search Warrant Applications

    People v. Castillo, 22 N.Y.3d 991 (2013)

    When a search warrant is based on information from a confidential informant, and the warrant application and supporting affidavit alone do not establish probable cause, the court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the magistrate to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Summary

    Castillo was convicted on drug and weapon charges after a search of his home pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer and the oral deposition of a confidential informant. Castillo moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and requesting a Darden hearing. The Supreme Court denied the motion without reviewing the informant’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that while a Darden hearing was not required, the Supreme Court erred in not reviewing the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed and if the requirements of CPL 690.40(1) were met. The case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for Castillo’s home based on her affidavit and the oral deposition of a confidential informant. The affidavit stated the informant purchased cocaine from Castillo at his home on three occasions. The affidavit did not detail the informant’s reliability or track record. During the warrant application process, the confidential informant testified before the issuing magistrate.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Castillo’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, without reviewing the transcript of the confidential informant’s testimony. Castillo was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the denial of a Darden hearing was appropriate. Castillo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to examine the transcript of the confidential informant’s testimony before the magistrate to determine if the search warrant was issued upon probable cause.
    2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to determine if the formal requirements of CPL 690.40(1) had been substantially complied with.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when the search warrant and supporting affidavit do not by themselves establish probable cause, the court must review the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed based on the totality of the evidence presented to the magistrate.

    2. Yes, because the suppression court must ensure that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.40(1) to ensure the regularity of the application process and preservation for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the search warrant and supporting affidavit, standing alone, did not establish probable cause. The affidavit lacked sufficient information to assess the informant’s reliability, failing to demonstrate a proven track record or indicate the informant was under oath. While admissions against penal interest can contribute to probable cause, the informant’s statements lacked sufficient detail and police corroboration. The court distinguished this case from People v. McCann, where the informant provided a detailed, signed statement against their penal interests with the explicit understanding that false statements were a crime.

    Because the warrant application was deficient, the Supreme Court was required to review the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause was established before the magistrate. Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of complying with CPL 690.40(1), which requires that any examination of a person providing pertinent information be recorded or summarized. This ensures the regularity of the warrant application process and preserves the grounds for issuing the warrant for appellate review. As the court stated, “[t]he suppression court must find that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.40 (1) in order to provide an ‘assurance of the regularity of the application process and preservation for appellate review of the grounds upon which a search warrant is issued.’” The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to review the transcript and determine if probable cause and compliance with CPL 690.40(1) were established.

  • James v. Wormuth, 24 N.Y.3d 530 (2014): Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitur When a Doctor Intentionally Leaves a Foreign Object

    James v. Wormuth, 24 N.Y.3d 530 (2014)

    Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in a medical malpractice case where a doctor intentionally leaves a foreign object inside a patient, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a deviation from accepted medical standards through expert testimony.

    Summary

    Marguerite James sued Dr. David Wormuth for medical malpractice after he intentionally left a localization guide wire in her lung during a biopsy. After an initial unsuccessful search, the doctor determined it was safer to leave the wire than prolong the surgery. James later experienced pain and underwent a second surgery to remove the wire. At trial, James argued res ipsa loquitur applied, negating the need for expert testimony. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant, which the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the doctor’s action was intentional, the plaintiff needed to prove the doctor’s decision deviated from accepted medical practice, which required expert testimony that she did not provide. Res ipsa loquitur applies only when the object is unintentionally left.

    Facts

    In October 2004, during a lung biopsy performed by Dr. Wormuth, a guide wire dislodged. The doctor performed a 20-minute manual search, but could not locate the wire. Dr. Wormuth decided it was better to leave the wire to avoid extending the surgery time. He informed James post-surgery that he had left the wire. James returned complaining of pain that she attributed to the wire. About two months later, Dr. Wormuth performed a second operation using a C-arm X-ray machine and successfully removed the wire.

    Procedural History

    James filed a medical malpractice suit. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. James appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether res ipsa loquitur applies when a doctor intentionally leaves a foreign object inside a patient’s body during surgery, thereby relieving the plaintiff of the burden to provide expert testimony demonstrating a deviation from the accepted standard of medical care.

    Holding

    No, because res ipsa loquitur is only applicable when a foreign object is unintentionally left in a patient; here, the doctor made an intentional decision, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the decision deviated from accepted medical standards through expert testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that normally, a medical malpractice claim requires proof that the doctor deviated from acceptable medical practice and that the deviation proximately caused the injury. The Court explained that res ipsa loquitur applies when the specific cause of an accident is unknown. To invoke res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must show that the event does not ordinarily occur without negligence, that the instrumentality was in the defendant’s exclusive control, and that the plaintiff did not contribute to the event. In foreign object cases, res ipsa loquitur applies only when the object is “unintentionally left in a patient following an operative procedure.” Here, the plaintiff’s case was based on the doctor’s intentional choice to leave the wire, as confirmed by her counsel. Because the doctor intentionally left the wire, the plaintiff was required to establish that the doctor’s judgment deviated from accepted community standards of practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. Dr. Wormuth claimed his decision was based on his professional judgment, testifying that it was riskier to continue the search. The Court stated that determining whether the doctor’s professional judgment was appropriate requires expert testimony. Since the plaintiff did not provide expert testimony, her complaint was properly dismissed. The court also found that plaintiff failed to establish exclusive control, as other medical personnel were involved in the process. The Court distinguished this case from those involving objects left unintentionally, where there is no decision to leave the object that must be measured against a standard of care. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of medical malpractice based on res ipsa loquitur or traditional negligence principles, noting, “As advantageous as the res ipsa loquitur inference is for a plaintiff unable to adduce direct evidence of negligence, application of the [evidentiary] doctrine does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of proof.”

  • De La Cruz v. Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co., 21 N.Y.3d 530 (2013): Defining ‘Public Work’ for Prevailing Wage Laws

    De La Cruz v. Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co., 21 N.Y.3d 530 (2013)

    A municipal vessel is a public work under Labor Law § 220 and the State Constitution, requiring prevailing wages, if its primary objective benefits the general public.

    Summary

    This case defines what constitutes a “public work” under New York Labor Law § 220 and Article I, § 17 of the New York State Constitution, which mandate prevailing wages for workers on public projects. The plaintiffs, employees of Caddell Dry Dock, sought prevailing wages for their work on New York City vessels, including Staten Island Ferries and fireboats. The Court of Appeals held that a municipal vessel is a “public work” if its primary objective is to benefit the general public, regardless of whether the public directly uses the vessel or has access to it. The court reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the vessels served a public function and thus qualified as public works.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs were employed by Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co., which repaired and maintained vessels for various companies, including New York City agencies. The vessels serviced included Staten Island Ferry boats, New York City fireboats, and Department of Sanitation garbage barges. The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to the prevailing wage rate under Labor Law § 220 and Article I, § 17 of the New York State Constitution because the vessels they worked on were “public works.” Caddell argued that the vessels were not public works.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Caddell, seeking enforcement of contractual provisions requiring payment of prevailing wages and supplemental benefits. Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendant’s motion, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Brukhman v. Giuliani. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipal vessel is a “public work” within the meaning of Labor Law § 220 and Article I, § 17 of the New York State Constitution, thus requiring the payment of prevailing wages to workers involved in its construction, maintenance, or repair.

    Holding

    Yes, because a municipal vessel is a public work if its primary objective is to benefit the general public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “public work” extends beyond structures attached to land and includes items that are “situated” or “used” for the public benefit. The Court emphasized the legislative intent to ensure social justice in the State’s dealings with laborers and mechanics, requiring a liberal interpretation of Labor Law § 220. The Court distinguished Brukhman v. Giuliani, stating that it was not dispositive on the issue of whether a vessel is a “public work,” noting that the critical factor is whether the primary purpose or objective of the project is public. The court established a three-prong test to determine whether a project is subject to prevailing wage requirements: (1) a public agency must be party to a contract involving laborers; (2) the contract must concern a project involving construction-like labor paid for by public funds; and (3) the work product’s primary objective must be for public use or benefit. Applying this test, the Court found that vessels like Staten Island Ferries and fireboats serve the general public, even if the public does not directly use the fireboats. As Justice Holmes stated, “whether a work is public or not does not depend upon its being attached to the soil”.

  • People v. Brinson, 20 NY3d 492 (2013): Double Jeopardy and Resentencing for Postrelease Supervision

    People v. Brinson, 20 N.Y.3d 492 (2013)

    Resentencing a defendant to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after the original determinate sentence was served, but while the defendant is still incarcerated serving an aggregated sentence, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant lacks a legitimate expectation of finality until the entire aggregated sentence is completed.

    Summary

    Defendants Brinson and Blankymsee were resentenced to include mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) after their original sentences omitted it. They argued this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, as they had already served their determinate sentences. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy because the defendants were still serving their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30. The Court reasoned that defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until their entire aggregated sentence is completed. This decision clarifies when resentencing for PRS is permissible without violating double jeopardy protections.

    Facts

    Christopher Brinson was arrested on December 8, 1998, and sentenced on July 14, 2000, to a determinate term of 10 years for second-degree robbery, an indeterminate term of 3 to 6 years for third-degree robbery, and an indeterminate term of 2 to 4 years for fourth-degree grand larceny. The indeterminate terms ran concurrently but consecutively to the determinate term. On April 28, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate count.

    Lawrence Blankymsee was sentenced on May 20, 2004, as a second felony offender, to seven concurrent prison terms, including determinate sentences of five years for two counts of loaded firearm possession and indeterminate sentences for other crimes. On October 20, 2010, he was resentenced to include five years of PRS on the determinate sentences for firearm possession.

    Procedural History

    In separate appeals, the Appellate Division affirmed the resentences, holding that the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their determinate sentences because they had not completed their properly aggregated sentences before resentencing. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) at resentencing violates the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant has completed the determinate sentence for the count subject to PRS, but is still incarcerated serving an aggregate sentence calculated under Penal Law § 70.30.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants do not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences until they have completed their aggregated sentences under Penal Law § 70.30.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same crime, preventing a sentence from being increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of the sentence. However, defendants are presumed to know that a determinate sentence without PRS is illegal, and courts have the authority to correct illegal sentences. The Court emphasized that this opportunity to correct illegality is not without end, stating, “there must be a temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant since criminal courts do not have perpetual jurisdiction over all persons who were once sentenced for criminal acts.” That temporal limitation occurs once the sentence is served and the appeal is completed, or the time for such appeal has expired.

    The Court relied on Penal Law § 70.30, which establishes the methodology for calculating a defendant’s multiple terms of imprisonment. In People v. Buss, 11 NY3d 553 (2008), the Court held that under Penal Law § 70.30, consecutive and concurrent sentences are merged or aggregated and thus “made into one.” Therefore, the Court concluded that defendants Brinson and Blankymsee would only have a legitimate expectation of finality upon completion of their respective aggregated sentences. Until that time, resentencing for the purpose of correcting their illegal determinate sentences does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.