New York Law Review

Tag: negligence per se

  • Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008): Landlord Liability for Extinguished Lights in Windowless Stairwells

    Kopsachilis v. 130 E. 18 Owners Corp., 10 N.Y.3d 514 (2008)

    A landlord can assert a “knowledge or consent” defense under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) to avoid liability for extinguished lights in a windowless stairwell, even though § 37(3) requires such lights to be kept burning continuously.

    Summary

    Plaintiff was injured when she fell in a dark, windowless stairwell of defendant’s apartment building during the 2003 blackout. She sued, claiming the defendant violated Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously, constituting negligence per se. The defendant argued that § 37(2) provides a defense if a light is extinguished without the owner’s knowledge or consent. The Court of Appeals held that the “knowledge or consent” defense applies to violations of § 37(3), reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to the defendant. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and legislative intent support applying the defense, even when lights are required to be on continuously.

    Facts

    During the August 14, 2003 blackout, the plaintiff stayed overnight in a coworker’s apartment in a building owned by the defendant. The building’s backup battery-operated lights lasted only 40 minutes and were out when the plaintiff arrived. Building staff provided flashlights and candles, escorting occupants up the fire-stairs. The next morning, without a flashlight or assistance, the plaintiff opened the door to the fire-stairs, saw nothing, and fell, sustaining injuries. The building was not required to have emergency lighting connected to a backup power source.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that § 37(3) imposes a categorical duty regardless of the owner’s knowledge or consent. Two justices dissented, arguing that the statute does not impose absolute liability and the defendant should be able to assert a “knowledge or consent” defense. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to a violation of § 37(3), which requires lights in windowless fire-stairs to be kept burning continuously.

    Holding

    No, because the “knowledge or consent” defense in Multiple Dwelling Law § 37(2) applies to the extinguishment of any lights required by subdivision (1), whether they are required to be on only at night or continuously.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute’s language supports the application of the “knowledge or consent” defense to § 37(3). The court stated, “The words ‘[e]xcept as provided in subdivision three’ do not modify the knowledge or consent defense—the exception and the defense appear in separate sentences.” The court further reasoned that it is unlikely the Legislature intended to impose strict liability for a light failure in a windowless area but not in a windowed hallway, absent a clear statement to that effect. The court noted that the defendant did not “consent” to the blackout. Therefore, the defendant had no liability under Multiple Dwelling Law § 37. The Court emphasized the interconnectedness of subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of the statute. Subdivision (1) establishes the lighting requirement, subdivision (2) sets the duration, and subdivision (3) creates an exception to the durational requirement. The court stated, “We therefore read subdivision (3)’s statement that lights in windowless areas ‘shall be kept burning continuously’ as stating an exception to the rule that lights need be on only at night, not as creating a new liability to which there is no defense.”

  • Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000): Violation of City Administrative Code as Evidence of Negligence

    Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000)

    Violation of a New York City Administrative Code provision constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision originates from state law.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the City of New York for negligence after falling from bleachers at a public school athletic field, alleging a violation of the New York City Building Code regarding protective guards on bleachers. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on liability, finding negligence per se. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a violation of the City’s Administrative Code is only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the code provision originates from state law. This distinction is rooted in the principle that only state statutes can alter the common law of negligence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff fell from bleachers at a public school athletic field owned by the City of New York after a softball game. The bleachers lacked handrails, and the plaintiff alleged the city violated section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code, which mandates protective guards on bleachers. The plaintiff claimed the absence of these guards caused his fall and subsequent injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging negligence based on a violation of the City’s Building Code. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, finding negligence per se. The jury found the defendants 100% liable. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding future lost earnings but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the defendants leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a violation of section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code constitutes negligence per se or merely some evidence of negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because a violation of a municipal ordinance or administrative rule constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision has its origin in State Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state statutes and local ordinances or administrative rules for establishing negligence. Violations of state statutes imposing specific duties constitute negligence per se, while violations of municipal ordinances are merely evidence of negligence. The court reasoned that elevating a violation of a city ordinance to negligence per se would substantially alter the state’s common law, a change more appropriately left to the Legislature. The Administrative Code itself states that its recodification should not be construed as validating any provision to state law. The court emphasized the City’s retained authority to amend or repeal its Administrative Code provisions without state legislative action, reinforcing its status as a local enactment. Quoting from Major v. Waverly & Ogden, Inc., the court stated that ” ‘has the force and effect of law does not make it so, if by that is meant that it is the equivalent of or equal to a legislative enactment. The Constitution of the State commits to the Legislature alone the power to enact a statute’…It is only to such an enactment that liability without regard to negligence may attach”. The court acknowledged that some Administrative Code sections originate in state law and might warrant statutory treatment but declined to extend statutory status to all City ordinances, as it would create uncertainty in the application of the common law. This holding aligns with Smulczeski v. City Ctr. of Music & Drama, where a violation of a lighting ordinance was deemed evidence of negligence.