New York Law Review

Tag: mistrial

  • People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995 (1980): Voluntariness of Confession and Mistrial Standard

    People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995 (1980)

    A defendant’s inculpatory statements are admissible if they were voluntarily made following a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent; a mistrial is not warranted for peripheral references to other criminal acts if less drastic means can alleviate potential prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant’s confession was admissible because it was voluntarily made after a valid waiver of his rights. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s requests for a mistrial, which were based on peripheral references to another alleged criminal act, because less drastic means of addressing any potential prejudice were available and, in one instance, actively pursued through a jury instruction.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jerry Young, made inculpatory statements. Prior to trial, Young moved to suppress these statements, arguing that they were not voluntarily made. During the trial, peripheral references were made to another criminal act allegedly committed by the defendant. The defendant requested a mistrial based on these references.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found that the defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntary and admissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntarily made following an effective waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s requests for a mistrial based on peripheral references to another criminal act allegedly performed by the defendant.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record supports the finding that the inculpatory statements were voluntarily made after a valid waiver of rights.

    2. No, because less drastic means of alleviating whatever prejudice may have resulted from the references were available.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the factual finding of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the defendant’s statements were voluntarily made following an effective waiver of his rights. The Court emphasized that it found no basis for disturbing this finding.

    Regarding the mistrial requests, the Court stated that a mistrial was not mandated because less drastic means were available to alleviate any potential prejudice. In one instance, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. In another, the court indicated a willingness to consider a request to address the issue. The Court noted that the defendant insisted on a mistrial instead of pursuing these less drastic alternatives.

    The court stated, “Our examination of the record persuades us that there exists no basis for disturbing the factual finding made by Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division that the inculpatory statements had been voluntarily made by defendant following an effective waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.”

  • People v. Roman, 46 N.Y.2d 857 (1979): Inadvertent Juror Viewing of Defendant in Handcuffs

    People v. Roman, 46 N.Y.2d 857 (1979)

    A brief and inadvertent viewing of a defendant in handcuffs by jurors is not, by itself, sufficient to warrant a mistrial and deny the defendant a fair trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that a brief and inadvertent viewing of the defendant in handcuffs by two jurors while returning from a lunch recess did not warrant a mistrial. The court reasoned that the viewing, by itself, was insufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial. Furthermore, the defense counsel declined the trial judge’s offer to deliver a curative instruction or to substitute alternate jurors, thus waiving any potential prejudice.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial and during a lunch recess, two jurors inadvertently saw him in handcuffs. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the incident prejudiced the jury against him.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The defendant was subsequently convicted. The defendant appealed the denial of the motion for a mistrial claiming a denial of due process. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after two jurors inadvertently viewed him in handcuffs.

    2. Whether the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and his accomplices caused physical injury to their victim while “effecting entry” into his dwelling, as required for a conviction of burglary in the first degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because the brief and inadvertent viewing of the defendant in handcuffs by the jurors was, by itself, insufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial.

    2. Yes, because the People met their burden of proof on this point based on the trial record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the brief and inadvertent viewing of the defendant in handcuffs was not inherently prejudicial enough to warrant a mistrial. The court distinguished the case from situations involving more egregious or prolonged exposure. The Court emphasized that defense counsel declined the Trial Judge’s express invitation to deliver a curative instruction, and did not request the substitution of alternate jurors or an examination into the effect of the encounter. The court found this inaction to be significant. Regarding the burglary conviction, the Court of Appeals stated, “Our examination of the trial record persuades us that the People did indeed meet their burden of proof on this point,” indicating that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding that the defendant caused physical injury while effecting entry into the dwelling. The Court did not elaborate further on the evidence, but the finding suggests a fact-specific inquiry was made and resolved in favor of the prosecution.

  • Oliver v. Justices of N.Y. Supreme Court, 36 N.Y.2d 53 (1974): Double Jeopardy and Ambiguous Jury Deadlocks

    36 N.Y.2d 53 (1974)

    A defendant cannot claim double jeopardy based on an improperly declared mistrial if the defense failed to clarify an ambiguous jury deadlock situation, thus implicitly consenting to the mistrial.

    Summary

    Charles Oliver was tried for murder, but the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, leading to a mistrial. Oliver then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a retrial, arguing that the jury had actually acquitted him on the murder charge and that the mistrial was improperly declared, thus violating double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defense had failed to clarify the ambiguous situation regarding the jury’s deadlock at trial, it could not later challenge the mistrial declaration based on double jeopardy grounds. The court emphasized the importance of clarifying jury verdicts, especially when a partial verdict has been indicated.

    Facts

    Oliver was charged with murder. At the close of evidence, the trial court submitted the murder charge and the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree to the jury. After several hours of deliberation, the jury informed the court that they had reached a partial verdict but did not specify which charge they had decided upon or whether the result was guilty or not guilty. The court sent the jury back for further deliberations. Later, the jury declared itself hopelessly deadlocked. The court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Post-trial, Oliver claimed the jury had acquitted him of murder, supported by juror affidavits.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declared a mistrial after the jury announced it was deadlocked. Oliver moved to dismiss the murder count, arguing that the jury had acquitted him of that charge. The trial court denied the motion. Oliver then initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent a retrial. The Appellate Division denied Oliver’s application. Oliver appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the jury’s initial indication of a “partial verdict” constituted an actual verdict of acquittal on the murder charge, thus barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds?

    2. Whether the trial court improperly discharged the jury, thereby negating the “deadlocked-jury” exception to double jeopardy?

    Holding

    1. No, because the nature of the jury’s partial verdict was unascertainable from the record without considering juror affidavits, and the defense was estopped from using these affidavits due to their conduct at trial.

    2. No, because the defense failed to clarify the ambiguity surrounding the jury’s deadlock, effectively acquiescing to the mistrial declaration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the jury’s initial announcement of a partial verdict was ambiguous. The verdict could have been an acquittal on the murder count, a guilty verdict on the manslaughter count, or an acquittal on the manslaughter count. The court emphasized that whatever the substance of the jury’s partial verdict, the decision was not announced in court, nor was it recorded, which meant legally there was no “verdict”.

    The court noted the difficulty created by the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury when further deliberations were contemplated. The jury may or may not have understood that it could properly reopen consideration of the verdict already reached. The court stated, “Following a court’s refusal to accept a partial verdict pursuant to CPL 310.70 (subd. 1, par. [b], cl. [ii]), the jury should be clearly instructed that its further deliberations may be upon the entire case, including that portion upon which they had previously agreed.”

    Critically, the court emphasized that defense counsel had the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity at trial but failed to do so. By not requesting clarification of the jury’s ambiguous statements, the defense impliedly assumed the jury was deadlocked on the entire case. The court held the defendant to that assumption, precluding him from later claiming double jeopardy. The court reasoned that “Having displayed no enthusiasm for the rendering of a partial verdict while the jury was still impaneled, and a guilty verdict still possible, the defense may not seek to overturn the court’s order of mistrial after discharge of the jury”.

  • Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971): Double Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity for Mistrial

    Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971)

    A mistrial granted without manifest necessity, and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defendant, Grant, whose trial was terminated by a mistrial declared by the judge due to a potential, albeit remote, appearance of bias. The New York Court of Appeals held that declaring a mistrial under these circumstances, over the defendant’s strenuous objection and without manifest necessity, violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights, thus prohibiting a retrial. The court emphasized that the appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient to justify a mistrial; there must be a demonstrable and substantial basis, a “manifest necessity,” to override the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by the original tribunal.

    Facts

    The trial court judge, during Grant’s trial, recalled that his cousin was acquainted with Grant’s father. Grant’s father had previously contacted the judge’s chambers about a complaint of police harassment unrelated to the current case. The judge had no personal interaction with Grant or his father, and the contact was minimal (a call to the judge’s clerk a year prior). The judge, concerned that this recollection “might in some conceivable way affect his judgment,” “disqualified” himself and declared a mistrial “in the interests of justice.”

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced without a jury, and after a police witness testified, jeopardy attached. Grant’s counsel objected to the mistrial, arguing that no cause existed and noting a tactical advantage gained from the police officer’s testimony. After the mistrial was declared, Grant sought relief under CPLR Article 78, seeking to prohibit retrial based on double jeopardy. The Appellate Division prohibited the retrial. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mistrial, declared by a judge due to a remote possibility of bias and over the defendant’s objection, constitutes manifest necessity, thus permitting a retrial without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because the judge’s subjective appraisal of a remote possibility of bias was not within the ambit of the well-established rule that “manifest necessity” must be shown to justify a mistrial. The remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant, interdicted the mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the mistrial was improperly granted because it lacked “manifest necessity.” The court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a tribunal they believe to be favorably disposed to their fate. The court quoted United States v. Jorn, stating that the judge must consider “the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate”. Although the appearance of impropriety is a valid concern, it cannot be used as an “escape hatch from the performance of an unpleasant duty.” The court emphasized that “the necessity must be ‘manifest,’” and the remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with the prejudice to the defendant (losing a tactical advantage), made the mistrial improper. The Court distinguished between a genuine, demonstrable need for a mistrial and a mere subjective apprehension of bias. The court noted that a mistrial declared in the public interest and against the defendant’s will must have some basis of demonstrable substance.

  • People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972): Double Jeopardy and Defendant-Induced Mistrials

    People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972)

    A defendant may be retried without violating double jeopardy protections when the defendant’s own actions caused the mistrial, creating a ‘manifest necessity’ to halt the initial proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unavailability of witnesses, where the unavailability is attributed to threats made by the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the defendant’s actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial. Allowing retrial in such circumstances does not violate double jeopardy principles, as the defendant should not benefit from obstructing the judicial process.

    Facts

    During jury selection in the initial trial, the prosecutor discovered that two witnesses were difficult to locate. Following a holiday adjournment, the prosecutor informed the court that the missing witnesses had been threatened and that their disappearance was attributable to the defendant. At the subsequent trial, one witness testified to leaving the state because his life was threatened, and another testified that the defendant’s uncle and another person threatened her with a knife.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s application for a mistrial on November 28, 1967, after the jury had been sworn but before any witnesses were called. The defendant was then retried. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine whether the retrial violated the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the mistrial granted on the People’s application due to witness unavailability, where the unavailability was allegedly caused by the defendant, precludes a subsequent trial based on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s own actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if a defendant’s actions cause a trial to be aborted, they should not be allowed to claim double jeopardy as a constitutional safeguard. This situation falls within the scope of “manifest necessity,” which justifies interrupting a trial. The court distinguished this case from Downum v. United States, where the witness absence was due to the prosecutor’s failure to ensure their presence. Here, the defendant’s alleged intimidation of witnesses directly impeded the prosecution’s ability to present its case.

    The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from frustrating the trial process. Citing United States v. Perez, the court reiterated that “manifest necessity” allows for the interruption of a trial. The court held that the retrial was permissible under the precedent established in Matter of Bland v. Supreme Ct., County of N.Y., indicating that actions taken by the defendant to disrupt the trial can waive double jeopardy protections.

    The court stated, “If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy.”

  • People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970): Duty to Investigate Potential Juror Bias from Extraneous Information

    People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970)

    When potentially prejudicial information comes to the attention of jurors outside of the courtroom, the trial judge is required to take appropriate steps to ensure that the jurors have not been exposed to or prejudiced by such accounts.

    Summary

    Jose Rivera was convicted of selling and possessing marijuana. He appealed, arguing that jurors were improperly exposed to information about another pending indictment against him for a similar crime due to a courtroom calendar posted outside the door. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to investigate whether the jurors had been prejudiced by the information on the calendar after the defense attorney brought it to the court’s attention. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that jurors base their verdicts solely on evidence presented at trial.

    Facts

    Jose Rivera was on trial for selling and possessing marijuana. A calendar was posted on the courtroom door listing six cases scheduled for trial. The calendar included two entries concerning Rivera, indicating he had another indictment pending against him for violating the same sections of the Penal Law. Jurors had to pass by this calendar to enter the courtroom. The defendant’s attorney informed the court that the defendant and a witness observed jurors looking at the calendar and overheard them discussing Rivera’s name in connection with the listed charges.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted at trial. His attorney moved for a mistrial based on the jury’s potential exposure to the information on the courtroom calendar, but the trial court denied the motion without further inquiry. Rivera appealed his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial without conducting an inquiry into whether the jurors were prejudiced by seeing a court calendar that indicated the defendant was facing another, similar charge.

    Holding

    Yes, because when prejudicial material comes to the attention of jurors outside of the courtroom, the trial judge is required to take appropriate steps to ensure the jurors have not been exposed to or prejudiced by such accounts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court had a duty to investigate the potential prejudice to the defendant when it was brought to the court’s attention that jurors may have seen the calendar indicating a pending, similar charge against Rivera. The court noted that it would have been gross error to admit evidence of the other indictment during the trial itself. The court stated that, “when, as in the present case, prejudicial material has come to the attention of jurors outside of the courtroom, the harm to the defendant is at least as great, and it has been uniformly held that the trial judge ‘is required to take appropriate steps to insure that the jurors [have] not been exposed to or prejudiced by such accounts.’” The court distinguished this case from others where convictions were upheld despite jurors potentially discovering inadmissible facts, noting that in those cases, the trial judge had questioned the jurors and determined their impartiality. The court emphasized that the trial judge in Rivera’s case did nothing to ascertain whether the jurors could rely solely on the evidence presented at trial. The court found that the failure to investigate and admonish the jury was serious error and warranted a new trial. The court also addressed another argument raised by the defendant regarding the admissibility of his address given to police, finding that asking a suspect for their name and address is a reasonable inquiry and not subject to Miranda warnings.

  • Esposito v. Farrar, 28 N.Y.2d 553 (1971): Establishes When Double Jeopardy Attaches in New York State

    Esposito v. Farrar, 28 N.Y.2d 553 (1971)

    In New York, a defendant is not placed in jeopardy until the jury has been examined and sworn, and evidence has been given.

    Summary

    The petitioners sought to prohibit their retrial on an indictment, arguing that it would violate the double jeopardy rule because a mistrial had been declared in their first trial after the jury was impaneled and sworn. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of their applications, holding that, under New York law, jeopardy does not attach until the jury has been sworn and evidence presented. The court reasoned that the timing of when jeopardy attaches is somewhat arbitrary but necessary to prevent prosecutorial harassment and that the New York rule was still applicable.

    Facts

    The petitioners were indicted for robbery, grand larceny, assault, and criminally possessing a loaded pistol.

    A jury was selected and sworn in Supreme Court, New York County.

    After the jury was sworn, the prosecutor requested and received a continuance.

    The prosecutor requested a further continuance because a complaining witness was unavailable. The court granted a continuance over the petitioner’s objection.

    The prosecutor then informed the court he had not located one witness but another was present. The petitioners moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

    The court denied the motion and declared a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners sought orders prohibiting the Supreme Court from proceeding with a retrial, arguing double jeopardy.

    The Appellate Division denied their applications.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether compelling the petitioners to stand trial on the indictment after a mistrial would violate the double jeopardy rule.

    Holding

    No, because under New York law, an indicted defendant who has pleaded not guilty is not placed in jeopardy until the jury has been examined and sworn, and evidence has been given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the established New York rule that jeopardy attaches only after the jury is sworn and evidence is presented. The court acknowledged that the precise point at which jeopardy attaches varies among states and federal courts but emphasized the importance of having a cutoff point to prevent prosecutorial harassment. It stated, “It makes little difference whether this point be regarded as having been reached when the oath is administered to the jury or when the first witness for the People is sworn. If a prosecutor were attempting to harass a defendant, he could refrain from having the jury sworn, if jeopardy attaches at that point, and whether the point is reached on swearing the jury or the first witness makes little difference in protecting a defendant’s rights.”

    The court distinguished Downum v. United States, stating it does not mandate that all states have uniform rules regarding when jeopardy attaches. Instead, Downum means that once jeopardy has attached, a mistrial cannot be declared merely to obtain a witness whose presence was doubtful at the trial’s commencement.

    Because no witness had been sworn in the first trial, the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy; therefore, the court did not need to determine if the mistrial was a “manifest necessity.”

    The court concluded that changing the “time-honored New York rule” would not substantively impact the essence of double jeopardy, particularly as no evidence was presented in the first trial.