71 N.Y.2d 63 (1987)
A juvenile does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel’s presence during a court-ordered diagnostic mental health study conducted after a fact-finding hearing but before a dispositional hearing; the applicable standard is fundamental fairness, which is satisfied by pre-hearing disclosure of the examiner’s report and the opportunity to cross-examine and present contrary evidence.
Summary
This case addresses whether a juvenile has the right to have counsel present during a court-ordered diagnostic mental study conducted between the fact-finding and dispositional hearings. The New York Court of Appeals held that the juvenile does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel’s presence at the examination. The Court reasoned that, unlike a pre-trial sanity examination, the diagnostic study occurs after a determination of guilt, making it more analogous to the sentencing phase of an adult trial. The Court stated that pre-hearing disclosure of the mental health report and the opportunity to cross-examine and present contrary evidence satisfy the requirement of fundamental fairness.
Facts
A juvenile, Brian AA, was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Subsequent to the fact-finding hearing, but before the dispositional hearing, the court ordered a diagnostic mental study of Brian. Brian’s attorney was not permitted to be present during the study. Brian appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated.
Procedural History
The Family Court ordered the diagnostic mental study. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision without opinion. Brian AA appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing a constitutional right to counsel’s presence and a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights due to the lack of Miranda warnings.
Issue(s)
1. Whether a juvenile has a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present during a court-ordered diagnostic mental health study conducted after a fact-finding hearing but before a dispositional hearing.
2. Whether the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the court-ordered mental health examination of a juvenile violates the juvenile’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Holding
1. No, because the diagnostic study occurs after the juvenile has been found to have committed an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, placing the juvenile in a position analogous to the sentencing stage of an adult criminal proceeding, where the “full panoply of constitutional rights” does not apply.
2. No, because Estelle v. Smith, which required Miranda warnings in the context of a capital sentencing examination, has been limited to its unique facts and distinguished in subsequent noncapital cases. The court noted that it did not hold “that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might be ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination.”
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the diagnostic study occurs after the fact-finding hearing, where the juvenile has already been found to have committed an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. Therefore, the juvenile’s position is more analogous to the sentencing stage of an adult criminal proceeding. Citing People v. Perry, the Court noted that the “full panoply of constitutional rights” does not apply at sentencing. The governing standard is fundamental fairness, which requires that the defendant have an opportunity to refute aggravating factors influencing the court. The court held that “pre-hearing disclosure of the mental health examiner’s report (Family Ct Act § 351.1 [4]), coupled with the right to cross-examine and submit a counter psychiatric study or other evidence (Family Ct Act § 350.4 [4]) amply satisfies the constitutional requisite”. Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the Court distinguished Estelle v. Smith, noting that the Supreme Court itself limited that holding. The Court of Appeals concluded that appellant was not entitled to Miranda admonitions, citing People v Ronald W.