92 N.Y.2d 591 (1998)

A river is navigable-in-fact if it has a practical utility for trade or travel, and evidence of recreational use can be considered in determining navigability.

Summary

Adirondack League Club (ALC) sued the Sierra Club for trespass after members canoed down a portion of the South Branch of the Moose River running through ALC property. ALC claimed the river was private property, while the Sierra Club argued the river was navigable-in-fact, granting public easement. The Court of Appeals considered whether recreational use can be part of the navigability analysis and whether factual questions existed about the South Branch’s navigability. The Court held that recreational use is a valid factor in determining navigability but found unresolved factual issues preventing summary judgment.

Facts

1. ALC, a private club, owns 50,000 acres including a 12-mile stretch of the South Branch of the Moose River.
2. In June 1991, Sierra Club members canoed down this section of the river, requiring several portages around obstacles.
3. ALC sued for trespass, claiming the river was private property.
4. Defendants argued the river’s navigability granted public easement.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of ALC. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Sierra Club, the State, and the Adirondack Mountain Club, finding the South Branch navigable-in-fact. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether evidence of recreational use can be considered in determining if a river is navigable-in-fact.
2. Whether factual questions exist regarding the South Branch’s navigability, precluding summary judgment.

Holding

1. Yes, because evidence of a river’s practical utility for transport need not be limited to evidence of its capacity for the movement of commercial goods; practical utility for travel or transport remains the standard.
2. Yes, because conflicting evidence exists regarding the river’s capacity for use without artificial augmentation and its ability to sustain commercial boating or canoeing operations. The court stated it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the historical log drives on the South Branch were not accomplished by use of dams and other artificial augmentation of the river flow.

Court’s Reasoning

1. The court reviewed the common-law standard of navigability-in-fact established in Morgan v. King, emphasizing the river’s “practical usefulness to the public as a highway for transportation.”
2. The court reasoned that while historically, practical utility was measured by a river’s capacity to move goods to market, evolving circumstances warrant considering recreational use as a form of practical utility for travel.
3. The court emphasized that it was not broadening the standard for navigability-in-fact, but merely recognizing that recreational use fits within it, clarifying that boaters can make use of the common-law easement.
4. Addressing property rights concerns, the court noted that riparian owners retain their rights, subject only to the long-recognized navigational servitude, and they cannot claim a taking because they never owned the easement.
5. The court found that conflicting evidence regarding historical log drives and recreational use prevented summary judgment. It noted that ALC presented evidence suggesting artificial augmentation was necessary for logging, while the Sierra Club presented evidence of recreational use.
6. The court concluded that the record presented issues of material fact that must be determined in a plenary trial.
7. The dissenting judge argued that summary judgment was appropriate based on the undisputed evidence of the river’s historic use for logging and recent use by recreational canoeists.