New York Law Review

Tag: Mistake

  • Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173 (1995): Defining ‘Mistake’ in New York’s Relation Back Doctrine

    87 N.Y.2d 173 (1995)

    New York’s relation back doctrine allows amended filings to relate back to claims against a co-defendant if both claims arose from the same conduct, the parties are united in interest, and the new party knew or should have known the action would have been brought against them but for a mistake, without requiring that the mistake be ‘excusable’.

    Summary

    Robert and Arlene Buran sued John and Janet Coupal over a seawall built on their property. The initial suit in 1979 named only John Coupal. After an amended answer raised the issue of Janet Coupal’s co-ownership, a second suit was filed against her in 1989. Janet Coupal then claimed adverse possession. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the second complaint related back to the first for Statute of Limitations purposes. The Court held that New York law requires only a ‘mistake,’ not an ‘excusable mistake,’ for the relation back doctrine to apply when adding a new defendant united in interest with the original defendant. Thus, the second complaint was timely, defeating the adverse possession claim. The Court emphasized the importance of notice to the defendant and avoided punishing minor drafting errors.

    Facts

    The Burans purchased a waterfront lot in 1962 with property rights extending into Lake Champlain. In 1967, the Coupals bought adjacent land. In 1973, the Coupals built a seawall that encroached onto the Burans’ property. In 1979, the Burans sued John Coupal for trespass. In 1982, John Coupal argued that his wife, Janet, was a necessary party because they owned the property as tenants by the entirety. Shortly after, the Coupals transferred the property to their corporation and back again. In 1989, the Burans filed a second complaint naming Janet Coupal. Janet Coupal then claimed adverse possession, asserting they had possessed the property for 10 years.

    Procedural History

    The two lawsuits were consolidated in 1992. The Supreme Court ordered removal of the seawall, rejecting the adverse possession claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing on whether the 1989 complaint related back to the 1979 complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the adverse possession defense failed because the 1989 complaint related back to the 1979 complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under New York’s relation back doctrine, a party seeking leave to add a new defendant who is united in interest with the original defendant must demonstrate an ‘excusable mistake’ for failing to name the new party originally, or whether a mistake alone is sufficient.

    Holding

    No, a party seeking to add a new defendant united in interest with the original defendant under New York’s relation back doctrine does not need to demonstrate an ‘excusable mistake,’ because the law requires merely a ‘mistake’.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the relation back doctrine (CPLR 203[b]) allows correcting pleading errors by adding claims or parties after the limitations period, provided the new and original defendants are “united in interest.” The Court adopted the three-part test from Brock v. Bua: (1) both claims arise from the same conduct, (2) the new party is united in interest with the original defendant and has notice, and (3) the new party knew or should have known the action would have been brought against them but for a mistake. The Court highlighted that the Brock test, unlike the federal rule, included an “excusable mistake” requirement. However, the Court found that adding “excusable” improperly shifts focus from whether the new party had notice. The Court reasoned that requiring “excusability” punishes minor drafting errors and renders the doctrine meaningless in most cases, which is inconsistent with the CPLR’s liberal construction mandate. The court clarified that intentionally omitting a known, potentially liable party is not a “mistake” and would not warrant application of the doctrine. In this case, Janet Coupal had notice, was united in interest with her husband, and adding her caused no delay or prejudice. The Court also noted the Coupals’ bad faith in transferring the property to delay the proceedings. As stated by the court, “[plaintiff’s only explanation for the misidentification is that the attorney who drafted the summons and complaint had never seen the descriptive announcement. * * * [S]imilar excuses have been rejected outright in Brock and its progeny”.

  • Fredonia & Clean Garage Co. v. MacDonald, 212 N.Y. 249 (1914): Reformation of Contract Due to Scrivener’s Error

    Fredonia & Clean Garage Co. v. MacDonald, 212 N.Y. 249 (1914)

    A contract may be reformed in equity when a writing, due to a scrivener’s error or other inadvertence, does not reflect the actual agreement between the parties, even if the mistake is not mutual.

    Summary

    The Fredonia & Clean Garage Co. (Plaintiff) sued E. MacDonald (Defendant) to reform a written contract for the sale of an automobile and to recover damages for its breach. The Plaintiff claimed the writing incorrectly identified the E. R. Thomas Motor Company as a party when it was intended to be a contract solely between Plaintiff and Defendant. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to warrant reformation of the contract due to a scrivener’s error.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, an authorized dealer of “Thomas” automobiles, had an exclusive sales territory in Chautauqua County. Plaintiff and Defendant discussed trading the Defendant’s old car for a new one. They met at the Thomas factory, where they negotiated the deal with Van Deusen, the Thomas Company’s sales manager. Van Deusen prepared a written order form addressed to the Thomas Company, which both Plaintiff and Defendant signed. This form appeared to create a contract between Plaintiff, Defendant, and the Thomas Company. However, the Plaintiff maintained that the agreement was for Plaintiff to sell the car to Defendant. After signing, Plaintiff took possession of Defendant’s old car and began preparing it for resale. Defendant later took back his old car without Plaintiff’s consent.

    Procedural History

    The Plaintiff filed suit in equity seeking reformation of the contract and damages for its breach. The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of the Plaintiff’s case. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to warrant reformation of the written contract to reflect the alleged true agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, suggested that a scrivener’s error resulted in the written contract failing to reflect the actual agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the written contract, on its face, did not reflect the intent of the parties. Van Deusen, the Thomas Company’s representative, told Defendant it was impossible to deal directly with the Thomas Company. Furthermore, the Plaintiff and Defendant were not acting as joint purchasers. The court noted that the Plaintiff also signed a separate, identical contract without the Defendant’s name, suggesting that the first contract was merely a means of transferring title to the Plaintiff for the sale to the Defendant. The court found significant that the Plaintiff, and not the Thomas Company, was to provide the allowance for the defendant’s old car. The court quoted Gordon Malting Co. v. Bartels Brewing Co., 206 N.Y. 528, 537 stating, “Parol evidence is competent to show that a written contract, not under seal, apparently made between the parties named in it, was in fact made between one of them and a person not named.” The court also cited Born v. Schrenkeisen, 110 N.Y. 55, stating, “Where there is no mistake as to the terms of an agreement, but through a mistake of a scrivener, or by any other inadvertence in reducing it to writing, the instrument does not express the agreement actually made, it may be reformed by the court.” Because the trial court directed a nonsuit, the Plaintiff was entitled to the most favorable inferences from the evidence. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff presented enough evidence to justify a new trial where the court could consider reformation of the contract.