New York Law Review

Tag: Miranda Rights

  • People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980): Impeachment by Silence at Arrest After Miranda Warnings

    People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980)

    Impeachment of a defendant’s trial testimony by questioning about their silence at the time of arrest is generally prohibited if Miranda warnings were given, as such silence is ambiguous and may be an exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest could be used to impeach their trial testimony. Conyers was arrested for robbery, possession of a weapon, assault, and attempted murder. At trial, he presented a different version of events, claiming he was the victim. The prosecution questioned him about his failure to mention this version to the arresting officers. The court held that using Conyers’ silence for impeachment was improper because it was ambiguous and potentially an exercise of his right to remain silent, especially if Miranda warnings were given. The court emphasized the potential prejudice to the defendant and the importance of ensuring a fair trial.

    Facts

    Dantzler and Johnson were allegedly robbed at gunpoint. Dantzler chased the defendant, Conyers, who was apprehended by police. At the time of the arrest, Conyers had a gun. He was told he was being arrested for robbery, possession of a weapon, assault and attempted murder. Conyers remained silent. At trial, Conyers testified to a different version of events, claiming that Dantzler had tried to rob him after a numbers bet dispute and Conyers was merely defending himself.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Conyers regarding his silence at the time of arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed but, upon reargument, reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution could use the defendant’s silence at the time of arrest to impeach his trial testimony, given that he was in custody and potentially aware of his right to remain silent.

    Holding

    No, because using Conyers’ silence for impeachment was improper. The court reasoned that such silence is inherently ambiguous and could be an exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent, especially considering he was in custody. It was deemed to violate the principles of due process and the privilege against self-incrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that using a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest for impeachment purposes is problematic. It emphasized that silence is inherently ambiguous; it could be due to the defendant exercising their right to remain silent, confusion, or fear. The court highlighted that permitting such impeachment could unfairly prejudice the defendant by implying guilt from their silence, thereby undermining the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the court noted the unfairness of using post-Miranda silence against a defendant, as the warnings themselves imply that silence will not be penalized. The court distinguished situations where silence might be more probative, but found that in this case, the potential for prejudice outweighed any probative value. The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling unduly restricted the prosecution’s ability to test the defendant’s credibility and that the defendant’s silence was inconsistent with his later exculpatory testimony. Judge Meyer, in dissent, stated: “To refuse to permit the jury to consider defendant’s silence at arrest under those circumstances is to fly in the face of human experience and of the public interest in truthful testimony embodied in the impeachment rule. It is, to put it bluntly, to provide defendants with a license to lie, not required by Constitution, statute or precedent.” However, the majority found that allowing the impeachment would create an unacceptable burden on the exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent.

  • People v. Stroh, 48 N.Y.2d 1000 (1979): Clarifying Ambiguous Requests for Counsel During Interrogation

    People v. Stroh, 48 N.Y.2d 1000 (1979)

    When a suspect makes an ambiguous statement regarding the desire for counsel during police interrogation, clarifying questions by the police are permissible, but once the suspect unequivocally requests an attorney, questioning must cease.

    Summary

    John Stroh was arrested and charged with murder. During interrogation, he made three statements to law enforcement officials. Before his first statement, Stroh stated he wanted “either an attorney or a priest to talk to.” After making the first two statements without an attorney present, Stroh told an Assistant District Attorney that he had asked for a lawyer earlier and nobody responded. The Court of Appeals held that the first two statements were admissible because Stroh’s initial request was ambiguous and clarified as a request for a priest. However, the third statement was inadmissible because Stroh explicitly requested counsel before making it.

    Facts

    John Stroh was arrested on July 8, 1975, for second-degree murder.

    During questioning by a senior investigator, Stroh stated, “hold it, I would like to either have an attorney or a priest to talk to, to have present”.

    The officer asked, “who do you want,” and Stroh replied, “contact a priest down in the parish, in Beacon”. The priest was contacted but did not arrive immediately.

    Before the priest arrived, Stroh made an oral statement and then a typewritten statement.

    Later, an Assistant District Attorney obtained a waiver of Stroh’s rights and questioned him. Stroh stated, “Well, I had asked for a lawyer before and nobody said nothing”. The assistant replied “O.K.” and continued to question Stroh, eliciting a third statement.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress all three statements.

    The lower courts ruled on the admissibility of the statements.

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision regarding the suppression motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s initial statement requesting “either an attorney or a priest” was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel, thus requiring the cessation of questioning.

    Whether the third statement, made after the defendant asserted he had asked for a lawyer previously, should have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. No, because the officer permissibly clarified Stroh’s ambiguous request, and Stroh then specified that he wanted a priest. Questioning could continue until Stroh clearly invoked his right to counsel.

    2. Yes, because once Stroh stated he had asked for a lawyer before, the authorities were obligated to cease questioning, and the third statement was therefore inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that when a defendant makes an ambiguous request for counsel, it is permissible for the police to clarify the request, as long as they do not dissuade the defendant from exercising their rights. The Court distinguished between the initial ambiguous request for “either a priest or an attorney” and the subsequent statement to the Assistant District Attorney, where Stroh asserted he had previously requested an attorney.

    Regarding the initial request, the court noted, “It was not improper for the officer to clarify the situation by asking ‘who do you want’, so long as this was not accomplished in a manner which would tend to dissuade defendant from exercising his rights.” Since Stroh clarified that he wanted a priest, the police were allowed to continue questioning him until he clearly requested an attorney.

    However, regarding the third statement, the court stated, “when speaking with the assistant, defendant did indicate a desire for an attorney. It was only at this time that defendant’s statement reflected a request for legal counsel. And it was then that the law enforcement authorities became duty bound not to seek a waiver of defendant’s rights or proceed with questioning. Their failure to do so renders the third statement inadmissible.”

    Chief Judge Cooke dissented in part, arguing that only the third statement should be suppressed, as the initial request was ambiguous and the officer properly clarified it. The dissent emphasized that the bright-line rule against questioning after a request for counsel should only apply when the request is unambiguous.

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Consent to Search After Request for Counsel

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent consent to a warrantless search obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, even if the consent appears voluntary.

    Summary

    Knapp was arrested for grand larceny, and after being read his Miranda rights, stated he would get a lawyer. The police ceased questioning about the crime but asked Knapp if they could look around his property. Knapp agreed and signed a consent form. The search revealed stolen materials. The New York Court of Appeals held that Knapp’s consent was invalid because it was obtained after he requested counsel but before he had the opportunity to consult with an attorney. The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The evidence obtained during the search was therefore suppressed.

    Facts

    Deputy Sheriff Price arrested Knapp for grand larceny based on information about ongoing thefts.

    Price advised Knapp of his Miranda rights, and Knapp indicated he understood them.

    Another officer testified that Knapp stated, “You’re damn right, I’m going to have a lawyer.”

    Sergeant Fikar arrived and, after confirming Knapp was advised of his rights, asked about building materials on the property.

    Knapp stated he wanted to speak to his attorney before making any statement.

    Fikar then asked if Knapp minded if he looked around, and Knapp said “no” and signed a consent to search form after being told he had the right to refuse.

    A search of the property revealed stolen building materials.

    After the initial search, Knapp again requested his attorney and was allowed to call him. The attorney arrived but did not object to the search.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the consent was voluntary based on People v. Gonzalez.

    Knapp pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a consent to a warrantless search is valid when obtained after a suspect in custody has requested counsel but before counsel is provided.

    Holding

    No, because once a suspect requests counsel, the police cannot seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures until the suspect has been permitted access to counsel, and any consent obtained before then is legally ineffectual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no basis to distinguish between obtaining a statement and obtaining consent to a search after a defendant’s request for an attorney. Quoting Miranda v. Arizona, the court emphasized that “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”

    The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a relinquishment of the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.

    The court found that the police did not “scrupulously honor” Knapp’s request for counsel. Instead, they merely shifted their focus from obtaining oral statements to eliciting consent to search. Because the defendant had requested counsel twice, the police were constitutionally prohibited from seeking his consent to the search before he had access to counsel.

    The court rejected the argument that the attorney’s later arrival and failure to object validated the search, stating the attorney “could not then undo what had already been accomplished”. The court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the claim that the defendant, on advice of counsel, retroactively validated the earlier unconstitutional search.

    The court cited People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366 and People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33 in support of their holding.

  • People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208 (1979): Admissibility of Statements Made During Custodial Interrogation Without Miranda Warnings

    People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208 (1979)

    Statements obtained during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible if Miranda warnings were not administered, and a guilty plea entered after the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress such statements must be vacated unless it can be said with certainty that the error played no part in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.

    Summary

    Harris pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to suppress (1) a potential in-court identification, (2) statements he made to police without Miranda warnings, and (3) sticks seized from him. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the plea, and remanded. The Court held that Harris’s statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of a custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings. Although the Court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the sticks, the improperly admitted statements require allowing the defendant to reconsider his guilty plea.

    Facts

    On December 30, 1974, three men, each carrying a stick, forced their way into Mrs. Turner’s home and robbed her. About 30 minutes later, Mrs. Turner’s son, Police Officer Clark, and two other officers stopped three men, two of whom were carrying a television set, and one of whom (Harris) was carrying two gray sticks. The two men carrying the television dropped it and fled. Officer Clark detained Harris and questioned him about the other two men and the television set without administering Miranda warnings. Harris stated he only knew one of the men by the name of “Billy” and did not know where the television came from. Officer Clark later learned his mother had been robbed and the television set taken from the men was hers. Mrs. Turner subsequently identified Harris in a photo array and a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Harris was charged with robbery. He moved to suppress his statements, the sticks, and any identification by Mrs. Turner. After a combined Wade-Mapp-Huntley hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Harris then pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Harris appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements made by Harris to the police when he was in custody but had not been given Miranda warnings.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress the sticks taken from Harris on the night of the crime.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statements were obtained during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, and their admission was prejudicial to the defendant.
    2. No, because the officers had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Harris and take possession of the sticks for their own protection during questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Harris was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights. The Court applied the standard of whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have felt free to leave. It determined that Harris was “in custody” when he was detained by officers, placed in the patrol car, and questioned. Because Harris’s statements were made without Miranda warnings, they should have been suppressed.

    The Court acknowledged the difficulty in determining whether an erroneous pretrial ruling contributed to a defendant’s decision to plead guilty, referencing People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 379. It noted that “when a conviction is based on a plea of guilty an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision, unless at the time of the plea he states or reveals his reason for pleading guilty.” Because a jury could reasonably interpret Harris’s statement as inculpatory, it could not be said with certainty that the erroneous ruling played no part in Harris’s decision to plead guilty. Therefore, the plea must be vacated.

    Regarding the sticks, the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe Harris was involved in a felony or misdemeanor, justifying the temporary detention and seizure of the sticks for the officers’ safety. The Court cited Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, noting that the Constitution does not require probable cause for such an action. CPL 140.50 authorizes temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the denial of the motion to suppress the sticks was proper. The failure to return them after questioning was a statutory violation but not a constitutional one, and did not warrant suppression.

  • People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979): Right to Counsel Extends to Questioning on Unrelated Matters

    People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979)

    Once an attorney has entered a proceeding representing a defendant, the police may not question the defendant in custody on any matter, even if seemingly unrelated, in the absence of counsel, and any waiver of this right must occur in the presence of the attorney.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that once an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and instructs the police to cease questioning, the police cannot further interrogate the defendant, even about unrelated matters, without the attorney present. Rogers was arrested for robbery and, after initially waiving his Miranda rights, his attorney instructed the police to stop questioning him. The police then questioned Rogers about unrelated activities, after which he made an inculpatory statement about the robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed Rogers’s conviction, ruling the statement inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.

    Facts

    Rogers was arrested on December 16, 1975, as a suspect in a liquor store robbery. He was given Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest and again at police headquarters. Rogers informed the police that he had an attorney but was willing to speak without him. After two hours of interrogation, Rogers’s attorney instructed the police to cease further questioning. Despite this instruction, the police continued to question Rogers for four hours about unrelated activities, after which Rogers made an inculpatory statement about the robbery. Rogers was handcuffed throughout the entire period.

    Procedural History

    Rogers was convicted of robbery in the first degree after a jury trial and of burglary in the third degree upon a guilty plea. He sought to suppress the inculpatory statement, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction. Rogers then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police may question a defendant about matters unrelated to the charge for which the defendant is represented by counsel, after the attorney has instructed the police to cease questioning and the defendant has waived his rights outside the presence of his attorney.

    Holding

    No, because once an attorney has entered the proceeding, the police may not elicit any statements from the defendant, except those necessary for processing or physical needs, nor may they seek a waiver of this right, except in the presence of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of protecting an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, stating that these rights must be accorded the highest degree of respect. The court noted that previous decisions had created an exception to the rule against questioning a represented defendant when the questioning concerned unrelated charges. However, the court found that this exception was inconsistent with the principles enunciated in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 (1976), which emphasized the protective role of counsel once representation has begun. The court reasoned that it would “ignore reality to deny the role of counsel when the particular episode of questioning does not concern the pending charge.” The court explicitly stated, “[O]nce a defendant is represented by an attorney, the police may not elicit from him any statements, except those necessary for processing or his physical needs. Nor may they seek a waiver of this right, except in the presence of counsel.” The court also determined that Rogers’s inculpatory statement did not fall within the “spontaneously volunteered statement” exception because it was induced by the coercive atmosphere created by the continuous interrogation and the restriction on Rogers’s freedom of movement. “Given the unique circumstances here, there can be no conclusion other than that defendant’s statement did not fall within the exception.”

  • People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979): Waiver of Counsel in Interrelated Offenses

    People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979)

    When two offenses are so interwoven that questioning about one necessarily involves the other, a suspect represented by counsel on one charge cannot waive counsel on the second charge without counsel being present.

    Summary

    William Ermo was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division overturned the conviction, and the People appealed. Ermo, represented by counsel on an assault charge, was questioned about an unrelated murder. He waived his right to counsel and confessed to the murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that because the questioning about the assault and murder were interwoven, Ermo could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The dissent argued that established precedent allowed questioning on an unrelated charge, and the charges here were sufficiently distinct.

    Facts

    William Ermo was accused of assaulting a young schoolgirl on March 13, 1972. This led police to question him about the murder of Ursula Shiba, which occurred seven months prior. There was no initial suspicion linking Ermo to the murder; only the proximity of his address to the victim’s led to the questioning. Ermo waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder during questioning.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ermo of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who is represented by counsel on one charge, can waive his right to counsel and be questioned about a separate, but possibly related, charge without his attorney present, and whether a confession obtained during such questioning is admissible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven, the defendant could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The confession was therefore inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven. Even though the charges were initially considered separate, the sexual nature of the assault charge brought the prior unsolved murder into the discussion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel, particularly when the questioning blurs the lines between ostensibly separate offenses.

    The dissenting judge, Gabrielli, argued that the majority opinion disregarded established precedent. He cited cases such as People v. Stanley, People v. Simons, and People v. Coleman, which held that a defendant could waive counsel on an unrelated pending charge without counsel present. Gabrielli argued that the mere fact that the defendant has been arraigned or indicted on one charge does not prevent law-enforcement officials from interrogating him, in the absence of an attorney, about another and different crime. He asserted that the two crimes were not significantly related. He stated, “Representation by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the investigation is insufficient to invoke” the rule that a person may not be interrogated after a lawyer has entered another proceeding in which he is represented by counsel.

  • People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979): Admissibility of Confessions Before Right to Counsel Attaches

    People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)

    When a defendant makes a confession, part of which is obtained before the defendant’s right to counsel attaches and part after, the portion of the confession obtained before the right to counsel attached is admissible, provided it can be clearly separated from the inadmissible portion and was not the result of prior illegality.

    Summary

    Dominick Byrne was convicted of grand larceny for his role in the kidnapping of Samuel Bronfman. Byrne argued that oral statements he made to FBI agents should have been suppressed because they were taken before he was allowed to consult with his attorney. The New York Court of Appeals held that statements made before Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI were admissible because Byrne had been fully advised of his rights, no coercion was used, the statements made after the attorney’s call were excluded, and the pre-attorney statements were not tainted by any prior illegality or inextricably bound to the later statements. The Court also rejected Byrne’s argument that the agents’ deferment of his request to go to church violated his rights.

    Facts

    Samuel Bronfman was kidnapped at gunpoint. Byrne contacted the New York City police claiming he and Lynch were coerced into participating in the kidnapping. FBI agents questioned Byrne at FBI headquarters after advising him of his constitutional rights. Byrne initially claimed coercion, but later confessed to his role in the crime, detailing the planning and execution of the kidnapping over several hours. Later, Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI and requested that questioning cease. The government continued questioning Byrne after receiving that call.

    Procedural History

    Byrne was convicted of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Byrne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his oral statements to the FBI agents because they continued to question him after being contacted by his attorney. The trial court suppressed written and oral statements made after the attorney’s phone call.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether oral statements made by the defendant to FBI agents before his attorney contacted them, but after he had been advised of his Miranda rights, are admissible when statements made after the attorney’s contact were suppressed?
    2. Whether the agents’ deferment of Byrne’s request to attend church during the interrogation was a violation of his constitutional rights?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statements made before the attorney’s contact were distinct from and not tainted by the illegally obtained statements after the attorney’s contact.
    2. No, because there was no indication that Byrne’s church request flowed from an intention to seek the aid of a clergyman rather than that of a lawyer as a primary source of help and advice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Failla, where the defendant’s lawyer was deliberately kept waiting while police questioned the defendant. In Byrne, the initial interrogation by the FBI agents occurred over many hours before the attorney’s call. The court emphasized that the statements elicited after the attorney’s call were either duplicative or committed to a written form and were excluded by the trial court.

    The court noted the principle that an invalidly obtained prior confession may require exclusion of a subsequent validly taken one (see People v. Valerius, 31 NY2d 51, 55), reasoning that once the police have illegally caused a defendant to “let the cat out of the bag,” statements he makes afterward, no matter the safeguards the police employ as to these, may be found as a matter of fact to stem from the initial illegality (see, e.g., People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115; People v. Stephen J. B., 23 NY2d 611, 615). However, the court pointed out that in such cases the taint is prospective only, never retrospective.

    Regarding Byrne’s request to attend church, the court distinguished this from People v. Bevilacqua, where the police engaged in a “seemingly conscious scheme * * * to prevent [an 18-year-old defendant] from establishing contact with anyone who might be able to provide him with assistance or advice”. The court found no similar intent to frustrate Byrne’s access to counsel. The court reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel does not transform into a right to consult with clergymen, physicians, or others.

  • People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 436 (1979): Scope of Vehicle Search Incident to Arrest

    People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 436 (1979)

    When police have probable cause to arrest a suspect in close proximity to a vehicle, they may search the vehicle if they reasonably believe it is connected to the crime and contains evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of the crime.

    Summary

    Harris was arrested while attempting to burglarize a store. Police found keys on him, which they used to open a nearby car suspected to be his. The search revealed evidence linking him to the crime. After initially refusing to answer questions without counsel, Harris made incriminating statements at the station. The court held the vehicle search was justified because police had a reasonable belief the car was connected to the crime. However, the statements were inadmissible because police failed to scrupulously honor Harris’s right to counsel after he invoked it.

    Facts

    Officer Mangiaracina observed a Plymouth parked suspiciously behind a shopping center at 12:45 a.m. He noted the license plate. At the rear of the A&P, he saw Harris with a lock from the door in one hand and a lock-pick in the other. Harris threw the lock-pick away. Harris was arrested, and a search revealed a flashlight, a police scanner, $500, and Chrysler keys on a rental agency key chain. Officer Cervelli used the keys to open the locked Plymouth, finding radio crystals matching Harris’ scanner and a rental agreement. A radio check revealed the car was stolen.

    Procedural History

    Harris was indicted on burglary and related charges. He moved to suppress the evidence found in the car and statements made at the police station. The trial court denied the motion. Harris pleaded guilty to burglary and criminal possession of stolen property after a sentencing agreement was reached. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Harris appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search of the vehicle was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

    2. Whether Harris’s statements at the police station were admissible, given his prior invocation of his right to counsel.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the police had a reasonable belief that the vehicle was associated with the crime and that a search of the vehicle would produce the fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence of the crime.

    2. No, because the police did not scrupulously honor Harris’s right to counsel before continuing the interrogation after he had invoked that right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the police had probable cause to arrest Harris. Given the suspicious circumstances surrounding the parked car—its unusual location, its rental plates, the Chrysler keys found on Harris—the police had good reason to believe the car belonged to Harris and was connected to the crime. The court applied the rule from People v. Lewis, stating that a search of a vehicle is permissible if the police have a reasonable belief that the vehicle was associated with the crime and a search would produce evidence. The court acknowledged there is no blanket “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment, but the exigencies of the situation (the late hour on New Year’s Eve, the possibility of accomplices, and the vehicle’s mobility) justified the warrantless search.

    Regarding the statements, the court cited Miranda v. Arizona and People v. Grant, emphasizing that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police must “scrupulously honor” that right. The court found that the police, by questioning Harris at the station after he had refused to answer questions without an attorney, failed to honor his right to counsel, rendering the statements inadmissible. The court stated this case was “essentially undistinguishable from People v Buxton” because the police only broke off questioning long enough to transport the defendant to the police station and complete paperwork. The court emphasized that the plea covered both indictments and was expressly conditioned on concurrent sentences, so the entire plea must be vacated.

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Re-Interrogation After Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody invokes their right to counsel, police must scrupulously honor that request, and cannot resume interrogation about the same crime shortly thereafter without counsel present, even if Miranda rights are re-administered.

    Summary

    Cunningham was arrested for attempted burglary with two others. After initially being questioned without Miranda warnings, he invoked his right to counsel. Shortly after, a different officer re-initiated questioning about the same crime, obtained incriminating statements, and a written confession after confronting Cunningham with a co-defendant’s statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the confession was inadmissible because the police failed to scrupulously honor Cunningham’s prior request for counsel. This case clarifies the obligations of law enforcement following a suspect’s invocation of their right to counsel during custodial interrogation.

    Facts

    Cunningham was arrested with Harvey and Eason for attempted burglary. At the time of his arrest, the police seized evidence from their car and obtained statements from Cunningham without advising him of his Miranda rights. Later, at the police station, after being advised of his rights, Cunningham stated he wanted an attorney and did not wish to answer questions without counsel. The initial questioning ceased, and he was allowed to call his mother and ask her to contact an attorney.

    Procedural History

    Cunningham moved to suppress his statements and the physical evidence. The County Court suppressed statements made before Miranda warnings but denied the rest of the motion. Cunningham pleaded guilty to criminal facilitation. The Appellate Term reversed, set aside the plea, and suppressed the confession. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession obtained after a suspect invokes the right to counsel, but is subsequently re-interrogated shortly thereafter about the same crime without counsel present, is admissible, when police briefly complied with the request but then resumed questioning and confronted the suspect with a co-defendant’s statement?

    Holding

    No, because the police did not scrupulously honor Cunningham’s request for counsel before re-initiating interrogation about the same criminal offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that when a defendant invokes their right to counsel, Miranda imposes additional obligations on the police, beyond simply advising the defendant of their rights. While the police briefly complied with Cunningham’s request by terminating the interrogation and allowing him to attempt to contact a lawyer, they almost immediately re-initiated questioning about the same crime before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel and without re-advising him of his rights. Confronting Cunningham with Harvey’s statement was coercive, designed to induce him to change his mind and respond to questioning without an attorney. The court emphasized that “[t]his type of conduct cannot be said to be consistent with the obligation of the police to scrupulously honor the defendant’s request for counsel and his refusal to answer questions about the attempted burglary without an attorney’s assistance.” The court distinguished this situation from a permissible break in questioning. This case underscores the importance of respecting a suspect’s right to counsel once invoked, preventing immediate resumption of interrogation on the same matter.

  • People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366 (1978): Resumption of Interrogation After Request for Counsel

    People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366 (1978)

    When a suspect in custody requests an attorney, interrogation must cease, and the police must scrupulously honor that request before resuming questioning; any resumption of interrogation without providing the suspect a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel renders subsequent statements inadmissible.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a confession was inadmissible because police resumed interrogation of the defendant too quickly after he requested counsel, failing to scrupulously honor his request. After being arrested and read his rights, Grant requested counsel. Ten minutes later, after an officer informed him of the evidence against him, he waived his rights and confessed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that when a suspect requests counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is present, and police actions that undermine the suspect’s decision to seek counsel violate Miranda.

    Facts

    Earl Stokes was murdered in a Manhattan apartment. Detective Campbell arrested Grant for the killing and seized a handgun from Grant’s room. Campbell asked Grant if he would speak to the District Attorney before advising him of his rights, and Grant agreed. An Assistant District Attorney arrived and advised Grant of his Miranda rights. Grant requested counsel when informed of his right to have an attorney present. Questioning stopped, but Detective Campbell asked the prosecutor to remain because he wanted to speak to Grant again. As Campbell escorted Grant from the room, they passed Grant’s girlfriend. Campbell told Grant they had several witnesses against him, including his girlfriend, and that others playing cards at the scene could identify him. Grant then stated he wanted to speak with the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    A pretrial motion to suppress the confession was denied. Grant pleaded guilty to murder after the prosecution presented its case at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Two justices concurred in the result but believed the confession should have been suppressed; however, they deemed the error harmless. Grant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated Miranda standards by resuming interrogation after the defendant requested counsel, thus requiring suppression of the confession.
    2. Whether the denial of the motion to suppress, if erroneous, was harmless in light of other evidence presented at trial before the guilty plea.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the authorities did not scrupulously honor Grant’s request for counsel before resuming the interrogation.
    2. No, because when a conviction is based on a guilty plea, an appellate court can rarely determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision, especially when it involves a confession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona to ensure statements obtained during custodial interrogation are truly voluntary. The court distinguished between the procedures required when a defendant asserts the right to remain silent and when the right to counsel is invoked. While Michigan v. Mosley clarified that interrogation could resume after a defendant asserted the right to remain silent if that right was “scrupulously honored,” the court here distinguished the request for counsel. The court stated, “the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities’ insistence to make a statement without counsel’s presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.” Even if interrogation could resume after a request for counsel, the police must “scrupulously honor” the request. The Court found that the authorities failed to do so in Grant’s case. Only ten minutes passed between Grant’s request for counsel and the second interrogation. During that time, Detective Campbell’s comments undermined Grant’s decision to seek counsel. Therefore, the confession should have been suppressed.

    Regarding the harmless error argument, the court recognized that harmless error rules are difficult to apply to guilty pleas. The court reasoned that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty can be based on numerous factors, and it is challenging for an appellate court to determine whether the denial of the motion to suppress contributed to the plea. The court concluded it could not rule out the possibility that the defendant pleaded guilty because he believed he could not prevail, given the confession, noting that he preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. Therefore, the plea was vacated.