New York Law Review

Tag: mistrial

  • People v. Batts, 69 N.Y.2d 363 (1987): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Without Manifest Necessity

    People v. Batts, 69 N.Y.2d 363 (1987)

    A trial court’s declaration of a mistrial sua sponte, without manifest necessity and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    Batts was convicted of sexual abuse after a retrial, his first trial ending in a mistrial declared sua sponte by the judge due to a perceived jury deadlock. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mistrial was improperly declared because there was no manifest necessity. The court emphasized that the trial judge prematurely determined the jury was deadlocked without sufficient inquiry, violating the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.

    Facts

    Batts and a co-defendant were tried for assault, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse. The jury began deliberations on April 4th, requested readbacks of testimony, and recessed for dinner. Later that evening, the jury requested another readback. The judge, without consulting counsel, stated his intent to declare a mistrial if a verdict wasn’t reached by 11:30 p.m. At 12:25 a.m., the judge, over the defendant’s objection, declared a mistrial after a brief colloquy with the foreperson indicated possible discrepancies in opinions but also “movement” in voting. The judge did not poll the jury.

    Procedural History

    The first trial ended in a mistrial declared by the trial court. Batts was retried and convicted. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Batts appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial sua sponte, over the defendant’s objection, and without manifest necessity, thereby barring a retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record did not demonstrate a manifest necessity for terminating the trial. The trial judge raised the issue of a mistrial prematurely and the colloquy with the foreperson did not sufficiently establish that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while a trial court’s determination of deadlock is entitled to deference, the defendant’s right to obtain a verdict from the first jury should not be foreclosed unless the jury is hopelessly deadlocked and there is no reasonable probability of agreement. Citing United States v. Perez, the court stated that the power to declare a mistrial must be exercised with the “greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes,” limited to situations where “there is a manifest necessity for the act.” Here, the impetus for the mistrial came solely from the judge, who acted prematurely and without adequately determining the jury’s deadlock. The foreperson’s statement indicated “movement” in the voting, suggesting the jury was not hopelessly deadlocked. The court noted that the judge should have sought confirmation from other jurors before declaring a mistrial. The Court found there was no support in the record for the court’s determination that the jury had found the problem insoluble or believed itself hopelessly deadlocked. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion, and the retrial was barred by double jeopardy.

  • People v. Catten, 69 N.Y.2d 547 (1987): Double Jeopardy and Withdrawal of Mistrial Motions

    People v. Catten, 69 N.Y.2d 547 (1987)

    A defendant waives double jeopardy protections by moving for a mistrial, and the trial court has discretion whether to allow withdrawal of that motion after it has been granted, but before the jury is discharged.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether a retrial after a mistrial, declared over defense objection, violates double jeopardy when the defendant initially requested the mistrial. In Catten, the defendant sought to withdraw his mistrial motion after it was granted. In Murphy, the defendant’s mistrial motion was initially denied, and the court later granted a mistrial based on the prosecution’s motion on the same grounds, purportedly “on consent.” The Court of Appeals held that in Catten, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the withdrawal of the mistrial motion, while in Murphy, the retrial violated double jeopardy because the mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent and without manifest necessity.

    Facts

    Catten: During a drug sale trial, an undercover officer testified about identifying the defendant in a lineup while wearing similar clothes to those worn during the sale. A backup officer later testified the defendant was allowed to change into street clothes before the lineup, and the outer clothing was removed at some point before identification. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was granted. He then attempted to withdraw the motion, but the court denied the request.

    Murphy: During a manslaughter trial, a witness for the prosecution testified that Murphy offered her a jacket if she went to the back of his store with him. The defense motioned for a mistrial, which was denied. Later, the prosecutor requested a mistrial based on the same testimony, which the court granted. The defense attempted to withdraw the mistrial motion but was denied.

    Procedural History

    Catten: Following a retrial, Catten was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial over the defendant’s desire to continue the trial.

    Murphy: Murphy was convicted of manslaughter at the second trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Catten, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to withdraw his mistrial motion after it was granted but before the jury was discharged.

    2. In Murphy, whether the retrial violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights when the mistrial was declared after his initial motion was denied, and the court granted the mistrial based on the prosecution’s motion.

    Holding

    1. In Catten, No, because it is within the trial court’s discretion to deny withdrawal of a mistrial motion after it has been granted, and there was no abuse of discretion here.

    2. In Murphy, Yes, because the mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent and without manifest necessity, thus violating his double jeopardy rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Catten: The Court reasoned that once a mistrial motion is granted, whether to allow its withdrawal is within the trial court’s discretion, citing Matter of Napoli v. Supreme Ct. The trial court found that defense counsel had adequate time to discuss the motion with his client, undermining the proffered reason for withdrawal. The Court also noted that a defendant need not agree with counsel’s mistrial motion for it to be binding. Thus, the denial of the withdrawal request was not an abuse of discretion.

    Murphy: The Court reasoned that the defendant’s initial mistrial motion was denied. When the prosecutor later moved for a mistrial (after the witness’s cross-examination testimony bolstered a justification defense) and the court granted it, the defendant possessed the right to have his trial completed by the current tribunal. Because the court had denied his original motion, there was nothing to withdraw, and the defendant registered an objection to the mistrial. The court abused its discretion by not considering a curative instruction, which has been held to preclude the mention of uncharged crimes from constituting reversible error (citing People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865, 866). Since the mistrial was declared without consent or manifest necessity, retrial violated double jeopardy.

    The Court distinguished other cases, noting that in those cases, the defendant did not object to the court’s ruling or attempt to withdraw their prior application on any ground. As the court stated, “appellate review in such situations would be facilitated if, immediately after a motion for mistrial is made and all parties are heard, the court clearly and unconditionally states its decision on the record.”

  • People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383 (1986): Attorney Consent to Mistrial Binding on Absent Defendant

    67 N.Y.2d 383 (1986)

    An attorney’s consent to a mistrial, whether express or implied, is binding on the defendant, even if the defendant is absent and has not personally consented, as the decision to consent to a mistrial falls within the scope of the attorney’s authority.

    Summary

    Edward Ferguson was convicted of second-degree murder after a retrial. His first trial ended in a mistrial declared while he was absent. Ferguson appealed, arguing double jeopardy, claiming his lawyer’s consent to the mistrial was invalid without his presence and personal consent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that defense counsel’s implied consent to the mistrial was binding on the defendant, even in his absence, and that personal consent from the defendant was not constitutionally required. The court reasoned the decision to consent to a mistrial is a tactical one properly belonging to the attorney.

    Facts

    Edward Ferguson was charged with second-degree murder after fatally shooting Ozell Jackson. During the fourth day of the trial, a juror was involved in an automobile accident and hospitalized. The trial judge, after a conference with attorneys (not recorded), indicated she was considering a mistrial due to the lack of alternate jurors. Ferguson was absent when the judge announced to the remaining jurors that a mistrial would be declared. Defense counsel waived Ferguson’s appearance and remained silent as the judge dismissed the jury.

    Procedural History

    The first trial ended in a mistrial. Prior to the second trial, Ferguson moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming double jeopardy, arguing his attorney had not given unqualified consent. The trial court denied the motion. Ferguson was convicted in the second trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding implied consent from defense counsel. The dissenting justices disagreed with the finding of implied consent and argued that the defendant’s presence was necessary for the attorney’s consent to be valid. Ferguson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether defense counsel impliedly consented to the mistrial.
    2. Whether defense counsel’s consent to a mistrial is effective only if the defendant was present at the time such consent was given.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because defense counsel’s statement in chambers (“the Judge must do what she feels must be done”) and silence when the court declared a mistrial to the jury provided support for the lower courts’ finding of implied consent.
    2. No, because the decision to consent to a mistrial is a tactical one that falls within the scope of the attorney’s authority, and thus the defendant’s personal consent or presence is not constitutionally required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant’s right against double jeopardy was violated. It acknowledged that retrial after a mistrial is barred unless there was manifest necessity or the defendant consented. The court found manifest necessity lacking because the judge did not adequately explore alternatives to a mistrial, such as a brief continuance. Therefore, the permissibility of the retrial hinged on the defendant’s consent. The court found implied consent based on the attorney’s statement in chambers and silence in court. The court then addressed whether the defendant’s personal consent was required. The court stated that “consent to a mistrial allows a retrial regardless of whether defendant knowingly waived the right not to be prosecuted twice”. The court aligned itself with numerous jurisdictions that hold that “there is no requirement that the Trial Judge obtain the personal consent of the defendant to a mistrial or scrutinize whether the attorney has consulted with the defendant.” The court reasoned that a defendant with counsel relegates control of much of the case to the lawyer, except for certain fundamental decisions (e.g., pleading guilty, waiving a jury, testifying, or appealing). The decision to consent to a mistrial does not fall within this limited category because it requires an evaluation of the case, analysis of evidence, and consideration of potential harm and benefits, making it an appropriate decision for the lawyer. The court noted that while it would be preferable for the lawyer to consult with the client, it held that “for purposes of double jeopardy there was consent to the mistrial.”

  • Matter of Schermerhorn v. Collin, 67 N.Y.2d 657 (1986): Double Jeopardy and Mistrial Declaration Standards

    Matter of Schermerhorn v. Collin, 67 N.Y.2d 657 (1986)

    A trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury rests within its sound discretion, and a retrial is not barred by double jeopardy unless the court abused that discretion.

    Summary

    Schermerhorn was tried for homicide and assault following a car accident. The central issue was whether Schermerhorn or another passenger, Dougherty, was driving. After a 10-day trial, the jury deliberated for several hours, including a sequestration overnight. They twice announced their inability to reach a verdict. The trial court declared a mistrial. Schermerhorn sought to prevent a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial because the jury indicated an inability to reach a verdict, justifying the retrial.

    Facts

    Schermerhorn was tried on homicide and assault charges related to a car accident where a passenger died. The key factual dispute was whether Schermerhorn or Dougherty was driving. Dougherty testified Schermerhorn was driving, while Schermerhorn’s sister testified she saw him in the passenger seat. Accident reconstruction experts also testified. After a 10-day trial, the jury began deliberations.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declared a mistrial after the jury twice announced it could not reach a verdict. Schermerhorn’s motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds was denied. Schermerhorn then initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division to prohibit further prosecution, which was initially granted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the petition, allowing the retrial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, thus barring a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court reasonably concluded, after the jury twice stated they were deadlocked and expressed no possibility of reaching a verdict, that further deliberations would be fruitless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the decision to declare a mistrial is within the trial court’s discretion, citing Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243, 250. While the length of deliberations is a factor, it is not determinative. The court considered the nature of the case, the jury’s explicit statements of deadlock, and the trial court’s attempts to encourage a verdict. The court highlighted that the primary issue hinged on witness credibility, an area where a deadlock could quickly occur. The court noted, “Resolution of the primary issue, the identity of the driver, in large measure turned on the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the prosecution’s chief witness, a task not necessarily complex but one where ‘a jury could shortly become deadlocked’” (quoting Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243, 251). The fact that the trial court inquired whether there was any possibility of the jury reaching a verdict and received negative responses from multiple jurors further supported the conclusion that the mistrial declaration was not an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that, under these circumstances, the trial court was justified in determining that unanimity was unlikely within a reasonable time, as required by CPL 310.60.

  • Matter of Plummer v. Rothwax, 63 N.Y.2d 243 (1984): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Due to Deadlocked Juries

    Matter of Plummer v. Rothwax, 63 N.Y.2d 243 (1984)

    A retrial is not barred by double jeopardy when a trial court declares a mistrial due to a genuinely deadlocked jury, provided the trial court appropriately considered factors such as the length of deliberations, the complexity of the case, and the potential effects of requiring further deliberation before declaring the mistrial.

    Summary

    Plummer was tried for sodomy and assault. After a day-long trial and approximately 4.5 hours of deliberation, the jury indicated they were deadlocked. The trial judge, after questioning the foreperson, declared a mistrial. Plummer sought to prohibit a retrial, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial, as the trial was short, the issue simple, and the judge adequately explored the genuineness of the deadlock. Therefore, retrial was not barred.

    Facts

    The complainant testified that Plummer entered her apartment under false pretenses and forced her to perform oral sex. Her testimony contained inconsistencies with prior statements. The arresting officer confirmed receiving a radio transmission and arresting Plummer. A defense witness testified that lab tests found no sperm in the complainant’s mouth. The trial lasted one afternoon plus a few minutes the following morning.

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced; the jury deliberated. The jury sent a note indicating deadlock; the judge declared a mistrial over defense objection. Plummer moved to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy grounds before a new trial judge (Rothwax). The motion was denied. Plummer then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking a writ of prohibition to bar retrial. The Appellate Division denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the jury’s apparent inability to reach a verdict, thereby barring a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court appropriately considered the relevant factors and did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jury was genuinely deadlocked and unlikely to reach a verdict within a reasonable time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, but noted this right is subordinate to the public interest in seeing criminal prosecutions proceed to verdict. A mistrial due to a genuinely deadlocked jury is a classic example where retrial is not barred. The decision to declare a mistrial rests within the trial court’s broad discretion because the trial judge is best situated to assess the circumstances. However, this discretion is not unlimited; the court must find a “manifest necessity” for the mistrial, or that the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. Factors to consider include the length and complexity of the trial, length of deliberations, communication between court and jury, and potential effects of requiring further deliberation.

    In this case, the trial was short and the issue simple, turning primarily on the complainant’s credibility. The jury’s 4.5-hour deliberation was not per se insufficient. The trial judge adequately explored the genuineness of the deadlock by questioning the foreperson, who insisted further deliberations would be fruitless, with no dissent from other jurors. While questioning all jurors would have been better practice, no prejudice resulted here. The court emphasized the importance of avoiding coercion or pressure on the jury to reach a verdict. The court noted that “the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict is limited to those situations where ‘in [the trial court’s] opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” Under the circumstances, failing to give an Allen charge was not error.

  • People v. Rukaj, 51 N.Y.2d 529 (1980): Inquiry into Juror’s Claim of Duress During Polling

    People v. Rukaj, 51 N.Y.2d 529 (1980)

    When a juror expresses having reached a verdict under duress during polling, the trial court must conduct a specific inquiry to determine the nature and source of the duress without violating the secrecy of jury deliberations, and then determine appropriate remedial action.

    Summary

    During the polling of the jury, one juror stated that her verdict was given “under duress.” Defense counsel requested a hearing to determine the nature of the duress, but the trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an inquiry into the juror’s claim of duress. The Court outlined a specific procedure for the judge to follow, balancing the need to investigate potential coercion with the importance of maintaining the secrecy of jury deliberations. The Court stated the trial court should have questioned the juror to ascertain whether the duress arose from extraneous matters and then taken remedial action as needed.

    Facts

    After the jury announced its verdict, the defense requested that the jury be polled. When asked whether the verdicts were hers, one juror responded, “Yes, under duress, I’m saying yes”. Defense counsel then requested the court to hold a hearing to determine the nature of the stated duress. The trial court denied this request and accepted the verdict.

    Procedural History

    The defense appealed the trial court’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the trial court should have inquired into the juror’s claim of duress. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court errs when it fails to inquire into a juror’s statement during polling that their verdict was given under duress.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court had a duty to investigate the juror’s claim to determine if the duress arose from improper influences without compromising the secrecy of jury deliberations and to take appropriate remedial action if necessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred by not inquiring into the juror’s claim of duress. The Court established a specific procedure for handling such situations. The trial judge should question the juror privately, instructing them not to disclose the content of jury deliberations. The judge should then inquire whether the juror can describe the circumstances of the duress without violating the secrecy of deliberations. If the juror can do so, the judge should listen, being careful to prevent disclosure of the deliberative process. If the duress arises from matters extraneous to the jury’s deliberations, the judge must determine what remedial action is suitable, which could range from directing the jury to continue deliberating to declaring a mistrial. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining jury secrecy while also ensuring that verdicts are not the product of coercion: “communications among the jurors that were a part of their deliberative process in attempting to reach a verdict on the issues they were charged to decide (including their efforts by permissible arguments on the merits to persuade each other) were secret and not to be disclosed to him.” The Court criticized the trial court’s limited inquiry, which gave the juror “only the categorical alternative of ‘yes or no’, with no opportunity even to volunteer any comment or exposition of the predicament in which she found herself.” The appropriate action depends on the specific facts and the effectiveness of any procedure to eradicate the effect of the duress.

  • Matter of Enright v. People, 58 N.Y.2d 172 (1983): Defining ‘Manifest Necessity’ for Mistrials

    Matter of Enright v. People, 58 N.Y.2d 172 (1983)

    A mistrial may be declared without the defendant’s consent only when there is a “manifest necessity” to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial or when the ends of public justice would be defeated.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a trial court may declare a mistrial without the defendant’s consent, thereby permitting a retrial without violating double jeopardy protections. The New York Court of Appeals held that a mistrial was justified in two separate cases: In Enright, the prosecution inadvertently introduced a suppressed confession. In Huntzinger, a key defense witness became unavailable and defense counsel made prejudicial remarks during voir dire. The Court emphasized that a trial judge’s determination of manifest necessity warrants deference due to their superior position to assess the situation, but the reasons for mistrial must be “necessitous, actual and substantial.”

    Facts

    Enright: Defendant was indicted for robbery. After a Huntley hearing, his confession was initially deemed admissible. The confession was referenced in opening statements. The prosecutor then discovered a Miranda rights statement indicating Enright requested counsel before confessing. The confession was suppressed.

    Huntzinger: Defendant was indicted for sodomy. He appeared at trial in a wheelchair, accompanied by an attendant. During voir dire, defense counsel made statements appealing to the jury’s sympathy. After the jury was sworn, the trial court declared a mistrial because of: 1) prejudice to the People from the defendant’s appearance; 2) improper remarks during voir dire; and 3) the unavailability of a crucial defense witness (Chief Jackson), who could not testify due to surgery.

    Procedural History

    Enright: After the trial court declared a mistrial, Enright sought to prohibit retrial via an Article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division held the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.

    Huntzinger: After the trial court declared a mistrial, Huntzinger commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit retrial. The Appellate Division held that the mistrial was an abuse of discretion.

    The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals of both cases.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial in Enright after the prosecution inadvertently referenced a suppressed confession in its opening statement.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial in Huntzinger due to the defendant’s sympathetic appearance, defense counsel’s improper voir dire statements, and the unavailability of a key defense witness.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial to ensure a fair trial for the defendant after a confession was presented to the jury and later suppressed.

    2. No, because considering the combination of the defendant’s appearance, the improper voir dire remarks, and the unavailability of a crucial witness, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that retrial is barred after a mistrial declared without defendant’s consent unless there is “manifest necessity” for the mistrial or the ends of public justice would be defeated. The Court emphasized deference to the trial judge’s discretion, recognizing that the trial judge is in the best position to determine necessity. However, the reasons for the mistrial must be “necessitous, actual and substantial” and not merely for the convenience of the court. The court noted, ” ‘a defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.’ ”

    In Enright, the court found the inadvertent introduction of the suppressed confession created prejudice for both sides, as unsophisticated jurors may struggle to disregard the confession. The court emphasized that Enright’s counsel agreed the jury could not be “sanitized.” Therefore, the mistrial was justified to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    In Huntzinger, the court found the unavailability of Chief Jackson, deemed “absolutely crucial” by the defense, justified the mistrial. The defense could not estimate the length of Jackson’s unavailability, so the trial judge was not obligated to grant an indefinite continuance. The Court found that considering the witness unavailability along with the improper remarks during voir dire supported the mistrial declaration.

    The court concluded by stating that in both cases, the trial judge did not abuse their discretion, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismissing the petitions.

  • People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Based on Manifest Necessity

    People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981)

    A trial court may declare a mistrial based on manifest necessity without violating double jeopardy protections when a juror’s conduct indicates an inability to fairly and impartially deliberate.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that declaring a mistrial in Tinsley’s first trial due to a juror’s misconduct did not violate double jeopardy principles. After jury deliberations began, a juror disappeared overnight and expressed doubts about his ability to be fair. The trial court, after interviewing the juror and consulting with counsel, declared a mistrial. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court acted within its discretion, as there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. The court also rejected Tinsley’s claims regarding pretrial identification and jury instructions.

    Facts

    During Tinsley’s first trial, after the jury was charged and sequestered, a juror disappeared overnight and returned the following morning. The juror stated that the deliberations had caused him distress and he doubted the jury’s ability to resolve the issues fairly without legal expertise. He expressed that he could not be fair to the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after interviewing the juror and discussing potential remedies with counsel (who declined to move for a mistrial), declared a mistrial. Tinsley was retried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Tinsley appealed, arguing that the mistrial declaration violated double jeopardy principles and that there were errors in the pretrial identification procedure and jury instructions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial sua sponte, thus unconstitutionally exposing the defendant to double jeopardy?

    2. Whether the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, tainting the in-court identification?

    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury regarding the presumption of correctness of the date on a check?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court was warranted in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity given the juror’s misconduct and expressed inability to be fair.

    2. No, because the suppression court made dual findings that the pre-trial identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and that there was an independent source for the in-court identification.

    3. No, because in the prosecution of a crime of violence the trial court was within its discretion to reject a jury instruction regarding the presumption of correctness applicable to commercial paper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the “unusual circumstances” presented by the juror’s behavior and statements. The court cited People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1, 9, emphasizing the principle of manifest necessity as the standard for justifying a mistrial without violating double jeopardy. The court found the juror’s overnight absence and subsequent admission of bias created a situation where a fair trial was impossible. The failure of the trial court to consult further with counsel prior to the declaration of mistrial did not vitiate the propriety of such declaration; the trial court was justified in concluding that there was no acceptable alternative to a mistrial. The court deferred to the suppression court’s findings regarding the pretrial identification procedure, noting evidence supported those findings, referencing People v. Dickerson, 50 NY2d 937. Regarding the jury instruction on the check’s date, the court found no error, implicitly stating that rules applicable to commercial paper generally do not apply in a case involving violent crime, especially where the factual issue involves violence not commercial transactions.

  • People v. Anderson, 52 N.Y.2d 641 (1981): Admissibility of Evidence After Curative Instructions

    People v. Anderson, 52 N.Y.2d 641 (1981)

    When a trial court sustains an objection to improper testimony and provides prompt curative instructions, a motion for a mistrial is properly denied unless the prejudice was not alleviated and the defendant requested further instructions that were not given.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an order denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The court held that any prejudice resulting from a brief mention of uncharged criminal activity was cured by the trial court’s prompt curative instructions. The Court further reasoned that the defendant waived any objection to the adequacy of the curative instructions by failing to request additional or more complete instructions. The Court also found the police encounter with the defendant was lawful, based on reasonable suspicion arising from an anonymous informant’s tip and the officer’s own observations.

    Facts

    During the defendant’s trial, there was a brief mention of uncharged criminal activity. The defendant objected to the testimony. The trial court sustained the objection and provided curative instructions to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a brief mention of uncharged criminal activity, given the court provided curative instructions.

    2. Whether the police encounter with the defendant prior to arrest was lawful.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court’s prompt curative instructions alleviated any potential prejudice to the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant did not request further instructions.

    2. Yes, because the information from an anonymous informant and the officer’s observations provided reasonable suspicion for the initial encounter. The intrusion was minimal and related to the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s curative instructions were sufficient to address any prejudice arising from the mention of uncharged criminal activity. The court emphasized that if the defendant believed the instructions were inadequate, it was his responsibility to request further instructions. Failure to do so waived the right to challenge the adequacy of the instructions on appeal. The court stated, “Any prejudice to the defendant which might have arisen due to the brief mention of uncharged criminal activity which was made at defendant’s trial was alleviated when the court sustained defendant’s objections and took prompt curative action.”

    Regarding the police conduct, the court found that the encounter was justified by reasonable suspicion based on information from an anonymous informant and the officer’s observations. Citing People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, the court noted that the initial encounter was lawful due to this reasonable suspicion. The court also found the intrusion was minimal and reasonably related to the circumstances that allowed for its initiation. The court cited People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 222 and People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 111 to support this finding.

  • Hall v. Potoker, 49 N.Y.2d 705 (1980): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Due to Witness Unavailability

    Hall v. Potoker, 49 N.Y.2d 705 (1980)

    A retrial is not barred by double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unforeseeable unavailability of a crucial prosecution witness, provided the trial court properly considered alternatives and the unavailability was not due to prosecutorial misconduct.

    Summary

    Raymond Hall was indicted for selling controlled substances. During the trial, the key prosecution witness, an undercover officer, was unexpectedly hospitalized due to a severe infection. The prosecutor requested a continuance, but the defense objected, arguing it would prejudice the jury. The trial court, sua sponte, declared a mistrial over the defense’s objection. Hall then sought to prohibit a retrial based on double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the mistrial was a manifest necessity, stemming from an unforeseeable event and not prosecutorial misconduct, and the trial court had adequately considered alternatives.

    Facts

    Raymond Hall was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance to an undercover officer. The prosecutor was informed that the officer would be available to testify on Wednesday, April 25, and they agreed to meet on Tuesday, April 24. On April 24, a jury was selected and opening statements were made. The prosecutor then learned that the officer had suffered a cut finger while effecting an arrest during the weekend, and the hand became severely infected, requiring hospitalization. The treating physician testified that the officer would remain in the hospital for at least a week, and would not be able to testify prior to the week of May 7, and stressed the impossibility of exact prediction.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for a continuance but, over defense objections, declared a mistrial sua sponte. Hall then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to restrain his retrial. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, holding that the mistrial was manifestly necessary and retrial would not violate double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether double jeopardy bars the retrial of a criminal defendant where a mistrial was declared over defense objection due to the unexpected hospitalization of a key prosecution witness.

    Holding

    No, because the declaration of a mistrial was manifestly necessary due to the unforeseeable unavailability of a crucial prosecution witness, and the trial court properly explored alternatives, and the unavailability was not due to prosecutorial misconduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the petition. The court acknowledged the defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal but weighed this against the public’s interest in fair trials. The court reiterated the classic formulation from United States v. Perez that retrial is not barred where there was “a manifest necessity for the mistrial, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” The decision to abort a criminal trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must explore appropriate alternatives. The court noted that when a mistrial is premised upon the claimed unavailability of crucial prosecution evidence, that claim is subjected to “the strictest scrutiny” because the prosecutor is not entitled to a mistrial merely to gain “‘a more favorable opportunity to convict’”.

    The court emphasized that the witness’s unavailability resulted from an unforeseeable contingency, not prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor had no reason to anticipate the hospitalization. Given the defense counsel’s strenuous objection to a continuance, the trial court reasonably concluded that a continuance was not a viable option. The court stated that the trial court acted upon reliable information in declaring a mistrial, and trial courts, when considering the exigencies of a potential mistrial, “cannot be bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable at formal proceedings”. Because the trial court adequately explored the available alternatives and based its decision upon valid considerations, there was no abuse of discretion.