Hughes v. Town of Huntington, 81 N.Y.2d 881 (1993)

A prior written notice statute requiring notice of unsafe conditions does not apply to a claim that a town negligently designed and constructed a roadway with a utility pole positioned dangerously, because the town was aware of the condition when it designed and constructed the roadway.

Summary

Carol Ann Hughes sued the Town of Huntington for negligence after a vehicle she was in struck a utility pole. Hughes argued the town failed to provide adequate warnings or barriers and allowed the pole to remain in a dangerous position. The Town argued it lacked prior written notice of the dangerous condition, as required by Town Code § 173-18(A). The lower courts dismissed the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prior written notice statute did not apply because the Town was aware of the condition when it designed and constructed the roadway. The court emphasized that prior written notice statutes apply to physical conditions that would not immediately come to the attention of town officers without actual notice.

Facts

Carol Ann Hughes was injured when the vehicle she was riding in struck a utility pole near Cove Road in the Town of Huntington.

Hughes sued the Town, alleging negligence in failing to post proper warnings, maintain adequate lighting or barriers, and allowing the pole to remain in a position that posed an unreasonable risk.

The Town asserted it had not received prior written notice of the allegedly unsafe condition as required by Town Code § 173-18(A).

Procedural History

The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the Town’s lack of prior written notice.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the Town’s prior written notice statute applies to a claim of negligent roadway design where the Town itself created the allegedly dangerous condition.

Holding

No, because the prior written notice statute is meant to apply to physical conditions that would not immediately come to the attention of town officers unless they were given actual notice, and the Town was aware of the condition when it designed and constructed the roadway.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that prior written notice statutes should be read strictly and refer to physical conditions that would not immediately come to the attention of village officers without actual notice, citing Alexander v. Eldred, 63 NY2d 460 and Doremus v. Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook, 18 NY2d 362.

The Court rejected the Town’s argument that Alexander and Doremus were limited to the “defect” language in the statute. The court stated that the Doremus court was analyzing the entire notice statute (“defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition”) when it concluded that it was meant to apply in situations where the physical condition of the street did not “immediately come to the attention of the village officers” unless they were given “actual notice.”

The Court found that the allegation of a failure to construct proper barricades and warnings was similar to the failure to construct a traffic control device as alleged in Alexander v. Eldred. The Court reasoned: “The Town was aware of the ‘condition’ when it designed and constructed the roadway and positioned the utility pole, thus it was not the type of physical condition which would not ordinarily come to the attention of the Town officers unless they were given notice thereof.” Therefore, the prior notice statute did not apply.