New York Law Review

Tag: Minimum Period of Incarceration

  • People ex rel. Flores v. Dalsheim, 56 N.Y.2d 895 (1982): Retroactive Application of Sentencing Law Amendments

    People ex rel. Flores v. Dalsheim, 56 N.Y.2d 895 (1982)

    Amendments to sentencing laws are generally not applied retroactively unless the legislature clearly indicates such an intent, particularly when the amendment would disrupt the efficient administration of justice.

    Summary

    Flores was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term, but the sentencing court did not set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI). At the time, the Board of Parole had the authority to set the MPI if the court did not. Before the Board acted, the law changed, vesting the power to set MPIs exclusively with the sentencing court. Flores argued the amendment should apply retroactively, requiring his return to the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment was not retroactive. The Board of Parole’s action in setting the MPI was valid because the legislature did not intend for the amendment to apply retroactively, as evidenced by the failure to repeal a related section of the Executive Law and the legislative purpose to avoid duplication of effort.

    Facts

    Flores was convicted of grand larceny and sentenced on January 16, 1980, to an indeterminate prison term of zero to three years. The sentencing court did not set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI). At the time of sentencing, if the sentencing court did not set an MPI, the State Board of Parole was authorized to do so. Flores’ conviction was affirmed, and he surrendered to serve his sentence. On April 27, 1982, the Board of Parole set Flores’ MPI at 28 months.

    Procedural History

    Flores initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Board of Parole’s authority to fix his MPI. The lower court initially sided with Flores. This decision was appealed. The Appellate Division’s order was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals, the determination of the Board of Parole was reinstated, and the petition was dismissed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an amendment to Penal Law § 70.00(3), which transferred the authority to set minimum periods of incarceration (MPIs) from the Board of Parole to the sentencing court, should be applied retroactively to a defendant sentenced before the amendment’s effective date, where the Board of Parole had not yet set the MPI at the time of the amendment.

    Holding

    No, because at the time Flores was sentenced, the Board of Parole had the authority to fix Flores’ MPI, and the legislature did not intend for the amendment to apply retroactively, and retroactive application would not further the legislation’s purpose of streamlining the MPI determination process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the amendment to Penal Law § 70.00(3), which took effect on September 1, 1980, was not intended to be applied retroactively. At the time Flores was sentenced, the Board of Parole had the authority to set the MPI. Only Flores’ release pending appeal delayed the board’s action until after the amendment’s effective date.

    The court emphasized that “A prime goal of the legislation was to eliminate duplication by placing the function of setting MPI’s in one body.” Requiring inmates sentenced before September 1, 1980, to be returned to the sentencing court for a new MPI determination would not further this goal.

    The court also noted that the legislature’s failure to repeal Executive Law § 259-i(1), which outlines the procedures for the Board of Parole to set MPIs, suggests that the legislature anticipated the Board of Parole would continue to set MPIs for individuals sentenced before September 1, 1980. Although section 259-i does not confer any independent authority on the Board of Parole to set MPI’s, the failure to repeal it indicates that the Legislature contemplated that the Board of Parole would continue to set MPI’s for persons sentenced before September 1, 1980.

    Therefore, the Board of Parole acted within its authority when it established Flores’ MPI. The court focused on the practical implications and the legislature’s intent to avoid duplication, indicating a preference for maintaining the Board’s MPI determination for those sentenced before the amendment’s effective date.

  • Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980): Parole Board Authority to Set Minimum Incarceration Period

    Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980)

    When a sentencing court fixes a maximum but no minimum sentence, the Parole Board may set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI) exceeding one-third of the maximum, even if the sentencing court could not have done so, without violating the defendant’s due process rights.

    Summary

    Russo was convicted of criminal solicitation and sentenced to a maximum of four years without a minimum period of incarceration (MPI). The Parole Board set his MPI at four years, deviating from its guidelines, citing the severity of the crime. Russo challenged this, arguing it conflicted with legislative intent and violated his due process right to parole consideration. The court held that the Parole Board’s decision was permissible because New York law does not guarantee parole at any specific time and the board followed established guidelines. The court emphasized the Parole Board’s broad discretion, structured by guidelines, in fixing minimum sentences. The decision reinforces the Parole Board’s authority and the discretionary nature of parole in New York.

    Facts

    Russo was initially charged with conspiracy for offering money to have his father-in-law murdered. After his conspiracy conviction was reversed, he was convicted of criminal solicitation in the first degree. The sentencing court imposed a maximum sentence of four years but did not set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI). The Parole Board convened to set Russo’s MPI. The board initially considered placing Russo’s crime at offense severity level two under its guidelines, but then set the MPI at four years, explaining that the solicitation of a homicide warranted such a term.

    Procedural History

    Russo filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Parole Board’s determination. Special Term granted the petition, finding the board’s placement of the offense too high and holding that the board could not set an MPI exceeding one-third of his maximum sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed, suggesting that sentencing judges expect parole consideration at or before the one-third point when they don’t impose an MPI. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Parole Board’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Parole Board, when a sentencing court fixes a maximum but no minimum sentence, may set a minimum period of incarceration (MPI) exceeding one-third of the maximum sentence, even though the sentencing court could not have done so. Whether a sentenced defendant has a cognizable liberty interest in the right to seek parole, such that a minimum sentence exceeding what a court could have fixed violates due process.

    Holding

    Yes, the Parole Board may impose an MPI exceeding what a Judge could have fixed, because New York law does not guarantee parole at any specific time. No, a defendant does not have a liberty interest in parole consideration such that the board’s MPI determination violated due process, because the New York statute promises only that guidelines shall be established and followed unless reasons are given for not following them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a State sentencing scheme can create a legitimate expectation of early release, thus creating a liberty interest, New York’s provisions do not provide such a guarantee. The court referenced Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, noting that there’s a difference between losing something one has and not getting something one wants. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the 1977 amendments to the Executive Law was to broaden the Parole Board’s discretion, structuring it through guidelines, but not limiting its power. The Court quoted Governor Carey’s statement that the law removed “needless statutory restraints” on the Board’s power. The Court stated that, “[w]hat the New York statute promises, simply put, is that guidelines shall be established and followed unless reasons are given for not following them. That guidelines are provided does not mean they cannot be deviated from or create an entitlement to release at any particular time; the system is thus discretionary and holds out no more than the possibility of parole.” The court rejected the argument that the sentencing judge’s refraining from imposing an MPI created an expectation of parole before one-third of the sentence, citing United States v. Addonizio: “the judge has no enforceable expectations with respect to the actual release of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term.” The court concluded that the board acted within its discretion, noting, “[i]n light of the board’s expertise and the fact that responsibility for a difficult and complex function has been committed to it, there would have to be a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety before intervention would be warranted.”