New York Law Review

Tag: negligent supervision

  • Brandy B. v. Eden Central School District, 15 N.Y.3d 297 (2010): School’s Duty to Supervise and Foreseeability of Harm

    15 N.Y.3d 297 (2010)

    A school district is not liable for the unanticipated intentional tort of a student against another student absent sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of prior similar conduct that would make the injury reasonably foreseeable.

    Summary

    This case concerns a negligence claim against a school district and a child services agency following a sexual assault by an 11-year-old student on a 5-year-old student on a school bus. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the school district had sufficient notice of the dangerous conduct and whether the child services agency had a duty to warn of the need for supervision. The Court held that the school district did not have sufficient notice, as the student’s prior history did not include sexually aggressive behavior, and the agency had no duty to warn in this specific situation. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

    Facts

    Robert F., born in 1991, had a history of behavioral issues, including aggression and hospitalization for psychiatric issues. He resided in various foster care placements and community residences. While living in a community residence, Robert was enrolled at the Stanley G. Falk School, where he was noted to be adapting well and displaying appropriate social skills. In 2002, he began living with foster parents and transferred to Eden Central School District. In September 2002, Brenna B., a kindergartner, started attending the same school and rode the same bus as Robert. Brenna’s mother, Brandy B., requested the bus driver separate the children. Thereafter, Brenna alleged Robert sexually assaulted her on the bus in March 2003.

    Procedural History

    Brandy B., Brenna’s mother, sued Eden Central School District for negligent supervision and Child and Family Services of Erie County (CFS) for failure to warn. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the school district had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury so that the third-party act could have been reasonably anticipated.

    2. Whether CFS had a duty to warn the child offender’s foster parents and others of the need to closely supervise him.

    Holding

    1. No, because the school district did not have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the injury-causing conduct to reasonably anticipate the sexual assault.

    2. No, because the plaintiff did not set forth a prima facie claim against CFS establishing a duty to warn under these circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that schools have a duty to adequately supervise students and can be liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision. However, the court emphasized that unanticipated third-party acts causing injury will not give rise to liability without actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct. The court stated, “[I]t must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated.” The Court reasoned that Robert’s past behavioral issues had not manifested for over two years, and more importantly, his history lacked any sexually aggressive behavior. Brandy’s statement to the bus driver about separating the children did not provide specific notice, nor did Robert’s past conduct without subsequent incidents require the school district to provide an aide or for CFS to issue a warning. The court concluded that the defendants demonstrated they had no specific knowledge or notice of similar conduct, and the plaintiff failed to present a triable issue of fact. The dissenting judge argued that the school had enough information to be on notice of a potential danger.

  • особисте життя Smithtown Central School Dist., 7 N.Y.3d 336 (2006): Adequacy of Expert Testimony in Negligent Supervision Claims

    Smith v. Smithtown Central School Dist., 7 N.Y.3d 336 (2006)

    In a negligent supervision claim against a school, an expert affidavit lacking a proper foundation or source for its standards lacks probative force and is insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    This case concerns a negligence claim brought against a school district after a second-grade student was injured during a gym class activity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the school district, holding that the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit failed to establish an adequate foundation for its conclusions regarding the school’s supervision. The court emphasized that expert opinions must be based on established standards and not mere speculation to overcome a motion for summary judgment. This case clarifies the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs alleging negligent supervision in school settings and the importance of well-supported expert testimony.

    Facts

    The infant plaintiff was injured while participating in a cargo net climbing exercise during her second-grade gym class at Smithtown Central School District. The physical education teacher had instructed the students on proper net climbing techniques and demonstrated these techniques before the incident. The teacher was approximately 10 to 12 steps away from the plaintiff when she fell and sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Smithtown Central School District for negligent supervision. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the expert affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of the school district’s supervision of the infant plaintiff.

    Holding

    No, because the expert affidavit lacked a proper foundation or source for the standards underlying its conclusion that the defendant’s supervision was inadequate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts, finding that Smithtown Central School District had demonstrated its entitlement to summary judgment. The court reiterated that while schools are not insurers of safety, they must exercise the same level of care as a reasonably prudent parent under similar circumstances. The court noted the physical education teacher’s deposition testimony, which detailed the instructions given, the demonstration of techniques, and the teacher’s proximity to the student. The critical deficiency was in the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit. The court stated that the affidavit “lacked probative force and was insufficient as a matter of law” to overcome the school district’s motion for summary judgment, quoting Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542, 545 (2002). The court emphasized that the expert failed to provide the foundation or the source of the standards used to conclude that the school’s supervision was inadequate. The absence of such a foundation made the expert’s conclusions speculative and unreliable. The court implicitly applied the standard that expert testimony must be based on accepted practices and not personal opinion to be admissible and to create a triable issue of fact. The Court’s decision underscores the need for expert opinions to be firmly grounded in established standards to be legally sufficient in negligence cases.

  • Tenebaum v. New York Downtown Hosp., 8 N.Y.3d 515 (2007): Establishing Industry Standards Through Expert Testimony

    8 N.Y.3d 515 (2007)

    Expert testimony, when offered as the sole evidence to establish an industry standard or practice, must be supported by a factual basis and cannot be speculative or conclusory to withstand summary judgment.

    Summary

    Tenebaum sued New York Downtown Hospital for negligent supervision after being sexually assaulted by a male technician during a transvaginal sonogram. Tenebaum argued that the hospital was negligent for not having a policy requiring a female staff member to be present during the procedure. Her case relied heavily on expert testimony citing guidelines from radiological organizations recommending a female presence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the expert’s affirmation, lacking a factual basis for concluding that these guidelines reflected an accepted industry standard, was insufficient to defeat the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. This case highlights the importance of providing concrete evidence, beyond mere recommendations, to establish industry standards in negligence claims.

    Facts

    Tenebaum was sexually assaulted by a male technician while undergoing a transvaginal sonogram at New York Downtown Hospital. The incident occurred when Tenebaum and the technician were alone in the examination room. Tenebaum sued the hospital alleging negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention of the technician, claiming the hospital should have known the technician was likely to commit such acts. Tenebaum’s case hinged on the argument that the hospital deviated from the standard of care by not having a policy requiring a female staff member’s presence during transvaginal sonograms.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims except the negligent supervision claim, finding that the expert affirmation created a factual question. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the entire complaint, stating that the guidelines cited by Tenebaum’s expert did not establish an industry standard and lacked evidence of actual practice. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals following a two-Justice dissent in the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an expert’s affirmation, citing professional organization guidelines recommending a practice without providing a factual basis that such guidelines reflect an accepted industry standard, is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment on a negligent supervision claim.

    Holding

    No, because the expert’s opinion was not supported by sufficient factual evidence to establish that the recommended guidelines constituted a generally accepted standard or practice in hospital settings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing that while expert testimony can preclude summary judgment when it demonstrates a deviation from relevant industry standards, such testimony must be grounded in a factual basis. The court noted that the guidelines from the American College of Radiology explicitly stated that their guidelines “are not rules.” Furthermore, the expert failed to provide evidence that the guidelines were reflective of a generally accepted standard or practice. The court stated, “Where the expert’s ultimate assertions are speculative or unsupported by any evidentiary foundation, however, the opinion should be given no probative force and is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.” Because the expert’s affirmation lacked a concrete basis for its conclusions, it was deemed insufficient to overcome the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. The court required more than just the recommendation of guidelines to establish an industry standard; actual implementation or recognition of the standard within the relevant community was necessary. The absence of reference to personal knowledge or evidence of implementation by other hospitals fatally undermined the expert’s opinion.

  • Sanchez v. State, 99 N.Y.2d 247 (2002): Foreseeability in Inmate Assault Cases

    Sanchez v. State, 99 N.Y.2d 247 (2002)

    The State’s duty to safeguard inmates from attacks by fellow inmates extends to reasonably foreseeable risks of harm, encompassing not only actual knowledge of a specific threat but also constructive notice of potential dangers based on the State’s knowledge and experience in operating correctional facilities.

    Summary

    Francisco Sanchez, an inmate at Elmira Correctional Facility, sued the State for negligent supervision after being attacked by other inmates. The attack occurred in a school building where one correction officer supervised approximately 100 inmates. Sanchez argued that the officer’s position and routine made the attack foreseeable. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the State, holding that the State’s duty to safeguard inmates extends to reasonably foreseeable risks, encompassing both actual and constructive notice of potential dangers. The Court emphasized that foreseeability should be determined based on what the State knew or should have known, not solely on whether the State had specific knowledge of an impending attack.

    Facts

    On December 14, 1995, Francisco Sanchez was attacked by two unidentified inmates in a school building at Elmira Correctional Facility. A single correction officer was assigned to supervise around 100 inmates in the area. The officer was usually stationed at a desk but, at the time of the attack, was in a storage room at the end of a long corridor, unable to see Sanchez. Sanchez was standing outside a classroom awaiting inspection when he was attacked from behind with a razor-like instrument. He testified that the attack was a complete surprise.

    Procedural History

    Sanchez sued the State for negligent supervision. The Court of Claims granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed, requiring proof that the State knew the victim was at risk or the assailant was dangerous. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denying the State’s motion for summary judgment and reinstating Sanchez’s claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State’s duty to protect inmates from attacks by fellow inmates is limited to situations where the State had actual knowledge of a specific risk to the victim or whether it extends to risks that the State reasonably should have foreseen based on its knowledge and experience.

    Holding

    No, because the State’s duty to safeguard inmates extends to reasonably foreseeable risks of harm, encompassing not only actual knowledge of a specific threat but also constructive notice of potential dangers based on the State’s knowledge and experience in operating correctional facilities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the State owes a duty of care to safeguard inmates, but this duty is limited to reasonably foreseeable risks. While the precise manner of the harm need not be foreseeable, the harm must be within the class of reasonably foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent. The Court criticized the Appellate Division’s test, which required proof that the State actually knew the victim was vulnerable or the assailant was dangerous. The Court stated that this test improperly modifies the standard of care, limiting it to what is actually foreseen rather than what is reasonably to be perceived. The court emphasized that the State’s own security post description and correctional regulations required constant contact with inmates and monitoring of their behavior to prevent assaults. The Court noted uncontested evidence of an elevated risk of inmate-on-inmate attacks during “go-back” time and the officer’s inattentiveness at that time. Quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., the court reiterated that “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.” The court clarified, “Although the precise manner in which the harm occurred need not be foreseeable, liability does not attach unless the harm is within the class of reasonably foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent.” The Court underscored that its holding did not mandate unremitting surveillance but rather emphasized the importance of reasonable care under the circumstances, given the State’s unique responsibility for individuals in its custody within a maximum-security prison environment.

  • La Torre v. Genesee Management, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 578 (1997): Parental Duty to Supervise Adult Child with Disabilities

    La Torre v. Genesee Management, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 578 (1997)

    A parent generally does not owe a duty of care to third parties for negligent supervision of an adult child with developmental disabilities, unless the parent has specific knowledge of the child’s dangerous propensities and the ability to control their conduct.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant can maintain a claim for negligent supervision against the mother of an adult plaintiff with developmental disabilities who allegedly caused them damages. The plaintiff, LaTorre, sued the defendant, Genesee Management, after a physical altercation with security personnel at a mall. Genesee then filed a third-party complaint against LaTorre’s mother, alleging negligent supervision. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint, holding that absent specific knowledge of dangerous propensities and an ability to control the adult child’s conduct, a parent is not liable to third parties for negligent supervision. This decision reinforces the principle that parental duties primarily run to the child, not to the general public, and emphasizes the importance of avoiding undue intrusion into family relationships.

    Facts

    LaTorre, a 20-year-old developmentally disabled man, accompanied his mother to a mall. While his mother shopped, LaTorre stayed in an arcade area. He became involved in an altercation with another person, prompting the arcade manager to call security. Security personnel subdued and handcuffed LaTorre, who subsequently sued Genesee Management, the security company, for physical and psychological injuries.

    Procedural History

    LaTorre sued Genesee Management in Supreme Court. Genesee filed a third-party complaint against LaTorre’s mother, alleging negligent supervision. The Supreme Court dismissed the third-party complaint, finding no actionable claim of negligent parental supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification can be maintained against the mother of an adult child with developmental disabilities, based on a theory of negligent supervision.

    Holding

    No, because a parent generally does not owe a duty of care to third parties for negligent supervision of an adult child with developmental disabilities, unless specific knowledge of dangerous propensities and the ability to control the child’s conduct are demonstrated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision primarily on the principles established in Holodook v. Spencer, which generally prohibits claims against parents for negligent supervision of their children. The court distinguished the case from Nolechek v. Gesuale, which recognized a limited duty of parents to third parties regarding a child’s use of a dangerous instrument. The Court emphasized that the allegations against LaTorre’s mother were too general and did not demonstrate specific knowledge of dangerous propensities. The court stated, “Defendants’ conclusory, generalized assertion is patently insufficient under presently governing principles to satisfy the requisite pertinent knowledge of the kind of dangerous propensities…” The court reasoned that allowing such claims would unreasonably burden parents and intrude into family relationships. The Court also noted the lack of specificity in the allegations against the mother, stating, “In order for a third-party claim of this kind against a parent or guardian to withstand the force of Holodook, negligence must be alleged and pleaded with some reasonable specificity, beyond mere generalities.” Ultimately, the court reaffirmed the importance of limiting litigation intrusions into families, stating that “[t]he mutual obligations of the parent-child relation derive their strength and vitality from such forces as natural instinct, love and morality, and not from the essentially negative compulsions of the law’s directives and sanctions.”

  • Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994): School’s Duty to Supervise Students and Foreseeable Harm

    84 N.Y.2d 44 (1994)

    Schools have a duty to adequately supervise students and are liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision, especially when the school has specific knowledge of potential danger to a student.

    Summary

    Two student sisters, Virna and Vivia Mirand, were attacked at their high school after Virna reported a threat from another student, Donna Webster, to a teacher and found the security office unattended. Vivia was stabbed trying to defend her sister. The New York Court of Appeals held that the school district could be liable for negligent supervision because it had notice of a specific threat against Virna but failed to take adequate steps to protect her, and because school security was absent from key locations at dismissal time, when the attack occurred. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the jury verdict in favor of the sisters.

    Facts

    Virna Mirand, a student at Harry S. Truman High School, had an altercation with fellow student Donna Webster, who threatened to kill her. Virna reported the threat to a teacher after finding the security office closed. Later, while waiting for her sister Vivia, Webster and her companions attacked Virna on the school veranda. Vivia was injured when she intervened to protect her sister; she was stabbed in the wrist by Webster’s brother. No security personnel were present during the attack.

    Procedural History

    The Mirand sisters sued the Board of Education for negligent supervision. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the jury verdict. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education negligently failed to provide adequate supervision, leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the school had notice of a specific threat and failed to take reasonable steps to protect the student, and because the absence of security personnel at a critical time and location was a proximate cause of the injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that schools have a duty to adequately supervise students, acting in loco parentis. To establish a breach of this duty when injuries are caused by fellow students, it must be shown that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury and that the injury was foreseeable. The Court highlighted the fact that the school, through a teacher, was made aware of Webster’s death threat to Virna. The Court also noted the absence of security personnel at dismissal time, despite the school’s own security plan requiring their presence. The court emphasized, “The violent acts which caused plaintiffs’ injuries were sparked by a prior altercation and death threat of which defendant, through one of its teachers, was expressly made aware; yet no action was taken to prevent escalation of the incident…” The Court found that the jury reasonably concluded that the Board was on notice of imminent danger and did not take reasonable steps to protect Virna. It further stated, “On the issue of proximate cause, we conclude that a rational jury could find that the complete absence of security or supervisory personnel at a time and place when vigilance was absolutely essential constituted the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.” The court concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and should be upheld.

  • Smith v. Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82 (1981): No Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision Between Siblings

    Smith v. Sapienza, 52 N.Y.2d 82 (1981)

    There is no cause of action for negligent supervision between unemancipated minor siblings in New York; therefore, a third party cannot bring a claim for contribution against a sibling for negligent supervision.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a younger sibling can sue an older sibling for negligent supervision, and whether a third party can seek contribution from the older sibling for such negligence. A four-year-old boy was allegedly attacked by a dog while his ten-year-old sister was supervising him. The court held that there is no cause of action for negligent supervision between unemancipated minor siblings. Consequently, a third party cannot seek contribution from the older sibling based on a claim of negligent supervision. The court reasoned that recognizing such a cause of action would disrupt family harmony, potentially dilute compensation for the injured child, and create an incongruous result given that minor siblings generally do not have a legal duty to supervise each other.

    Facts

    On May 4, 1977, Heather Smith, age 10, took her four-year-old brother, Christian, to deliver Girl Scout cookies to their neighbors, the Sapienzas. While on the Sapienzas’ property, Christian was allegedly attacked by their collie dog. William Smith, the children’s father, sued the Sapienzas on Christian’s behalf and for his own medical expenses. The Sapienzas then brought a third-party action against William and Heather, alleging negligent failure to supervise Christian.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint against Heather. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal specifically on the issue of the dismissal of the complaint against Heather.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action exists between unemancipated minor siblings for negligent supervision, and, if not, whether a third party can maintain a claim for contribution against the allegedly negligent sibling.

    Holding

    No, because there is no historical precedent or sound policy reason for creating such a cause of action; and, no, because a claim for contribution requires a violation of duties owed to the injured person, and a sibling generally owes no duty of supervision to another sibling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by acknowledging the abrogation of intrafamilial immunity for non-willful torts in Gelbman v. Gelbman. However, the court emphasized that while Gelbman made family members liable for ordinary torts, it also opened the door to exploring duties arising specifically from family relationships. Despite this, the court found no precedent for a negligent supervision action between siblings and declined to create one. The court relied heavily on policy considerations similar to those in Holodook v. Spencer, which denied a similar action against a parent. Recognizing such an action would lead to Dole claims against the sibling, potentially reducing the injured child’s recovery. More importantly, it would create intrafamily conflict, as parents would be forced to take adversarial positions. The court also noted that while parents have a legal duty to supervise their children, siblings generally do not, making such an action incongruous. Finally, the court reasoned that temporary entrustment of a child’s well-being to a sibling is often a parental delegation, and allowing suit against the sibling would indirectly allow suit against the parent. As to the third-party claim, the court stated, “A claim for contribution exists only when two or more tort-feasors share in responsibility for an injury, in violation of duties they respectively owed to the injured person.”

  • Austin v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, 5 N.Y.3d 430 (2005): Duty to Supervise Students

    5 N.Y.3d 430 (2005)

    A university has a duty to adequately supervise students in its charge, and it can be held liable for foreseeable injuries resulting from a failure to do so.

    Summary

    This case concerns a university’s liability for injuries sustained by a student during an altercation at an off-campus party. The Court of Appeals considered whether the university had a duty to supervise student activities, particularly where alcohol was involved. The Court held that while universities are not insurers of student safety, they have a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students, especially when the university sponsors or controls the activity. The court found that there was a question of fact as to whether the university breached that duty, and whether that breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a student at the university, was injured during an altercation at an off-campus party. Alcohol was present at the party. The plaintiff sued the university, alleging negligent supervision.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the claim. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the university could be liable. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a university owes a duty of care to its students to supervise student activities, particularly those involving alcohol, and whether a breach of that duty can result in liability for injuries sustained by a student.

    Holding

    Yes, because a university has a duty to adequately supervise students in its charge and can be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to do so when it sponsors or controls the activity and the injury is foreseeable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while universities are not insurers of student safety, they have a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students. This duty is heightened when the university sponsors or controls the activity, such as orientation events or organized parties. The court noted that universities are aware of the risks associated with alcohol consumption and student behavior, making such injuries foreseeable. The court emphasized that this duty to supervise must be balanced against the recognition that college students are adults capable of making their own decisions. The Court found that the determination of whether the university breached its duty and whether that breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries was a question of fact that should be determined at trial. The court noted that while a university is not expected to monitor every student activity, it must provide adequate supervision of activities it sponsors or controls, especially when involving alcohol. The court noted: ” Colleges must adequately supervise students in their charge, and they can be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to inadequate supervision.”

  • Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 32 (1974): No Cause of Action for Negligent Parental Supervision

    Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 32 (1974)

    A parent’s negligent failure to supervise a child is not a tort actionable by the child in New York.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a child has a legally cognizable claim against a parent for negligent supervision. The court consolidated three cases raising similar issues. It held that a child does not have a cause of action against a parent for negligent supervision, primarily due to concerns about family harmony and the potential for undermining a child’s recovery against third parties through contribution claims against the parent. Allowing such claims would invite excessive judicial intrusion into family dynamics and potentially reduce compensation available to the injured child.

    Facts

    * Graney v. Graney: A four-year-old fell from a high slide in a playground; the child sued his father for inadequate supervision.
    * Ryan v. Fahey: A three-year-old’s hand was run over by a lawnmower operated by a neighbor’s child; the child sued his mother for failing to supervise him.
    * Holodook v. Spencer: A four-year-old darted between parked cars and was struck by a car. The driver brought a third-party action against the child’s mother for negligent supervision.

    Procedural History

    * In Graney, the lower court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
    * In Ryan, Special Term denied the mother’s motion to dismiss, but the Appellate Division reversed.
    * In Holodook, Special Term denied the parents’ motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim against the parents.
    * All cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a parent owes a legal duty to a child giving rise to an action for damages for negligent supervision.
    2. Whether damages may be apportioned between a parent who failed to adequately supervise a child and a third party who injured the child, without violating General Obligations Law § 3-111.

    Holding

    1. No, because recognizing such a duty would unduly interfere with family relations and could reduce the child’s compensation through third-party contribution claims against the parent.
    2. N/A, as there is no underlying cause of action for negligent supervision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Gelbman v. Gelbman abrogated intrafamilial immunity for non-willful torts, it did not create new liabilities based on the family relationship itself. Recognizing a cause of action for negligent supervision would open the door to excessive litigation against parents. “Indeed, if within the wide scope of daily experiences common to the upbringing of a child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise care commensurate with the risk… a new and heavy burden will be added to parenthood.” The court expressed concern about the impact of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., which allowed for apportionment among joint tortfeasors, as it could lead to third parties seeking contribution from parents for negligent supervision, potentially diminishing the child’s recovery. The court highlighted General Obligations Law § 3-111, which prevents imputing parental negligence to a child, arguing that allowing contribution claims would create a loophole in this protection. The court also noted the difficulty in defining the scope of a parent’s duty to supervise and the potential for retaliatory suits between estranged parents. While acknowledging that some states recognize a duty to supervise, the court emphasized the importance of parental discretion in raising children. The court quoted Cannon v. Cannon, stating, “Indeed, if within the wide scope of daily experiences common to the upbringing of a child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise care commensurate with the risk—for each injury caused by inattention, unwise choice or even selfishness—a new and heavy burden will be added to parenthood.” It concluded that the mutual obligations within a family should derive from natural instinct and love, not legal coercion. Since there is no primary cause of action, there can be no claim for contribution.