New York Law Review

Tag: New York Court of Appeals

  • Powers v. 31 E 31 LLC, 23 N.Y.3d 84 (2014): Establishing Foreseeability in Landowner Negligence Cases

    23 N.Y.3d 84 (2014)

    A landowner’s duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition extends to foreseeable uses of the property, even if those uses are not explicitly authorized, and the question of foreseeability is generally one for the jury.

    Summary

    Joseph Powers fell from a setback roof of an apartment building into an air shaft and sustained serious injuries. He sued the building owners, alleging negligence in failing to install a protective railing or wall. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that issues of fact remained regarding the building’s compliance with applicable building codes and the foreseeability of the accident. The court emphasized the landowner’s duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition, considering foreseeable uses, even unauthorized ones.

    Facts

    Joseph Powers, while visiting a friend’s apartment, accessed a setback roof through a window. The setback roof lacked a railing around a 25-foot-deep air shaft. Powers later re-exited the apartment and fell into the air shaft, sustaining injuries. The building was constructed in 1909 and converted to multiple dwelling use later.

    Procedural History

    Powers sued the building owners for negligence. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendants’ summary judgment proof sufficiently refuted the plaintiff’s allegation that the building codes required a railing or parapet on the setback roof?

    2. Whether the plaintiff’s accident was foreseeable, precluding summary judgment for the defendants?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendants failed to eliminate questions of fact concerning the applicability of building code exceptions and whether the building’s conversion to multiple dwelling use triggered an obligation to comply with updated building codes.

    2. No, because reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff’s use of the roof and his resulting fall were foreseeable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendants, as the moving party for summary judgment, failed to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact regarding compliance with building codes. Specifically, they did not conclusively prove that the roof was finished with gutters in 1909 (potentially exempting it from earlier code requirements) or that the later conversion to multiple dwelling use did not trigger an obligation to comply with the 1968 Building Code. The court found the engineer’s affidavit and certificate of occupancy insufficient to establish code compliance.

    Regarding foreseeability, the court cited Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 NY2d 982 (1993), which involved a similar fall from a setback roof. The court emphasized a landowner’s duty to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition extends to foreseeable uses, even unauthorized ones. The court noted the setback roof was accessible through a window, was large enough for multiple people, and there was evidence of prior use, making the accident foreseeable. As the court stated, “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed”. Because the defendants failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment on either code compliance or foreseeability, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to offer opposing proof. The court remitted the case for further proceedings.

  • Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (2014): Defamation and the Fact vs. Opinion Distinction

    Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (2014)

    Statements that accuse someone of lying and acting with malicious intent can be considered statements of fact, especially when the speaker implies knowledge of undisclosed facts supporting their accusations.

    Summary

    Robert Davis and Michael Lang sued Syracuse University and its basketball coach, James Boeheim, for defamation after Boeheim publicly accused them of lying about being sexually abused by a former coach, Bernie Fine. The plaintiffs argued that Boeheim’s statements implied he had undisclosed facts supporting his accusations that they were motivated by money. The Court of Appeals held that Boeheim’s statements could be reasonably interpreted as conveying facts, not just opinions, especially considering his position of authority and access to information. This ruling reversed the lower court’s dismissal, allowing the case to proceed to discovery to fully evaluate the claims.

    Facts

    Davis and Lang alleged they were sexually abused by Bernie Fine, a Syracuse University basketball coach, starting in the 1980s. They reported the abuse to authorities and the university, but no action was taken. Years later, after the Penn State University scandal involving similar allegations, ESPN reported Davis and Lang’s claims. Boeheim, Fine’s long-time friend and colleague, publicly defended Fine and accused Davis and Lang of lying and seeking financial gain, implying they were motivated by the Penn State case.

    Procedural History

    Davis and Lang sued Boeheim and Syracuse University for defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), arguing Boeheim’s statements were non-actionable opinion. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, finding the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for defamation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Boeheim’s statements that Davis and Lang were liars seeking money constitute non-actionable opinion or potentially defamatory statements of fact or mixed opinion.

    Holding

    Yes, because Boeheim’s statements could be reasonably interpreted by a reader as conveying facts about the plaintiffs, specifically, that they lied about the abuse for financial gain, and that Boeheim’s statements implied a basis in undisclosed facts supporting those accusations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied a three-factor test to determine whether the statements were fact or opinion, considering: 1) whether the language had a precise, readily understood meaning; 2) whether the statements could be proven true or false; and 3) whether the context signaled opinion rather than fact. The court found the first two factors favored treating Boeheim’s statements as factual. On the third factor, the court considered the context: Boeheim was a respected figure within the university and community, and his statements implied access to information not available to the general public. Boeheim’s statements were made during a media investigation, lending more credibility to his assertions. The court noted, “[Boeheim’s] assertions that Davis previously made the same claims, for the same purpose, communicated that Boeheim was relying on undisclosed facts that would justify Boeheim’s statements that Davis and Lang were neither credible nor victims of sexual abuse.” While Boeheim denied knowledge of facts and used phrases like “I believe,” the court found that a reasonable reader could still interpret his statements as supported by undisclosed facts. The court emphasized that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the standard is whether *any* reasonable reading of the complaint supports a defamation claim. Because the complaint met this minimum pleading requirement, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and allowed the case to proceed.

  • People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013): Police Can Rely on Attorney’s Statement of Discontinuance

    People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013)

    When police are told by a suspect’s lawyer that the lawyer no longer represents him, they may question the suspect without violating his right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police did not violate a defendant’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney stated he no longer represented him. McLean, previously represented by Kouray for a robbery charge, provided information about a murder in exchange for a plea deal. Years later, after Baker implicated McLean in the murder, detectives spoke with Kouray, who stated he no longer represented McLean. Subsequently, the detectives questioned McLean, who provided a new statement implicating himself in the murder. The Court of Appeals found that the police reasonably relied on Kouray’s statement and were not required to take further steps to ascertain the status of the attorney-client relationship.

    Facts

    In 2003, McLean, represented by attorney Kouray, offered information about a murder to get a lighter sentence on a robbery charge. He provided a statement to Detective Sims in Kouray’s presence. In 2006, after Antoan Baker implicated McLean in the murder, Detective Sims contacted Kouray to inquire if he still represented McLean. Kouray stated he did not. Detectives then interviewed McLean in prison, after administering Miranda warnings, about the murder. McLean provided a new, more incriminating statement.

    Procedural History

    McLean was indicted for murder. His motion to suppress the 2006 statement was denied, and he pleaded guilty. His direct appeal, arguing a violation of his right to counsel, was initially rejected due to an insufficient record. McLean then moved to set aside his conviction under CPL 440.10, again arguing a right to counsel violation. The County Court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McLean’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney told them that he no longer represented him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had a reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client relationship had ceased when McLean’s attorney explicitly stated he no longer represented him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1968) and People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993), which generally prohibits questioning a defendant in the absence of counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, unless the defendant affirmatively waives his right to counsel in the attorney’s presence. However, the Court distinguished the present case from West, where police failed to make any inquiry regarding the status of the attorney-client relationship. Here, the police specifically asked Kouray if he still represented McLean, and Kouray responded in the negative.

    The Court reasoned that the police are not required to take all imaginable steps to protect a defendant’s right to counsel. The court stated: “Where they follow the rules laid down in our cases — rules that are, in general, highly protective of the attorney-client relationship — they need do no more.” The Court found that by inquiring with Kouray and receiving an unequivocal answer, the police discharged their burden to ascertain the status of the representation. This decision emphasizes the importance of direct inquiry with the attorney of record and provides a clear standard for police conduct in such situations. The Court indicated that its holding does not mean that “the right to counsel is interminable” as stated in West. It clarified that the outcome would be different if police had reason to believe the attorney-client relationship had ended, which in this case, they did.

  • People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014): Establishing Witness Tampering Through Online Communication

    People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014)

    Evidence of online communications, including social media posts, can be sufficient to establish witness tampering if it demonstrates the defendant knew the person was a potential witness and wrongfully attempted to induce that person to avoid testifying.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for witness tampering, holding that the defendant’s Facebook posts and YouTube video identifying a confidential informant, combined with threatening comments, were sufficient evidence to prove he attempted to prevent her from testifying in a drug case. The court reasoned that the jury could reasonably infer the online communications were coded threats intended to dissuade the informant from testifying, particularly given the defendant’s knowledge of her role and the pending charges against his friend. The decision highlights the potential for online activity to constitute witness tampering.

    Facts

    A confidential informant assisted the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office in a controlled drug purchase from Clarence Jackson, which was recorded. Jackson was arrested and informed the defendant, Thomas Horton, about his arrest and intention to plead guilty, showing him the videotape. The confidential informant reported that Horton was “outing” her as an informant on Facebook, posting a clip of the surveillance video on YouTube with a link on his Facebook page. Horton and others made denouncing and threatening statements towards the informant on Facebook including “Snitches get stitches” and “I hope she gets what’s coming to her.”

    Procedural History

    Horton was arrested and convicted in Town Court for fourth-degree witness tampering. He was sentenced to one year in jail. Horton appealed to County Court, arguing insufficient evidence that he attempted to prevent the informant from testifying or knew she would testify. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the defendant knew the confidential informant might testify in a proceeding and that he wrongfully sought to stop her from doing so through online communications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant knew the informant might testify and that his online communications constituted a wrongful attempt to prevent her from doing so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court emphasized that after learning about Jackson’s arrest and the informant’s role, Horton posted communications online that the jury could reasonably infer were coded threats intended to induce the informant not to testify. The court also noted that Horton was in contact with the informant and her mother via Facebook messages. The court stated, “[A]fter learning about Jackson’s arrest and the confidential informant’s role as a witness against Jackson and, potentially, himself, defendant immediately posted communications on the Internet that the jury might have reasonably inferred were coded threats that were intended to induce the confidential informant not to testify.” The court concluded that Horton’s actions satisfied the elements of Penal Law § 215.10, which defines witness tampering as wrongfully inducing or attempting to induce a person to avoid testifying, knowing that person is or is about to be called as a witness. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the context of the Facebook posts and YouTube video, to determine that the defendant’s intent was to dissuade the informant from testifying.

  • People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Choice of Counsel

    People v. Espinal, 24 N.Y.3d 136 (2014)

    A trial court is not obligated to inquire whether a defendant seeks new counsel when newly retained counsel requests an adjournment for more preparation time, unless the defendant communicates a desire to obtain new counsel.

    Summary

    Espinal was convicted of rape and related charges. He argued the trial court violated his right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment requests made by his newly retained attorney, Bruno, who stepped in for Espinal’s original attorney, Martineau, due to Martineau’s illness. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had no obligation to inquire if Espinal wanted to retain new counsel because Espinal only requested more time for Bruno to prepare, not to seek a different attorney. The Court emphasized that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and can be limited by the need for efficient administration of justice.

    Facts

    Espinal was charged with multiple counts of rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child.
    He initially retained attorney Martineau, who suffered a debilitating medical condition.
    Martineau requested and received an adjournment of Espinal’s trial due to his health.
    After another adjournment request, Martineau suggested that Espinal might need to find substitute counsel. Attorney Bruno was identified as a potential replacement.
    Bruno took over the case shortly before trial as Martineau’s health worsened.

    Procedural History

    County Court initially granted adjournments due to Martineau’s health.
    After Bruno took over, the County Court denied further adjournment requests.
    Espinal was convicted on all charges in County Court.
    Espinal moved to set aside the verdict, arguing a violation of his right to counsel of choice; the motion was denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s judgment.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to counsel of choice by denying adjournment motions without inquiring whether the defendant sought to retain new counsel.

    Holding

    No, because no communication was made to the County Court that the defendant was asking for the opportunity to retain new counsel. The defendant simply sought an adjournment to give Bruno more time to prepare.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the fundamental right to counsel of one’s choosing under both the Federal and State Constitutions, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 144 (2006) and People v. Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 270 (1980). However, the Court emphasized that this right is qualified and can be subordinate to the efficient administration of justice, referencing People v. Griffin, 20 NY3d 626, 630 (2013).

    The Court reasoned that a defendant cannot use the right to counsel of choice as a delaying tactic, quoting Arroyave: “the efficient administration of the criminal justice system is a critical concern to society as a whole, and unnecessary adjournments for the purpose of permitting a defendant to retain different counsel will disrupt court dockets, interfere with the right of other criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and inconvenience witnesses, jurors and opposing counsel” (Arroyave, 49 NY2d at 271).

    The Court highlighted that Espinal never explicitly requested new counsel. Bruno’s requests for adjournment were framed as needing more time for preparation, not as a desire to find a different attorney. The Court noted that while it is “the better practice” for a court to inquire about a defendant’s intentions when new counsel requests an adjournment, there was no constitutional violation in this case because there was no indication that Espinal wanted to replace Bruno.

  • Town of North Hempstead v. County of Nassau, 23 N.Y.3d 72 (2014): County Authority to Charge Back Community College Costs

    23 N.Y.3d 72 (2014)

    A county can charge back to its towns the costs associated with residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT), even for four-year degree programs, and can offset these costs against sales tax revenue owed to the towns.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether Nassau County can charge back to the Town of North Hempstead the costs for town residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The court held that the county could charge back these costs, even for FIT’s four-year programs, and could offset the amount owed against the town’s share of sales tax revenue. The court reasoned that the Education Law allows counties to seek reimbursement for community college costs, and the state’s failure to fund its reimbursement obligation did not eliminate the county’s right to seek chargebacks from the towns. The expansion of FIT’s degree programs did not change the financing structure. The county’s right to offset the debt was upheld under common-law principles.

    Facts

    FIT, while initially a two-year community college, expanded to offer baccalaureate and master’s degrees. Nassau County, the local sponsor, began charging back to its towns the costs associated with residents attending out-of-county community colleges. In 2010, the county began including FIT chargebacks. By April 2011, the Town of North Hempstead owed the county $1,174,462.60 in FIT expenses for the 2010 fiscal year. The county withheld this amount, along with other community college expenses, from the town’s share of sales tax revenue.

    Procedural History

    The Town commenced a hybrid action seeking a declaration that the County lacked the authority to charge back FIT expenses. Supreme Court found the County could collect chargebacks, but only for two-year programs. The Appellate Division modified, applying chargebacks to all FIT degree programs, but found the County needed a formal resolution and couldn’t offset against sales tax revenue. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the County has the authority to charge back FIT costs to the Town, considering the State’s previous reimbursement obligation?

    2. Whether the County’s reimbursement should be limited to expenses associated with FIT’s two-year programs?

    3. Whether the County has the authority to offset the Town’s debt by retaining the appropriate amount from the Town’s share of sales tax revenue?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the State’s reimbursement obligation was superseded when the legislature failed to appropriate the required funding and the statute continues to authorize chargebacks to the towns and cities for all community colleges.

    2. No, because the statute expanding FIT’s curriculum states that the school “shall be financed and administered in the manner provided for community colleges” (Education Law § 6302 [3]).

    3. Yes, because the County, like any other creditor, is permitted to employ the common-law right of set-off.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State’s failure to fund its reimbursement obligation did not eliminate the County’s ability to seek chargebacks from the towns under Education Law § 6305 (5). The statutes were not in irreconcilable conflict, but could be harmonized to allow the counties to be reimbursed using funds from the State or the local municipalities. The effect of the State’s failure to fund its reimbursement obligation did not impose an additional expense upon the counties.

    The Court also rejected the argument that reimbursement should be limited to expenses associated with FIT’s two-year programs, citing Education Law § 6302 (3), which states that FIT “shall be financed and administered in the manner provided for community colleges.”

    Finally, the Court upheld the County’s authority to offset the Town’s debt against sales tax revenue, citing the common-law right of set-off. The Court noted that “the Education Law allows the County to seek chargebacks from the Town and the amount of the Town’s debt has been reliably determined based on concrete FIT enrollment figures.” As a result, the County may offset the amounts owed by the Town and a specific resolution for this purpose is not required.

    The court stated, “Generally, a statute is deemed impliedly repealed by another statute only if the two are in such conflict that it is impossible to give some effect to both. If a reasonable field of operation can be found for each statute, that construction should be adopted” (Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]).

  • People v. Ramos, 24 N.Y.3d 63 (2014): Warrantless Searches and the Exigent Circumstances Exception

    People v. Ramos, 24 N.Y.3d 63 (2014)

    Once the exigency that justifies a warrantless search dissipates, the search must cease unless another exception to the warrant requirement applies.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Police officers, responding to gunshots, pursued the defendant into an apartment. After securing the defendant and other occupants, an officer searched a closed box and found a gun. The New York Court of Appeals held that the warrantless search of the box was unreasonable because the exigent circumstances that initially justified the entry into the apartment had abated once the defendant and the other occupants were secured. Therefore, the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Responding to reports of gunshots and observing muzzle flashes, police officers entered an apartment building. Hearing a gunshot directly above them and voices in the hallway, officers found the defendant holding a firearm. The defendant fled into an apartment, and the officers forced entry. Inside, two women were present. The officers located the defendant and another man hiding under a bed, handcuffed them, and brought them to the living room with the women. A subsequent search of the apartment by one of the officers led to the discovery of a closed metal box in an adjoining bedroom. The officer opened the box and found a gun.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the exigent circumstances had dissipated once the defendant was handcuffed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the same exigent circumstances that justified the entry into the apartment also justified the search for the gun. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of a closed metal box in the defendant’s apartment was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement after the defendant and other occupants were secured by police.

    Holding

    No, because the exigent circumstances that justified the initial entry into the apartment had abated by the time the officer searched the closed box. The defendant and other occupants were secured, and there was no immediate threat to the public or the police.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that warrantless searches of a home are per se unreasonable unless subject to specific, narrow exceptions. The exigent circumstances exception allows police to act without a warrant when urgent events make it impossible to obtain one in time to preserve evidence or prevent danger. However, the scope of a search under exigent circumstances is strictly limited by the necessities of the situation. Once the exigency abates, the authority to conduct a warrantless search also ends.

    In this case, the Court found that any urgency had abated by the time the officer opened the box. The defendant and the other man were handcuffed and under police supervision in the living room along with the two women. The Court reasoned that the police were in complete control, and there was no longer a danger that the defendant would dispose of the weapon or pose a threat to the public or the police. Absent another exception to the warrant requirement, the police were required to obtain a warrant before searching the box.

    The Court distinguished this situation from cases where the exigency remained present, such as when a suspect could access a weapon or pose an immediate threat. The Court emphasized that the burden is on the People to prove that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, a burden they failed to meet in this case. The court noted, “[A]ll occupants were out of commission.” (Knapp, 52 NY2d at 696-697)

  • People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Speedy Trial Rights After Appellate Reversal

    People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    When a conviction is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the statutory speedy trial clock starts running from the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final, and the mere passage of time during an adjournment is not automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of assault, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. After the People’s application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, the case was adjourned. Due to a clerical error, the case was not calendared, and the prosecution was not present. Over 90 days after the denial of leave to appeal, Green moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the time was not automatically excludable and the People failed to justify the delay.

    Facts

    Defendant Green was convicted of assault in the third degree in October 2006. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction in March 2010 and remanded the case for a new trial due to an improper jury charge. The People sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 2010, the case was adjourned to June 21, 2010, while the People’s leave application was pending. The Court of Appeals denied leave on May 14, 2010. Due to a clerical error, Green’s case was not calendared for June 21, 2010, and no prosecutor was present. The District Attorney’s office discovered the error in July and scheduled a new date of August 23, 2010. The People had not declared themselves ready for trial before this point.

    Procedural History

    Green was convicted of assault in Criminal Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The People’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Criminal Court granted Green’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals granted Green leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Term, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between May 10, 2010, and August 23, 2010, was automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30(4)(a) as a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal, when the People did not provide any justification for the delay after their leave to appeal was denied.

    Holding

    No, because the mere lapse of time following the denial of leave to appeal does not automatically constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal under CPL 30.30(4)(a), and the People provided no justification for any delay to be added to the 90-day speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action involving a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of more than three months. CPL 30.30(5)(a) states that when a conviction is reversed and remanded, the action commences on the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final. The Court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes a “reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to…appeals…and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court.” The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division case, People v. Vukel, which held that an adjournment pending leave to appeal was excludable. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment, even after leave to appeal is denied, would be inconsistent with the intent of CPL 30.30, which is to discourage prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that Vukel holds otherwise, the Court stated that “it should not be followed.” The Court agreed with the Criminal Court that the People had not justified any reasonable period of delay under CPL 30.30(4)(a) to be added to the 90-day period under CPL 30.30(1)(b).

  • People v. Coleman, 23 N.Y.3d 116 (2014): Scope of Drug Law Reform Act Resentencing for Persistent Felony Offenders

    23 N.Y.3d 116 (2014)

    The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009’s resentencing exclusion for offenders ineligible for merit time allowances applies only to those convicted of specific serious crimes listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii), not to offenders ineligible solely due to persistent felony offender status.

    Summary

    Earl Coleman, convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance and sentenced as a persistent felony offender, sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2009. The prosecution argued he was ineligible due to his status preventing merit time allowances. The New York Court of Appeals held that Coleman was eligible for resentencing. The court reasoned that the DLRA exclusion applies only to convictions for specific serious crimes that inherently preclude merit time, not to those whose ineligibility stems solely from a recidivist sentencing adjudication. This interpretation aligns with the DLRA’s remedial purpose of lessening excessive punishments for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders.

    Facts

    In 2001, Earl Coleman was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Due to prior felony convictions (robbery and criminal possession of stolen property), the court sentenced him as a persistent felony offender to 15 years to life. He later sought resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA). The prosecution opposed, arguing Coleman was ineligible due to his persistent felony offender status, which prevented him from receiving merit time allowances.

    Procedural History

    Coleman’s initial resentencing motion was denied by the County Court. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the County Court erred in failing to assign counsel. Upon remittal, the County Court again denied resentencing. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Coleman eligible. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the DLRA resentencing exclusion for those ineligible for merit time allowances applies to all offenders ineligible, including those due to recidivist sentencing, or only to those convicted of crimes listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii)?

    Holding

    1. No, because the exclusion applies only to offenders convicted of crimes listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii) that automatically preclude merit time allowances, regardless of recidivist sentencing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation of CPL 440.46(5)(a), which defines an “exclusion offense” with reference to Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii). While acknowledging ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court emphasized the DLRA’s remedial purpose: to alleviate excessive punishments for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders. Interpreting the exclusion to apply only to convictions for specific serious crimes that inherently preclude merit time better aligns with this legislative intent. The court reasoned that the legislature’s focus was on the nature of the offense, not merely the resulting sentence. The Court also noted that the DLRA generally excludes offenders based on the violent or unsavory nature of their crimes. "[W]hen the legislature enacted the 2009 DLRA, it sought to ameliorate the excessive punishments meted out to low-level, nonviolent drug offenders under the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws, and therefore the statute is designed to spread relief as widely as possible, within the bounds of reason, to its intended beneficiaries." Therefore, persistent felony offenders whose underlying crimes are not those listed in Correction Law § 803(1)(d)(ii) remain eligible for resentencing. The Court stated: "[T]he merit-time-related exclusion follows the offense-based approach of the other exclusions by precluding resentencing only for individuals whose offenses are so serious as to make it impossible for them to receive a merit time allowance under the Correction Law."

  • People v. Rossi, 23 N.Y.3d 969 (2014): Applying the Emergency Exception to Warrantless Searches

    People v. Rossi, 23 N.Y.3d 969 (2014)

    The emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement justifies a warrantless search when there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring immediate action to protect life or property, and the scope of the search is reasonably related to the exigency.

    Summary

    Police responded to a 911 call from the defendant’s wife, who reported he had shot himself. Upon arrival, officers found Rossi bleeding and learned children were present. Rossi claimed he didn’t know where the gun was. Officers searched the house and backyard, finding the loaded weapon near a shed. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless search under the emergency exception, finding sufficient record support for the lower court’s conclusion that an ongoing emergency existed due to the unsecured firearm and the presence of children. The court emphasized its limited review of mixed questions of law and fact when record support exists for the lower courts’ findings.

    Facts

    On July 11, 2009, police responded to Rossi’s residence after his wife reported he shot himself. Rossi was found bleeding, and officers learned his children and another child were in the house. Rossi stated he had been cleaning a gun, which discharged, but claimed he didn’t know where the gun was. Officers searched the premises, eventually finding a loaded gun in the backyard.

    Procedural History

    Rossi was charged with criminal possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing the emergency had ended when he was secured. The suppression court denied the motion, finding the search lawful under the emergency exception. After a jury trial, Rossi was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of Rossi’s property was justified under the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, considering the presence of children and the unsecured firearm.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was record support for the lower court’s conclusion that the search was lawful under the emergency exception. The Appellate Division majority determined that “defendant’s incoherence and evasive answers about the location of the gun and the presence of children on the premises . . . established an ongoing emergency and danger to life, justifying the search for and seizure of the gun.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that applying the emergency doctrine involves a mixed question of law and fact. The Court’s review is limited to determining whether there is record support for the findings of the lower courts. Here, both the Appellate Division majority and dissent applied the test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173 (1976), but reached different conclusions on when the emergency ceased.
    Because there was record support for the majority’s conclusion that the search was lawful under the emergency exception, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court stated, “ ‘any further review is beyond this Court’s jurisdiction’ ” (quoting People v. Dallas, 8 N.Y.3d 890, 891 [2007], quoting People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 335 [2002]). This highlights the importance of establishing a clear record in suppression hearings to support the application of the emergency exception. The court implicitly acknowledged that once Rossi was frisked and the children were determined not to have the gun, the exigency lessened, however there was deference to the finding that officers were not aware that the children were safe, and the record supported that conclusion. The case illustrates how the emergency exception can extend beyond the immediate threat if there’s a reasonable, ongoing concern for safety.