New York Law Review

Tag: Mutual Wills

  • Matter of Cohen, 635 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1994): Enforceability of Agreement to Make Mutual Wills When One Will is Revoked

    Matter of Cohen, 635 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1994)

    An agreement to make mutual wills is unenforceable when one party revokes their will with the other party’s consent, as there is no unjust enrichment to justify imposing a constructive trust.

    Summary

    Harry and Rae Cohen executed mutual wills in 1982, agreeing to leave half their estate to Harry’s relatives and half to Rae’s, with the wills being irrevocable without mutual consent. Harry died in 1986, and Rae, claiming she couldn’t find his will, was appointed administrator of his estate. Harry’s nephew sought to probate a copy of the will or enforce the agreement. The court denied probate due to presumption of revocation but imposed a constructive trust on the estate based on the agreement. The Appellate Division modified this, limiting the trust. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Harry’s will was deemed revoked with Rae’s consent, Rae wasn’t unjustly enriched, and the agreement couldn’t be enforced.

    Facts

    1. Harry and Rae Cohen, a childless couple, executed mutual wills in April 1982, each establishing a trust for the surviving spouse, with the remainder to be divided equally between relatives of Harry and Rae.
    2. The wills devised the residue of the estate to the surviving spouse outright.
    3. Simultaneously, they entered a written agreement making the wills irrevocable except with mutual consent, designating the legatees as third-party beneficiaries.
    4. Harry died in December 1986; Rae claimed she couldn’t find his will and was issued letters of administration.
    5. Harry’s nephew, a legatee under the will, sought to probate a copy of the will or enforce the agreement.

    Procedural History

    1. The Surrogate’s Court denied probate of the will due to the presumption of revocation but enforced the agreement, imposing a constructive trust on the entire estate.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of probate but modified the constructive trust, limiting it to the portion of the estate not passing outright to Rae under the original will.
    3. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an agreement to make mutual wills is enforceable through a constructive trust when one of the wills is deemed to have been revoked by the testator.

    Holding

    1. No, because the surviving spouse did not receive the estate as a result of the agreement but rather due to intestacy following the revocation of the will, and therefore was not unjustly enriched.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that prior cases enforcing agreements to make mutual wills involved situations where the first party to die performed the agreement by not revoking their will. The surviving party then breached the agreement by disposing of the estate inconsistently with the original agreement. The key principle is that equity prevents the surviving party from benefiting from the first party’s performance and then breaching the agreement. This is essentially a particular application of preventing unjust enrichment, a necessary element for a constructive trust. In this case, because the lower courts found that Harry’s will was revoked, Rae did not benefit from Harry’s performance of the agreement. Instead, she took the estate through intestacy. Therefore, there was no unjust enrichment to justify imposing a constructive trust. The court stated, “[T]o permit the one who survives to gain the benefits of the joint will and then to flout its provisions in violation of the promise made to the other ‘would be a mockery of justice’”. The court also noted that the designation of the legatees as third-party beneficiaries did not change the outcome, as Rae effectively assented to the revocation of Harry’s will when she applied for letters of administration. This precluded the third-party beneficiaries from asserting any vested rights under the agreement.

  • In re Estate of Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193 (1981): Mutual Will Mistake and Testamentary Intent

    In re Estate of Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193 (1981)

    When mutual wills are mistakenly signed by the wrong party but are otherwise identical and executed with proper formality, the court may admit the mistakenly signed will to probate if the testator’s intent is clear and there is no evidence of fraud.

    Summary

    Harvey and Rose Snide intended to execute mutual wills, but each mistakenly signed the will prepared for the other. The wills were identical except for the names. Harvey’s will left everything to Rose. After Harvey’s death, Rose offered the will Harvey signed for probate. The Surrogate’s Court admitted the will and reformed it. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the will inadmissible. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the will could be admitted to probate. The court reasoned that because the mistake was genuine, the testamentary intent was clear, and there was no evidence of fraud, the will should be admitted.

    Facts

    Harvey and Rose Snide intended to execute mutual wills. The wills were prepared such that Harvey’s will left his estate to Rose, and Rose’s will left her estate to Harvey. At the execution ceremony, the wills were placed in envelopes, mistakenly labeled such that each received the other’s will. Neither Harvey, Rose, the attorney, nor the witnesses noticed the error, and Harvey signed the will intended for Rose, and Rose signed the will intended for Harvey. The wills were otherwise identical.

    Procedural History

    Rose Snide, as the proponent, offered the instrument Harvey signed for probate in Surrogate’s Court. The Surrogate decreed the will admissible and reformed it to reflect the correct names. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the instrument could not be admitted to probate. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a will mistakenly signed by the wrong testator, but intended to be executed by that testator as part of a mutual will agreement and otherwise executed with proper formality, can be admitted to probate.

    Holding

    Yes, because the mistake was genuine, the testamentary intent was clear, the wills were mutual and identical in substance, and there was no evidence of fraud.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the critical element for a valid will is testamentary intent. While that intent usually attaches to the document signed, the court declined to take such a formalistic view in this case. The court emphasized that the dispositive provisions of the two wills were identical except for the names and that the variance was fully explained by considering the documents together and the surrounding circumstances. The court distinguished the case from those where testamentary intent was truly lacking. The court stated: “Under such facts it would indeed be ironic — if not perverse — to state that because what has occurred is so obvious, and what was intended so clear, we must act to nullify rather than sustain this testamentary scheme.”

    The court addressed the concern that this ruling would open the door to widespread reformation of wills, clarifying that the holding was limited to the specific facts of the case: identical mutual wills executed simultaneously with statutory formality. The court emphasized that there was no danger of fraud, and refusing to read the wills together would expand formalism without any benefit. “Not only did the two instruments constitute reciprocal elements of a unified testamentary plan, they both were executed with statutory formality, including the same attesting witnesses, at a contemporaneous execution ceremony. There is absolutely no danger of fraud, and the refusal to read these wills together would serve merely to unnecessarily expand formalism, without any corresponding benefit. On these narrow facts we decline this unjust course.”