New York Law Review

Tag: municipal ordinance

  • Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000): Violation of City Administrative Code as Evidence of Negligence

    Elliott v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 730 (2000)

    Violation of a New York City Administrative Code provision constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision originates from state law.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the City of New York for negligence after falling from bleachers at a public school athletic field, alleging a violation of the New York City Building Code regarding protective guards on bleachers. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on liability, finding negligence per se. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a violation of the City’s Administrative Code is only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the code provision originates from state law. This distinction is rooted in the principle that only state statutes can alter the common law of negligence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff fell from bleachers at a public school athletic field owned by the City of New York after a softball game. The bleachers lacked handrails, and the plaintiff alleged the city violated section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code, which mandates protective guards on bleachers. The plaintiff claimed the absence of these guards caused his fall and subsequent injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging negligence based on a violation of the City’s Building Code. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, finding negligence per se. The jury found the defendants 100% liable. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding future lost earnings but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the defendants leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a violation of section 27-531(a)(8)(d) of the New York City Building Code constitutes negligence per se or merely some evidence of negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because a violation of a municipal ordinance or administrative rule constitutes only evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, unless the provision has its origin in State Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between state statutes and local ordinances or administrative rules for establishing negligence. Violations of state statutes imposing specific duties constitute negligence per se, while violations of municipal ordinances are merely evidence of negligence. The court reasoned that elevating a violation of a city ordinance to negligence per se would substantially alter the state’s common law, a change more appropriately left to the Legislature. The Administrative Code itself states that its recodification should not be construed as validating any provision to state law. The court emphasized the City’s retained authority to amend or repeal its Administrative Code provisions without state legislative action, reinforcing its status as a local enactment. Quoting from Major v. Waverly & Ogden, Inc., the court stated that ” ‘has the force and effect of law does not make it so, if by that is meant that it is the equivalent of or equal to a legislative enactment. The Constitution of the State commits to the Legislature alone the power to enact a statute’…It is only to such an enactment that liability without regard to negligence may attach”. The court acknowledged that some Administrative Code sections originate in state law and might warrant statutory treatment but declined to extend statutory status to all City ordinances, as it would create uncertainty in the application of the common law. This holding aligns with Smulczeski v. City Ctr. of Music & Drama, where a violation of a lighting ordinance was deemed evidence of negligence.

  • Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y.2d 854 (1986): Competitive Bidding and Municipal Ordinances

    Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y.2d 854 (1986)

    A municipal ordinance that establishes a precondition to awarding a contract to the lowest responsible bidder is inconsistent with General Municipal Law § 103 and is thus invalid unless expressly authorized by the legislature.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a municipal ordinance requiring contractors to participate in apprentice training programs as a condition for bidding on city contracts violates New York’s General Municipal Law § 103, which mandates competitive bidding. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was invalid because it imposed a precondition not expressly authorized by the legislature, thereby conflicting with the state’s policy of fostering honest competition to secure the best work at the lowest price. The court emphasized that while apprentice training is a desirable goal, it cannot be a mandatory qualification affecting an otherwise responsible low bidder.

    Facts

    The City of Rochester enacted Ordinance 82-450, which required contractors bidding on city projects to participate in apprentice training programs. Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. challenged the ordinance, arguing that it violated General Municipal Law § 103, which requires competitive bidding for municipal contracts.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Monroe County, initially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring the ordinance invalid and enjoining its enforcement. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Supreme Court’s original ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipal ordinance that establishes participation in apprentice training programs as a precondition to awarding a contract to the lowest responsible bidder is inconsistent with General Municipal Law § 103 and, therefore, invalid.

    Holding

    Yes, because the ordinance imposes a precondition to the award of a contract that is not expressly authorized by the legislature and thus conflicts with the state’s competitive bidding requirements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strong public policy of fostering honest competition to obtain the best work or supplies at the lowest possible price, as embodied in General Municipal Law § 103. The court stated that a municipal ordinance establishing a precondition to the award of a contract to the lowest responsible bidder is invalid unless expressly authorized by the legislature. While Labor Law Article 23 encourages apprenticeship programs, it applies only when a contractor voluntarily elects to conform with its provisions. Similarly, while Labor Law § 220 allows paying apprentices less than the prevailing wage under certain conditions, its purpose is to equalize labor costs, not to mandate apprentice training. The court noted, “[t]he predominate purpose of the State Legislature was the protection of the public fisc by requiring competitive bidding (General Municipal Law § 103), that apprentice training, while a desirable end, was not intended by the State Legislature to affect the qualification of an otherwise responsible low bidder.” Therefore, the ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with General Municipal Law § 103. The court distinguished *Matter of Skyway Roofing v County of Rensselaer*, noting that the prior case suggested apprentice training was already required by statute, a suggestion with which the court now disagreed. The court clarified that even a broader reading of the *Skyway Roofing* decision would not have precedential effect because the denial of leave to appeal is not a binding decision.

  • People v. DeFino, 49 N.Y.2d 428 (1980): Preemption of Local Laws Regulating Alcohol Sales

    People v. DeFino, 49 N.Y.2d 428 (1980)

    The State of New York, through the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, has comprehensively preempted the field of regulating establishments that sell alcoholic beverages, thereby preventing local governments from enacting laws that duplicate, contradict, or enter into the same area of regulation.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a city ordinance prohibiting patrons from being in establishments selling alcohol after 2:00 a.m. is preempted by New York State’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. The Court of Appeals held that the state law is comprehensive and preempts local regulation in this area. The ordinance impermissibly infringes upon the state’s exclusive control over alcohol regulation, even though it targets patrons rather than licensees, because the state has determined that controlling sellers, not drinkers, is the most effective approach. The court affirmed the dismissal of charges against patrons for violating the local ordinance.

    Facts

    The City of Rochester enacted a local ordinance prohibiting anyone from patronizing an establishment selling alcohol after 2:00 a.m. Twelve patrons of an unlicensed “after hours” club were charged with violating this ordinance. The ordinance stated that “[n]o person shall patronize an establishment which is selling or offering for sale alcoholic beverages after 2:00 a.m. in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law”.

    Procedural History

    The Rochester City Court dismissed the charges against the patrons, holding that the State had not delegated power to restrict and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. The Monroe County Court affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals after obtaining certification.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law preempts a local ordinance that prohibits patrons from being present in establishments that sell alcoholic beverages after 2:00 a.m., thereby rendering the local ordinance invalid.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State has enacted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory system for alcohol control, demonstrating a clear intent to preempt local regulation in this area.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the police power, which is the power to govern, originates in the state. Local governments can only exercise such power if the state delegates it. Article IX of the New York Constitution prohibits local laws that are inconsistent with state law. This inconsistency extends beyond direct conflicts and includes situations where the state has demonstrated an intent to preempt the field. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Law is a comprehensive and detailed regulatory system, granting the State Liquor Authority power to license and sanction unauthorized alcohol sales. The state law specifies permissible hours of alcohol sales and consumption and even addresses disorderliness on licensed premises. The purpose of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law is “to regulate and control the manufacture, sale and distribution within the state of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of fostering and promoting temperance *** and obedience to law.” The court found that the state made a conscious decision to address alcohol-related problems through state action, not local ordinances. The court emphasized that the State statute embraces all sellers of alcohol, including those operating without a license, as the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law includes a provision making it a crime to sell such beverages without a license. The court dismissed the attempt to differentiate between the ordinance targeting patrons and the State law focusing on sellers because the State consciously decided that concentrating on sellers was the most effective approach. The Court acknowledged local laws of general application still apply (smoke alarms, refuse, etc), but this law specifically regulates alcohol, therefore is preempted. As the Court stated, the local law “would render illegal what is specifically allowed by State law”.

  • Albert Simon, Inc. v. Myerson, 36 N.Y.2d 300 (1975): Legality of Pinball Machine Prohibition

    Albert Simon, Inc. v. Myerson, 36 N.Y.2d 300 (1975)

    A municipality may prohibit pinball machines, even if they are not inherently gambling devices, if the prohibition is reasonably related to a proper governmental purpose, such as preventing evils associated with gambling, and the legislative judgment that pinball machines contribute to such evils is not irrational.

    Summary

    Albert Simon, Inc., a distributor of pinball machines, challenged a determination by the New York City Commissioner of Consumer Affairs to withdraw approval for licensing and installation of their machines. The city’s decision was based on a local ordinance prohibiting gaming devices, including pinball machines. The petitioners argued that their machines were amusement devices, not gambling devices. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the city’s prohibition was valid because it was rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of preventing gambling and its associated evils. The court emphasized that it’s the potential use of the machines, not their inherent nature, that justifies the ban.

    Facts

    Albert Simon, Inc. distributed four types of pinball machines in New York City.

    The Commissioner of Consumer Affairs initially approved the licensing and installation of these machines.

    The Commissioner later withdrew approval, citing a provision in the Administrative Code of the City of New York that prohibited gaming devices, including pinball machines.

    The distributors conceded that there was an element of chance in the games but argued they were primarily for amusement because no prizes or free plays were awarded.

    Procedural History

    The distributors initiated an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the Commissioner’s determination.

    The lower court ruled against the distributors.

    The Appellate Division reversed.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the petition and upholding the Commissioner’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality’s prohibition of pinball machines, based on their potential use for gambling, violates due process, even if the machines are not inherently gambling devices.

    Whether the Commissioner’s initial approval and licensing of the machines estops the city from later withdrawing approval.

    Whether the state’s regulation of gambling preempts the city’s ability to prohibit pinball machines.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prohibition is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose of preventing gambling and its associated evils, and the legislative judgment connecting pinball machines to these evils is not irrational.

    2. No, because an erroneous application of the law does not prevent a public official from correctly applying and enforcing it later.

    3. No, because Article 225 of the Penal Law, dealing with gambling offenses, does not indicate a legislative intent to reserve exclusive regulatory power to the state, preventing a city from prohibiting pinball machines.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the city’s ordinance was a valid exercise of its police power to prevent the evils associated with gambling. Even though the pinball machines may not be gambling devices in and of themselves, the extensive declaration of legislative purpose in the ordinance made it clear that the city was concerned with how the machines were used and their potential to encourage gambling among adults and children, leading to juvenile delinquency and crime. The court stated, “A very extensive declaration of legislative purpose incorporated in the ordinance (§ 436-8.0, subd a) makes clear that it is the use to which such gaming devices are put rather than their inherent characteristics that motivated their interdiction.”

    The court emphasized that it is not the court’s role to determine whether the legislation is wise or the best way to achieve its purpose, but only whether it has a rational basis. The court quoted Nettleton Co. v Diamond, 27 NY2d 182, 193, “To reinforce the presumption that the regulation is valid…we have an expressed legislative judgment that there is a strong relationship between gambling and the evils that attend it, on the one hand, and pinball machines, on the other. We cannot say this judgment is irrational.”

    The court also rejected the argument that the Commissioner was estopped from withdrawing approval, stating, “An erroneous application of law does not relieve a public official from the obligation to apply and enforce it correctly thereafter.”

    Finally, the court found no preemption issue, as the state’s Penal Law did not explicitly reserve exclusive regulatory power in the gambling field. The court cited People v Cook, 34 NY2d 100, and Myerson v Lentini Bros. Moving & Stor. Co., 33 NY2d 250, to support this conclusion.

  • Robin v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347 (1972): Preemption of Abortion Regulation by State Law

    Robin v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347 (1972)

    When the state has demonstrated a clear intent to comprehensively regulate a particular field, such as medical procedures, local municipalities are preempted from enacting ordinances in the same area unless explicitly authorized by the state.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a village ordinance restricting abortions to hospitals is valid when state law already regulates the practice of medicine and abortions. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was invalid because the State of New York had preempted the field of abortion regulation through comprehensive legislation and administrative rules. The court reasoned that allowing municipalities to create their own abortion regulations would undermine the state’s uniform policy and that the village lacked specific authorization to enact such an ordinance.

    Facts

    Dr. Charles Robin, a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, performed abortions at his office in the Incorporated Village of Hempstead. The Village enacted an ordinance requiring all abortions to be performed in state-licensed and accredited hospitals. The Bill Baird Center, a family planning and birth control center where Dr. Robin also worked, did not meet these hospital requirements. The Village sought to enjoin Dr. Robin and the Center from performing abortions in violation of the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Nassau County, consolidated two actions and declared the village ordinance valid, enjoining Dr. Robin and the Center from violating it. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the ordinance was outside the scope of the Village’s powers. The Village appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Village of Hempstead’s ordinance, restricting abortions to hospitals, is valid given the State’s existing regulation of medicine and abortions.

    Holding

    1. No, because the State of New York has preempted the field of abortion regulation, and the Village lacked specific authorization to enact its own ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the State had demonstrated a clear intent to comprehensively regulate the practice of medicine, including abortions, through the Education Law, Public Health Law, and amendments to the Penal Law. The Public Health Law explicitly gives the Department of Health “the central, comprehensive responsibility for the development and administration of the state’s policy with respect to hospital and related services”.

    The court emphasized that the State Department of Health had amended the State Hospital Code to regulate abortions in both hospitals and “independent out-of-hospital health facilities”. This indicated the State’s intention to occupy the entire field of abortion regulation, prohibiting additional regulation by local authorities.

    The Court cited precedent, including Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312 (1943), to support the principle that a municipality lacks authority to legislate on a matter when the State has expressed a policy to preempt the subject, “unless it is specifically empowered so to do in terms clear and explicit”. The Court found no such clear and explicit authorization in this case.

    While villages have the general power to enact ordinances for the health of their inhabitants under Village Law § 89, subd. 59, this is not a delegation of the entire police power of the state and is limited to matters of an inherently local nature. The Court noted that there were no “special conditions” concerning the performance of abortions in the Village of Hempstead, as opposed to the rest of the State, which would warrant the local ordinance.

    The Court also pointed out that when the Legislature amended the Penal Law to define a “justifiable abortional act,” it did not specify the place where such an act must be performed. The Legislature had considered bills that would have required abortions to be performed in certified hospitals, but these bills did not become law, indicating a deliberate choice not to impose such a restriction.

    The Court acknowledged that health and safety considerations might justify requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals, but emphasized that the decision was solely about the Village of Hempstead lacking the power to enact the ordinance, not about the wisdom of such a restriction.

  • People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286 (1970): Landlord Liability for Tenant’s Unlawful Conduct

    People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286 (1970)

    A landlord is not liable for a tenant’s unlawful conduct on the leased premises unless the landlord has the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy due to the unlawful activity.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a landlord for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting the storage of junked vehicles. The landlord had leased the property to his son, who then stored the vehicles. The court held that the landlord could not be held liable because he did not have the right to re-enter the property and stop his tenant’s actions. A dissenting opinion argued the landlord did have the right to re-enter to discontinue the unlawful use of his property, especially since the lease was a sham. This case illustrates the limits of a landlord’s responsibility for a tenant’s illegal activities and the importance of the right to re-entry.

    Facts

    The defendant, Scott, leased his property to his son. After the lease was executed, a municipal ordinance was enacted prohibiting the storage of junked vehicles. The son stored approximately 100 junked vehicles on the property. The defendant was arrested and convicted for violating the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    The Broome County Court convicted the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the landlord could not be held liable for his tenant’s actions because he lacked the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy based on the unlawful activity. The dissent argued for affirmance, asserting the lease was a sham and the landlord had a right and a duty to re-enter.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landlord can be held criminally liable for a tenant’s violation of a municipal ordinance on the leased property, when the landlord does not have the right to re-enter the property and terminate the tenancy?

    Holding

    No, because a landlord cannot be penalized for conduct over which he has no control. The court reasoned that the landlord’s inability to control his tenant’s unlawful acts precluded imposing any penalty upon him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant could not be held liable for his son’s actions because he had leased the property and did not have the legal right to re-enter and stop the unlawful activity. The court relied on the principle that a person cannot be penalized for conduct over which he has no control. The court stated that the owner “cannot permit an unlawful condition to persist with impunity,” but reasoned the landlord did not “permit” in this case since the lease transferred control to the tenant. They distinguished Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 stating that in this case, the lease was executed before the enactment of the ordinance, therefore no sanction can be imposed upon the defendant.

    The dissenting opinion argued that the landlord did have the right to re-enter the property to discontinue the unlawful use, regardless of whether the activity was for profit. The dissent cited People ex rel. Jay v. Bennett, 14 Hun 63 stating: “This statute was intended not only to prevent the use of premises for an unlawful purpose, but to protect the landlord from the consequences of allowing such unlawful purpose to continue. It gave him in other words the power to put an end to it, and thus to shield himself from any penalty for knowingly permitting the premises to be used as indicated.” The dissent further argued the lease was a sham, granting the landlord the right to re-enter at any time. The dissent also noted the defendant took no action for almost a year after the ordinance was effective, which should warrant an affirmance (Tenement House Dept. of City of N. Y. v. McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160).