New York Law Review

Tag: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

  • Ornstein v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 1 (2008): Recovery for Emotional Distress After HIV Exposure

    10 N.Y.3d 1 (2008)

    A plaintiff exposed to HIV due to negligence can recover damages for emotional distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder, beyond six months after exposure if they present prima facie evidence of continued distress, regardless of negative HIV test results.

    Summary

    Helen Ornstein, a nurse, was stuck by an HIV-contaminated needle while working at Bellevue Hospital. Although she tested negative for HIV, she sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming ongoing mental anguish and post-traumatic stress disorder. The defendants moved to limit damages to the six-month period following the incident, citing a lower court decision that suggested emotional distress is unreasonable after six months with a negative HIV test. The New York Court of Appeals held that Ornstein could seek damages beyond the six-month period because she presented sufficient evidence of continuing emotional distress, including a psychiatric diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. The court reasoned that a rigid six-month limit is inappropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates ongoing psychological harm.

    Facts

    On September 1, 2000, Helen Ornstein, a nurse, was stuck by a blood-filled hypodermic needle while bathing a patient with AIDS at Bellevue Hospital. She immediately began antiviral medication, experiencing side effects. She underwent periodic HIV testing, consistently testing negative. She testified that she experienced anxiety about contracting HIV until June 2002. Even after the fear of a positive test subsided, she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, including sleep disturbances and flashbacks, leading her to change her work from patient care to teaching.

    Procedural History

    Ornstein sued the intern and New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation in May 2001. The defendants sought to limit damages to the six months following the incident, relying on the Appellate Division decision in Brown v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed. The case proceeded to trial with the damage limitation. The jury found the defendants liable, awarding Ornstein $333,000 for past pain and suffering and $15,000 for lost wages. Ornstein appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff, who has tested negative for HIV after exposure, can recover damages for emotional distress sustained more than six months after the exposure incident, if the plaintiff presents prima facie evidence of continuing emotional distress, such as post-traumatic stress disorder?

    Holding

    Yes, because a rigid six-month limitation on emotional distress damages following HIV exposure is inappropriate when the plaintiff presents credible evidence of ongoing psychological harm, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, that persists beyond that period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while plaintiffs must demonstrate actual exposure to HIV through a scientifically accepted method to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a blanket six-month limitation on damages is unwarranted when a plaintiff provides evidence of continuing emotional distress. The court distinguished this case from Brown v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., where the plaintiff refused to be tested for HIV. Here, Ornstein underwent regular testing and presented psychiatric evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder causally related to the needle-stick incident. The court stated, “a rule that restricts recovery of emotional distress damages for all plaintiffs as a matter of law based only on scientific and medical statistics—no matter how reliable those statistics may be—makes little sense if the probabilities identified by researchers were not known to the plaintiff during the relevant time frame.” The court emphasized that plaintiffs can recover for emotional harm that is a direct, rather than a consequential, result of the breach of duty and that has some guarantee of genuineness. The Court further stated that trial judges could preclude damages claims not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court also noted that defendants could challenge emotional distress evidence by presenting medical and scientific proof concerning the probability of contracting HIV after negative tests. The failure to mitigate damages can also be a defense. Because Ornstein presented sufficient evidence of continuing emotional distress, the six-month limitation was improper.

  • Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697 (1987): Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Based on Erroneous Medical Advice

    70 N.Y.2d 697 (1987)

    A physician’s negligent misdiagnosis and advice, which directly leads a patient to undergo a medical procedure that violates her deeply held beliefs, can be the basis for a claim of emotional distress damages, even in the absence of physical injury.

    Summary

    Carmen Martinez sued Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center for emotional distress. She had an abortion based on the defendant’s negligent genetic counseling, which erroneously indicated a high probability that her child would be born with severe birth defects. After the abortion, she learned the advice was wrong. Martinez, who morally opposed abortion except in extreme cases, claimed the erroneous advice and subsequent abortion caused her severe mental anguish. The Court of Appeals held that Martinez could recover for emotional distress because the distress resulted directly from the defendant’s breach of duty owed directly to her, and her affirmative action based on that breach.

    Facts

    Carmen Martinez, in her first trimester of pregnancy, sought genetic counseling from Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center to assess the impact of medication she took early in her pregnancy on the fetus. The medical center negligently advised Martinez that her baby would likely be born with microcephaly (small brain) or anencephaly (no brain). Based on this advice, Martinez, who held strong moral objections to abortion except in extraordinary circumstances, underwent an abortion. She later discovered the medical advice was incorrect, and the abortion was unnecessary.

    Procedural History

    Martinez sued Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center for emotional distress. The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. Martinez. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and other issues not reached on the initial appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a patient can recover damages for emotional distress caused by undergoing a medical procedure (abortion) based on a physician’s negligent misdiagnosis and advice when that procedure violated the patient’s deeply held moral beliefs.

    Holding

    Yes, because the emotional distress was the direct result of the defendant’s breach of a duty owed directly to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff affirmatively acted upon the erroneous advice, resulting in the violation of her deep-seated convictions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from bystander emotional distress cases such as Tobin v. Grossman, where emotional harm stems from observing injury to a third person. Here, Martinez’s mental anguish stemmed directly from the defendants’ breach of a duty owed to her. The court emphasized that Mrs. Martinez’s emotional distress did not derive from what happened to the fetus, but from the psychological injury directly caused by her agreeing to an act that violated her firmly held beliefs, based on the erroneous medical advice.

    The court stated, “[H]er mental anguish and depression are the direct result of defendants’ breach of a duty owed directly to her in giving her erroneous advice on which she affirmatively acted in deciding to have the abortion. The emotional distress for which she seeks recovery does not derive from what happened to the fetus; it derives from the psychological injury directly caused by her agreeing to an act which, as the jury found, was contrary to her firmly held beliefs. Defendants’ breach of duty was the precipitating and proximate cause of that injury.”

    The dissent argued that the majority effectively created a new cause of action for negligent infliction of harm to an individual’s deep-seated beliefs, an expansion of tort law beyond established precedents. The dissent emphasized that while intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligently induced fear of physical injury were recognized causes of action, compensating emotional distress from guilt due to acting against one’s convictions based on negligent advice was unprecedented.

  • Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 62 N.Y.2d 523 (1984): Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Duty of Care to Parents

    Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 62 N.Y.2d 523 (1984)

    A hospital’s duty of care to a child does not extend to the parents for emotional distress resulting from the hospital’s negligence, absent direct injury to the parents themselves.

    Summary

    Parents sued a hospital for emotional distress after their newborn was abducted from the nursery due to the hospital’s negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the hospital did not owe a direct duty of care to the parents regarding their emotional well-being in this situation. While acknowledging the parents’ distress, the court reasoned that extending liability in this manner would create boundless exposure for indirect emotional injuries to families in various contexts of negligent care, setting a precedent with broad and potentially unmanageable consequences.

    Facts

    Cynthia Johnson and Percy Williams’ newborn daughter, Kawana, was born at Jamaica Hospital on June 8, 1981. After Cynthia was discharged, Kawana remained in the hospital nursery for treatment. On June 16, 1981, Kawana was discovered missing, having been abducted from the nursery. The hospital had received two bomb threats that day. Kawana was recovered by police approximately four and a half months later.

    Procedural History

    The parents sued Jamaica Hospital for their emotional distress. The Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a hospital owes a direct duty of care to the parents of a newborn infant to prevent emotional distress resulting from the hospital’s negligence in the care of the infant, specifically in the context of abduction from the hospital nursery.

    Holding

    No, because the hospital’s duty of care extended to the infant, not the parents, and allowing recovery for emotional distress in this situation would create unbounded liability. “Jamaica Hospital, even if negligent in caring for Kawana and directly liable to her, is not liable for emotional distress suffered by plaintiffs as a consequence of the abduction.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the parents undoubtedly suffered emotional distress, the hospital’s duty of care was primarily to the infant. Extending this duty to cover the parents’ emotional distress would create a slippery slope, potentially opening the door to limitless liability in cases involving negligent care of vulnerable individuals. The court distinguished this case from situations where a direct duty was owed, such as the negligent transmission of information about a relative’s death or the mishandling of a deceased body. The court stated, “That sound policy reasons support these decisions is evident here, for to permit recovery by the infant’s parents for emotional distress would be to invite open-ended liability for indirect emotional injury suffered by families in every instance where the very young, or very elderly, or incapacitated persons experience negligent care or treatment.” The court also rejected the argument that the hospital stood in loco parentis, stating that such a status requires more than temporary care and custody. The dissent argued that the parents’ right to custody was infringed and was the basis for a claim of emotional distress. The majority rejected this position stating, “any right to recover for emotional injury sustained by plaintiffs because of defendant’s negligence in the “care, custody and management” of their child cannot rationally be refused to other parents, relatives or custodians of persons to whom caretakers of various types, such as schools and day care centers, are alleged to have breached a similar duty.”