New York Law Review

Tag: Miranda Rights

  • People v. Perdomo, 26 N.Y.3d 68 (2015): Admissibility of Post-Miranda Statements for Impeachment

    People v. Perdomo, 26 N.Y.3d 68 (2015)

    A voluntary statement made by a defendant after invoking their right to remain silent under Miranda can be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant later testifies inconsistently at trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether statements made by a defendant after invoking their Miranda rights can be used for impeachment if the defendant later testifies at trial. The court held that such statements are admissible for impeachment as long as they were voluntarily made. The court declined to adopt a rule that would automatically exclude all post-invocation statements, even if voluntary. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the defendant’s statements were voluntary and thus admissible for impeachment, as there was no evidence that the police intentionally coerced the statements.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for a shooting and read his Miranda rights, which he invoked. However, during questioning, the police made statements suggesting the defendant knew his co-defendant, and the defendant responded by denying the co-defendant had shot himself. The prosecution sought to use the defendant’s post-Miranda statements for impeachment if he testified. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude the use of these statements. The defendant did not testify at trial but was convicted of several charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision that the statements were admissible for impeachment. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude the use of post-Miranda statements for impeachment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a statement made by a defendant to police after invoking their Miranda rights can be used for impeachment purposes if the statement was voluntary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because voluntary statements made by a defendant after invoking their Miranda rights can be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant later testifies inconsistently.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by restating the general rule that statements obtained in violation of Miranda cannot be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. However, drawing on the precedent of Harris v. New York, the court reiterated that such statements may be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant testifies at trial and makes statements inconsistent with the prior statement. The court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that would prohibit the use of all post-invocation statements for impeachment, because it would effectively permit perjury by defendants. The court emphasized the importance of voluntariness, finding that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. The court noted that the police did not overreach, and there was no evidence that the investigators deliberately tried to get around the defendant’s rights. The court found nothing in the record to suggest that the police deliberately sought to circumvent the defendant’s invocation of his rights.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the principle that a defendant’s voluntary post-Miranda statements can be used for impeachment, even if they are not admissible in the prosecution’s direct case. This ruling is important for attorneys and legal practitioners because it affects how they advise their clients during custodial interrogations. Prosecutors can still use voluntary statements obtained after a defendant asserts their right to silence if the defendant later offers inconsistent testimony at trial. Defense attorneys must consider the possibility that any statements their client makes, even after invoking Miranda, could be used against them if they choose to testify. The case underscores the importance of assessing the voluntariness of any statements made by the defendant and considering the implications for cross-examination. The case underscores the principle that a defendant cannot use the exclusionary rule to shield themselves from impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. The rule encourages truthful testimony.

  • People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.3d 994 (2014): Preservation of Legal Issues for Appellate Review and Miranda Rights

    People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.3d 994 (2014)

    For an issue to be reviewed on appeal in New York, it must have been properly preserved at the trial level by a specific objection or if the trial court expressly decided the legal question raised on appeal.

    Summary

    The defendant, Williams, was arrested for using counterfeit money. After an initial interrogation where he was read his Miranda rights, he requested to speak with detectives again, with his attorney present for part of the interview. Williams made incriminating statements during the second interview, but was not re-advised of his Miranda rights. He sought to suppress these statements, arguing a Miranda violation. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Williams argued the second interview violated his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the issue was not preserved because Williams did not raise the specific argument about the need for new Miranda warnings. The Court emphasized that the trial court focused on whether counsel needed to be present, not on the necessity for new Miranda warnings.

    Facts

    Williams was arrested for using counterfeit money and taken to the police station. He was read his Miranda rights, which he waived. During the initial interrogation, he did not provide consistent answers. After the detectives ended the interrogation, they told Williams that he could speak with them through his defense counsel. Three weeks later, defense counsel contacted the detectives, and indicated that Williams wanted to provide additional information. Williams spoke with counsel in private and counsel was present for the initial part of the second interview before leaving with his consent. Williams was not read his Miranda rights a second time during the second interview, and made allegedly incriminating statements. Williams subsequently moved to suppress these statements, claiming a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

    Procedural History

    Williams moved to suppress the statements made to the detectives, which was denied by the Supreme Court. Williams was found guilty at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the issue of whether the police were required to re-administer Miranda warnings during the second interview was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because the issue was not preserved for appellate review, as the trial court did not explicitly rule on whether the second interview required new Miranda warnings, but rather focused on the right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the legal issue was preserved for appellate review, citing New York law. Under CPL 470.05(2), a question of law is presented when a protest is registered at a time the court can change it or if the court expressly decides the question. The Court noted Williams’s omnibus motion for suppression did not specifically address whether the lack of new Miranda warnings was problematic. Further, the trial court did not explicitly rule on this specific issue, but instead decided that counsel’s presence was not required during the second interview. The Court stated that “[i]nasmuch as defendant made only a general motion for suppression and it cannot be said that the court expressly decided the issue that defendant raises on this appeal, preservation has not been established and that issue is, therefore, beyond our power to review.”

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the critical importance of preserving legal issues for appeal. Attorneys must make specific, timely objections at the trial level to ensure that appellate courts can review alleged errors. The Court of Appeals cannot review an issue that was not presented to and decided by the trial court. Attorneys should ensure that arguments are made with precision and clarity during pre-trial motions and at trial. When a party seeks to suppress evidence based on an alleged constitutional violation, the argument must clearly and specifically state the nature of the violation, and it is the burden of the party to seek an explicit ruling from the court. This ruling underscores the need for attorneys to be diligent in both their objections and in seeking explicit rulings on those objections to ensure that potential appellate issues are properly preserved.

  • People v. Thomas, 24 N.Y.3d 1115 (2014): Admissibility of Confession Obtained Through Deception

    People v. Thomas, 24 N.Y.3d 1115 (2014)

    A confession is involuntary and inadmissible when obtained through police deception that creates a substantial risk the defendant might falsely incriminate themselves.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s confession was involuntary and inadmissible because it was obtained through police deception. The police falsely told the defendant his girlfriend was alive and needed his help to receive proper medical treatment, implying he could be responsible for her death if he withheld information. The Court found this deception created a substantial risk that the defendant would falsely incriminate himself, thus rendering the confession involuntary. Because the Appellate Division’s reversal was based on a mixed question of law and fact, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.

    Facts

    The defendant’s girlfriend was found dead of a heroin overdose in his mother’s residence. The defendant was arrested for violating an order of protection. After being given Miranda warnings, he initially denied involvement in her death, claiming she was already intoxicated when she arrived. Later, detectives falsely told him his girlfriend was alive but needed his help to receive appropriate medical treatment and that withholding information about drug use could harm her. Based on this deception, the defendant confessed to injecting her with heroin. This confession was recorded.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the confession, finding the police deception was not egregious enough to render the confession involuntary. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the deception created an implied threat that the defendant could be held responsible for his girlfriend’s death if he didn’t confess, and thus, the confession was involuntary. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in finding the defendant’s confession involuntary based on the interrogating officer’s deception, considering the totality of the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division’s determination that the defendant’s will was overborne was a factual one, or one involving mixed questions of law and fact, beyond the review power of the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division correctly applied the “totality of the circumstances” test to determine voluntariness, as established in People v. Guilford, 21 NY3d 205, 208 (2013). The Appellate Division properly considered the interrogating officer’s deception. The Court found that the false prospect of being penalized for remaining silent, raised by the interrogators, was incompatible with a finding that the defendant’s confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division concluded that the deception, implying the defendant could be held responsible for his girlfriend’s death if he didn’t confess, created a substantial risk the defendant would falsely incriminate himself. The Court of Appeals noted that a voluntariness determination by the Appellate Division on the facts ordinarily implicates a mixture of factual and legal elements resistant to the Court’s review. The Court dismissed the appeal because the Appellate Division’s finding was based on a mixed question of law and fact, preventing further review.

  • People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665 (2013): Applying the Emergency Exception to Miranda

    People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665 (2013)

    The emergency exception to Miranda allows police questioning without warnings when there is a reasonable belief, grounded in fact, that an emergency exists requiring immediate assistance, even without certainty of a crime or victim.

    Summary

    Scott Doll was found walking covered in fresh blood, offering inconsistent explanations. Police, believing someone might be injured, questioned him without Miranda warnings. This led them to the body of Doll’s business partner. Doll also made incriminating statements to a friend while in custody, overheard by an officer. The New York Court of Appeals held the initial questioning was justified under the emergency doctrine, as police reasonably believed someone needed immediate aid. The court further held that the statements to the friend were admissible because the police did not initiate the conversation or pressure Doll to speak.

    Facts

    A 911 call reported a suspicious person, Scott Doll, walking on a road. A deputy found Doll matching the description, wearing camouflage and a hood. Doll dropped a metal object and held a lug wrench. He had wet bloodstains on his clothes. Doll claimed he was walking for his blood pressure and his van was nearby. The deputy agreed to give him a ride. A firefighter told the deputy that Doll had been hiding between cars at the automotive garage. The deputy detained Doll and frisked him. Doll stated he was wearing his deer butchering outfit but did not explain why the blood was wet.

    Procedural History

    Doll was indicted for second-degree murder. He moved to suppress his statements and physical evidence, arguing an illegal arrest and Miranda violations. The County Court denied most of the motion, finding the emergency doctrine applicable, but suppressed DNA evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the police actions justified by the emergency doctrine.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the emergency exception to Miranda applies when police lack definitive knowledge of a crime or injured victim, but possess a reasonable, fact-based belief that an emergency situation requiring immediate assistance exists.

    2. Whether statements made by a defendant to a friend in the presence of a police officer constitute a custodial interrogation requiring suppression in the absence of Miranda warnings.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the emergency doctrine is premised on reasonableness, not certitude, and the police had a reasonable belief based on empirical facts that someone may have been seriously injured and in need of imminent emergency assistance.

    2. No, because the police did not initiate the conversation or act in a manner designed to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant; therefore, the statements were voluntary and admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the emergency doctrine, which allows questioning without Miranda warnings when police reasonably believe an emergency requires immediate assistance. The court cited Michigan v. Fisher, Brigham City v. Stuart, New York v. Quarles, People v. Molnar, People v. Krom, and People v. Mitchell. The court emphasized the situation: Doll was found with fresh blood, offered inconsistent explanations, and refused to clarify the blood’s source. This created a reasonable belief that someone might be injured. The court stated that the Constitution “is not a barrier to a police officer seeking to help someone in immediate danger” (People v Molnar, 98 NY2d at 331).

    The court distinguished the situation from a typical custodial interrogation regarding Doll’s statements to his friend. Citing Arizona v. Mauro, the court noted that the investigator did not question Doll and that “officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself” (Arizona v. Mauro, 481 US at 529). The woman initiated the conversation. Doll was aware the officer was present. The court found no evidence of a “psychological ploy” to circumvent the right to counsel. Therefore, Doll’s statements were voluntary and admissible. The dissent argued that Mauro was distinguishable, but the majority argued the facts are similar because the officer in Mauro admitted he listened to record incriminating statements.

  • People v. Pacquette, 17 N.Y.3d 87 (2011): Indelible Right to Counsel and Attorney’s Affirmative Action

    17 N.Y.3d 87 (2011)

    An attorney’s instruction to police not to question a defendant is ineffective to invoke the indelible right to counsel on an unrelated charge when the attorney’s representation is explicitly limited to a separate matter and the defendant has not otherwise invoked the right to counsel.

    Summary

    Dean Pacquette was arrested for a drug crime in Manhattan while being a suspect in a Brooklyn homicide. While waiting for arraignment on the drug charge, an attorney, Daniel Scott, was assigned to represent him on the drug charge. Detectives from Brooklyn transported Pacquette back to Brooklyn where he confessed to the homicide after waiving his Miranda rights. Pacquette moved to suppress his confession arguing that his right to counsel had been violated because Scott had instructed the detectives not to question him. The court of appeals held that the confession was admissible because Scott’s representation was limited to the drug charge and Pacquette had not otherwise invoked his right to counsel in the homicide investigation. The court emphasized that an attorney cannot unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship to trigger the indelible right to counsel.

    Facts

    Pacquette was a suspect in a Brooklyn homicide. He was arrested in Manhattan on drug charges.

    Detectives transported Pacquette from Manhattan to Brooklyn for a lineup, where he was identified by eyewitnesses.

    While waiting for arraignment on the Manhattan drug charges, attorney Daniel Scott was assigned to represent Pacquette on the drug charges.

    Scott met with Pacquette in the presence of the detectives. Accounts differed as to what was said, but Scott conceded he was only representing Pacquette on the drug charge.

    After arraignment on the drug charge, Pacquette was transported back to Brooklyn where he confessed to the homicide after waiving his Miranda rights.

    Procedural History

    Pacquette was indicted for second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and weapon possession.

    He moved to suppress his statements, arguing a violation of his right to counsel. The motion was denied.

    Pacquette was convicted of a weapon charge and acquitted of intentional murder.

    The Appellate Division vacated the sentence and remitted for resentencing, but otherwise affirmed the conviction, deeming any error in admitting the statements harmless.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney’s instruction to police not to question a defendant triggers the indelible right to counsel on an unrelated charge, when the attorney’s representation is explicitly limited to a separate matter and the defendant has not otherwise invoked the right to counsel.

    Holding

    No, because an attorney cannot unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship to trigger the indelible right to counsel when their representation is explicitly limited to a separate matter, and the defendant has not otherwise invoked the right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Ramos (40 N.Y.2d 610 (1976)), where the attorney’s actions in open court were directly related to the interrogation about to commence on the shooting charge. Here, Scott made no statements during the arraignment even arguably related to the homicide.

    The Court emphasized that Pacquette’s conduct did not suggest that he meant to invoke his right to counsel before he made the statements. It further distinguished People v. Marrero (51 N.Y.2d 56 (1980)), noting that Scott had not already conspicuously represented Pacquette in an aspect of the homicide matter.

    The Court rejected the argument that Scott’s failure to “specify” whether he represented Pacquette in “the drug case or the homicide case or both” created an ambiguity that caused the indelible right to counsel to attach. The Court stated, “We have never held that an attorney may unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship in a criminal proceeding in this fashion, and decline to do so now.”

    The dissent argued that Scott’s directives unambiguously communicated that Pacquette was not to discuss any legal matter with the detectives, and that the context made clear that Scott’s concern was the Brooklyn homicide. The dissent emphasized that the detectives were aware that Pacquette was a suspect in the Brooklyn homicide and that he was to be immediately returned to their custody for arraignment on homicide charges. The dissent also argued that, even if there were ambiguity, the burden was on the prosecution to ensure that Pacquette’s right to counsel was protected.

  • In re Jimmy D., 15 N.Y.3d 417 (2010): Parental Presence During Juvenile Interrogation

    In re Jimmy D., 15 N.Y.3d 417 (2010)

    While parental presence during the custodial interrogation of a juvenile is preferred, it is not an absolute right, and the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile’s confession was voluntary when obtained after his mother agreed to leave the interrogation room. Jimmy D., a 13-year-old, confessed to sexually abusing his nine-year-old cousin after being given Miranda warnings and after his mother agreed to let him speak to the detective alone. The Court held that while parental presence is preferred during juvenile interrogations, it is not an absolute right and the confession was voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances, including the administration of Miranda warnings and the mother’s presence during the waiver of those rights.

    Facts

    Jimmy D., a 13-year-old, was accused of sexually abusing his nine-year-old cousin. After the cousin reported the abuse, Jimmy and his mother were taken to a child advocacy center where a detective interviewed them. Jimmy was given Miranda warnings in English, and his mother was given the warnings in Spanish, both indicating they understood their rights. The detective asked the mother for permission to speak with Jimmy alone, and after Jimmy consented, the mother agreed. The detective told Jimmy that if he told her what happened, he would get “some help.” Jimmy then confessed to the abuse in a written statement.

    Procedural History

    A juvenile delinquency petition was filed against Jimmy. The Family Court denied Jimmy’s motion to suppress his confession. Following a fact-finding hearing, Family Court adjudicated Jimmy a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals granted Jimmy leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the presentment agency met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of Jimmy’s confession, considering he was a juvenile interrogated without his parent present in the room.

    Holding

    Yes, because the totality of the circumstances, including the administration of Miranda warnings, the presence of his mother during the waiver of those rights, and the absence of coercive tactics, supported the lower courts’ findings that the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the need to protect the rights of minors in the criminal justice system and reiterated that when a parent is present at the location where a child under 16 is being held in custody, the parent must not be denied the opportunity to attend the custodial interrogation. The Court stated, “In practical terms, this means that the parent of the child has the right to attend the child’s interrogation by a police officer, and should not be discouraged, directly or indirectly, from doing so.” However, the Court clarified that neither the Family Court Act nor precedent gives a child under 16 the absolute right to the presence of a parent during interrogation. The determination of voluntariness is based on the “totality of circumstances.”

    The Court found that Jimmy and his mother were not so isolated from one another as to affect the likelihood that his confession was voluntary. His mother was present during the Miranda waiver, and both agreed to his being questioned alone. The detective’s promise of “help” did not create a substantial risk that Jimmy might falsely incriminate himself. The Court distinguished this case from those where deception or trickery were used to prevent a parent from retaining a lawyer for the child. The court specifically rejected the argument that any post-waiver conduct can retroactively invalidate a valid Miranda waiver, holding that the relevant inquiry is whether the confession was voluntary.

    The court concluded that there was evidence in the record supporting the finding that the presentment agency met its burden of proving the voluntariness of Jimmy’s inculpatory statement beyond a reasonable doubt. Because voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact, further review was beyond the court’s scope.

  • People v. Malaussena, 10 N.Y.3d 904 (2008): Admissibility of Confessions After a Miranda Violation

    10 N.Y.3d 904 (2008)

    A voluntary confession made after Miranda warnings is admissible even if preceded by a brief period of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, provided there was a sufficient break in the interrogation and the later confession was not the product of a continuous chain of events.

    Summary

    John Malaussena voluntarily went to the police station to discuss a matter with detectives. During the interview, a detective noticed blood on Malaussena’s shoe. Questioning continued briefly without Miranda warnings. Questioning ceased for approximately four hours, after which Malaussena was given Miranda warnings and confessed. The Court of Appeals held that the post-Miranda confession was admissible. The Court reasoned that despite the initial potential Miranda violation, the subsequent confession was not part of a continuous chain of events due to the significant break in questioning. Malaussena’s decision to confess after receiving Miranda warnings was deemed voluntary and independent of the initial unwarned questioning.

    Facts

    John Malaussena voluntarily appeared at a police station to speak with detectives regarding an unspecified matter.

    During the interview, a detective observed blood on Malaussena’s shoe.

    After this observation, questioning continued briefly without Malaussena being advised of his Miranda rights.

    Questioning then ceased for approximately four hours.

    Malaussena was subsequently given Miranda warnings.

    After receiving Miranda warnings, Malaussena confessed to the crime.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declined to suppress Malaussena’s confessions.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession made after Miranda warnings is admissible when it is preceded by a brief period of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.

    Holding

    Yes, because the significant break in questioning (approximately four hours) meant that Malaussena’s decision to confess after receiving Miranda warnings was not part of a continuous chain of events related to the initial unwarned questioning, therefore rendering the confession admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether the initial potential Miranda violation tainted the subsequent confession obtained after Malaussena was given Miranda warnings. The Court applied the principle that a subsequent confession is admissible if it is not the product of a single, continuous chain of events emanating from the initial, potentially unlawful, interrogation. The Court emphasized the importance of a break in the stream of events. Here, the four-hour break in questioning was deemed significant enough to break the chain. Even though the second interview occurred in the same room and with the same detectives, the court focused on the temporal break. The Court cited People v. White, 10 N.Y.3d 286, 291-292 (2008), noting that Malaussena’s decision to disclose the incriminating information was not the function of a single continuous chain of events. The Court essentially reasoned that the break provided Malaussena with an opportunity to reflect and make an independent decision about whether to confess after being properly advised of his rights. Therefore, the confession was deemed voluntary and admissible.

  • People v. Henriquez, 6 N.Y.3d 784 (2005): Constructive Knowledge of Prior Attorney Contact and Right to Counsel

    People v. Henriquez, 6 N.Y.3d 784 (2005)

    When determining whether police should be charged with constructive knowledge of a suspect’s prior assertion of the right to counsel, courts consider the passage of time, record availability, and whether the same officers were involved in prior investigations.

    Summary

    Henriquez was convicted of homicide after admitting in 2001 that she paid her brother to murder her husband in 1990. She argued that the admission of these incriminating statements violated her right to counsel because an attorney had contacted police in 1998 during a polygraph examination related to the same murder, asserting representation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the police in 2001 neither knew nor reasonably should have known of the attorney’s prior entry in 1998. The court considered the passage of time, the destruction of records in the regular course of business, and the lack of involvement of the same officers in the subsequent interrogation.

    Facts

    In 1990, Henriquez’s husband was murdered.
    In 1998, Henriquez was questioned about the murder after her former lover’s suicide note implicated her.
    An attorney, previously hired by Henriquez’s sister, contacted the police during a polygraph examination in 1998, stating he represented Henriquez and asking that the examination cease. Henriquez was informed of the attorney’s call but stated she did not need an attorney.
    In 2001, Henriquez went to the police and confessed to paying her brother to commit the murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Henriquez’s motion to suppress the 2001 confession.
    Henriquez was convicted of homicide.
    On appeal, Henriquez claimed the admission of the 2001 statements violated her right to counsel.
    The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the incriminating statements Henriquez made in 2001 violated her right to counsel, given that an attorney had contacted police in 1998 asserting representation during questioning related to the same crime.

    Holding

    No, because the police who questioned Henriquez in 2001 neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, of the attorney’s entry in 1998.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in People v. Carranza, 3 NY3d 729, 730 (2004), that “[w]here a police officer does not know and cannot be charged with knowledge that the suspect has a lawyer, the officer has no obligation to refrain from asking questions.” The court emphasized that either actual or constructive knowledge by the interrogating officers is sufficient to perpetuate the indelible right to counsel.

    In assessing whether the police can be charged with knowledge, the court considered several factors: the three-year gap between the 1998 phone call and the 2001 interrogation; the fact that the Highland State Police had destroyed their closed case file concerning the 1998 investigation, which would have contained the attorney’s contact; the lack of a record of the 1998 interview in the Brooklyn South Homicide Squad’s file; and that none of the officers involved in the 1998 incident participated in the 2001 interrogation. The court noted that since no charges were brought in 1998, the attorney had no further contact with the police.

    Because of these factors, the Court determined that the 2001 interrogating officers neither knew, nor should reasonably have known, of the attorney’s prior involvement. Therefore, any right to counsel that might have attached in 1998 did not prevent Henriquez from waiving counsel and speaking to the police in 2001. The Court also declined to review the suppression court’s finding that Henriquez was not in custody prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, as that was a mixed question of law and fact and supported by the record.

  • People v. Grice, 100 N.Y.2d 318 (2003): Attorney’s Entry Requires Direct Communication to Police

    100 N.Y.2d 318 (2003)

    An attorney’s entry into a criminal case, triggering the suspect’s indelible right to counsel, requires direct communication from the attorney or their professional associate to the police; notification by a third party, such as a family member, is insufficient.

    Summary

    Grice was arrested for a shooting and, after waiving his Miranda rights, gave two incriminating statements. Before the second statement, Grice’s father told police an attorney was coming. Later, an attorney contacted the police, who then ceased questioning. Grice moved to suppress his statements, arguing his right to counsel was violated when police continued questioning after his father’s notification. The court denied the motion, and Grice was convicted on several charges. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the indelible right to counsel requires direct communication by the attorney, not merely notification by a third party.

    Facts

    Grice was arrested in connection with a shooting.

    He was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them at 11:20 a.m.

    Grice provided two written statements admitting his involvement as a lookout, signed at 1:45 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.

    At approximately 12:30 p.m., Grice’s father told a detective at the police station that an attorney was coming to represent his son, but was told he could not speak to his son.

    At 2:10 p.m., Grice’s attorney contacted the lead detective and informed him that he represented Grice. The interrogation then stopped.

    Procedural History

    Grice moved to suppress his statements, alleging a violation of his state constitutional right to counsel. The hearing court denied the motion.

    Following a jury trial, Grice was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of burglary and criminal possession of a weapon.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the state constitutional right to counsel is violated when police continue to question a suspect after the suspect’s father informs a detective that an attorney is en route to the police station.

    Holding

    No, because the indelible right to counsel is triggered by direct communication from the attorney (or their associate) to the police, not by notification from a third party.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the indelible right to counsel, stemming from the State Constitution’s guarantees of due process and the right against self-incrimination, attaches when a criminal action commences, when a suspect requests counsel, or when an attorney enters the matter. The court distinguished the facts from previous cases such as People v. Arthur, emphasizing that “entry” requires an actual appearance or communication by the attorney.

    The Court emphasized the need for a “pragmatic and simple test” based on “common sense and fairness” to guide law enforcement and the courts. Requiring direct communication provides an objective measure and confirms the attorney’s actual retention.

    The Court rejected the argument that any notification, regardless of the source, should trigger the right to counsel, stating that it would be unreasonable to require the police to cease questioning and begin a separate inquiry to verify whether the defendant is actually represented by counsel.

    The court noted that a defendant’s statement of having retained counsel is an invocation of the right, while a third party cannot invoke the right on behalf of an adult defendant because “the right to counsel is personal” to the accused.

    The Court explicitly reaffirmed a bright-line rule: “an attorney ‘enters’ a criminal matter and triggers the indelible right to counsel when the attorney or a professional associate of the attorney notifies the police that the suspect is represented by counsel.”

    Because only Grice’s father notified the police, and not the attorney, Grice’s right to counsel had not yet attached when he made his statements.

  • People v. Berg, 92 N.Y.2d 701 (1999): Admissibility of Refusal to Perform Field Sobriety Tests Without Miranda Warnings

    People v. Berg, 92 N.Y.2d 701 (1999)

    Evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible even without Miranda warnings, as such refusal is not considered compelled within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence of a defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests is admissible when the defendant was not given Miranda warnings before the request. The court held that the refusal was admissible. The court reasoned that the refusal was not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because the tests themselves are not testimonial in nature, and the defendant had the option to take the test. This decision clarifies the scope of Miranda rights in the context of DWI investigations and allows prosecutors to present evidence of refusal to perform sobriety tests.

    Facts

    In the early morning, the defendant drove her car into a ditch near a State Trooper’s residence. The Trooper, upon investigation, noticed signs of intoxication. The defendant initially asked the Trooper for assistance and requested that he not call the police. She then left the scene and was later found hiding in bushes. At the police station, the officer asked her to perform several field sobriety tests, including reciting the alphabet, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn, and the one-leg stand. The defendant refused to perform the tests before being arrested and given Miranda warnings.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for driving while intoxicated (felony) and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The County Court ruled the evidence of the defendant’s refusal inadmissible due to the lack of Miranda warnings. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, finding Miranda warnings unnecessary. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible at trial when the defendant has not been given Miranda warnings prior to the request to take the tests.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s refusal to perform the field sobriety tests was not compelled and therefore not the product of custodial interrogation triggering Miranda safeguards.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from compelled self-incrimination, this protection has limitations. First, it applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence, not real or physical evidence. Second, Miranda safeguards are only triggered when an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation. The court emphasized that field sobriety tests do not reveal a person’s subjective knowledge but rather exhibit a person’s degree of physical coordination for observation. “Responses to such tests incriminate an intoxicated suspect ‘not because the tests [reveal] defendant’s thoughts, but because [defendant’s] body’s responses [differ] from those of a sober person.’” Furthermore, the court found that there was no direct compulsion on the defendant to refuse the tests. She had the option to take the tests. Because the results of field sobriety tests are not testimonial, the State can request that she take them without violating the Self-Incrimination Clause. The absence of a statute specifically authorizing the admissibility of refusal evidence for field sobriety tests, unlike chemical analysis tests, was deemed constitutionally insignificant.