New York Law Review

Tag: mistrial

  • Matter of Gentil v. Margulis, 24 N.Y.3d 1028 (2014): Double Jeopardy and Implied Consent to Mistrial

    Matter of Gentil v. Margulis, 24 N.Y.3d 1028 (2014)

    A defendant’s consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances, such that retrial does not violate double jeopardy protections.

    Summary

    In *Matter of Gentil v. Margulis*, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a retrial was barred by double jeopardy after a mistrial was declared in a criminal case. The court held that the defendant had implicitly consented to a mistrial, waiving their double jeopardy protection. This ruling was based on the defendant’s actions, including requesting a partial verdict and remaining silent about the court’s plans for retrial. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had granted a petition arguing a lack of manifest necessity for the mistrial, finding the defendant’s implied consent to the mistrial determinative.

    Facts

    During a criminal trial, a juror became unable to continue deliberations. The defendant refused to substitute an alternate juror and requested a partial verdict on the count upon which the jury indicated it had reached a verdict. The trial court declared a mistrial on the remaining counts. The defendant subsequently argued that a retrial on the unresolved counts violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.

    Procedural History

    The defendant filed an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition, arguing that a retrial would violate double jeopardy. The Appellate Division granted the petition, finding no manifest necessity for a mistrial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s actions constituted implied consent to a mistrial, thereby waiving double jeopardy protection?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant’s request for a partial verdict and silence regarding retrial plans constituted implied consent to a mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a defendant’s consent to a mistrial could be implied from the circumstances. In this case, the defendant’s request for a partial verdict and failure to object to the court’s intentions to retry the unresolved counts indicated implicit consent to the mistrial. The court distinguished this case from situations where the defendant affirmatively opposed the mistrial or did not take actions suggesting agreement. The court emphasized that the issue of consent is a factual question. The majority found the defendant had implicitly consented to the mistrial and therefore did not reach the issue of manifest necessity.

    Judge Fahey, in a concurring opinion, stated that the Appellate Division made no factual findings regarding the defendant’s consent and that such a determination is a factual matter, which the Court of Appeals is generally without power to address. Judge Fahey argued there was manifest necessity for a mistrial.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the principle that a defendant’s actions can waive double jeopardy rights. Attorneys must carefully advise clients on how their conduct during trial can impact their rights. A defendant’s actions, such as requesting specific remedies or remaining silent when retrial is discussed, may be construed as consent to a mistrial. Legal practitioners should ensure that the record clearly reflects a defendant’s position on a mistrial to avoid future disputes about implied consent. Courts will scrutinize the specific facts to determine whether consent can be implied. This decision underscores the importance of a clear record of the defendant’s position, as factual determinations are often not revisited on appeal.

  • People v. Shaulov, 24 N.Y.3d 32 (2014): Prejudicial Surprise and the Duty to Correct Misleading Representations

    24 N.Y.3d 32 (2014)

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a mistrial or fails to strike testimony when the prosecution’s introduction of the evidence surprises the defense and undermines its trial strategy, especially when it contradicts prior representations made by the prosecution.

    Summary

    In People v. Shaulov, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial because the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial or to strike testimony that constituted a prejudicial surprise. The prosecution had previously represented that there would be no “prompt outcry” testimony from the complainant, but then elicited such testimony at trial. The Court held that this surprise testimony, which contradicted the prosecution’s pretrial statements, fundamentally changed the defendant’s trial strategy and substantially prejudiced his case. The failure of the prosecution to disclose the information and correct its prior representation warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    Boris Shaulov was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault. Prior to trial, the prosecution explicitly represented that there would be no “prompt outcry” testimony. Relying on this representation, defense counsel structured the opening statement and prepared cross-examination. During the trial, the complainant testified that she had told a friend “what happened” shortly after the alleged assault, which the prosecution had expected. Defense counsel objected, arguing this constituted prompt outcry testimony, which the prosecution had previously disavowed. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial and allowed the testimony, finding it was not a surprise that unduly prejudiced the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Shaulov’s motion for a mistrial, allowing the disputed testimony. Shaulov was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial or to strike the surprise testimony?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the surprise testimony undermined the defendant’s trial strategy and contradicted the prosecution’s prior representation, creating substantial prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial or striking the testimony. The Court found that the testimony that the complainant told a friend “what happened” was a prejudicial surprise. The prosecution’s prior representation that there would be no prompt outcry evidence led the defense to structure its case on that basis. The surprise testimony undermined the defense’s strategy and credibility. The Court cited People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, stating that relevant evidence “may be rejected if its probative value is outweighed by the danger that its admission would . . . unfairly surprise a party.” The Court also emphasized that the prosecution had an obligation to correct its prior representation. The Court noted the prejudice was substantial because the surprise testimony affected voir dire, opening statements, and the defense’s overall approach to the case. The Court considered the timing of the error, occurring early in the trial, as well.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of the prosecution’s candor and accuracy in its representations to the court and opposing counsel. Attorneys must prepare their cases based on these representations. Failure to correct a prior representation, especially when new information becomes available, can lead to a mistrial. This case reinforces the principle that the prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory information that would otherwise be harmful to the defendant. It highlights that a surprising change in the prosecution’s case can be a basis for overturning a conviction where it causes demonstrable prejudice. Defense attorneys should immediately object and move for a mistrial when the prosecution introduces testimony that violates a previous agreement or representation. This case demonstrates the risks associated with introducing new evidence and testimony that contradicts prior information or promises given to opposing counsel. Later cases will need to consider whether the surprise was truly prejudicial, and whether the party had an opportunity to respond.

  • People v. Herring, 17 N.Y.3d 1084 (2011): Inquiry Into Juror Competency During Deliberations

    People v. Herring, 17 N.Y.3d 1084 (2011)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion when, after a report that a juror was sleeping during deliberations, the court questions the juror, receives assurances of attentiveness and willingness to serve, and declines to further investigate the specifics of jury participation.

    Summary

    Carlos Herring was convicted of murder, assault, and weapons possession. During deliberations, another juror reported that one juror was sleeping. The trial judge questioned the allegedly sleeping juror, who denied sleeping and affirmed her willingness to serve. The judge declined to investigate further into the jury’s deliberation process and denied a motion for mistrial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that the juror was fit to serve, given the juror’s assurances and the potential for intrusion into the jury’s private deliberations.

    Facts

    Carlos Herring shot and killed one man and wounded another in a crowded parking lot outside a nightclub. He was charged with murder, assault, weapon possession, and menacing. At trial, Herring argued he acted in self-defense. During the trial, the jury acquitted him of menacing, but convicted him of the other crimes.

    Procedural History

    Herring was convicted in Rockland County and sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in prison, plus five years of post-release supervision. On appeal to the Appellate Division, Herring argued that the trial judge mishandled a report that a juror was sleeping during deliberations. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to discharge a juror or for a mistrial based on the alleged inattentiveness of that juror, after making an inquiry of that juror.

    Holding

    No, because the trial judge appropriately inquired into the juror’s attentiveness and received assurances of her willingness and ability to serve, and further investigation could have improperly intruded into the jury’s deliberation process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge acted within her discretion. When juror 7 reported that juror 11 was sleeping, the judge first repeated the deliberation charge to the entire jury. Before deliberations resumed, the judge questioned juror 11 directly, who denied sleeping and affirmed her willingness and ability to perform her duties. The judge noted that juror 7 indicated the concerning conduct was not continuing. The court reasoned it would not further inquire into the specifics of jury participation, stating that it would “invade[] the privacy and the province of that jury.”

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the trial judge’s opportunity to observe juror 11’s demeanor and assess her credibility. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a juror’s behavior definitively renders them “grossly unqualified.” The court affirmed the principle that a trial judge must balance the need to ensure juror competence with the need to protect the confidentiality of jury deliberations. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court acted reasonably in determining that Juror 11 was fit to serve based on her responses and the limited inquiry conducted, and that the judge had “recharged [the jury] on deliberations and how to conduct themselves during deliberations.”

  • People v. Marte, 97 N.Y.2d 82 (2001): Implied Consent to Mistrial Based on Silence at O’Rama Conference

    People v. Marte, 97 N.Y.2d 82 (2001)

    A defendant’s consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances, particularly their silence and lack of objection at an O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicates the intention to declare a mistrial.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating they reached a verdict on some counts but were deadlocked on others. At an O’Rama conference, the trial judge stated his intent to take a partial verdict and declare a mistrial on the remaining counts. Defense counsel did not object when asked for their input. After the jury was discharged, the defendant objected. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant impliedly consented to the mistrial by remaining silent during the O’Rama conference when the judge announced his intentions, precluding a later objection. The court emphasized the importance of active participation in O’Rama conferences to avoid misleading the court.

    Facts

    The jury deliberated and sent a note stating it reached a verdict on two counts but was deadlocked on others.

    At an O’Rama conference, the trial judge indicated his intent to take a partial verdict and declare a mistrial on the undecided charges.

    The judge asked defense counsel if they wanted to be heard; counsel for one defendant responded “no,” and counsel for the co-defendant remained silent.

    After the partial verdict but before discharging the jury, the judge again inquired if there was anything defense counsel wanted to put on the record; neither attorney responded.

    After the jury was discharged, the defendant objected to the mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declared a mistrial on the undecided charges.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding implied consent to the mistrial.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial by remaining silent during the O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicated his intention to declare a mistrial.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was record support for the lower court’s finding of implied consent based on the defendant’s silence and lack of objection at the O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicated his intention to declare a mistrial. The purpose of the O’Rama conference is for attorneys to advise the court, and the defense cannot remain silent, giving the false impression of acquiescence, and then object later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Ferguson, which states that consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances. The court found that the defense counsels’ silence during the O’Rama conference, when the judge announced his intention to declare a mistrial on the undecided charges, constituted implied consent. The court emphasized the purpose of an O’Rama conference, which is for attorneys to assist the court in averting error by advising the court concerning the appropriate response to a jury note. Allowing attorneys to remain silent during the conference and then object later would undermine the purpose of the O’Rama procedure. The court reasoned that if the defense believed the court should have taken a different course of action, such as giving an Allen charge, they should have suggested it at the O’Rama conference. By remaining silent, they allowed the court to proceed under the impression that the defense agreed with the proposed course of action. The Court stated, “If this were permissible, attorneys could—by their silence—lull the court into taking actions that could not later be undone.” The court concluded that focusing on the circumstances leading up to the dismissal of the jury, rather than post-discharge statements, is appropriate when determining implied consent. The court noted the defense’s silence prevented the creation of a record that would facilitate appellate review of whether manifest necessity existed for the mistrial.

  • Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501 (2008): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Based on Jury Deadlock

    Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501 (2008)

    A trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial based on jury deadlock is entitled to great deference and will not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds unless the court abused its discretion by failing to explore appropriate alternatives or if the jury clearly indicated it had reached a partial verdict.

    Summary

    Rivera was tried for second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon, with lesser included manslaughter offenses submitted to the jury. After nearly six days of deliberation and multiple deadlock notes, the trial court declared a mistrial without inquiring whether the jury had reached a partial verdict, despite a request from defense counsel. Rivera sought to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial because the jury never declared it had reached a partial verdict and the trial court reasonably determined further deliberation would be futile.

    Facts

    Rivera was indicted for second-degree murder and weapon possession for a fatal stabbing. The trial court instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter only if it acquitted Rivera of murder, and second-degree manslaughter only if it acquitted him of first-degree manslaughter. The jury sent multiple notes indicating deadlock. After the jury requested clarification of the manslaughter charges, it repeatedly asked for copies of all three charges. Defense counsel requested the court ask about a partial verdict before adjourning for the weekend. Ultimately, the jury sent another deadlock note stating they could not reach a unanimous decision after extensive deliberations.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court declared a mistrial after the jury indicated they were deadlocked. Rivera moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, which the Supreme Court denied. Rivera then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to prevent retrial. The Appellate Division granted the petition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the petition and allowing retrial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial based on jury deadlock without first inquiring whether the jury had reached a partial verdict, thereby barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court reasonably determined that there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial and the jury never clearly declared that it had reached a partial verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that double jeopardy protects a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. However, this right is subordinate to the public interest in seeing a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict. A mistrial may be declared when there is a manifest necessity, such as a genuinely deadlocked jury. The determination of jury deadlock is within the trial court’s discretion, which is entitled to great deference. The court must consider factors such as the length of trial and deliberations, communications between court and jury, and potential effects of further deliberation. Here, the jury deliberated longer than the trial lasted, sent three deadlock notes, and requested reinstruction on all three charges multiple times, suggesting it had not reached a verdict on any count. The court distinguished Matter of Robles v. Bamberger, where there was “overwhelming evidence” the jury had reached agreement on at least one count. The Court also rejected the argument that Matter of Oliver v. Justices of N.Y. Supreme Ct. of N.Y. County compelled a different result because, unlike in Oliver, the jury here never explicitly declared it had reached a partial verdict. The Court declined to create a per se rule requiring inquiry into a partial verdict whenever requested, stating, “no per se rules or mechanical formulas apply to mistrial determinations.” The Court concluded that the trial court reasonably determined there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, and retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles.

  • People v. Gorghan, 9 N.Y.3d 470 (2007): Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct

    People v. Gorghan, 9 N.Y.3d 470 (2007)

    When a prosecutor engages in misconduct during trial, double jeopardy will only bar retrial if the misconduct was deliberately intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and related charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon remittal, the defendant sought to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the misconduct warranted dismissal of the charges. The Court of Appeals held that while the prosecutor’s conduct was deplorable, it did not bar retrial because the intent was to secure a conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. The court clarified that double jeopardy bars retrial only when the prosecutorial misconduct is specifically intended to cause a mistrial, depriving the defendant of their right to a verdict from the initial jury.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of raping his live-in girlfriend’s daughter in 1997. The victim reported the abuse to the police in 1999, including allegations of childhood abuse. The defendant was subsequently charged with rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and criminal possession of a weapon, all allegedly occurring in 1997 or later. Prior to trial, the court ruled much of the evidence of defendant’s prior uncharged criminal and immoral acts inadmissible. The prosecutor repeatedly attempted to introduce the excluded evidence, referenced matters not in evidence, made unsupportable assertions, and urged the jury to draw improper inferences, despite the court’s rulings. The defendant objected and moved for a mistrial three times, but the motions were denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on all charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, citing a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct prejudicial to a fair trial. Upon remittal to the County Court, the defendant moved to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds, which was denied. The defendant then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division to prohibit a second trial. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, finding the misconduct was intended to secure a conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether double jeopardy principles bar retrial of a defendant when the conviction was reversed on appeal due to prosecutorial misconduct, but the misconduct was intended to secure a conviction rather than to provoke a mistrial motion?

    Holding

    No, because double jeopardy only bars retrial when the prosecutorial misconduct was deliberately intended to provoke a mistrial motion. Here, the prosecutor’s intent was to secure a conviction, not to cause a mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that while the prosecutor’s conduct was “deplorable,” double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the misconduct was motivated by an intent to secure a conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. The Court explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from multiple prosecutions for the same offense, including the right to have the case decided by the initial jury. However, this right is not absolute. An exception exists when a prosecutor engages in misconduct specifically intended to provoke a mistrial motion, thereby eviscerating the defendant’s right to a verdict from the first jury. The Court emphasized that this exception applies equally to reversals on appeal as to mistrials granted by the trial court. Citing Matter of Davis v. Brown, the court stated that when a prosecutor “fears the case is headed toward acquittal and intentionally causes a mistrial, the calculated result of this prosecutorial misconduct is to deprive the defendant of the right to have the case completed before the first jury.” However, because the Appellate Division found that the prosecutor’s intent was to obtain a conviction, the defendant was only entitled to a new, fair trial. As the court noted in People v. Adames, “The corrective action for prosecutorial trial misconduct should ordinarily not vary whether a verdict is nullified by a trial court or by an appellate court”.

  • People v. Pizarro, 7 N.Y.3d 830 (2006): Extrinsic Juror Knowledge and Appellate Deference

    People v. Pizarro, 7 N.Y.3d 830 (2006)

    A trial court’s credibility findings regarding juror impartiality, made after a hearing and based on observations of the jurors, are entitled to great deference on appeal, provided they are supported by the record.

    Summary

    Defendant Pizarro appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial because a juror allegedly concealed knowledge about the case during jury selection, attempted to share outside information during deliberations, and lied to the court about it. The trial court conducted a hearing, interviewing the juror and other jurors. The court concluded that the juror did not possess outside knowledge and had not tried to convey such information. The Appellate Division affirmed, deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s findings were supported by the record and deserved deference.

    Facts

    Pizarro was convicted on four counts of second-degree murder. During jury deliberations, the jury foreperson reported that another juror had attempted to share information about the case that was not part of the evidence presented at trial. Pizarro argued this warranted a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    Following the jury foreperson’s report, the trial court held a hearing. The trial judge interviewed the allegedly errant juror three times and also questioned the other jurors. The trial court found that the juror did not possess outside knowledge and did not attempt to share any such knowledge with the other jurors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deferring to the trial court’s findings. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial based on the allegation that a juror concealed personal knowledge about the case, attempted to share outside-the-record information with other jurors, and then lied to the trial court about these actions.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s credibility findings, made after hearing and viewing the jurors, are entitled to great deference, and the record supported the court’s determination that there was no juror misconduct warranting a mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the deference owed to the trial court’s credibility determinations, stating that such findings are “entitled to great deference.” The Court found that the juror repeatedly denied having extrinsic knowledge, and the trial judge credited these denials. The Court noted that the Appellate Division had also deferred to the trial court’s findings, observing that there was merely a “misunderstanding” between the juror and some of the other jurors. The Court of Appeals further explained that it must accept the affirmed factual determinations of the lower courts if they are supported by the record, which they were in this case. The court found no basis to overturn the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s credibility, particularly since the juror’s denials were not, as a matter of law, contradicted by the other jurors’ accounts. The court implied that absent clear and convincing evidence of juror misconduct or bias, deference should be given to the trial court’s first-hand observations and findings.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 2 N.Y.3d 737 (2004): Upholding Denial of Mistrial Based on Juror Qualification

    2 N.Y.3d 737 (2004)

    A trial court’s determination regarding a juror’s qualification will be upheld if the juror unequivocally declares impartiality and the court reasonably concludes the juror is not grossly unqualified.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted rape and sodomy. During deliberations, a juror’s fitness was questioned based on a claim she had been raped. After questioning, the juror denied being raped and affirmed her impartiality. The trial court denied a mistrial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied the mistrial motion because the juror unequivocally stated she had never been raped and affirmed her ability to render an impartial verdict. The Court also found that defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to conduct a probing and tactful inquiry was unpreserved. Further, the court properly denied the motion to set aside the verdict because the evidence was not of the type that would entitle the defendant to a new trial.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with rape and related crimes. During jury deliberations, the foreperson raised a concern that a juror should be excused because she claimed to have been forcibly raped by her boyfriend or fiancé. The trial court questioned the juror, who denied ever being raped. The juror also affirmed that her previous answer that she had never been the victim of a crime was true. The defense moved for a mistrial which was denied. The jury convicted the defendant of attempted rape and sodomy. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence in the form of testimony from a parole officer that would tend to impeach the victim’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial and subsequent motion to set aside the verdict, sentencing him as a second felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The case then went to the Court of Appeals after a Judge of that court granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on concerns about a juror’s qualification and impartiality.

    2. Whether the defendant’s claim that the court failed to conduct a probing inquiry of the juror was preserved for appellate review.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the juror unequivocally declared that she had never been raped and stated that she could render an impartial verdict.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to object to the scope or intensity of the court’s inquiry at trial.

    3. No, because the testimony offered in conjunction with the defendant’s motion was unclear and lacked indicia of certainty, and merely tended to impeach the victim’s trial testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the juror was not grossly unqualified to serve. The court emphasized the juror’s unequivocal denial of ever being raped and her affirmation of impartiality. The Court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s credibility. Regarding the claim that the trial court failed to conduct a probing inquiry, the Court stated that this argument was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant did not object to the scope or intensity of the inquiry at trial, nor did he request further questioning. The Court of Appeals also stated that a defendant must inform the court that its questioning was insufficient or objectionable, or suggest additional avenues of inquiry, to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Concerning the motion to set aside the verdict, the Court found that the testimony offered in support of the motion was “unclear, equivocal and lacking in indicia of certainty.” The Court stated that the testimony did not give rise to a “probability” of a verdict more favorable to the defendant, as required by CPL 330.30 (3). Furthermore, the Court noted that the testimony merely tended to impeach the victim’s trial testimony, which is “not the sort of ‘newly discovered evidence’ that would entitle a defendant to a new trial” (People v Jackson, 78 NY2d 638, 645 [1991]).

    The Court emphasized the importance of raising objections at trial to preserve issues for appellate review, stating that, “In the absence of a protest to the scope or intensity of the court’s inquiry, no question of law was preserved for our review.” This highlights the practical importance of timely objections in preserving legal arguments for appeal.

  • People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 599 (1995): Waiver of Double Jeopardy Defense in Plea Bargain

    People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 599 (1995)

    A defendant may expressly waive the right to raise a double jeopardy claim as part of a plea bargain, as there is no overriding societal interest that prevents such a waiver.

    Summary

    Defendant Allen was granted a mistrial over his objection after the prosecution’s key witness suffered a heart attack. Allen later pleaded guilty to lesser charges, expressly waiving his right to appeal on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that Allen’s waiver was valid. The Court reasoned that unlike rights such as the right to a speedy trial or competency to stand trial, there is no larger societal interest that prohibits a defendant from waiving double jeopardy protections in exchange for the benefits of a plea bargain. Therefore, the defendant was bound by his express waiver.

    Facts

    After jury selection in Allen’s trial for attempted murder and related charges, the prosecutor requested a continuance due to his key witness’s heart attack. The court granted a one-day continuance. The following day, the court learned the witness would be unavailable for at least seven weeks due to the severity of the heart attack. The prosecutor’s request for a second continuance was denied, and the court granted the People’s motion for a mistrial over the defendant’s objection, finding manifest necessity due to the witness’s critical testimony.

    Procedural History

    Allen pleaded guilty to lesser charges, waiving his right to appeal, including any double jeopardy claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the waiver invalid but upholding the mistrial based on manifest necessity. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant may validly waive the right to raise a double jeopardy defense as part of a plea bargain under New York State double jeopardy law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court found no substantive basis to distinguish between an implied consent to retrial and the express waiver of a double jeopardy defense and that there is no overriding societal interest that prohibits a defendant from waiving double jeopardy protections in exchange for the benefits of a plea bargain.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that plea bargaining is a vital part of the criminal justice system, enabling parties to avoid the uncertainties of trial and to tailor sentences to the case’s circumstances. While certain appellate claims, such as the right to a speedy trial, legality of a sentence, and competency to stand trial, cannot be waived due to a larger societal interest in their correct resolution, a double jeopardy claim does not implicate the same concerns.

    The Court emphasized that the purpose of the double jeopardy bar is to protect the defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. However, a defendant may forgo this right in exchange for a definite sentence and protection against conviction on the highest counts. Expressly waiving a double jeopardy defense in a plea bargain does not implicate a larger societal value.

    The court distinguished this case from those where certain appellate claims may not be waived because of a larger societal interest in their correct resolution, stating, “Society has a recognized interest in speedy trials because trial delay may result in the loss of evidence or an accused’s inability to respond to criminal charges, thereby compelling innocent persons to plead guilty out of necessity… Because of this societal interest, a defendant may not waive such claims… Similarly, a defendant may not waive the right to challenge the legality of a sentence…or his competency to stand trial… These rights are recognized as a matter of fairness to the accused but they also embrace the reality of fairness in the process itself.”

    The court noted its holding aligns with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which suggests an express waiver of double jeopardy protection is permissible. Referencing Menna v. New York, the court cited the Supreme Court’s caveat that “[w]e do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be waived. We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”

    Therefore, the Court held the defendant was bound by his express waiver of his double jeopardy claim and did not reach the merits of the underlying double jeopardy claim itself.

  • People v. Dawkins, 82 N.Y.2d 226 (1993): Rescinding Mistrials Before Jury Discharge

    82 N.Y.2d 226 (1993)

    A trial court retains the power to rescind a declaration of a mistrial, particularly one based on a perceived jury deadlock, until the jury is actually discharged.

    Summary

    Lamonte Dawkins was convicted of attempted murder. During jury polling, one juror disagreed with the verdict, leading to a mistrial declaration. However, the jury then claimed to have reached a verdict. The trial court rescinded the mistrial, accepted the verdict, and Dawkins was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mistrial was not final until the jury’s discharge. Because the jury had not been discharged, the trial court retained the power to reconsider its decision and accept the verdict. This case highlights the importance of the jury’s actual discharge in finalizing a mistrial ruling based on deadlock.

    Facts

    Dawkins was tried for attempted murder, assault, and weapons possession. After deliberations, the jury announced a guilty verdict on the attempted murder count but not guilty on the others. During polling, juror number 4 initially disagreed with the verdict after Dawkins protested. The court sent the jury back for further deliberation. Later, the jury sent a note stating they couldn’t reach a verdict. The defense requested a mistrial, opposing an Allen charge. The court initially granted the mistrial. Approximately 40 minutes later, the jury sent another note claiming they reached a verdict. The court then set aside the mistrial ruling and accepted the new verdict.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Dawkins. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in rescinding its declaration of a mistrial and accepting the jury’s verdict after initially declaring a mistrial based on the jury’s indication of deadlock but before the jury was formally discharged.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court did not err because the declaration of a mistrial is not final until the jury is discharged; therefore, the court retained the power to rescind its declaration and accept the jury’s subsequent verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 280.10, concerning mistrials, did not apply because the mistrial was declared due to perceived jury deadlock, not an error or defect in the proceedings. For jury deadlock, CPL 310.60(1)(a) governs, requiring the jury’s actual discharge to terminate the trial. Because the jury had not been discharged, the mistrial declaration was considered “inchoate” and subject to rescission. The court distinguished People v. Catten, where the mistrial was granted due to a prejudicial error, making CPL 280.10 applicable. The court also rejected the argument that rescinding the mistrial was an abuse of discretion, noting that the trial judge was in the best position to assess whether a fair verdict could be reached, particularly given the initial concern about pressuring the dissenting juror which was alleviated by the second verdict without any further instruction. The dissent argued the mistrial was granted due to the prejudicial effect of pressuring a dissenting juror, making it a CPL 280.10 issue and thus not rescindable.