New York Law Review

Tag: neutral principles of law

  • Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 11 N.Y.3d 341 (2008): Church Property Disputes and the Neutral Principles Approach

    11 N.Y.3d 341 (2008)

    Under the neutral principles of law approach, a court must examine deeds, church charters, state statutes, and the constitution of the general church to determine if a trust or restriction exists in favor of the general church regarding local church property.

    Summary

    This case addresses a dispute over church property following a parish’s separation from its diocese. The New York Court of Appeals applied the “neutral principles of law” approach to determine whether the local parish held its property in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Diocese and the National Church. The Court found that while deeds and incorporation documents did not establish an express trust, the Dennis Canons (constitution of the general church) did, and the parish’s agreement to abide by the church’s enactments created a legally cognizable trust. Thus, the property was held in trust for the Diocese and the National Church.

    Facts

    All Saints was organized as a mission in 1927 under the Episcopal Diocese of Western New York. It incorporated under Article 3 of the Religious Corporations Law. In 1947, All Saints became a parish in spiritual union with the Rochester Diocese, agreeing to abide by the Diocese’s constitution and canons. In 2005, theological disputes led the Rochester Diocese to declare All Saints ecclesiastically “extinct” and sought transfer of its assets. All Saints argued it held legal title to its property free and clear of any trust.

    Procedural History

    The Rochester Diocese sued All Saints for a declaratory judgment that All Saints’ property was held in trust. All Saints counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title and challenging the Religious Corporations Law. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Diocese. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether All Saints held its real and personal property in trust for the benefit of the Rochester Diocese and the National Church, such that upon the parish’s separation, its property reverted to the Diocese or the National Church.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the neutral principles of law approach, the Dennis Canons of the National Church established an express trust, and All Saints agreed to abide by these canons, creating a legally enforceable trust in favor of the Diocese and the National Church.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court adopted the “neutral principles of law” approach from Jones v. Wolf, requiring examination of deeds, church charters, state statutes, and the general church’s constitution to determine if a trust exists. While the deeds, certificate of incorporation, and Religious Corporations Law didn’t conclusively establish a trust, the Dennis Canons did. The Court noted that the enactment of the Dennis Canons was an attempt by the Episcopal Church to “ensure . . . that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church [would] retain the church property.” By agreeing to abide by the “canonical and legal enactments” of the Diocese, All Saints agreed to be bound by future changes to the canons. The Court found it significant that All Saints never objected to the Dennis Canons in the more than 20 years since their adoption. The court explicitly referenced Trustees of Diocese of Albany v Trinity Episcopal Church of Gloversville as precedent. The Court concluded that the Dennis Canons created an express trust, and All Saints’ agreement to abide by them created a binding legal obligation. The Court also affirmed the lower court’s determination that the resolution deeming the parish “extinct” was a nonreviewable ecclesiastical determination.

  • Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B’nai Jacob, 90 N.Y.2d 517 (1997): Resolving Church Disputes Using Neutral Principles of Law

    Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B’nai Jacob, 90 N.Y.2d 517 (1997)

    Courts can resolve church property and contractual disputes by applying neutral principles of law, without delving into religious doctrine.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between two Jewish congregations arising from disagreements over women’s equality in religious services. The New York Court of Appeals held that the dispute, centered on a stipulation agreement regarding property use and occupancy payments, could be resolved using neutral principles of law. The Court emphasized that enforcing the stipulation, determining membership credits, and addressing ejectment claims did not require interpreting religious doctrine, thus making the dispute justiciable. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for resolution on the merits.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, Park Slope Jewish Center, and Defendant, Congregation B’nai Jacob, are two Jewish congregations. A schism occurred within Plaintiff’s congregation when a majority voted to grant women equal rights of worship. Those disagreeing formed Defendant congregation. Plaintiff commenced a trespass action, which was settled by a stipulation in 1984. The stipulation granted Plaintiff ownership of the premises but allowed Defendant to use the lower sanctuary for a monthly fee of $460. The agreement also detailed membership terms, dues credits, and proceeds distribution upon sale or demolition. Later, Plaintiff amended its bylaws to require members to support women’s equality, leading to further disputes and non-payment by Defendant.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff initially sued Defendant for trespass, settling via stipulation. Defendant challenged Plaintiff’s bylaw amendment regarding membership, initially prevailing in Supreme Court, but the Appellate Division reversed, deeming the dispute nonjusticiable. Subsequent orders attempting to resolve payment credits were appealed, with appeals dismissed for lack of finality. Defendant then sued to declare the parties’ rights, but the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiff then initiated the present action for use and occupancy payments and ejectment, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division based on the religious dispute doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dispute between two religious congregations regarding property use and occupancy payments, governed by a prior stipulation agreement, is nonjusticiable due to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because the dispute can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law without delving into religious doctrine.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the “neutral principles of law” doctrine, as established in First Presbyt. Church v. United Presbyt. Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110 (1984), and Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). The Court stated that while church property disputes implicate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, courts can resolve them without deciding religious doctrine. The Court reasoned that the 1984 stipulation provided a secular framework to resolve the dispute, setting terms for property ownership, usage, payment, and distribution of proceeds. Enforcement of the stipulation and determination of membership credits did not require interpreting religious law. The court quoted Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 115 (1983), stating that “[N]o doctrinal issue need be passed upon, no implementation of a religious duty is contemplated, and no interference with religious authority will result.” Because the lower courts erroneously deemed the dispute nonjusticiable, the Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Supreme Court for consideration of the cross-motions for summary judgment on their merits, applying neutral principles of law. The court emphasized that the membership clause in the stipulation allowed the plaintiff to determine its membership criteria “without limitation” and that determining the credits to be applied did not require the court to decide whether membership criteria violated religious law.

  • First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110 (1984): Resolving Church Property Disputes Using Neutral Principles of Law

    62 N.Y.2d 110 (1984)

    Civil courts can resolve church property disputes by applying neutral principles of law, examining deeds, charters, and state statutes without delving into religious doctrine.

    Summary

    First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady (First Church) sued The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPCUSA) after withdrawing from the denomination due to disagreements over UPCUSA’s financial support of certain political groups. First Church sought a declaration of independence and an injunction to prevent UPCUSA from interfering with its property. The New York Court of Appeals held that civil courts *can* resolve such disputes using “neutral principles of law,” focusing on property ownership documents rather than religious doctrine. The court found in favor of First Church, allowing it to retain control of its property.

    Facts

    First Church, organized in 1760 and incorporated in 1803, became a member of UPCUSA’s predecessor in 1789.
    In the 1970s, the congregation expressed discontent with UPCUSA, particularly regarding its funding of radical groups.
    First Church requested dismissal to another denomination, but the Presbytery of Albany denied the request and appointed an administrative commission to investigate First Church’s activities.
    In January 1977, First Church voted to sever ties with UPCUSA and retain its property.

    Procedural History

    First Church sued UPCUSA seeking a declaration of its right to withdraw and an injunction against interference with its property.
    The trial court granted the injunction but denied declaratory relief.
    The Appellate Division reversed the injunction, dismissed the complaint, and granted UPCUSA’s counterclaim, relying on deference to ecclesiastical authority.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order regarding the injunction, reinstating the trial court’s original judgment (granting the injunction in favor of First Presbyterian Church).

    Issue(s)

    Whether a civil court can resolve a church property dispute between a local church and its hierarchical denomination, when the local church has withdrawn from the denomination, without violating the First Amendment’s prohibition against entanglement in religious matters.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court can apply neutral principles of law to resolve the property dispute without interpreting religious doctrine.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the “neutral principles of law” approach for resolving church property disputes, as endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf. This approach involves examining deeds, local church charters, state statutes, and the general church’s constitution, focusing on objective evidence of intent regarding property ownership. The court emphasized that it must scrutinize these documents in purely secular terms, avoiding reliance on religious precepts.

    The court found that First Church held record title to the property, the deeds contained no forfeiture or reversion clauses, and state law (Religious Corporations Law) did not apply due to First Church’s pre-1828 incorporation. While the UPCUSA’s Book of Order contained provisions about church governance, it lacked express trust language favoring the UPCUSA. The court stated that any inquiry into the meaning of provisions within the Book of Order by a court is constitutionally foreclosed because it would require the court to choose between the insurgent Session and the commission or “replacement Session.” The Court rejected the argument for an implied trust, noting that First Church acquired the property independently and took no action indicating an intent to create a trust. The court quoted Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, stating that “the State has a legitimate interest in resolving property disputes, and * * * a civil court is a proper forum for that resolution”.

    The court reasoned that applying neutral principles avoids entanglement in religious controversies and allows the state to protect its interest in securing property titles. The court also noted the preference for neutral principles over deference, as the deference approach assumes local churches relinquish control to hierarchical bodies, frustrating the intent of some local churches and potentially violating the free exercise clause. The court states “[i]n applying neutral principles, the focus is on the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charter, the State statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property”.

  • Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan v. Terlecky, 414 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1979): Resolving Church Property Disputes Using Neutral Principles

    Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan v. Terlecky, 414 N.Y.S.2d 459 (N.Y. 1979)

    Civil courts can resolve church property disputes by applying neutral principles of law without delving into religious doctrine, ensuring the free exercise of religion while adjudicating property rights.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between two factions within the Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan (Kazan) regarding control of the parish and its properties. One faction sought to remain under the jurisdiction of the Metropolia, while the other attempted to align with the Synod of Bishops. The court held that the property belonged to the faction loyal to the Metropolia, the ecclesiastical body under which Kazan was originally incorporated and operated until the schism. The decision was based on neutral principles of law, recognizing Kazan’s initial and sustained affiliation with the Metropolia, without resolving any underlying religious controversies.

    Facts

    In 1942, members of the Russian community in Sea Cliff, New York, organized the Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan under the guidance of Metropolitan Theophilus of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of America (the Metropolia). The community committed to following the Metropolia’s statutes. In December 1942, the church incorporated under New York’s Religious Corporations Law, with a rector appointed by Metropolitan Theophilus serving as a trustee. In 1970, a schism occurred, with one faction (the appellants) attempting to secede from the Metropolia and align with the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia.

    Procedural History

    Two actions were initiated: one by the faction loyal to the Metropolia to enjoin the secessionists (Action No. 1), and another by the secessionists seeking a declaratory judgment validating their actions (Action No. 2). The trial court ruled in favor of the Metropolia faction. The Appellate Division affirmed in Action No. 1 and modified in Action No. 2 to reinstate the complaint and declare the parties’ rights. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the control of the property of the Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan should be vested in a group loyal to the Metropolia, under which it was founded, or be given over to a dissident faction seeking to align with the Synod of Bishops.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan knowingly and voluntarily chose the Metropolia as its governing body at its founding and consistently recognized its authority until the schism; therefore, the property rights belong to the faction that remained loyal to the Metropolia.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized its role was to resolve the property dispute, not to delve into religious doctrine. It relied on the principle that civil courts can apply neutral principles of law to church property disputes without violating the First Amendment. The court noted uncontroverted evidence that Kazan considered itself affiliated with the Metropolia from its organization in 1942 until 1970. The church was incorporated under the Metropolia’s guidance, followed its statutes, and recognized its authority. The court found no evidence of a direct tie to the Synod of Bishops. The court quoted Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, stating that the First Amendment commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying religious controversies. Because Kazan was incorporated into the Metropolia, the court reasoned that the right to the parish property belonged to the faction that remained loyal to the Metropolia at the time of the schism. The Court stated, “Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘ establishing ’ churches to which property is awarded.”