New York Law Review

Tag: Miranda Rights

  • People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967 (1990): Admissibility of Oral Statements After Refusal to Provide Written Statements

    People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967 (1990)

    A defendant’s willingness to make an oral statement after refusing to provide a written one, following a valid Miranda waiver, does not constitute an invocation of the right to silence, making the oral statement admissible.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant’s oral statement is admissible when made after the defendant waived his Miranda rights but refused to provide a written statement. The Court of Appeals held that the oral statement was admissible because the defendant’s refusal to sign a written statement, in this context, did not amount to an invocation of his right to silence. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a defendant refuses to speak further, which would invoke the right to remain silent. The key is whether the defendant clearly indicated a desire to cut off further questioning.

    Facts

    During the People’s direct case, the prosecutor presented police testimony indicating that:

    • The defendant received Miranda warnings.
    • The defendant acknowledged the warnings and signed a written waiver of his rights.
    • After the waiver, the officer asked for a written statement.
    • The defendant responded, “I’ll talk to you but I am not signing anything else.”
    • The defendant then provided an oral statement.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after an intermediate appellate court reviewed the trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s oral statement.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s oral statement, given after refusing to provide a written statement, constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant waived his right to silence and his preference for an oral statement over a written one did not indicate a desire to cut off further inquiry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the defendant did not invoke his right to silence but, rather, waived it after receiving Miranda warnings. The court emphasized that the defendant’s statement, “I’ll talk to you but I am not signing anything else,” indicated a preference for the form of the statement (oral vs. written) rather than a desire to terminate the interrogation altogether. The court distinguished this case from People v. Von Werne, where the defendant refused to talk further, which was interpreted as an invocation of the right to remain silent.

    The court also distinguished the case from Connecticut v. Barrett, noting that Barrett involved the right to counsel, specifically the refusal to make a written statement without counsel present. In Sirno, the defendant’s refusal to provide a written statement did not implicate his right to counsel. As the court stated, “Defendant’s reliance on Connecticut v Barrett (479 US 523) is misplaced as defendant’s refusal to give a written statement did not implicate his right to counsel.”

    The court concluded that, since the defendant had been properly Mirandized and waived his rights, the officer’s testimony regarding the circumstances in which the defendant made the oral statement was admissible.

  • People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990): Limits on Derivative Right to Counsel

    People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990)

    A suspect who has counsel assigned in a prior, unrelated case can waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel during a subsequent interrogation regarding a new, unrelated charge.

    Summary

    Bing addresses the scope of a defendant’s right to counsel in New York, particularly when the defendant has prior representation in an unrelated case. The Court of Appeals held that the derivative right to counsel established in People v. Bartolomeo was no longer good law. Thus, a defendant can waive their right to counsel, even without counsel present, when being questioned on a new charge that is unrelated to a previous case where they were assigned counsel. This decision overruled the broader protections previously afforded to defendants under Bartolomeo, emphasizing the need for a clearer, more practical standard.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for criminal possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest. While in custody, he volunteered information about an unrelated homicide. He was assigned counsel for the misdemeanor charges under an alias. Later, police learned his true identity and arrested him for a parole violation. After receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant waived his right to counsel and discussed the homicide again, making inculpatory statements. He was then charged with murder.

    Procedural History

    The Onondaga County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, finding a violation of his right to counsel. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed, denying suppression. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory statements made by a defendant, after waiving the right to counsel in the absence of counsel, should be suppressed when the defendant had previously been assigned counsel in a pending, unrelated misdemeanor case.

    Holding

    No, because the derivative right to counsel established in People v. Bartolomeo does not extend to subsequent interrogations on unrelated charges after a valid waiver of Miranda rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between People v. Rogers and People v. Bartolomeo, and ultimately overruled Bartolomeo to limit the scope of derivative right to counsel. The Court explained that the Bartolomeo rule, which imputed a duty to inquire about prior representation, lacked a “principled basis which justifies its social cost.” The Court emphasized that “there is little to be said for a [derivative] rule which is not firmly grounded on prior case law, cannot be applied uniformly, favors recidivists over first-time arrestees, and exacts such a heavy cost from the public.”

    The Court clarified that Rogers still stands for the principle that once a defendant in custody requests or is represented by counsel, interrogation must cease on any subject. However, Bing makes it clear that this protection does not extend to subsequent interrogations on unrelated charges when the defendant validly waives their Miranda rights. The Court distinguished Bing from Rogers noting, “In People v. Bartolomeo (supra), however, defendant was taken into custody for questioning on a new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that charge and freely waived his right to counsel”.

    Thus, the Court held that a suspect is competent to waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel regarding matters unrelated to a charge where counsel was previously assigned. This decision aimed to strike a balance between protecting defendants’ rights and ensuring effective law enforcement.

  • People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967 (1990): Implicit Waiver of Miranda Rights

    People v. Sirno, 76 N.Y.2d 967 (1990)

    A defendant implicitly waives their Miranda rights when they understand those rights, are administered them correctly, and then willingly proceed to make a statement or answer questions during interrogation.

    Summary

    Following a Huntley hearing, the Supreme Court found that Sirno, after being arrested, was read his Miranda rights in English. He then asked to see the warnings in Spanish. After reviewing the Spanish version, he wrote “yes” next to each statement of his rights and proceeded to give a statement to the detective. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Sirno had implicitly waived his Miranda rights. The court reasoned that his actions clearly demonstrated an understanding and willingness to cooperate with the interrogation after being fully informed of his rights.

    Facts

    After being arrested, a detective read Sirno his Miranda rights in English.
    Sirno requested to see the warnings in Spanish.
    The detective provided a card with the Miranda warnings in Spanish.
    Sirno was instructed to read the Spanish warnings, record “yes” or “no” after each statement, and indicate if he did not understand any part.
    Sirno wrote “yes” next to each statement and did not ask any questions.
    Sirno then immediately gave a statement to the detective.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court held a Huntley hearing and found that Sirno had implicitly waived his Miranda rights.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the undisturbed findings of the lower court, that the defendant clearly understood his Miranda rights and willingly proceeded to make a statement after being administered those rights, are sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant implicitly waived those rights.

    Holding

    Yes, because where a defendant clearly understands his Miranda rights and promptly after having been administered those rights willingly proceeds to make a statement or answer questions during interrogation, no other indication prior to the commencement of interrogation is necessary to support a conclusion that the defendant implicitly waived those rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the undisturbed findings of the lower courts that Sirno understood his Miranda rights. The court emphasized that a waiver can be inferred from a defendant’s actions. Here, Sirno’s request for the Spanish version of the Miranda warnings, his affirmative responses to each right, and his subsequent willingness to provide a statement demonstrated a clear understanding and intention to waive those rights. The court noted that it is difficult to imagine how a defendant could implicitly manifest a waiver other than by cooperating with interrogation after being informed of their rights.

    The court directly quoted, “where, as here, undisturbed findings have been made that a defendant clearly understands his Miranda rights and promptly after having been administered those rights willingly proceeds to make a statement or answer questions during interrogation, no other indication prior to the commencement of interrogation is necessary to support a conclusion that the defendant implicitly waived those rights.”

    The court distinguished this case from *People v. Williams*, 62 N.Y.2d 285 (1984), without providing specific reasoning why. This implies that the facts in *Williams* were substantially different such that an implicit waiver could not be found. This highlights the importance of a fact-specific inquiry into whether a defendant’s actions demonstrate a clear understanding and voluntary waiver of their Miranda rights.

  • People v. Davis, 67 N.Y.2d 514 (1986): Waiver of Counsel After Non-Custodial Request

    People v. Davis, 67 N.Y.2d 514 (1986)

    An individual who requests counsel during a non-custodial interrogation can later waive that right, even outside the presence of counsel, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

    Summary

    Brenda Davis was convicted of felony murder. Prior to her guilty plea, she moved to suppress statements made to police, arguing that they were obtained in violation of her right to counsel. She initially requested counsel during a non-custodial interview, but later waived her rights during a custodial interrogation the following day. The County Court suppressed the first statement, but admitted the second. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the second statement as well. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a suspect who requested counsel while not in custody may later waive that right before formal proceedings begin, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine the validity of the waiver.

    Facts

    Brenda Davis lived on a farm with her daughter, James Davis, and Jessie White. Elizabeth Schlitt, James Davis’s girlfriend, died on the farm. Initially, Davis and the codefendant claimed Schlitt died from a fall in the barn. An autopsy revealed she died from multiple injuries, including sexual assault. During a non-custodial interview at the farm, after being read her Miranda rights, Davis requested a lawyer after being confronted with James Davis’s confession. The deputies ceased questioning at that time but told her they would return the next day. The next day, deputies found a note from Davis and met her at her sister’s house, asking her to come to the Sheriff’s office for questioning. She voluntarily accompanied them. She was given Miranda warnings, waived her rights, and gave incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed statements Davis made after requesting counsel on August 25 but denied suppression of those made on August 26, finding a valid waiver. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the August 26 statements. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect who has requested counsel during a non-custodial interrogation may subsequently waive that right, without counsel present, during a later custodial interrogation?

    Holding

    Yes, because the protections afforded to suspects who request counsel are different in custodial versus non-custodial settings. The coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation necessitates stricter protections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the robust right to counsel in New York, extending beyond the federal constitutional right. It identified two scenarios where the right to counsel attaches indelibly, requiring counsel’s presence for a valid waiver: (1) after formal proceedings commence, and (2) when a suspect in custody has retained or requested an attorney. However, this case did not fall within either of these rules. The court distinguished People v. Cunningham, noting that Davis was not in custody when she initially requested counsel. The court reasoned that during a non-custodial interview, the coercive power of the state is limited because the suspect can refuse to answer questions or leave. The court stated: “In a noncustodial interview, however, a witness or suspect is not constrained by police influence and does not suffer ‘the disadvantage’ of being ‘directly confronted with the awesome law enforcement machinery possessed by the State.’” The court emphasized that the ultimate question is whether the People met their burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Factors relevant to this determination include whether the defendant was fully advised of their rights, whether the defendant initiated further communication with police, and whether there was a break in interrogation providing a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider the unreviewed factual question of whether Davis’s waiver was indeed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Court noted that it is always desirable to remind the defendant of the earlier request and obtain an express withdrawal.

  • People v. Gamble, 70 N.Y.2d 885 (1987): Invocation of Right to Counsel Must Be Unequivocal

    70 N.Y.2d 885 (1987)

    An individual’s statement during Miranda advisements regarding the right to counsel must unequivocally invoke that right to trigger the cessation of questioning.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary and robbery. He sought to suppress statements made to police, arguing violations of his Miranda and Payton rights. During Miranda advisements, he stated, “I have an attorney,” leading to a cessation of questioning. After further investigation, officers asked who his attorney was, and he recanted, stating, “I don’t have an attorney.” He then made incriminating statements after being re-advised of his Miranda rights. The lower courts found he did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts’ undisturbed findings were supported by the record and therefore beyond the scope of its review.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested and given Miranda warnings.
    During the advisement of his right to counsel, the defendant stated, “I have an attorney.”
    All questioning ceased at that point.
    After further investigation, police asked the defendant who his attorney was.
    Defendant then stated, “I don’t have an attorney.” He explained he had called an attorney earlier to inquire about police obtaining his military record fingerprints but did not discuss the criminal investigation.
    Defendant was re-advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently made incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, finding that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s ruling.
    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel during Miranda advisements when he stated, “I have an attorney,” such that any subsequent statements should be suppressed.

    Holding

    No, because the lower courts’ resolutions rested on undisturbed findings supported by the record, placing the issue beyond the scope of the Court of Appeals’ review. The initial statement was not deemed an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decisions based on the principle that factual findings, if undisturbed and supported by the record, are beyond the scope of appellate review in the Court of Appeals. The suppression court and Appellate Division had both found that the defendant’s statement, “I have an attorney,” did not constitute an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. This factual determination was critical because Miranda requires that questioning cease only when the suspect clearly asserts the right to an attorney. The court implicitly reasoned that allowing ambiguous or equivocal statements to trigger the Miranda protections would unduly hamper legitimate police investigations. The court noted that there was no Payton issue presented because the arrest occurred outside the defendant’s home. The court also dismissed the defendant’s other arguments as either unpreserved or without merit. The decision highlights the importance of clear and unambiguous invocation of rights during custodial interrogation; ambiguity will be construed against the defendant.

  • People v. Candelario, 69 N.Y.2d 22 (1986): Parolee Statements and Miranda Rights During Custodial Interrogation

    People v. Candelario, 69 N.Y.2d 22 (1986)

    Statements made by a parolee to their parole officer during a custodial interrogation regarding potential criminal activity are considered compelled and inadmissible at trial unless preceded by Miranda warnings; subsequent statements to police after Miranda warnings may also be inadmissible if part of a continuous, unattenuated interrogation.

    Summary

    Candelario, a parolee, was suspected of burglary. His parole officer, prompted by police, questioned him about the crime. Initially, the parole officer questioned Candelario about a parole violation (drug use), leading to Candelario being handcuffed. Then, the parole officer questioned Candelario regarding the burglary without administering Miranda warnings. After Candelario confessed to the burglary, the parole officer contacted the police, who then administered Miranda warnings, after which Candelario again confessed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial unwarned statements to the parole officer were inadmissible, and the subsequent statements to the police were also inadmissible because they were part of a continuous interrogation, insufficiently attenuated from the initial coerced statements. This case highlights the potential for coercion inherent in the parole officer-parolee relationship when questioning turns to criminal activity.

    Facts

    Candelario, on parole for a previous offense, was suspected of a recent burglary. A police investigator informed Candelario’s parole officer of evidence linking Candelario to the burglary. When Candelario reported to his parole officer, the parole officer questioned him about a potential parole violation, discovering drug use and a knife, leading to Candelario’s handcuffing. The parole officer then questioned Candelario about the burglary without providing Miranda warnings. After admitting involvement, Candelario was turned over to the police.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled Candelario’s initial statements to his parole officer inadmissible due to the lack of Miranda warnings. The court also suppressed Candelario’s subsequent statements to the police, finding they were a product of a continuous interrogation without sufficient attenuation. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed only the second ruling regarding the statements to the police to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a parolee to a police officer, after Miranda warnings, are admissible when those statements are part of a continuous interrogation that began with unwarned questioning by the parolee’s parole officer during a custodial situation?

    Holding

    No, because the subsequent Mirandized statements were not sufficiently attenuated from the initial, unwarned statements to dispel the coercive effect of the earlier questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the dual role a parole officer plays as both counselor and law enforcement agent. While routine, non-custodial questioning may not require Miranda warnings, the situation changes when the parole officer’s actions become the functional equivalent of those of a police officer. In this case, the parole officer had already decided to violate Candelario’s parole, had him in custody and handcuffed, and had obtained incriminating evidence before questioning him about the burglary. "At that point, the parole officer’s actions were the functional equivalent of those of a police officer." The court emphasized that once Candelario was physically taken into custody and handcuffed, the potential for coercion was as great as that in custodial interrogation by a police officer. Therefore, Miranda warnings were required. Because the subsequent Mirandized statements to the police were part of a virtually uninterrupted interrogation stemming from the initial unwarned statements, they were deemed inadmissible because the coercive effect of the initial questioning was not dispelled. The court relied on People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, regarding attenuation. The People did not dispute that the questioning was virtually uninterrupted, thus reinforcing the lack of attenuation.

  • People v. Santiago, 72 N.Y.2d 836 (1988): Invocation of Right to Counsel During Interrogation

    72 N.Y.2d 836 (1988)

    A defendant’s statements to interrogating officers are admissible if the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their right to counsel, and the lower courts’ factual findings supporting this waiver are supported by evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of statements made by Publio Santiago to a prosecutor during interrogation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the trial court’s denial of Santiago’s motion to suppress those statements. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s undisturbed findings indicated that Santiago, a mature and well-educated individual, had not refused to speak, had not explicitly requested a lawyer, and was not coerced. Therefore, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Because there was evidence to support the lower courts’ findings, the Court of Appeals deferred to those findings and affirmed the conviction.

    Facts

    Publio Santiago was interrogated by a prosecutor. He subsequently sought to suppress the statements he made during that interrogation. The specific details of the interrogation (the specific questions asked, the exact nature of the statements) are not detailed in the opinion, as the core issue revolved around whether Santiago had invoked his right to counsel.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held a Huntley hearing to determine the admissibility of Santiago’s statements. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Santiago had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Santiago was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lower courts erred in concluding that Santiago failed to invoke his right to counsel, thereby making his statements to the interrogating prosecutor admissible.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s findings, undisturbed by the Appellate Division, were supported by evidence that Santiago did not refuse to speak, did not explicitly request a lawyer, was not coerced, and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of deferring to the factual findings of the lower courts, especially when those findings are supported by evidence. The court noted that the trial court specifically found that Santiago was a mature, intelligent, and well-educated defendant. Based on these characteristics and the circumstances of the interrogation (no refusal to speak, no explicit request for counsel, no coercion), the trial court concluded that Santiago had waived his right to counsel. The Appellate Division did not disturb these findings. The Court of Appeals held that it could not say, as a matter of law, that the lower courts were wrong. The court implicitly applied the standard of review that requires deference to factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. The court stated, “There being evidence to support the undisturbed findings, we cannot say as a matter of law that the lower courts were wrong in concluding defendant failed to invoke his right to counsel with respect to the statements by defendant to the interrogating prosecutor.” The court’s decision underscores the principle that the determination of whether a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to counsel is heavily fact-dependent and that appellate courts will generally defer to the findings of the trial court, which is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence.

  • People v. Thomas, 70 N.Y.2d 823 (1987): Admissibility of Audio/Visual Recordings of Sobriety Tests

    People v. Thomas, 70 N.Y.2d 823 (1987)

    Audio/visual recordings of performance-based sobriety tests, including colloquy not amounting to custodial interrogation, are generally admissible without prior Miranda warnings.

    Summary

    The defendant was arrested for felony driving while intoxicated and taken to police headquarters for sobriety tests. An audio/video recording was made of the tests, including questions about pedigree, refusal to take a chemical test, and medical conditions. The defendant moved to suppress the audio portion of the tape, arguing that Miranda warnings were required before questioning. The court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division upheld the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that performance tests need not be preceded by Miranda warnings and that the defendant failed to specifically identify which questions he found objectionable.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated and charged with a felony. At police headquarters, he underwent performance-based sobriety tests. During the tests, he was questioned about his identity, his refusal to take a chemical analysis test, and whether he was under medication or diabetic. An audio/video recording was made of the entire process. Police form 38, containing similar questions and answers, was admitted at trial without objection.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the audio portion of the tape, arguing that Miranda warnings should have been administered. The Judicial Hearing Officer denied the motion, finding no custodial interrogation. The trial court confirmed this determination. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether audio portions of a video tape recording sobriety tests are inadmissible because no Miranda warnings were given before the defendant was questioned?

    Holding

    No, because performance tests need not be preceded by Miranda warnings, and the defendant failed to preserve the issue by not specifically identifying the objectionable questions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that audio/visual tapes of performance tests, including colloquy not constituting custodial interrogation, are generally admissible without Miranda warnings. The Court cited People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141 in support of this holding. Here, the Court emphasized that the defendant made a general motion to suppress the audio portions of the tape but failed to specify which questions and answers he found objectionable. Because of this lack of specificity, the defendant’s claims of inadmissibility were unpreserved and beyond the court’s review, citing People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011. The Court also addressed the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor acted vindictively in indicting him for a felony, finding no merit to it. Citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, the court found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.

  • People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969 (1987): Invocation of Right to Counsel Must Be Unequivocal

    People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969 (1987)

    An individual’s inquiry about whether they should speak to a lawyer is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, and therefore does not require police to cease questioning.

    Summary

    Hicks voluntarily went to the police station with his brother. He was gratuitously given Miranda warnings. He then asked police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?” The police asked if he thought he was in trouble; Hicks said no and gave a statement. Hicks was told he wasn’t under arrest and could leave. Hicks moved to suppress the statement, arguing his question invoked his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the inquiry was not an unequivocal request for counsel, and therefore, the police were not required to stop questioning him.

    Facts

    Defendant Hicks and his brother voluntarily went to the police station.

    The police gave Hicks Miranda warnings, even though he was not in custody.

    Hicks asked the police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?”

    The police responded by asking Hicks if he thought he was in trouble.

    Hicks replied, “No,” and then gave a statement to the police.

    Hicks was advised that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Hicks’s motion to suppress the statement he made to the police.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect’s question to police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?” constitutes an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, thereby requiring the police to cease questioning.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s inquiry did not unequivocally inform the police of his intention to retain counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a suspect must unequivocally inform the police of their intention to retain counsel to trigger the right to counsel. A simple inquiry, such as asking whether one should speak to a lawyer, does not meet this standard. The court relied on prior case law, including People v. Rowell and People v. Johnson, which established the requirement of an unequivocal request for counsel. The court distinguished the case from People v. Esposito, where the invocation of the right to counsel was deemed unequivocal. The suppression court found that Hicks was not in custody and a reasonable person would not have believed their freedom was impaired. Because the defendant’s inquiry was not an unequivocal request for counsel, his right to counsel did not attach. The court found the remaining arguments to be either unpreserved, unreviewable, or without merit.

  • People v. Harris, 68 N.Y.2d 951 (1986): Admissibility of Confession Following Illegal Warrantless Arrest

    68 N.Y.2d 951 (1986)

    When a confession follows an illegal arrest, it is admissible only if the prosecution proves the confession was attenuated from the illegal arrest by intervening events, considering temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.

    Summary

    Harris was arrested at his home without a warrant for assault. After being given Miranda warnings, he was taken to the police station. After two hours alone, he was questioned and confessed to the shooting, claiming it was accidental. He sought to suppress the statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the arrest was illegal under Payton v. New York, the confession was admissible because it was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest. The court emphasized the extensive findings by the hearing court, including the multiple advisements of Miranda rights, the two-hour period of isolation before questioning, and the proper conduct of the police throughout the custody period. The court found that the lower courts’ finding of attenuation had support in the record and was thus beyond their power to review.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested at his home on November 18, 1980, without a warrant, and charged with first-degree assault for shooting Thelma Barnes. The arrest was based on probable cause. After the arrest, he was given Miranda warnings in a police vehicle and taken to headquarters, where he remained alone for two hours. He was then questioned for an hour and admitted to the shooting, claiming it was accidental. The police prepared a written statement, which he signed.

    Procedural History

    Harris moved to suppress his post-arrest statements. The hearing court denied the motion, initially holding the arrest lawful because Payton v. New York was not retroactive, and alternatively, that any illegality was attenuated. Harris was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed, acknowledging the Supreme Court’s retroactive application of Payton, but agreed with the attenuation finding.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made following a warrantless and thus illegal arrest in the home are admissible, or whether they must be suppressed as the fruit of the illegal arrest.

    Holding

    No, the statements are admissible because the connection between the illegal arrest and the confession was sufficiently attenuated by intervening circumstances, including the administration of Miranda warnings, a significant time lapse, and proper police conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that when a defendant challenges statements as the product of an illegal arrest, the prosecution must show the statements were acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable to purge the illegality. This determination considers the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.

    While Miranda warnings are important, they are not conclusive. The court highlighted the hearing court’s findings: Harris was advised of his rights twice, waived them, was alone for two hours before questioning, questioning was intermittent, the statement was partly exculpatory, and police conduct was proper. The court quoted People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 407: That determination requires consideration of the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

    The court deferred to the finding of attenuation made by the courts below, noting that this presented a mixed question of law and fact, and because the finding was supported by the record, it was beyond their power to review. The court emphasized the original legality of the arrest, which later became illegal due to a subsequent Supreme Court decision, as a factor contributing to the attenuation. The court analogized to People v Graham, 90 AD2d 198, 202, emphasizing the act of free will in making the statement, unaffected by the subsequent change in the law.