New York Law Review

Tag: Mental Disability

  • Matter of Rowe, 73 N.Y.2d 336 (1989): Reinstatement Hearing Required After Suspension for Mental Disability

    Matter of Rowe, 73 N.Y.2d 336 (1989)

    An attorney suspended from practice due to mental disability is entitled to a hearing on their application for reinstatement when they present prima facie evidence that the disability has been removed.

    Summary

    Rowe, an attorney suspended due to a mental disability, sought reinstatement after being unconditionally discharged from court-ordered psychiatric care. The Appellate Division denied his application without a hearing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that due process requires a hearing when a suspended attorney presents prima facie evidence that their disability has been removed. The court reasoned that suspension due to disability is not punitive, and the attorney retains a property interest in their license, distinguishing it from disbarment for misconduct.

    Facts

    Rowe, an attorney, was suspended from practice in 1978 due to mental disability, following an acquittal on criminal charges by reason of mental disease or defect. He was initially confined to mental health facilities but later discharged under the condition of outpatient psychotherapy. In 1988, after being unconditionally discharged from mandated psychiatric care, Rowe again applied for reinstatement.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division, Second Department, initially denied Rowe’s first application for reinstatement in 1985, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After Rowe was unconditionally discharged from psychiatric care, he applied again. The Appellate Division denied this second application without a hearing. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney suspended from practice due to mental disability is entitled to a hearing on an application for reinstatement when the attorney presents prima facie evidence that the disability has been removed.

    Holding

    Yes, because due process requires a hearing to resolve the factual question of whether the disability has been removed and to determine, on the whole record, whether the attorney is fit to practice law, when the attorney presents prima facie proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that the disability has been removed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an attorney suspended for mental disability holds a different position than a disbarred attorney. Disbarment is a punishment for violating the public trust, whereas suspension for disability is a precautionary measure. Furthermore, an attorney suspended for disability retains a property interest in their license, unlike a disbarred attorney. The court stated, “In addition, unlike a disbarred attorney, an attorney suspended because of medical disability retains a protected property interest in his license during the period of suspension.” The court emphasized that due process requires a hearing when a first-time applicant to the bar is denied admission based on unfitness. The court analogized the situation of an attorney suspended for disability who presents evidence of recovery: “Inasmuch as petitioner was suspended because of his disability and his application for reinstatement presents prima facie proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that the disability has been removed, due process requires a hearing to resolve that question of fact, and to enable the court to determine on the whole record whether he is fit to practice law.” The court therefore reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings, including a hearing.

  • Matter of Luzinski, 39 N.Y.2d 165 (1976): Establishing Residency for Public Assistance

    Matter of Luzinski, 39 N.Y.2d 165 (1976)

    A person does not lose their New York residency for purposes of public assistance solely by residing in an out-of-state facility for treatment, care, and rehabilitation, provided they maintain ties to New York and do not intend to establish permanent residency elsewhere.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a mentally retarded adult, who resided in a New Jersey facility for treatment, was still a New York resident and thus eligible for public assistance. The court found that his placement in the out-of-state facility was for treatment purposes, that he maintained ties to New York through his parents’ home, and that there was no indication of intent to establish permanent residency in New Jersey. The Court emphasized that the state cannot deny aid based on grounds not originally invoked in the administrative determination.

    Facts

    The petitioner, a 24-year-old mentally retarded individual, resided with his parents in Brooklyn until he entered a training school in Vineland, New Jersey, due to his disability. His parents contracted with the school for his maintenance, treatment, training, and education. He received financial assistance from New York State until he turned 21. After his 21st birthday, his parents applied for aid to the disabled under the Social Services Law.

    Procedural History

    The New York City Department of Social Services initially denied the application, citing adequate resources (later abandoned), non-residency, and the facility’s lack of New York State approval. The State Commissioner upheld the denial based on non-residency and lack of facility approval. The petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court, New York County, which transferred the case to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division annulled the Commissioner’s determination. The Commissioner then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner lost his New York residency for public assistance purposes by residing in an out-of-state treatment facility.
    2. Whether the state can deny aid based on arguments that were not initially raised in the administrative process.

    Holding

    1. No, because his presence in the New Jersey facility was solely for treatment, and he maintained significant ties to New York without intending to establish permanent residency in New Jersey.
    2. No, because a reviewing court must judge the propriety of administrative action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the petitioner’s presence at the Vineland school was solely for treatment, care, and rehabilitation. There was no evidence that he intended to make the school his permanent residence or surrender his former residence. The court analogized the situation to students and hospital patients, who do not automatically lose their residence by being away from home for these purposes. The Court emphasized that any change of residence requires an independent manifestation of intent, which was absent here. The Court cited Matter of Garvey, 147 N.Y. 117, stating, “the sojourn of the student is assumed to be temporary, and the law preserves to him his former residence, notwithstanding his absence therefrom.” The Court also stated that it was impermissible for the appellant to raise a new argument (that the State may properly limit grants in aid to facilities within the State), when that argument was not a ground advanced in the original determination. The Court quoted Matter of Barry v. O’Connell, 303 N.Y. 46, 50, referencing Securities & Exch. Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196: “a reviewing court… must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.” The Court further found the Vineland school to be effectively approved due to accreditation by New Jersey authorities and the New York Department of Mental Hygiene’s willingness to approve out-of-state facilities approved by other states’ authorities. Finally, the Court emphasized the humanitarian goals of the statutes and the potential for public failure if such aid was denied given the limited facilities in New York.