Tag: Modification of Sentence

  • Matter of Haggerty v. Himelein, 89 N.Y.2d 431 (1996): Limits on Prohibition to Review Sentencing Modifications

    Matter of Haggerty v. Himelein, 89 N.Y.2d 431 (1996)

    Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and does not lie to correct errors of law in a criminal case unless there is a clear legal right and the court exceeds its jurisdiction.

    Summary

    This case addresses the availability of the extraordinary writ of prohibition to challenge a trial court’s modification of a sentence. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition was appropriate in this case because the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the defendant’s sentence after it had already been imposed and the defendant had begun serving it. The court reasoned that the trial court’s action was not merely an error of law, but an act in excess of its jurisdiction, thus warranting the use of prohibition. The dissent argued that prohibition was inappropriate because the trial court was arguably exercising its discretion within its statutorily delegated powers.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and probation. As a condition of probation, the defendant was required to abstain from alcohol. After the defendant violated this condition, the trial court modified the defendant’s sentence by increasing the term of imprisonment and decreasing the term of probation. The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing the modified sentence, arguing that the court lacked the authority to alter the sentence after it had been imposed and the defendant had begun serving it.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying the sentence. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is appropriate to prevent a trial court from enforcing a modified sentence when the District Attorney claims the modification exceeds the court’s jurisdiction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the defendant’s sentence after it had already been imposed and the defendant had begun serving it, and therefore prohibition is an appropriate remedy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated, “Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only where there is a clear legal right, and only when a court acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no power over the subject matter or where it exceeds its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction.” The Court reasoned that the trial court’s modification of the sentence was not merely an error of law, but an act in excess of its jurisdiction. Quoting Matter of State of New York v. King, the court emphasized that prohibition is appropriate when there is “an unlawful use or abuse of the entire action or proceeding.” The Court distinguished between errors of law, which are typically reviewable on appeal, and actions that exceed a court’s power, which may warrant prohibition. The Court found that the trial court’s action impinged on the “entire proceeding” related to the defendant’s sentence because, once imposed and commenced, the sentence could not be unilaterally altered in this manner. The dissent argued that the trial court was arguably exercising its discretion within its statutorily delegated powers concerning conditions of probation, and therefore prohibition was not warranted. The dissent further contended that the majority’s decision expands the availability of prohibition, strengthening the procedural hand of the prosecutor over trial courts. The dissent also suggested that policy factors should not be considered in deciding a prohibition case, but the majority improperly weighed society’s and victims’ interests.