New York Law Review

Tag: Motive to Fabricate

  • People v. Spencer, 19 N.Y.3d 955 (2012): Admissibility of Evidence to Show Witness Bias

    People v. Spencer, 19 N.Y.3d 955 (2012)

    Extrinsic evidence demonstrating a witness’s motive to fabricate testimony is not considered collateral and is admissible, provided a good faith basis exists for introducing such evidence; however, the exclusion of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if overwhelming independent proof supports the conviction.

    Summary

    Spencer was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. He argued the trial court erred in precluding him from presenting evidence that the complaining witness, an off-duty police officer, had a motive to frame him. Spencer wanted to testify that the officer was protecting a third party involved in the incident because they were friends and the officer allowed the third party to deal drugs in front of his home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the trial court erred in excluding the evidence as collateral, the error was harmless because of the overwhelming independent evidence supporting Spencer’s guilt, including multiple eyewitness testimonies and 911 call recordings.

    Facts

    On August 16, 2006, Spencer was involved in a street altercation. An off-duty police officer arrived on the scene and witnessed Spencer brandishing a firearm. The officer ordered Spencer to drop the weapon, which was loaded. Multiple eyewitnesses corroborated the officer’s account. Recordings of two 911 calls placed during the incident were also presented as evidence. Spencer claimed the officer falsely implicated him to protect the third party from the initial altercation, alleging that the third party possessed the firearm.

    Procedural History

    A Queens County grand jury indicted Spencer on charges including second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, the Supreme Court permitted the People to introduce eyewitness testimony and 911 call recordings but precluded Spencer from introducing evidence that the complaining officer and the third party were friends. The jury convicted Spencer, and he was sentenced to a 15-year prison term. The Appellate Division agreed that the trial court erred in excluding Spencer’s evidence but affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding the error was harmless. Spencer appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding Spencer from introducing evidence that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate his testimony against Spencer?

    Holding

    No, the trial court erred in precluding the evidence because extrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground; however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming independent proof of Spencer’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Court cited Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). However, it also recognized the trial court’s discretion to manage proceedings and curtail exploration of collateral matters. The court stated, “[I]t is well established that the trial courts have broad discretion to keep the proceedings within manageable limits and to curtail exploration of collateral matters” (People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56 [1988]). The Court emphasized that “extrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground” if counsel has a good faith basis for eliciting the evidence. The Court determined that Spencer had a good faith basis for his proposed testimony regarding the officer’s relationship with the third party. However, the Court ultimately concluded that the error was harmless, referencing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240-241 (1975), given the overwhelming independent evidence, including multiple eyewitness testimonies and 911 calls corroborating the officer’s version of events.

  • People v. Hudy, 19 N.Y.3d 1042 (2012): Scope of Cross-Examination and Rape Shield Law

    People v. Hudy, 19 N.Y.3d 1042 (2012)

    A trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination of a witness regarding evidence of sexual conduct or other matters where the probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion, and the Rape Shield Law generally prohibits evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct in sex offense prosecutions.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for sex offenses, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the defendant’s daughter regarding her relationship with a teenage boy and her MySpace account content. The Court found the excluded evidence either fell under the Rape Shield Law or was of limited probative value compared to the risk of prejudice. The Court emphasized the defendant was given sufficient latitude to establish his defense that his daughter fabricated the charges.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his two daughters after his divorce. The older daughter disclosed the abuse following a heated phone conversation with the defendant after she was found at a 16-year-old boy’s house. The younger daughter later made similar allegations. The defendant and his older daughter had a strained relationship marked by disagreements about her behavior, attire, and relationships with boys. He threatened to send her to a “brat camp.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse, rape, criminal sexual act, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court deprived the defendant of a fair trial by precluding: (1) cross-examination of the older daughter regarding the nature of her relationship with a 16-year-old boy; (2) cross-examination about her MySpace account postings and photos; and (3) evidence of her clothing choices?

    Holding

    No, because (1) the evidence regarding the daughter’s relationship with the boy fell within the Rape Shield Law; (2) the trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination where the probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion; and (3) the defendant was given sufficient latitude to develop his defense that his daughter had reasons to fabricate the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion. First, the Court stated that the evidence regarding the daughter’s relationship with the 16-year-old boy fell squarely within the ambit of the Rape Shield Law, which generally prohibits “[e]vidence of a victim’s sexual conduct” (CPL 60.42). The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is that such evidence “rarely elicits testimony relevant to the issues of the victim’s consent on credibility, but serves only to harass the alleged victim and confuse the jurors” (quoting People v. Scott, 16 NY3d 589, 594 [2011]). The Court noted that the defendant focused solely on alleged sexual behavior and did not attempt to elicit the general nature of the relationship. However, the trial court did permit evidence that the daughter failed to return home, was found at the boy’s house, and was angry at the defendant for involving the police.

    Second, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the MySpace evidence, because trial judges have “discretion to determine the scope of the cross-examination of a witness” (quoting People v. Corby, 6 NY3d 231, 234 [2005]). The trial court gave the defendant some leeway in portraying the nature of the material on the daughter’s MySpace account and the conflict that arose between them over the postings. The Court reasoned that it was obvious that the MySpace postings caused considerable friction between the defendant and his daughter, and that she resented his parental intrusion.

    Third, the Court determined there was no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of evidence regarding the daughter’s clothing. The court permitted testimony regarding the controversy over the daughter’s attire and the defendant’s negative reaction to her clothing choices. The Court stated that the precise types of clothing were unnecessary to further the motive defense.

    The Court concluded the trial judge gave the defendant sufficient latitude to develop his theory that his older daughter had substantial reasons to fabricate either to put an end to the defendant’s parental interference or to avoid being sent to an institution for troubled youths. The Court concluded: “Defendant was therefore able to present evidence reflecting his parental concern over his daughter’s inappropriate and risky behavior, which he claimed provoked his daughter’s motivation to lie about his conduct. As such, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of the challenged evidence.”