New York Law Review

Tag: Miranda violation

  • People v. Miles, 28 N.Y.2d 112 (1971): Admissibility of Suppressed Statements for Impeachment

    People v. Miles, 28 N.Y.2d 112 (1971)

    A defendant’s prior inconsistent statement, even if inadmissible as direct evidence due to a failure to comply with Miranda, may be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility if the defendant testifies to facts denying participation in the crime.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary, possession of burglar’s tools, and possession of a loaded firearm. His initial statement to the police was suppressed due to Miranda violations. At trial, the defendant testified, denying intent to commit burglary and claiming he was present to play cards. The prosecution used portions of the suppressed statement to cross-examine him, highlighting inconsistencies. The trial court instructed the jury to consider these inconsistencies only for assessing the defendant’s credibility. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming this use of the inadmissible statement improper. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the suppressed statement was admissible for impeachment purposes because the defendant testified in a way that contradicted the prior statement. The court reasoned that allowing the defendant to testify falsely without challenge would be a perversion of the constitutional privilege.

    Facts

    Police discovered the defendant and two others inside a country club at 2:30 a.m. after receiving a tip about an intended burglary.

    The defendant was carrying a crowbar and screwdriver.

    The defendant made a statement to the police after his arrest.

    At trial, the defendant testified that he was invited to the premises to play cards and denied any intent to commit burglary or possessing burglar’s tools.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court convicted the defendant of burglary, possession of burglar’s tools, and possession of a loaded firearm.

    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the use of the inadmissible statement improper.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s prior statement, inadmissible as direct evidence due to Miranda violations, may be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility when the defendant testifies at trial and makes statements inconsistent with the prior inadmissible statement.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant testifies to facts denying participation in a crime, a prior statement inconsistent with that testimony is admissible on the issue of credibility, even if the statement itself is not admissible as direct evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle established in Walder v. United States, stating that the constitutional privilege should not shield a defendant from inquiry when he affirmatively proffers testimony as part of a strategy in contested litigation. To allow a defendant to use the privilege as a “shield against contradiction of his untruths” would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the defendant’s direct testimony, claiming he was present to play cards and lacked criminal intent, directly concerned the crime and allowed the prosecution to test his credibility using inconsistencies in his suppressed statement. The court emphasized that a defendant cannot limit cross-examination to only the precise facts mentioned in their direct testimony. Cross-examination may extend to admissions reasonably inconsistent with the direct testimony.

    The court addressed the argument that the prosecutor’s questions exceeded the scope of direct examination, referencing People v. Miles. The court distinguished the present case, noting that the defendant’s direct testimony affirmatively presented his version of events. The statement made by the defendant to the police, to the extent used on cross-examination, and not otherwise before the jury, was that he had gone to the premises to commit a burglary, to “get” a safe and that he waited outside as a lookout while his companions “got in” to the building; that all three were “looking for the safe” when they were interrupted by the police.

    The court also addressed the defendant’s argument regarding the prosecutor’s cross-examination about prior acts of misconduct. Citing People v. Schwartzman, People v. Alamo, and People v. Sorge, the court stated that such inquiry is permissible unless there is an absence of good faith. The inquiry was limited by the court and did not constitute legal error.

  • People v. Wright, 29 N.Y.2d 408 (1972): Admissibility of Identification Testimony after Suggestive Lineup

    People v. Wright, 29 N.Y.2d 408 (1972)

    When a pretrial identification procedure is unduly suggestive, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a subsequent in-court identification is based on an independent source, untainted by the suggestive procedure.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim identified him in court, but this identification was preceded by a potentially suggestive photo array and a highly suggestive showup. The prosecutor improperly cross-examined the defendant about statements made at the police station without Miranda warnings, using those statements to impeach his credibility. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the showup violated due process and that the prosecutor’s cross-examination exceeded the scope of the defendant’s direct testimony, thus improperly introducing evidence obtained in violation of Miranda.

    Facts

    Mrs. Wright was robbed in her apartment by an intruder who was present for 30-45 minutes. She later identified the defendant from a photo array of parolees and known criminals. The police then conducted a showup where she identified the defendant. During his arrest, black socks were found in the defendant’s pocket, relevant because the victim said the robber wore black socks on his hands.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the identification evidence, arguing it was tainted by the suggestive showup. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the in-court identification would be sufficient even without the pretrial identifications. The defendant appealed, arguing the improper admission of identification testimony and improper cross-examination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the showup identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process, thereby requiring the prosecution to demonstrate that the in-court identification was independently sourced.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant regarding statements made at the police station, without proper Miranda warnings, was permissible impeachment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the showup, conducted after the witness had already selected a photograph and been told the police might pick someone up, was unduly suggestive, requiring the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification had an independent source.
    2. No, because the prosecutor’s cross-examination exceeded the scope of the defendant’s direct testimony and improperly introduced evidence obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the showup, where the victim was told she would see the man whose photo she picked out, was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to an erroneous identification that it violated due process of law.” The court emphasized that the burden was on the People to establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that the in-court identification was not tainted by the suggestive showup, citing People v. Ballott. Since the hearing court did not properly utilize the preliminary hearing, because of the misplacement of the burden of proof and the omission from the People’s case of Mrs. Wright’s testimony, it made it impossible for the hearing court to determine whether an in-court identification would have independent value. The court stated, “It was error for the court on the identification suppression hearing to hold that the in-court identification would be ‘sufficient’ without first requiring the prosecution to establish by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that it was neither the product of, nor affected by, the improper pretrial showup.”

    Regarding the cross-examination, the court held that while statements inadmissible on direct examination can be used for impeachment, this is only permissible when the defendant “opens the door” by testifying to the matter on direct examination, citing People v. Harris. The court found that the defendant’s direct testimony was limited to a denial of guilt and alibi and did not address events at the police station. Therefore, the prosecutor’s cross-examination “in order to lay a foundation for the tainted evidence on rebuttal” was improper, citing People v. Miles. The court found that this error was not harmless because the improperly admitted statement related to a crucial element of the case – the method of the crime and the defendant’s identification.

    The court explicitly stated that the black socks found on the defendant were admissible since they were discovered during a search incident to a lawful arrest.