New York Law Review

Tag: Multiple Dwelling

  • Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 69 N.Y.2d 350 (1987): Eligibility for Real Property Tax Exemption for Mixed-Use Condominiums

    Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 69 N.Y.2d 350 (1987)

    When a building qualifies as a “multiple dwelling” under Real Property Tax Law § 421-a, the tax exemption applies to the entire building, including commercial units, up to the statutory limit, and is not to be applied on a unit-by-unit basis.

    Summary

    Trump-Equitable sought a tax exemption under RPTL 421-a for its mixed-use condominium building. The city only granted the exemption to residential units, assessing the commercial units separately. The Court of Appeals held that the exemption should be applied to the entire building, including commercial units, up to the statutory limit (12% of aggregate floor area), because the statute applies to ‘multiple dwellings’ regardless of whether they are rented or owned as condominiums. The Court reasoned that the city’s interpretation would effectively exclude all condominium property from the tax exemption.

    Facts

    Trump-Equitable owned a newly constructed 32-story mixed-use condominium building with 223 residential units and 5 commercial units (parking garage, drug store, fruit/vegetable store, bakery/cafe, children’s clothing store). The commercial space was less than 12% of the building’s total floor area. Trump-Equitable sought a RPTL 421-a tax exemption, claiming the entire building should be assessed at the pre-construction value of $757,000. The City only applied the exemption to the residential units, assessing the building at $1,621,691 by apportioning the pre-construction assessment and adding the value of the commercial units.

    Procedural History

    Trump-Equitable filed an Article 78 proceeding to annul the city’s determination and compel assessment at $757,000. Special Term granted the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the Special Term opinion. The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tax exemption under RPTL 421-a for a “multiple dwelling” should be applied to the entire building, including commercial units within the statutory limit, or solely to the residential units.

    Holding

    Yes, because RPTL 421-a applies to “multiple dwellings” regardless of the form of ownership (rental, cooperative, or condominium), and the 1975 amendment to the statute expressly recognizes that commercial uses are entitled to a limited exemption based on floor area ratio.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute’s plain language requires that the exemption be applied to the building as a whole, up to the specified commercial use limit. The court stated, “We are obliged to read the words of the statute in their natural and most obvious sense…and when we do so it appears that the Legislature intended all properties, regardless of the type of ownership, to receive the benefit of the exemption.” The Court dismissed the City’s argument that the primary purpose of the statute (encouraging residential building) would not be furthered by applying the exemption to commercial condominiums. The Court emphasized that the statute’s purposes were broader, including construction, employment, and stabilizing the city’s tax base. Granting a limited exemption to commercial space was consistent with the intent to incentivize development by allowing developers to maximize the value of the ground floor. The court found that the 1975 amendment to RPTL 421-a explicitly recognized that commercial uses are entitled to the exemption. The court stated, “…far from disqualifying commercial uses from the benefit of the exemption, the Legislature expressly recognized their limited entitlement to it by the 1975 amendment.” The Court also rejected the argument that this interpretation was inconsistent with Real Property Law § 339-y or RPTL 580 and 581, which deal with taxation of individual condominium units. The purpose of those laws was to ensure fair taxation and separate tax accounts for each unit, not to alter the application of the RPTL 421-a exemption at the building level. The Court noted that if its application offered an unfair tax advantage to commercial condominiums over other business properties, the New York City Council could restrict, limit or condition the eligibility of benefits. The court stated that because the statutory language is clear, the court must implement it as written and may not defer to an interpretation made by the agency charged with enforcement of the statute. The Court concluded that the city’s interpretation would effectively excise buildings held in condominium ownership from the statute and apply the exemption differently depending on the type of ownership, which was not the legislature’s intent.

  • People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35 (1964): Search Warrant Must Particularly Describe Premises

    14 N.Y.2d 35 (1964)

    A search warrant that authorizes the search of an entire building containing multiple separate residential units, based on probable cause to search only one unit, violates the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement and is invalid.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant authorizing the search of an entire building containing two separate apartments, based on probable cause relating only to one apartment, was unconstitutionally overbroad. The warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, violating both the New York and U.S. Constitutions. Evidence seized from both apartments was deemed inadmissible, even though the occupant of the second apartment did not complain about the search. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the indictment against the defendant.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for the premises at 529 Monroe Street, Buffalo, based on an affidavit stating probable cause to believe that the defendant, Rainey, was committing larceny and forgery at that address. The affidavit did not disclose that the building contained two separate apartments: one occupied by Rainey, and the other by Mildred Allison and her child. The warrant authorized a search of the “entire premises” at 529 Monroe Street.

    Procedural History

    The police searched both apartments. In Allison’s apartment, they found nothing. In a shed accessible from Allison’s apartment, they found a check writer and stolen checks. In Rainey’s apartment, they found a typewriter and checks. Rainey moved to vacate the search warrant and suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied. The evidence was admitted at trial over Rainey’s objection. Rainey was convicted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant authorizing the search of an entire building containing multiple residential units, based on probable cause relating to only one unit, violates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched.

    Holding

    Yes, because the warrant’s failure to specify which part of the building was subject to the probable cause showing rendered it a general warrant, violating constitutional protections against unreasonable searches.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that searching multiple residential apartments in the same building is analogous to searching multiple separate houses; probable cause must be established for each unit. Because the affidavit supporting the warrant only established probable cause to search Rainey’s apartment, the warrant was invalid insofar as it authorized the search of Allison’s apartment. The Court emphasized that the officer knew Allison was an innocent party but failed to inform the court of the building’s layout when seeking the warrant. The Court stated, “It is to avoid ‘a blanket search’ with its obvious interference with the innocent that the State and Federal Constitutions provide that ‘No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, * * * and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized’.” The Court cited federal cases holding that a search warrant commanding the search of an entire residential building is void if probable cause exists for the search of only a single residential space. The Court distinguished cases upholding warrants for single apartments within a multi-unit building when the warrant sufficiently identifies the target apartment. The Court rejected the argument that Allison’s lack of complaint validated the search, stating, “The warrant being void in its inception is void for all purposes, which in this instance includes the execution of its command against this defendant.” The Court emphasized that the focus is on the validity of the warrant at the time of issuance, not on subsequent events. The Court concluded that the warrant’s overbreadth rendered the seized evidence inadmissible.