New York Law Review

Tag: minors

  • Stringfellow’s of New York v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 53 (2001): “Adult Establishment” Definition and Exclusion of Minors

    Stringfellow’s of New York v. City of New York, 96 N.Y.2d 53 (2001)

    A business cannot avoid classification as an “adult eating or drinking establishment” under New York City zoning regulations by adopting a sham policy of allowing minors when its primary business involves sexually explicit entertainment.

    Summary

    Stringfellow’s, a topless bar, challenged its classification as an “adult eating or drinking establishment” under New York City’s zoning resolution, which restricts the location of such businesses. Stringfellow’s argued that its policy of purportedly admitting minors exempted it from the definition, which includes establishments “not customarily open to the general public * * * because it excludes minors by reason of age.” The New York Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding the policy a sham designed to circumvent the zoning regulations. The court emphasized the city’s intent to protect children from sexually oriented environments and upheld the restrictions on adult establishments.

    Facts

    Stringfellow’s operated a topless bar in New York City. After the city amended its zoning resolution (AZR) to restrict the location of “adult eating or drinking establishments,” Stringfellow’s adopted a “minors policy.” This policy involved a detailed, multi-step process for admitting minors accompanied by a parent or guardian, including attorney consultation, parental consent forms attesting the entertainment was “not harmful,” and written consent from the minor. From 1997 to 1998, Stringfellow’s admitted only one minor under this policy. The city sought to enforce the AZR against Stringfellow’s, arguing it qualified as an “adult eating or drinking establishment.”

    Procedural History

    Stringfellow’s sued the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not an “adult eating or drinking establishment.” The City counterclaimed to enforce the AZR. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the City’s complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Stringfellow’s was an “adult eating or drinking establishment.” On remand, the Supreme Court granted a permanent injunction against Stringfellow’s, preventing it from operating as an adult establishment. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Stringfellow’s appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Stringfellow’s minors policy, despite its restrictive nature and minimal practical effect, effectively removed it from the definition of an “adult eating or drinking establishment” under the New York City Zoning Resolution.

    Holding

    No, because Stringfellow’s “minors policy” was a transparent attempt to circumvent the AZR, and the establishment was not “customarily open to the general public,” given the policy’s restrictive nature and the extremely limited number of minors actually admitted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Stringfellow’s policy was a sham designed to avoid the AZR’s restrictions and potential criminal liability. The court emphasized that “customary openness” requires openness that is “usual, ordinary or habitual (rather than rare or occasional),” citing Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. v City of New York, 82 NY2d 35, 43. The court noted the City’s clear intent to keep children away from adult establishments, stating that the AZR was “designed to keep children away from these establishments, not to have them invited in as customers.” The court refused to interpret the AZR in a way that would create a paradox where admitting more children would strengthen an establishment’s claim that it is customarily open to the public. The court stated, “When the lawmakers’ purpose is as clear as it is here, we will not bend their words into the shape of a loophole.” The court further reasoned that Stringfellow’s interpretation would be at odds with the underlying purposes of the Penal Law, which includes provisions designed to shield children from exposure to activities appropriate only for adults.

  • People v. Talerico, 27 N.Y.2d 231 (1970): Obscenity Laws & Sales to Minors

    People v. Talerico, 27 N.Y.2d 231 (1970)

    A state statute may prohibit the sale of materials obscene to minors without violating the First Amendment, even if it doesn’t require proof that the seller knew the buyer was a minor, so long as the seller had knowledge of the obscene nature of the material.

    Summary

    Talerico was convicted under a New York law for selling pornographic material to a minor. He argued the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amendment because it didn’t require proof he knew the buyer was a minor. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute clearly defined prohibited material, required knowledge of the material’s obscene nature, and that imposing strict liability for age was a reasonable means to protect minors, not an unconstitutional burden on free speech.

    Facts

    A 17-year-old, working with “Operation Yorkville,” bought two “girlie” magazines from Talerico’s cigar store. The magazines, titled “Candid,” featured sexually explicit content and were marketed as sexually stimulating. The magazine cover stated, “Sale To Minors Forbidden.” Talerico sold the magazines to the minor after looking at them and pricing them.

    Procedural History

    Talerico was convicted under Section 484-i of the Penal Law for selling pornographic material to a minor. He appealed, arguing the statute was unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, upholding the statute’s validity.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 484-i of the New York Penal Law is unconstitutionally vague, violating due process?

    2. Whether the statute’s failure to require proof of scienter (knowledge) regarding the purchaser’s age violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute provides reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt readily determinable by men of reasonable intelligence.

    2. No, because imposing strict liability for the sale of obscene material to minors, after establishing scienter of the material’s obscenity, is a reasonable regulation and doesn’t unduly restrict free speech.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Section 484-i clearly defines the type of material it prohibits, focusing on material “posed or presented in such a manner as to exploit lust for commercial gain” and appealing to the lust or sexual curiosity of minors. This excludes legitimate works of art or educational texts. The court emphasized that the statute requires knowledge of the material’s obscene character, satisfying the Smith v. California standard. The court distinguished between requiring knowledge of the material’s content and requiring knowledge of the purchaser’s age. Imposing strict liability for age, the court reasoned, doesn’t unduly burden free speech because it only requires sellers to inquire about age in doubtful cases, a far less onerous burden than requiring them to inspect every piece of material they sell. The court quoted Smith v. California, stating, “The question then is not one of absolutes—it is one of reasonableness in relation to the legitimate end to be obtained. We think the burden of the statute neither unduly restricts dissemination of protected matter nor unduly inhibits receipt by those who are constitutionally entitled to receipt.” The court concluded that protecting minors from obscenity is a legitimate state interest, and the statute’s method is reasonably tailored to achieve that goal without unduly infringing on First Amendment rights. The court referenced Ginzburg v. United States, noting that the accused publications were openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.