Matter of State Division of Human Rights v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 892 (1979)

Discrimination may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not always required when the totality of the circumstances suggests that an adverse action was motivated by national origin or other protected characteristics.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the Human Rights Appeal Board’s order and granting the cross-motion for enforcement. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that a bus driver discriminated against an American Indian couple based on their national origin. The court emphasized that direct evidence of discriminatory intent isn’t always necessary; discrimination can be inferred from inconsistent actions and the totality of the circumstances, even without explicit references to national origin.

Facts

Eugene Dawson and his wife, both American Indians, purchased round-trip bus tickets. On August 22, 1975, while wearing Indian headbands and other traditional ornaments, Mrs. Dawson mistakenly presented a return ticket for the initial leg of their journey. The bus driver, instead of calmly addressing the error, told them in a “nasty voice” to go to the end of the line. When they presented the correct tickets, he repeated his demand and then refused them passage, stating, “Now you’re not going on the bus at all. Wait for the next bus,” before driving off.

Procedural History

The State Division of Human Rights found the bus driver discriminated against the Dawsons. The Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed this finding. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that there was a lack of substantial evidence. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Appeal Board’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether substantial evidence supported the State Division of Human Rights’ finding that the bus driver discriminated against the complainants based on their national origin in violation of Executive Law § 296.2, despite the absence of explicit discriminatory remarks.

Holding

Yes, because discrimination can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including inconsistencies in the driver’s actions and deviation from company policy, even without direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The court found that the driver’s actions were inconsistent with company policy and constituted a refusal to transport them.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized that the State Division of Human Rights had the authority to infer that the bus driver’s testimony was shaped to conceal a discriminatory motive. The court highlighted the fact that the driver’s actions deviated from standard company policy and resulted in a denial of service. Citing 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, the court stated that it is “not always necessary to find specific evidence of spoken references to complainants’ national origin or color, for acts of discrimination may occur without such references.” The court found that the driver’s orders for the Dawsons to go to the end of the line were inconsistent with company policy and included a refusal to transport them at all. The court considered the driver’s demeanor, the inconsistency of his actions with company policy, and the refusal to transport the Dawsons as indicative of discriminatory intent, despite the absence of explicit discriminatory statements. This aligns with the broader principle that discrimination cases often rely on circumstantial evidence to establish discriminatory motives.