New York Law Review

Tag: municipal ordinances

  • Wharram v. City of Utica, 56 N.Y.2d 733 (1982): Restriction of Non-Resident Businesses

    Wharram v. City of Utica, 56 N.Y.2d 733 (1982)

    A municipal ordinance that restricts the ability of non-resident businesses to operate within the municipality is invalid under New York General Municipal Law § 80 if the restriction is not necessary for the proper regulation of the business.

    Summary

    Wharram, a towing business located just outside Utica city limits, challenged a city ordinance that excluded non-resident towing companies from a rotational towing service list used by the police. The ordinance effectively prevented Wharram from being called to accident scenes by the police, limiting their business opportunities. The New York Court of Appeals held that the ordinance violated General Municipal Law § 80 because the city failed to demonstrate that the restriction on non-resident businesses was *necessary* for the proper regulation of the towing business and police operations. The court emphasized that the burden of proving necessity rested with the municipality.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, doing business as Commercial Collision, operated a towing service located 0.4 miles outside Utica’s city limits.
    Utica established a rotational towing service list (Ordinance § 17-26.1) that the police used to call tow trucks to accident scenes.
    Because the plaintiffs’ business was outside the city limits, they were excluded from the list.
    As a result, the police never called them to accident scenes.
    The ordinance prohibited non-listed tow operators from coming within 100 feet of an accident scene.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued the City of Utica, arguing that the ordinance violated General Municipal Law § 80.
    The trial court ruled in favor of the city, declaring that the ordinance did *not* violate § 80.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case, directing the lower court to declare the ordinance invalid.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Utica’s ordinance restricting non-resident towing businesses from being included on the police department’s rotational towing list is invalid under New York General Municipal Law § 80 because it’s not *necessary* for the proper regulation of such business.

    Holding

    Yes, because the City of Utica did not provide evidence establishing that the restriction against non-residents was necessary for the proper regulation of police business, as required by General Municipal Law § 80.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the language of General Municipal Law § 80, which voids any municipal restriction on non-resident businesses unless the restriction is “necessary for the proper regulation of such… business.” The court emphasized the distinction between a restriction that is merely *reasonable* and one that is *necessary*.
    The court placed the burden on the municipality (the City of Utica) to prove the *necessity* of the restriction. The court found that the city failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet this burden.
    The court stated, “The issue under section 80 is not whether there is a reasonable ground for such a restriction of nonresident tow truck operators but whether such a restriction is necessary.”
    The court pointed out that the record lacked evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that the restriction against non-residents was *necessary* for the proper regulation of police business. The dissent argued the ordinance served legitimate public safety functions (preventing traffic congestion) without prohibiting non-residents from conducting business in the city because they could still solicit work if they remained 100 feet from an accident. The majority, however, focused on the *necessity* requirement of Section 80 and found that the city had not met its burden. This case is significant because it clarifies the high bar municipalities must clear when restricting non-resident businesses and shows that reasonableness is not enough. Evidence must show the restriction is *necessary*.

  • People v. Farrar, 38 N.Y.2d 627 (1976): Limits on Fines for Continuous Violations Charged in a Single Count

    People v. Farrar, 38 N.Y.2d 627 (1976)

    When a municipal ordinance defines each day of a continuing violation as a separate offense, multiple such violations can be charged in a single information, but only if each violation is stated in a separate count; absent separate counts, the maximum fine that can be imposed is the maximum for a single violation.

    Summary

    The People appealed a decision reducing a fine imposed on the defendant for violating a municipal code regarding property maintenance. The defendant was charged with failing to maintain his property, leading to insect and rodent infestation, over a period of several months. The city’s code defined each day of violation as a separate offense, and the trial court levied a fine exceeding the maximum single-violation amount. The Appellate Term reduced the fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while the ordinance validly permitted cumulative penalties for continuous violations, those violations had to be charged in separate counts in the accusatory instrument.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with violating the Long Beach Municipal Code by failing to maintain his property, resulting in insect and rodent infestation. The violation was alleged to have occurred continuously from October 21, 1971, to April 11, 1972. The City of Long Beach’s ordinances stated that each day a violation continues constitutes a separate violation. The City Court imposed a fine of $350 for Count X, which exceeded the maximum fine of $250 for a single violation under the city ordinances.

    Procedural History

    The City Court of Long Beach convicted the defendant upon a guilty plea and imposed fines totaling $1,050 and a jail sentence. The Appellate Term modified the judgment by reducing the fine for Count X from $350 to $250. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, albeit on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be fined an amount exceeding the ordinance maximum for a single violation when the information alleges a continuous violation over a period of months, where the ordinance defines each day of violation as a separate offense, but the information does not contain separate counts for each day of violation.

    Holding

    No, because when a continuous violation is charged in a single count, the maximum fine that can be imposed is the maximum for one count, even if the ordinance specifies that each day of violation constitutes a separate offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the City of Long Beach’s ordinance validly allowed for cumulative penalties for continuous violations, the information charging the defendant did not properly reflect this. The court stated, “As in the case of an indictment, and subject to the rules of joinder applicable to indictments, two or more offenses may be charged in separate counts of an information.” The court emphasized that because the offenses charged in Count X were contained in only one count, it was impermissible to punish the defendant as if he were charged with multiple counts. The court noted that each of the violations were joinable with others in the same information. The court distinguished the case from People v. Briary Improvement Corp., noting that Long Beach was not a second-class city and therefore not subject to the limitations of the Second Class Cities Law. The Court of Appeals declined to address whether Count X was void for duplicity because the defendant failed to cross-appeal. Therefore, the maximum fine imposable on the defendant was limited to $250, the maximum for a single count. The practical implication is that municipalities must carefully draft informations to include separate counts for each distinct violation when seeking cumulative penalties for continuing offenses.