New York Law Review

Tag: municipal liability

  • Barry v. Niagara Frontier Transit System, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 632 (1974): Prior Notice Requirement for Claims Against Municipalities

    Barry v. Niagara Frontier Transit System, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 632 (1974)

    A municipality cannot be held liable in a third-party action for contribution or indemnification relating to a defective street or sidewalk condition if the municipality did not receive prior written notice of the condition, as required by statute.

    Summary

    Dorothy Barry sued Niagara Frontier Transit System for injuries sustained while exiting a bus at a bus stop in the Village of Kenmore, alleging negligence in failing to provide a safe place to alight. Niagara Frontier then brought a third-party action against the Village, seeking contribution or indemnification should it be found liable to Barry. The Village moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing that it had not received prior written notice of the defective condition as required by Village Law § 341-a. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that allowing a third-party action without prior written notice would undermine the statute’s intent to limit municipal liability for nonfeasance.

    Facts

    Dorothy Barry allegedly sustained personal injuries on September 10, 1968, while alighting from a bus operated by Niagara Frontier Transit System at a bus stop within the Village of Kenmore. Barry sued Niagara Frontier, claiming negligence in operating the bus and failing to provide a safe place to alight. Niagara Frontier then filed a third-party complaint against the Village of Kenmore, seeking contribution or indemnification, arguing that if Barry’s injuries occurred as claimed and Niagara Frontier was found liable, the Village should be responsible for all or part of the judgment. It was conceded that the Village had not received prior written notice of the alleged defect.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term dismissed Niagara Frontier’s third-party complaint, relying on Village Law § 341-a, which requires prior written notice to the Village of any dangerous condition before an action can be maintained. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the applicability of the notice requirement in the context of a third-party complaint for apportionment, following the principles established in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a third-party action for contribution or indemnification can be maintained against a village for personal injuries allegedly caused by a dangerous condition in a street or sidewalk when the village did not receive prior written notice of the condition, as required by Village Law § 341-a (now CPLR 9804).

    Holding

    No, because allowing a third-party action without prior written notice would undermine the legislative intent of Village Law § 341-a to restrict a village’s liability for nonfeasance regarding defective street and sidewalk conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule of apportionment applies when tortfeasors share responsibility for an accident due to violations of duties they respectively owed to the injured person. In this case, the village’s duty of care to the plaintiff was to repair or remove any defect within a reasonable time after receiving written notice of the dangerous condition. Because no prior notice was given, no cause of action accrued against the village directly. The court emphasized that allowing a third-party action would permit indirectly what could not be done directly due to the failure to comply with the notice requirement. The court stated, “applies when two or more tort-feasors have shared, albeit in various degrees, in the responsibility by their conduct or omissions in causing an accident, in violation of the duties they respectively owed to the injured person.” The Court further explained that Village Law § 341-a was enacted to address municipal street and sidewalk liability and modified the general substantive law of torts by varying a village’s duty of care. The practical consequence of this requirement is to prevent any possibility of liability for nonfeasance, except where the village fails or refuses to remedy the condition within a reasonable time after receipt of notice. The Court noted that permitting a Dole claim to proceed without notice would undermine the legislative intent to restrict the village’s liability and potentially subject the village to significant financial burdens arising from unnoticed defects. As the Court argued, “To permit a Dole claim to go forward in the absence of notice would undermine the legislative design to restrict the village’s liability for nonfeasance and might subject the village to ultimate responsibility to pay a ‘catastrophe judgment’ arising from unnoticed defects.”

  • Camarella v. East Irondequoit Central School District, 34 N.Y.2d 139 (1974): Strict Compliance with Notice of Claim Requirements in New York

    Camarella v. East Irondequoit Central School District, 34 N.Y.2d 139 (1974)

    In New York, strict compliance with the General Municipal Law § 50-e regarding the manner and timing of serving a notice of claim is required before commencing an action against a municipality, and defects in service or untimely filing cannot be excused absent specific statutory exceptions.

    Summary

    This case underscores the stringent requirements of New York’s General Municipal Law § 50-e concerning the timely and proper service of a notice of claim as a prerequisite to suing a municipality. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ failure to serve a timely notice of claim (within 90 days of the accident) and to seek leave for late filing within one year barred their action. The Court rejected the argument that an accident report or a letter from the attorney could substitute for a formal notice of claim, emphasizing the need for legislative reform to balance the municipality’s need for prompt notification and the injured party’s right to compensation.

    Facts

    A plaintiff was injured in an accident involving the East Irondequoit Central School District. The plaintiffs served a notice of claim 92 days after the accident, exceeding the statutory 90-day limit prescribed by General Municipal Law § 50-e. An accident report was filed by the school principal the day after the accident. The plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter of representation to the school district’s insurance carrier one week after the accident. The plaintiffs did not move for leave to file a late notice of claim within one year of the accident.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs initially brought suit despite the untimely notice of claim. The lower court initially granted relief to the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the notice of claim was untimely and that the accident report and letter of representation did not constitute valid substitutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a notice of claim served 92 days after the accident, exceeding the 90-day limit prescribed by General Municipal Law § 50-e, is timely.

    2. Whether an accident report filed by a school principal and a letter of representation from the plaintiff’s attorney can be considered a sufficient substitute for a formal notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e.

    3. Whether the plaintiffs’ failure to move for leave to file a late notice of claim within one year of the accident bars their claim.

    Holding

    1. No, because General Municipal Law § 50-e requires a notice of claim to be served within 90 days of the accident.

    2. No, because these documents were not intended to be a notice of claim in which curable good faith mistakes or omissions were made, and it’s unclear if they were served on the proper parties.

    3. Yes, because General Municipal Law § 50-e requires a motion for leave to file a late notice of claim to be made within one year of the event and prior to commencement of an action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the strict requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e. The court stated that relief from late filing is only available if a motion for such relief is made within one year after the event and prior to commencing the action. The court reasoned that the accident report and attorney’s letter could not substitute for a formal notice of claim because they were not intended as such and may not have been served on the correct parties. The court further explained that the saving provisions of subdivision 6 of section 50-e deal only with inconsequential defects or irregularities, not pertaining to the manner or time of service, in otherwise sound notices of claim. The Court noted the harshness of section 50-e, but reiterated that it lacked the power to substitute something else for the statutorily required notice. The court acknowledged the need for legislative reconsideration of the harsher aspects of section 50-e to achieve a more equitable balance. As the court stated, “But where the Legislature has decreed that, as a prerequisite to sue, a particular form of notice shall be conveyed with particular details to particular public officers, the courts lack the power to substitute something else.”

  • Klapak v. City of Buffalo, 19 N.Y.2d 812 (1967): Municipality’s Duty and Notice Requirements for Sidewalk Defects

    Klapak v. City of Buffalo, 19 N.Y.2d 812 (1967)

    A municipality is generally not liable for injuries caused by defective sidewalks unless it has received prior written notice of the defect and fails to remedy it, unless the municipality itself affirmatively caused the defect.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether the City of Buffalo was liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff due to a defective sidewalk. The City Charter required prior written notice of sidewalk defects for liability. The plaintiff argued the city caused the defect by negligently allowing salt from a city-placed barrel to spill onto the sidewalk, accelerating deterioration. The Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding that the city could be liable if its affirmative negligence created the defect, even without prior written notice. The dissent argued the evidence of the city’s negligence was speculative and the sidewalk’s condition resulted from normal wear and tear, thus requiring prior written notice.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Klapak, was injured due to a defective sidewalk in the City of Buffalo. The City of Buffalo had placed a barrel of salt on the street for public use during icy conditions. Klapak contended that the City’s employees negligently refilled the salt barrel, causing salt to spill onto the sidewalk. Klapak presented expert testimony that prolonged and indiscriminate use of salt could cause sidewalk deterioration. The custodian of a nearby church testified that while people used the salt and children scattered it, spillage was generally cleaned up.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially dismissed the complaint. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court set aside the jury verdict. The appellate division reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated the jury verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the City of Buffalo could be held liable for injuries sustained on a defective sidewalk when the City Charter required prior written notice of the defect and no such notice was given.

    2. Whether an exception to the written notice requirement exists when the municipality allegedly caused the defective condition through its own affirmative negligence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the City of Buffalo could be held liable because the city’s own negligence created the defect. The requirement for prior written notice does not apply when the municipality caused the condition.

    2. Yes, an exception to the written notice requirement exists when the municipality causes and maintains the defective condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the City Charter provision requiring prior written notice was intended to protect the city from liability for defects that it was unaware of. However, this protection does not extend to situations where the city itself affirmatively created the dangerous condition. The court cited precedent supporting the principle that a municipality cannot benefit from the notice requirement when its own actions caused the defect. The court implicitly found that the plaintiff provided enough evidence to infer the city’s negligence caused the sidewalk defect. The court appears to have accepted the plaintiff’s expert testimony that salt caused the sidewalk defect. The court did not provide explicit quotes from previous cases, but cited precedent supporting that a municipality cannot benefit from the notice requirement when its own actions caused the defect. Scileppi, J., in dissent, argued that the plaintiff’s evidence was based on speculation and conjecture. The dissent emphasized that there was no evidence the city allowed salt to accumulate over prolonged periods. Furthermore, the dissent contended that providing a salt barrel was not inherently dangerous and the sidewalk deterioration was a result of normal wear and tear. The dissent argued that the majority was effectively making the city an insurer, even when the respondents had not proven actionable negligence.

  • Weiner v. Serps Auto Wreckers, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 857 (1969): Impact of Misleading Notice of Claim on Negligence Liability

    Weiner v. Serps Auto Wreckers, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 857 (1969)

    A misleading notice of claim regarding the location of a defect in a negligence case can prejudice a defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, potentially warranting a new trial.

    Summary

    In this negligence action, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the impact of a misleading notice of claim on the City of New York’s liability. The plaintiff, Stuart Weiner, sustained injuries when a car being towed broke away due to an alleged defect in the roadway. The defendant Simon’s testimony was crucial, but his initial statements conflicted with his trial testimony regarding the defect’s location. The court found that the notice of claim, pleading, and bill of particulars incorrectly identified the location of the defect, hindering the city’s ability to investigate and defend the claim. Due to the closeness of the case on the merits and the prejudice caused by the misleading notice and inadmissible evidence, the court ordered a new trial for the City of New York.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Stuart Weiner was injured when a car being towed by defendant Simon of Serps Auto Wreckers, Inc., broke away. Simon’s testimony at trial indicated a hole in the pavement caused the incident. However, Simon’s initial statements to the police immediately after the accident did not mention any road defect and at least one statement disclaimed it as a cause. The notice of claim filed by the plaintiff, along with the pleading and bill of particulars, placed the defective condition of the street approximately 200 feet away from where the plaintiff’s evidence at trial located it.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff initially won a judgment against multiple defendants, including the City of New York, Serps Auto Wreckers, Inc., and Simon. The City of New York appealed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals modified the judgment, directing a new trial specifically for the City of New York, while affirming the judgment against the other defendants.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a misleading notice of claim regarding the location of a defect prejudices a defendant’s ability to prepare a defense in a negligence case.
    2. Whether evidence of repairs made after an accident is admissible when the location of the purported defect differs from that specified in the notice of claim.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the notice of claim, pleading, and bill of particulars placed the purported defect 200 feet away from the location established by the plaintiff’s proof at trial, misleading the city in preparing its defense.
    2. No, because the evidence of repairs pertained to a different location than that identified in the notice of claim, and the city’s photograph of the area specified in the notice of claim did not open the door to evidence concerning repairs at the actual accident site.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the importance of an accurate notice of claim in negligence cases against municipalities. The purpose of the notice is to allow the municipality to investigate the claim promptly and efficiently. The court noted that Simon’s trial testimony was the sole basis for the city’s liability, but it conflicted with his initial statements. Given the close nature of the case against the city, the misleading notice of claim significantly prejudiced its ability to defend itself. The court stated, “The notice of claim, pleading and bill of particulars, placing the purported defective condition of the street some 200 feet away from where plaintiff’s proof on the trial placed it, were misleading to the city in preparation of its defense.” Furthermore, the court held that evidence of repairs made after the accident at the actual accident site was inadmissible. The court reasoned that the city’s introduction of a photograph of the location specified in the notice of claim did not justify admitting evidence related to a different location. The court concluded that these errors, combined with the closeness of the case, warranted a new trial for the City of New York. The court’s decision underscores the importance of accurate and timely notice in claims against municipalities and the potential consequences of misleading information on the ability to defend against such claims.

  • Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579 (1968): Municipal Liability for Failure to Provide Police Protection

    Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579 (1968)

    A municipality is not liable for failure to provide specific police protection to an individual member of the public, even when that individual has made repeated requests for protection and faces a foreseeable risk of harm, unless the municipality has assumed a special duty to that individual.

    Summary

    Riss sued New York City for failing to provide her with police protection after she repeatedly requested it due to threats from a rejected suitor. The New York Court of Appeals held that a municipality is not liable for failing to provide police protection to a specific individual, even with knowledge of potential harm, because allocating police resources is a governmental function best left to the legislative and executive branches. Imposing a general duty of protection would overwhelm police resources and force courts to make resource allocation decisions, a task for which they are ill-suited. The Court distinguished cases where the police assume a specific duty to an individual, creating a special relationship.

    Facts

    Linda Riss was threatened by a rejected suitor, Burton Pugach, who stated that if he couldn’t have her, no one else would, and that he would have her killed. Riss repeatedly sought police protection and informed them of Pugach’s threats. The police were aware of Pugach’s threats but did not provide Riss with specific protection. Pugach later hired someone to throw lye in Riss’s face, causing severe and permanent injuries, including blindness.

    Procedural History

    Riss sued the City of New York for failing to provide her with police protection. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, but a divided Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal after both sides presented their cases but before the case went to the jury. Riss then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality is liable in tort for failing to provide specific police protection to a member of the public who has repeatedly requested such protection and is foreseeably threatened with physical harm.

    Holding

    No, because imposing a general duty of police protection on municipalities would require courts to make resource allocation decisions better suited to the legislative and executive branches, and could overwhelm police resources without predictable limits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the provision of police protection is a governmental service to protect the public generally. The amount of protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the community and by legislative-executive decisions about how those resources should be deployed. The court stated, “For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits.” The Court emphasized that allocating resources for public safety is a legislative and executive function, not a judicial one. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where a municipality undertakes a specific duty to protect an individual, thereby creating a special relationship, as in Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75. The Court also highlighted the potential consequences of imposing liability, given the increased crime rates and the repetitive nature of criminal activity in certain areas. To impose liability based on a showing of probable need and a request for protection would be “foolhardy indeed and an assumption of judicial wisdom and power not possessed by the courts.” The Court also noted that compensation for crime victims is a matter for the legislature, which had carefully studied and narrowly defined such compensation through specific statutes.

  • Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 18 N.Y.2d 362 (1966): Scope of Prior Written Notice Requirement for Village Liability

    Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 18 N.Y.2d 362 (1966)

    A village’s statutory requirement of prior written notice for defects applies only to physical conditions of streets and sidewalks, not to malfunctioning traffic signs.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Doremus sued the Village of Lynbrook for negligence after a car accident allegedly caused by a malfunctioning stop sign. The Village moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to allege prior written notice of the defect as required by Section 341-a of the Village Law. The lower courts granted the motion, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prior written notice requirement applied only to physical defects in streets and sidewalks, not to malfunctioning traffic signs. The Court reasoned that the statute should be narrowly construed as it is in derogation of common law.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Doremus was injured in a car accident at an intersection in the Village of Lynbrook. The plaintiff alleged the accident was caused by the Village’s negligence in failing to maintain a working stop sign at the intersection. The complaint stated: “That the negligence of the defendant, The Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, consisted of failing to keep in good working order and failing to repair a stop sign on the southeast corner of Walnut Street and Earle Avenue in the aforesaid Incorporated Village of Lynbrook.” The plaintiff did not allege that the Village had received prior written notice of the defective stop sign.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the Village’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to allege prior written notice as required by Section 341-a of the Village Law. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with two justices dissenting. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 341-a of the Village Law, requiring prior written notice of defective conditions, applies to a claim of negligence based on a malfunctioning or missing traffic sign.

    Holding

    No, because Section 341-a applies only to physical defects in the surface of streets, highways, bridges, culverts, sidewalks, or crosswalks, and does not extend to claims based on a failure to maintain traffic signs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Section 341-a should be read strictly and applies only to physical defects in the surface of streets and sidewalks. The court emphasized that the statute is “in derogation of the common law” and its scope should not be extended beyond its plain meaning. The court stated that the statute’s language “seems to refer to actual physical defects in the surface of a street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk and the reference to snow and ice seems to confirm this.” The court also noted that when the statute was adopted in 1927, stop signs were not as prevalent, suggesting the legislature did not intend for the statute to cover malfunctioning traffic signs.

    The court distinguished the case from Canepa v. State of New York, 306 N.Y. 272, which held that the State could be liable for negligence in failing to provide adequate warning signs, because that case did not involve Section 341-a. The court concluded that the purpose of Section 341-a was to exempt villages from liability for “holes and breaks of a kind which do not immediately come to the attention of the village officers unless they are given actual notice thereof.”

  • Woodhull v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 150 N.Y. 450 (1896): Municipal Liability for Police Officer Actions

    Woodhull v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 150 N.Y. 450 (1896)

    A municipality is not liable for the actions of a police officer performing a public duty mandated by statute, even if the officer is appointed by the municipality.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, Woodhull, sued the City of New York for false imprisonment after being arrested by a bridge policeman. The New York Court of Appeals held that the city was not liable for the officer’s actions because the officer was performing a public duty under state law, not acting as a servant of the municipality. This case clarifies the distinction between municipal liability for actions performed in a corporate capacity versus those performed as part of a broader public service. It establishes that even when a municipality appoints an individual, if that individual is executing a state-mandated public duty, the municipality is shielded from liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

    Facts

    Woodhull entered a car on the Brooklyn Bridge. As he entered, a bridge police officer, Bishop, closed the sliding door, catching Woodhull’s foot. After freeing his foot, Woodhull questioned Bishop. Bishop then arrested Woodhull, claiming he had been struck. Woodhull was taken to a police station, charged with assault, and later discharged after a trial.

    Procedural History

    Woodhull sued the City of New York for false imprisonment. The trial court’s judgment was appealed to the General Term. The General Term sided with Woodhull. The City of New York then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York is liable for the actions of Bishop, a police officer appointed by the bridge trustees, in arresting Woodhull for an alleged assault.

    Holding

    No, because Bishop was acting as a public officer performing a state-mandated duty, not as a servant or agent of the City of New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the liability of a municipal corporation depends on the character of the service performed by the employee. If the employee is performing a public service mandated by statute, the municipality is not liable for their actions, even if the municipality appointed the employee. The court distinguished between actions performed in a corporate capacity for the benefit of the municipality and those performed as part of a broader public service. The court stated, “Police officers appointed by a city are not its agents or servants.” Bishop was appointed under a statute giving him the powers of city policemen and requiring him to protect all travelers, not just city residents. The court rejected the argument that Bishop’s initial act of closing the door (potentially an employee action) was inseparable from the arrest (a police action). The court emphasized that Bishop’s act of placing Woodhull under arrest was performed in his capacity as a policeman, not as an employee of the city. Therefore, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply.

  • Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N.Y. 104 (1858): Independent Contractors and Non-Delegable Duties

    Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N.Y. 104 (1858)

    A municipality cannot avoid liability for injuries resulting from inherently dangerous work in a public street by delegating the work to an independent contractor; the duty to maintain safe streets is non-delegable.

    Summary

    The City of Utica contracted for the construction of a sewer in a public street. The contractor created a deep excavation that was left unguarded, leading to an accident and injuries to the plaintiff. The city argued it wasn’t liable because the negligence was that of an independent contractor. The New York Court of Appeals held the city liable, establishing that a municipality has a non-delegable duty to maintain its streets in a safe condition. When work authorized by the city necessarily creates a dangerous condition unless properly guarded, the city remains responsible for ensuring those safeguards are in place, regardless of who performs the work.

    Facts

    The City of Utica contracted with a third party to construct a sewer in one of its public streets.
    The construction involved creating a deep excavation in the street.
    The excavation was left unguarded and unlit at night.
    The plaintiff fell into the excavation, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of Utica to recover damages for his injuries.
    The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff.
    The City of Utica appealed, arguing it was not liable because the negligence was that of an independent contractor.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding the city liable.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality can avoid liability for injuries caused by dangerous conditions created during public works projects by claiming the negligence was that of an independent contractor.

    Holding

    No, because a municipality has a non-delegable duty to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition, and this duty extends to protecting the public from dangers created during the performance of work it has authorized in those streets.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the city had a duty to ensure the safety of its streets. This duty could not be discharged by simply hiring an independent contractor. The court emphasized that the excavation itself created an inherently dangerous condition. The key was whether the work *necessarily* involved a dangerous condition. The court distinguished this from situations where the danger arose from *collateral* negligence. The court stated, “Where the obstruction or defect caused or created in the street is purely collateral to the work contracted to be done, and is entirely the result of the wrongful acts of the contractor or his workmen, the rule is that the employer is not liable; but where the obstruction or defect which occasioned the injury results directly from the acts which the contractor agreed and was authorized to do, the person who employs the contractor and authorizes him to do those acts is equally liable to the injured party.”

    The court noted that the city authorized the creation of the dangerous condition (the excavation). Therefore, the city remained responsible for ensuring that appropriate safeguards were in place to protect the public, regardless of who was performing the work. The court contrasted this situation with cases where the negligence was merely collateral to the work itself. The municipality’s duty to maintain safe streets is a crucial policy consideration that outweighs the typical rules regarding independent contractor liability.