New York Law Review

Tag: municipal liability

  • Orellana v. Town of Carmel, 2024 NY Slip Op 05131: Determining if Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) Exempts Municipal Defendants from Liability for Ordinary Negligence

    2024 NY Slip Op 05131

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts parties “actually engaged in work on a highway” from liability for ordinary negligence, but this exemption does not apply to individuals merely traveling between work sites without actively performing a protected task on the road.

    Summary

    In Orellana v. Town of Carmel, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the scope of the exemption from ordinary negligence liability provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The court considered whether the Town of Carmel’s Superintendent of Highways, who was involved in a collision while driving to the office after inspecting road conditions, was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that because the superintendent was not actively performing any protected work, the exemption did not apply. Therefore, the municipal defendants were not shielded from liability for ordinary negligence, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability was granted.

    Facts

    During a snowstorm in December 2018, Michael J. Simone, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, was driving to his office after assessing road conditions and directing his team to salt the roads. While en route, Simone stopped at a stop sign, observed snow accumulation, and proceeded through the intersection. He then collided with Ana Orellana’s vehicle. Orellana sued, claiming negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding they were protected by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Appellate Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff commenced a negligence action. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, ultimately reversing the Appellate Division’s decision, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and granting plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Superintendent of Highways was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the accident, thereby exempting the municipal defendants from liability for ordinary negligence under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b).

    Holding

    No, because the Superintendent was not actively performing any protected work at the time of the accident, the defendants were not exempt from liability for ordinary negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), which provides that the rules of the road do not apply to those “actually engaged in work on a highway.” The court cited prior cases like Riley v. County of Broome, which clarified that the focus is on the nature of the work being performed (construction, repair, maintenance) and not just the vehicle performing the work. The court emphasized that the exemption only applies when such work is in fact being performed at the time of the accident. In this case, the superintendent had completed his assessment and directed the salting of the roads. The court found that, at the time of the accident, Simone was merely traveling on the highway, and not actively engaged in road work. The court held that this did not satisfy the requirements for the exemption.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies the limits of the exemption provided by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Attorneys should focus on whether the party was actively engaged in construction, repair, or maintenance, not just whether the vehicle was equipped for such work or traveling on a road. A vehicle traveling between work sites or performing preliminary assessments might not qualify for the exemption. This ruling supports a narrower interpretation of the statute, suggesting that the exemption is reserved for situations involving immediate, active work on the highway. This decision highlights that mere travel or preparation is insufficient; actual performance of highway work is required to invoke the protections of the statute. This is a case that must be considered when assessing liability of municipalities and their employees in cases involving accidents on highways.

  • Orellana v. Town of Carmel, 2024 NY Slip Op 05131: Defining “Work on a Highway” and the Scope of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b)

    2024 NY Slip Op 05131

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) provides an exemption from ordinary negligence liability for those “actually engaged in work on a highway”; this exemption does not apply to mere travel between work sites.

    Summary

    In Orellana v. Town of Carmel, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a town highway superintendent, who was driving back to his office after inspecting road conditions, was “actually engaged in work on a highway” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Court held that the superintendent was not engaged in protected work at the time of the accident, as he was merely traveling to his office, and reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. This decision clarifies the scope of the exemption from liability granted to those performing highway work, emphasizing that the exemption is not applicable when the work is not actively being performed.

    Facts

    On a snowy day in December 2018, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, Michael J. Simone, drove to a location to inspect road conditions. After observing a quarter inch of snow accumulation, Simone directed his team to salt the roads. He then began driving back to his office. While driving through an intersection, Simone stopped at a stop sign, observed some additional snow accumulation, but did not take any action and proceeded into the intersection, colliding with Ana Orellana’s vehicle. Orellana sued the Town of Carmel and Simone for negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, Ana Orellana, filed a negligence lawsuit against the Town of Carmel and Michael J. Simone (Superintendent of Highways). The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted the plaintiff leave to appeal, and ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Superintendent of Highways was “actually engaged in work on a highway” at the time of the collision, as defined by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b)?

    Holding

    1. No, because Simone was not actively engaged in work on a highway at the time of the collision, the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) did not apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reiterated that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts those “actually engaged in work on a highway” from ordinary negligence liability, but they remain liable for recklessness. The court referenced Riley v. County of Broome, which clarified that the exemption turns on the nature of the work (construction, repair, etc.) being performed, not the vehicle performing the work. The Court emphasized that the exemption applies only when such work is in fact being performed at the time of the accident. In this case, the Court found that Simone was not actively engaged in work on the highway; he had already assessed conditions and dispatched his team. He was merely traveling to his office, and the observation of additional snow just before the accident did not constitute active work. “Because the uncontested evidence demonstrates that Simone was not actually engaged in work on a highway at the time the accident occurred, defendants are not entitled to the protections of section 1103 (b).”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of the “work on a highway” exemption under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). It underscores that merely traveling to or from a work site, even for the purpose of inspecting conditions, does not qualify as “actually engaged in work on a highway.” This ruling reinforces the concept that the exemption applies to those actively performing tasks related to highway maintenance or repair at the time of the accident. Attorneys should carefully examine the specific activities being performed at the time of an accident involving municipal vehicles. The Court’s emphasis on the active performance of protected work could lead to more frequent determinations that the exemption does not apply, expanding the potential liability of municipalities and their employees.

  • Tara N.P. v. Western Suffolk Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 27 N.Y.3d 711 (2016): Establishing a Special Duty is Required for Municipal Liability in Governmental Capacity

    27 N.Y.3d 711 (2016)

    A municipality is not liable for negligence committed while performing a governmental function, unless the municipality owed a special duty to the injured party.

    Summary

    Tara N.P. sued Suffolk County for negligence after she was sexually assaulted by a worker referred to a facility where she attended classes through the County’s “welfare to work” program. The New York Court of Appeals held that the County was acting in a governmental capacity when referring the worker and did not owe Tara N.P. a special duty. The Court found the County’s actions were part of a governmental function and did not meet the requirements for a special duty, specifically the lack of direct contact and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff. Therefore, the County was not liable for the assault.

    Facts

    Suffolk County operated a “welfare to work” program (SWEP). The County referred Larry Smith, a known sex offender, to a facility operated by North Amityville Community Economic Council (NACEC) for a maintenance position, despite NACEC’s policy against hiring individuals with criminal records. Smith sexually assaulted Tara N.P. at the facility. N.P. sued the County, arguing its negligence in referring Smith caused her injuries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the County based on governmental immunity, holding the County acted in a governmental capacity and did not assume a special duty to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity when it referred Smith to NACEC?

    Whether, assuming the County acted in a governmental capacity, the County owed a special duty to Tara N.P. that would allow the County to be liable for Smith’s actions?

    Holding

    Yes, the County was acting in a governmental capacity because it was operating a “welfare to work” program.

    No, the County did not owe a special duty to Tara N.P., because the requirements of a special duty were not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court first determined whether the County was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity. The Court found that the County’s referral of Smith was part of its operation of the SWEP program, a governmental function “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers.” As such, the Court held that the County was performing a governmental function. The Court distinguished this from a proprietary function where the government’s activities substitute for private enterprises. The Court found no evidence to suggest the County assumed the role of a private landlord in this case.

    Having established the County acted in a governmental capacity, the Court addressed whether the County owed Tara N.P. a “special duty.” The Court explained that to “sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached must be more than that owed the public generally.” A special duty arises when (1) a statute protects the plaintiff’s class, (2) the government voluntarily assumed a duty beyond that owed to the public, or (3) the municipality took control of a dangerous condition. Only the second situation was at issue here. The Court cited Cuffy v. City of New York to explain the four elements of this special relationship: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.” The Court found that the last two elements were not met because there was no direct contact between Tara N.P. and the County, and she did not justifiably rely on the County’s actions. The Court stated that because there was no direct contact or justifiable reliance, the County had no special duty to N.P. and thus could not be held liable for Smith’s actions.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces that municipalities performing governmental functions are generally immune from liability for negligence unless a special duty is established. Attorneys must carefully analyze whether a municipality’s actions constitute a governmental or proprietary function. The case underscores the strict requirements for proving a “special duty,” particularly the need for direct contact between the injured party and the municipality, and the party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s actions. This decision will guide the analysis of similar negligence claims against municipalities, especially those involving social services programs or other governmental activities. Lawyers need to emphasize the lack of direct contact and justifiable reliance of the injured party on the municipality’s promises or actions to defeat a negligence claim.

  • Turturro v. City of New York, 27 N.Y.3d 474 (2016): Municipal Liability for Roadway Design and the Proprietary Function Exception

    <strong><em>Turturro v. City of New York</em>, 27 N.Y.3d 474 (2016)</em></strong>

    A municipality’s failure to adequately study or implement roadway design changes to address a known speeding problem constitutes a proprietary function, subjecting it to ordinary negligence standards, even if the underlying cause of the accident is driver negligence.

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the City of New York acted in a proprietary or governmental capacity when it failed to conduct a comprehensive traffic study and implement traffic calming measures on a Brooklyn roadway, despite repeated complaints of speeding. The court held that the City’s actions fell under its proprietary function because they concerned roadway design and safety. Thus, the plaintiffs did not need to prove a special duty to establish liability. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding the evidence supported the jury’s findings on proximate cause and that the City was not entitled to qualified immunity.

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>

    Anthony Turturro, a 12-year-old bicyclist, was struck by a speeding vehicle on Gerritsen Avenue in Brooklyn. The City had received multiple complaints about speeding on the road, including requests for traffic studies and signals. The City’s Intersection Control Unit (ICU) conducted several studies at specific intersections along the road, finding speeding issues, but did not undertake a comprehensive study of the entire roadway or implement traffic calming measures. The driver, Pascarella, was speeding and subsequently pleaded guilty to assault. Anthony suffered severe injuries. The plaintiffs sued the City, Pascarella, and the vehicle owner, alleging negligence in the City’s failure to address the speeding problem.

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>

    The trial court found the City, Pascarella, and Anthony were negligent and apportioned liability. The City’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the City acted in a proprietary capacity and rejecting the City’s claims of governmental function immunity. The Court of Appeals granted the City leave to appeal.

    <p><strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>

    1. Whether the City acted in a proprietary or governmental capacity when it failed to address speeding complaints.
    2. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings on proximate cause.
    3. Whether the City was entitled to qualified immunity.

    <p><strong>Holding</strong></p>

    1. Yes, because the City’s actions regarding roadway design and safety are considered a proprietary function.
    2. Yes, because the jury’s finding of proximate cause was supported by the evidence.
    3. No, because the ICU studies did not address the overall speeding problem, thus the City was not entitled to immunity.

    <p><strong>Court's Reasoning</strong></p>

    The court differentiated between a municipality’s proprietary and governmental functions. Highway design and maintenance are generally considered proprietary. The court emphasized that “the determination of the primary capacity under which a governmental agency was acting turns solely on the acts or omissions claimed to have caused the injury” (World Trade Ctr.). The court found the City’s failure to address speeding through traffic studies and measures related to its proprietary duty to maintain roads in a reasonably safe condition. The court noted that the City’s response to speeding complaints did not constitute the exercise of police power, a governmental function. The court referenced Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283 (1986), which established qualified immunity where a municipality has studied a dangerous condition and developed a reasonable plan. But, because the ICU studies were not intended to address the generalized speeding along the roadway, the court found that they were not a reasonable response to complaints, and the City could not claim immunity. The Court referenced the statement in Tomassi v. Town of Union, 46 N.Y.2d 91 (1978) that the government has a duty to make its highways “reasonably safe for people who obey the rules of the road.” However, the court did not hold this to mean a municipality is absolved of liability when a collision involves speeding; rather, the court found that the City needed to use available design methods to account for speeding, and that the City’s failure was a proximate cause of the accident.

    <p><strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>

    This case clarifies the boundary between a municipality’s proprietary and governmental functions in roadway safety cases. It emphasizes that a municipality must take appropriate action when aware of dangerous conditions, and that a cursory or inadequate study is not sufficient to claim qualified immunity. It establishes that failure to study the speeding problem adequately and implement proper traffic calming measures could establish liability. The court also clarifies that even if the direct cause of an accident is driver negligence, a municipality can still be liable if its negligence in roadway design contributed to the accident. This case emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to roadway safety, considering all relevant factors to determine if traffic calming measures are necessary. Attorneys should consider this case when evaluating the city’s response to complaints of hazardous road conditions and failure to employ proper traffic calming methods.

  • Matter of Newcomb v. Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 N.Y.3d 460 (2016): Burden of Proof in Late Notice of Claim Cases

    28 N.Y.3d 460 (2016)

    A petitioner seeking to serve a late notice of claim against a public corporation must initially show that the delay will not substantially prejudice the corporation, after which the burden shifts to the corporation to provide particularized evidence of substantial prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s denial of a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim against a school district. The Court held that the lower courts erred by placing the entire burden on the petitioner to demonstrate a lack of substantial prejudice to the school district caused by the delay in filing the notice. The Court clarified that the petitioner bears the initial burden of showing no prejudice. Once this is established, the burden shifts to the public corporation to provide specific evidence of substantial prejudice. The court found that the lower courts relied on speculation rather than evidence to support the claim of prejudice and that the school district had not met its burden.

    Facts

    A 16-year-old boy was struck by a car. The driver fled the scene. The boy sustained severe injuries. Within days of the accident, the boy’s father reported the details to the boy’s high school within the defendant school district. Counsel for the father requested the police accident file. The police delayed providing the file due to the ongoing criminal investigation. The father’s investigator took photographs of the accident scene within the 90-day statutory period, but these photos did not show a sign, which was later identified in police photos as being owned by the school district. After receiving the police file, the father’s counsel served a late notice of claim on the school district, alleging the sign obstructed the view and caused a dangerous condition.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the late notice would not prejudice the school district. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion by denying the petitioner’s motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

    2. Whether the lower courts correctly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner to demonstrate a lack of substantial prejudice to the school district.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the lower courts’ determination of substantial prejudice was based on speculation and inference, not evidence, and the lower courts failed to shift the burden to the school district to provide specific evidence of prejudice.

    2. No, because the court held that while the petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating a lack of substantial prejudice, once the initial showing is made, the burden shifts to the public corporation to demonstrate that the corporation will be substantially prejudiced by the late notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated that the decision to grant or deny a motion for a late notice of claim is discretionary. However, the court’s determination must be supported by evidence in the record. The court found the lower courts’ decisions regarding substantial prejudice were not supported by evidence. The court held that a public corporation’s claim of substantial prejudice cannot be based solely on speculation and inference; instead, it requires a factual basis. The court then addressed the burden of proof, ruling that the petitioner must initially show that the late notice will not substantially prejudice the public corporation. Once that showing is made, the public corporation must then provide particularized evidence of such prejudice. The court reasoned that this approach balances the interests of both parties, placing the burden on the public corporation to provide facts which are peculiarly within its knowledge.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the evidentiary burdens in late notice of claim cases in New York. Attorneys should understand that a petitioner must make an initial showing of no substantial prejudice, which might be based on facts such as actual knowledge of the incident by the public entity. It is then up to the public corporation to demonstrate specific ways in which the delay has hindered its ability to defend the claim (e.g., loss of evidence, fading witness memories, or difficulty investigating the scene). The decision reinforces the importance of submitting supporting evidence and distinguishes between a mere inference of prejudice versus demonstrated, substantial prejudice. The Court’s holding should shape how attorneys approach these cases from the initial filing of a motion to the presentation of evidence and legal arguments. Later cases will likely cite this decision when evaluating the sufficiency of evidence related to prejudice.

  • Coleson v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 455 (2013): Limits of Municipal Liability Based on Police Assurances

    Coleson v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.3d 455 (2013)

    A municipality can be held liable for negligence in performing a governmental function only where there is an affirmative undertaking by the municipality, which creates justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; vague assurances of protection, without specific details, are insufficient to establish such reliance.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a municipality can be held liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function, specifically police protection. The plaintiff, a victim of domestic violence, sued the City of New York, alleging that police assurances of protection led her to justifiably rely on them, resulting in her subsequent injury by her husband. The New York Court of Appeals held that the vague assurances provided by the police did not create a special relationship sufficient to impose liability on the City. The court emphasized the need for specific assurances and justifiable reliance for municipal liability to attach.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Coleson, had a history of domestic violence with her husband, Samuel Coleson. Police arrested Samuel, and the court issued an order of protection for the plaintiff. After Samuel’s arrest, a police officer allegedly told the plaintiff that Samuel would be “in prison for a while, not to worry, [she] was going to be given protection.” The officer also contacted the plaintiff later that night, stating that Samuel was being sentenced and that police would “keep in contact.” Subsequently, Samuel was released, and he harmed the plaintiff.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the City of New York, alleging negligence. The trial court dismissed the claim. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a triable issue of fact regarding justifiable reliance. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question from the Second Circuit regarding municipal liability. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the vague assurances were insufficient to establish justifiable reliance and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of other issues.

    Issue(s)

    Whether vague assurances of protection made by a police officer to a victim of domestic violence, without specific details as to the type or extent of protection, can create a special relationship sufficient to impose liability on the municipality for the victim’s subsequent injury.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s reliance on the vague assurances of protection was not justifiable in the absence of a specific undertaking by the police. Liability requires an “affirmative undertaking” that creates justifiable reliance (Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260 [1987]).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police officer’s statement that the plaintiff would be given “protection” was too vague to create justifiable reliance. The court emphasized that there was no indication as to the type of protection to be provided, and the plaintiff did not inquire about the specifics. The court distinguished the case from situations where police made specific assurances, such as remaining in the vicinity or providing immediate assistance. The court cautioned against imposing liability based on vague promises, as it could deter police from communicating with victims. The dissent argued that the majority opinion discourages police from making any meaningful communication or action that could be construed as creating a special relationship. Quoting the dissent, statements such as, “It’s going to be okay,” or “We’ll send him away so he doesn’t hurt you again” will undoubtedly be utilized in potential civil suits as examples of assurances that the police made that had no “actual basis.” The court cited Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872 (2009), reiterating that only an “affirmative undertaking” that creates justifiable reliance can justify holding a municipality liable for negligence in performing a governmental function. The court distinguished this case from De Long v. County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296 (1983), where a 911 operator’s assurance that help would be there “right away” played a role in the victim’s decision to remain home. The court effectively narrowed the scope of potential municipal liability in domestic violence cases, requiring specific and concrete assurances of protection before a special relationship can be established.

  • Wittorf v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.3d 473 (2013): Distinguishing Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions in Municipal Liability

    Wittorf v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.3d 473 (2013)

    When a municipality’s employee is negligent while performing an act integral to a proprietary function, such as road repair, the municipality can be held liable under ordinary negligence principles, even if the specific negligent act resembles a governmental function like traffic control.

    Summary

    Rhonda Wittorf sued the City of New York for injuries sustained while bicycling through a Central Park underpass. A Department of Transportation supervisor, Bowles, had told Wittorf it was “okay to go through,” despite knowing about dangerous depressions in the roadway. The jury found Bowles negligent, apportioning 60% fault to the City. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing Bowles was performing a governmental function (traffic control) and thus immune from liability. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Bowles’s actions were integral to the proprietary function of road repair, subjecting the City to ordinary negligence standards.

    Facts

    On November 5, 2005, DOT supervisor Donald Bowles and his crew arrived at Central Park’s 65th Street transverse to repair roadway defects. Bowles closed the west entrance to vehicular traffic. Rhonda Wittorf and Brian Hoberman arrived on bicycles and asked if they could proceed. Bowles said it was “okay to go through.” While riding through an underpass, Wittorf encountered a depression, attempted to avoid it, hit another, and fell, sustaining injuries. The roadway was dark and the depressions were difficult to see.

    Procedural History

    Wittorf sued the City of New York. The jury found the roadway unsafe but also that the City lacked prior written notice of the condition. It also found that the City did not cause or create the condition by an affirmative act of negligence. However, the jury found Bowles negligent and apportioned fault. The Supreme Court granted the City’s motion to set aside the verdict, finding Bowles was performing a governmental function. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted plaintiff leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City of New York was engaged in a proprietary function when its Department of Transportation supervisor, in preparation for roadway repairs, told a bicyclist it was “okay to go through” a closed roadway containing dangerous conditions, such that the City can be held liable for the supervisor’s negligence under ordinary negligence principles.

    Holding

    Yes, because the supervisor’s action was integral to the proprietary function of road repair, subjecting the City to ordinary negligence standards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the governmental/proprietary function test outlined in Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc., noting that a municipality is subject to ordinary negligence rules when engaged in a proprietary function, defined as activities that “essentially substitute for or supplement traditionally private enterprises.” The Court distinguished governmental functions as those undertaken for public safety under general police powers. Historically, road maintenance has been performed by both private entities and local governments and is therefore typically a proprietary function. The court cited precedents establishing a municipality’s duty to maintain roads in a reasonably safe condition and to provide adequate warnings of hazards. While prior written notice laws can limit liability, the nature of the function remains proprietary when performed by highway maintenance personnel. The Court distinguished Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp., where police traffic control at an accident scene was deemed governmental. In Balsam, there was no proprietary duty to maintain the property. Here, Bowles’s actions were directly connected to the impending road repair, a proprietary function. The court emphasized that Bowles’ act of closing the entry to vehicular travel was integral to the repair job. Therefore, the jury could assess the City’s conduct under ordinary negligence rules. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to consider the weight of the evidence.

  • Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 412 (2013): Governmental Function & Special Duty in Municipal Emergency Response

    Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 412 (2013)

    When a municipality provides ambulance service through EMTs responding to a 911 call, it performs a governmental function and can only be liable if it owed a “special duty” to the injured party.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a municipality is liable for negligence when its EMTs respond to a 911 call. Tiffany Applewhite suffered anaphylactic shock, and her mother called 911. EMTs arrived but were not paramedics with advanced life support (ALS) capabilities. Tiffany’s mother allegedly requested the EMTs take her to a nearby hospital, but they waited for an ALS ambulance. Tiffany suffered brain damage. The New York Court of Appeals held that providing ambulance service is a governmental function, requiring a “special duty” for liability. The Court found triable issues of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed a special duty to Tiffany, precluding summary judgment for the City.

    Facts

    In 1998, Tiffany Applewhite experienced anaphylactic shock after a nurse administered medication. Her mother called 911 when Tiffany’s breathing worsened. Two EMTs from the New York City Fire Department arrived in a basic life support ambulance because no ALS ambulance was available. One EMT performed CPR while the other called for an ALS ambulance. Tiffany’s mother allegedly asked the EMTs to transport Tiffany to a nearby hospital. Paramedics from a private hospital arrived in an ALS ambulance, administered epinephrine, intubated her, gave her oxygen, and transported her to Montefiore Hospital. Tiffany survived but suffered serious brain damage.

    Procedural History

    Tiffany and her mother sued the nurse, her employer (Accuhealth), and the City of New York. The claims against Accuhealth and the nurse were resolved. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing governmental immunity and lack of proximate cause. Supreme Court granted the City’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, finding triable issues on special duty and proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City was exercising a governmental or proprietary function when the EMTs initiated emergency care.

    Whether the City voluntarily assumed a “special relationship” with the plaintiffs beyond the duty owed to the general public.

    Holding

    Yes, the City was exercising a governmental function because providing ambulance service by EMTs responding to a 911 call is a core governmental responsibility.

    Yes, because the allegations raised a question of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed an affirmative duty and whether the mother justifiably relied on their actions, precluding summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that police and fire protection are quintessential governmental functions. Emergency medical services are a critical government duty. The court distinguished this case from medical services provided in hospital settings, which are akin to private, proprietary conduct. The Court stated that emergency medical services are “undertaken for the protection and safety of the public pursuant to the general police powers.” The court stated that “publicly-employed, front-line EMTs and other first responders, who routinely place their own safety and lives in peril in order to rescue others, surely fulfill a government function…because they exist ‘for the protection and safety of the public’ and not as a ‘substitute for…private enterprises’.”

    To establish a special duty, the plaintiff must prove: ” ‘(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.’ ”

    The Court found a question of fact as to whether the EMTs assumed an affirmative duty by deciding to await ALS paramedics rather than transport Tiffany to the nearby hospital, after being asked to take her to the hospital by her mother. The court also found a question of fact concerning justifiable reliance. The Court stated, “Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to show how the EMTs’ statements or “conduct deprived [plaintiffs] of assistance that reasonably could have been expected from another source”.

    The court also cited public policy concerns. The cost of tort recoveries would be excessive for taxpayers, and liability could dissuade municipalities from maintaining emergency services.

  • Dinardo v. St. John the Baptist Diocesan High School, 15 N.Y.3d 863 (2010): Special Duty and Governmental Discretion

    Dinardo v. St. John the Baptist Diocesan High School, 15 N.Y.3d 863 (2010)

    A special duty cannot be established when the governmental action is discretionary, even if a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the municipality.

    Summary

    In Dinardo v. St. John the Baptist Diocesan High School, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the question of municipal liability based on a special duty. The plaintiff, a teacher, sought damages for injuries sustained when a student with known behavioral problems attacked her. She argued that the school board had a special duty to protect her due to their awareness of the student’s dangerous behavior and assurances that action was being taken. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the school board’s actions were discretionary and therefore, not subject to liability, despite the potential existence of a special relationship. This decision highlights the limitations on municipal liability and the importance of distinguishing between discretionary and ministerial actions.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, a teacher, experienced increasing behavioral problems from a student, including the student bringing a knife to school, resulting in a suspension. The plaintiff and her supervisor recommended the student’s removal from the classroom due to safety concerns. The recommendation was supported by documented instances of the student punching, kicking, and threatening classmates and teachers. The teacher repeatedly expressed her concerns about classroom safety to her supervisors. Her supervisors assured her that the situation was being addressed and told her to “hang in there.” While the transfer request was pending, the student injured the teacher.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the school board, alleging negligence. The lower court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed that ruling. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality can be held liable for negligence when its actions are discretionary, even if a special relationship exists with the injured party.

    Holding

    No, because government action, if discretionary, may never form the basis for tort liability, even if a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the municipality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in McLean v. City of New York, which established that discretionary governmental actions cannot be the basis for tort liability, even when a special relationship exists. The court reasoned that the decision of whether and when to transfer a potentially dangerous student is a discretionary act of the school board. Chief Judge Lippman, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that a jury could not find a special relationship, citing the repeated assurances given to the teacher. However, he concurred in the result due to the constraint of McLean. Lippman argued that McLean unreasonably narrows the special relationship exception. He stated, “Although I agree that liability should not generally attach when a municipal employee is exercising his or her reasoned judgment, the broad immunity recognized for discretionary acts should not extend to situations where a special relationship is present.” The court emphasized that almost any governmental act may be characterized as discretionary, broadly insulating government agencies from accountability. The dissent argued that the focus should be on whether the government, by its undertaking to the specific plaintiff, has gone above and beyond the general duty it owes to the public and created a unique relationship with that plaintiff, upon which he or she is entitled to rely.

  • Gorman v. Town of Huntington, 12 N.Y.3d 275 (2009): Strict Interpretation of Prior Written Notice Laws

    Gorman v. Town of Huntington, 12 N.Y.3d 275 (2009)

    Prior written notice laws, which require notice to specified municipal officers before a municipality can be held liable for certain defects, are strictly construed, and notice to other municipal departments is insufficient unless those departments are statutory designees.

    Summary

    Norma Gorman sued the Town of Huntington after tripping on a defective sidewalk. The Town had a prior written notice law requiring that the Town Clerk or Highway Superintendent receive notice of the defect before the Town could be sued. Gorman argued that notice to the Town’s Department of Engineering Services (DES) was sufficient because the DES kept records of sidewalk complaints. The Court of Appeals held that notice to the DES was insufficient, as it was not a statutory designee, and that the Town was not estopped from asserting the prior written notice defense because Gorman did not rely on any representations from the DES. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

    Facts

    Norma Gorman tripped and fell on an uneven sidewalk in the Town of Huntington. Four months prior to Gorman’s fall, the local church pastor had notified the Town’s Department of Engineering Services (DES) about the need for sidewalk repairs. The Town of Huntington has a prior written notice bylaw requiring written notice of sidewalk defects to be given to the Town Clerk or the Town Superintendent of Highways.

    Procedural History

    Gorman sued the Town of Huntington. The Town moved for summary judgment, arguing it did not receive the prior written notice required by the town ordinance and state law. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Gorman, finding the Town delegated its record-keeping duties to the DES. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the Town’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether notice to a municipal department other than the Town Clerk or Highway Superintendent (specifically, the Department of Engineering Services) satisfies the prior written notice requirement when that department maintains records of sidewalk complaints.

    2. Whether the Town is estopped from asserting the prior written notice defense when the injured party did not rely on any representations made by the Town regarding the sidewalk defect.

    Holding

    1. No, because prior written notice provisions are strictly construed, and the Department of Engineering Services is not a statutory designee for receiving such notice.

    2. No, because estoppel requires reliance, and the plaintiff did not rely on any actions or representations by the Town regarding the defective sidewalk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that prior written notice laws are “always strictly construed” because they are enacted in derogation of common law. The purpose of these laws is to protect municipalities from liability for defects they are unaware of and have not had an opportunity to repair. The Court stated that “every written complaint to a municipal agency” does not satisfy the prior written notice laws and that notice to any agency other than the “statutory designee that a defect be repaired is not.” Because the Town of Huntington’s code specifically requires that notice be given to the Town Clerk or Highway Superintendent, notice to the DES was insufficient. The court rejected the argument that the DES’s record-keeping practices warranted a departure from strict construction, stating, “it cannot be inferred from that conduct that the Town was attempting to circumvent its own prior written notice provision.”

    Regarding estoppel, the Court held that even if estoppel could excuse the lack of prior written notice, there was no evidence that Gorman relied on the pastor’s letter to the DES or any assurances from the DES that the condition would be repaired. The Court noted that Gorman only learned of the pastor’s letter after her accident, “demonstrating a lack of reliance.”