42 N.Y.2d 1087 (1977)

The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board of Parole is not statutorily required to provide inmates with a written statement of reasons for fixing their minimum period of imprisonment.

Summary

Marshall Speed, convicted of manslaughter, sought a judgment compelling the New York State Board of Parole to furnish written reasons for denying his request for parole. The lower court initially ordered Speed’s resentencing, but the Appellate Division reversed this, remitting the matter to the Board of Parole to provide reasons for establishing Speed’s minimum imprisonment period. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The dissenting opinion argued that neither statute nor constitutional principles mandate the Parole Board to provide reasons for setting minimum imprisonment periods, advocating for dismissal of Speed’s petition.

Facts

On September 2, 1972, Marshall Speed committed manslaughter in the first degree, a class B felony. He pleaded guilty and on May 9, 1973, was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of zero to 25 years. On March 13, 1974, the Parole Board conducted a hearing and subsequently fixed Speed’s minimum imprisonment period at four years. Dissatisfied, Speed sought written reasons for this decision.

Procedural History

Speed initiated an Article 78 proceeding against the Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole, seeking a judgment compelling the provision of written reasons for parole denial. The Supreme Court, Wyoming County, ruled that no legal minimum period of imprisonment had been set and ordered Speed’s resentencing or release. The Appellate Division reversed this judgment and remitted the case to the Board of Parole, directing them to provide reasons for setting the four-year minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

Whether the Board of Parole is required to furnish an inmate with written reasons for fixing their minimum period of imprisonment.

Holding

No, because Section 212 of the Correction Law does not mandate that the Board of Parole provide reasons for setting the minimum period of imprisonment. Additionally, the due process and equal protection clauses do not compel the Board to furnish a written statement of reasons.

Court’s Reasoning

The court’s reasoning, as articulated in the dissenting opinion, hinged on statutory interpretation and constitutional considerations. Judge Cooke argued that Section 212 of the Correction Law does not explicitly require the Board of Parole to provide reasons for setting minimum imprisonment periods. He cited precedent supporting the view that the due process and equal protection clauses do not compel the furnishing of a written statement of reasons in this context. The dissent emphasized the importance of judicial restraint, stating that courts should not read words into a statute unless there is a clear necessity. The dissent also noted that while the Board of Parole adopted a policy of providing reasons, retroactive application should be left to the legislature and the board itself due to its potential impact on the parole system. The dissent concluded by stating, “A court assumes a great responsibility in reading into a statute words which are not there and, in the absence of clear necessity, it is a legally incorrect thing to do”.