New York Law Review

Tag: Motion for Reargument

  • People v. D’Alessandro, 11 N.Y.3d 216 (2008): Distinguishing Coram Nobis Relief from Motions for Reargument

    People v. D’Alessandro, 11 N.Y.3d 216 (2008)

    A motion seeking coram nobis relief based on a new argument, not previously raised, should not be characterized as a motion for reargument, even if it pertains to the same general issue as a prior coram nobis application.

    Summary

    D’Alessandro appealed the Appellate Division’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a speedy trial claim. The Appellate Division treated the petition as a motion to reargue a prior, pro se coram nobis application. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second petition raised a novel argument, distinct from the first, and thus should not have been characterized as a motion to reargue. The court emphasized its authority to examine the true nature of the petition, irrespective of the Appellate Division’s label, and remitted the case for consideration of the merits of D’Alessandro’s claim.

    Facts

    D’Alessandro’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1996. Nearly twelve years later, represented by counsel, he petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis, asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This claim was based on his appellate counsel’s failure to argue a speedy trial violation. D’Alessandro previously filed a pro se coram nobis application nine years earlier, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division denied D’Alessandro’s second petition, deeming it a motion to reargue its prior denial of his first coram nobis application. D’Alessandro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division properly characterized D’Alessandro’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis as a motion to reargue a prior coram nobis application.

    Holding

    No, because D’Alessandro’s second petition raised a novel argument, not previously presented, regarding the alleged speedy trial violation; thus, the Appellate Division erred in treating it as a motion for reargument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals asserted its authority to look beyond the Appellate Division’s characterization of the petition, citing People v. Giles, 73 NY2d 666 (1989). The court emphasized that a motion to reargue, under CPLR 2221(d)(2), must be based on matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion. A motion to reargue “is not an appropriate vehicle for raising new questions . . . which were not previously advanced” (People v. Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 597 (1987). D’Alessandro’s second petition raised a new argument: that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, citing People v. McKenna, 76 NY2d 59 (1990) and People v. Correa, 77 NY2d 930 (1991). The People conceded that D’Alessandro “never raised the speedy trial claims advanced in his current petition.” The Court distinguished the case from People v. Mazzella, 13 NY2d 997 (1963), noting that Mazzella involved a coram nobis writ brought at the trial level and predated the codification of CPL Article 440. The court emphasized that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should first be heard in the court where the alleged deficiency occurred (citing Bachert). Remitting the case allows for two potential reviews of the claims—one by the Appellate Division and, if unsuccessful, another by the Court of Appeals on a motion for leave to appeal.

  • Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990 (1968): Limits on Expanding In Personam Jurisdiction Based on Attachment

    Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990 (1968)

    A motion for reargument is not an appropriate vehicle for raising new questions not previously advanced in the lower courts or on the initial appeal, and the Seider doctrine does not expand in personam jurisdiction beyond the value of the attached insurance policy.

    Summary

    This case addresses a motion for reargument following a decision related to the Seider doctrine, concerning attachment of insurance policies for jurisdictional purposes. The New York Court of Appeals denied the motion, emphasizing that a reargument is not the place to raise new arguments or reinterpretations of the insurance policy that were not previously presented. The court reaffirmed that the Seider decision does not expand in personam jurisdiction beyond the value of the attached insurance policy, clarifying that recovery is limited to the policy’s face value even if the defendant defends on the merits.

    Facts

    The underlying case likely involved an attempt to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant by attaching their insurance policy within the state, based on the Seider doctrine. After the initial appeal, the appellant filed a motion for reargument, introducing new arguments regarding the interpretation of the insurance policy and the impact of CPLR 320(c).

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals. After a decision on the initial appeal, the appellant filed a motion for reargument. The Court of Appeals denied this motion in a brief memorandum opinion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a motion for reargument is the proper venue for raising new legal arguments and interpretations of evidence not previously presented to the court?

    2. Whether the Seider doctrine expands in personam jurisdiction beyond the face value of the attached insurance policy, allowing for recovery exceeding that amount if the defendant defends on the merits?

    Holding

    1. No, because a motion for reargument is not an appropriate vehicle for raising new questions that were not previously advanced in the lower courts or on the initial appeal.

    2. No, because the recovery is necessarily limited to the value of the asset attached, which in this case is the liability insurance policy; therefore, the face amount of the policy represents the maximum possible recovery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that motions for reargument should not be used to introduce new issues or arguments. The court cited prior cases such as Mississippi Shipbuilding Corp. v. Lever Bros. Co. and Matter of United States of Mexico v. Schmuck to support this principle. Regarding the scope of the Seider doctrine, the court referenced its earlier opinion in the same case, stating explicitly that “neither the Seider decision [17 Y 2d 111] nor the present one purports to expand the basis for in personam jurisdiction in view of the fact that the recovery is necessarily limited to the value of the asset attached, that is, the liability insurance policy.” The court emphasized that the face value of the insurance policy is the limit of recovery, even if the defendant chooses to defend the case on its merits. This clarification prevents the Seider doctrine from becoming an unbounded expansion of personal jurisdiction. The court declined to address the broader implications of CPLR 320(c) in other attachment contexts, reserving that issue for future cases. The court explicitly stated: “For the purpose of pending litigation, which looks to an ultimate judgment and recovery, such value is its face amount and not some abstract or hypothetical value.”