New York Law Review

Tag: Mens Rea

  • People v. Teitelbaum, 450 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1982): Criminal Facilitation Requires Aid Concurrent with the Underlying Crime

    People v. Teitelbaum, 450 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1982)

    Criminal facilitation requires that the facilitator’s aid be rendered while the underlying crime is still in progress; assistance provided after the principal crime is complete does not constitute criminal facilitation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the temporal relationship between the commission of a crime and the act of criminal facilitation. The New York Court of Appeals held that a lawyer could not be convicted of criminal facilitation for assisting an Assistant District Attorney in a bribery scheme because the assistance occurred after the ADA had already accepted the bribe. The court reasoned that the crime of bribe receiving was complete upon acceptance of the bribe, and any subsequent assistance could not have facilitated the commission of that crime. The dissent argued that the bribery scheme was ongoing and that the lawyer’s actions did, in fact, facilitate the overall criminal enterprise.

    Facts

    An Assistant District Attorney (ADA) solicited a bribe in exchange for influencing the outcome of a burglary prosecution. The ADA received $6,500 and later an additional $1,500 to pay a more compliant defense attorney, the defendant Teitelbaum, whom the ADA suggested be substituted as counsel. The ADA guaranteed a refund if the burglary defendant wasn’t kept out of jail. Teitelbaum was engaged by the ADA and did not disclose the amount he was paid. Teitelbaum was later convicted of criminal facilitation.

    Procedural History

    Teitelbaum was convicted of criminal facilitation in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, finding that Teitelbaum’s actions did not constitute criminal facilitation. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person can be convicted of criminal facilitation when the assistance rendered occurred after the principal actor had already committed the underlying crime.

    Holding

    No, because criminal facilitation requires that the facilitator provide assistance during the commission of the underlying felony. Once the felony is complete, any subsequent assistance cannot be considered facilitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the crime of bribe receiving, as defined in Penal Law § 200.10, is complete when a public servant “solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit…upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced.” Since the ADA had already accepted the bribe before Teitelbaum was engaged, the court concluded that Teitelbaum’s actions could not have facilitated the commission of the crime of bribe receiving. The court emphasized the importance of the temporal relationship, stating that the facilitator’s actions must aid the principal actor in committing the felony. The court distinguished between aiding the commission of a crime and aiding a person who has already committed a crime. The dissent argued that the bribery scheme was an ongoing enterprise and that Teitelbaum’s assistance was integral to the overall plan, even if it occurred after the initial acceptance of the bribe. The dissent emphasized the language of the indictment, which spanned the connected events running from the crime’s inception through the date of the arrest. However, the majority adhered to a strict interpretation of the statute, focusing on the specific elements of the crime of bribe receiving and the timing of Teitelbaum’s involvement.

  • People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977): Criminal Liability for Attempt When Completion is Impossible

    41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977)

    A defendant can be convicted of attempted murder even if the victim was already dead when the defendant acted, provided the defendant believed the victim was alive at the time of the attempted act.

    Summary

    Melvin Dlugash was convicted of murder. The evidence showed that Dlugash shot Michael Geller multiple times in the head. Dlugash admitted to the shooting, but claimed Geller was already dead from prior gunshot wounds inflicted by another person, Joe Bush. The trial court instructed the jury on intentional murder and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence that Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that even if Geller was dead, Dlugash could be guilty of attempted murder if he believed Geller was alive. The court reasoned that the Penal Law eliminates impossibility as a defense to attempt if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Facts

    Michael Geller was found dead in his apartment, riddled with bullets. The autopsy revealed multiple gunshot wounds to the head and chest from different caliber weapons. Dlugash confessed to police that he, Geller, and Bush were together the night of the murder. Bush shot Geller after an argument. Dlugash then shot Geller in the head and face with a .25 caliber pistol. Dlugash stated that Geller looked dead at the time of his shots. Bush and Dlugash disposed of the weapons. Ballistics evidence confirmed that different guns were used.

    Procedural History

    Dlugash was indicted for murder by the Grand Jury of Kings County. At trial, the prosecution presented Dlugash’s confession and medical testimony that could not definitively determine if Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. The defense presented expert testimony suggesting Geller could have died quickly from the initial chest wounds. The trial court declined to charge the jury on aiding and abetting but submitted intentional murder and attempted murder. The jury convicted Dlugash of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, finding the prosecution failed to prove Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him, and that the uncontradicted evidence showed Dlugash believed Geller was dead. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder when the target of the attempt may have already been dead, by the hand of another, when the defendant made his felonious attempt, but the defendant believed the target to be alive.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Penal Law § 110.10, it is no defense to a charge of attempt that the crime was factually impossible to commit if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. Therefore, a murder conviction could not stand. However, the court analyzed whether Dlugash could be convicted of attempted murder. The court reviewed the historical distinction between factual and legal impossibility as defenses to attempt, noting that New York Penal Law § 110.10 eliminates the defense of impossibility in most situations, reflecting the Model Penal Code’s approach. The statute focuses on the actor’s mental state. The court found sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Dlugash believed Geller was alive when he shot him. This evidence included the fact that Dlugash fired five shots at Geller’s head from close range, and his actions after the shooting indicated a consciousness of guilt. Dlugash’s admissions, particularly his cooperative actions in disposing of the weapons and providing a false alibi, contradicted his later claim of duress or belief that Geller was dead. While Dlugash argued the jury was bound to accept the exculpatory portions of his admission, the court stated the jury could reject those portions if they were improbable or contradicted by other evidence. The court found the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the indictment instead of modifying the judgment to reflect a conviction for attempted murder, a lesser-included offense. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for review of the facts and further proceedings regarding the sentence.

  • People v. Borrero, 21 N.Y.2d 333 (1968): Criminal Responsibility and the Narcotics Addiction Defense

    21 N.Y.2d 333 (1968)

    A narcotics addict is not absolved from criminal responsibility for crimes committed to procure drugs unless the addiction renders the individual incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of their actions or that such conduct was wrong.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether narcotics addicts who commit crimes solely to obtain money for drugs should be exempt from criminal responsibility under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that addiction, in itself, does not excuse criminal behavior. The defendants, both long-time narcotics users with criminal records, argued their addiction drove them to commit larceny and burglary, thus negating their criminal culpability. The court affirmed their convictions, distinguishing their situation from being punished for the status of addiction itself, as deemed unconstitutional in Robinson v. California. The court emphasized the state’s power to punish antisocial behavior, even when motivated by addiction, unless the addiction eliminates the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of the conduct.

    Facts

    Defendant Walton was involved in a purse snatching and Defendant Borrero in a burglary. Both defendants were long-time narcotics users with prior criminal records largely consisting of narcotics offenses and larceny. Walton pleaded guilty to petit larceny, and Borrero pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted in trial court and sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions. The cases were then consolidated for appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of a prison sentence or other penal sanction upon a narcotics addict who commits crimes solely for the purpose of procuring money to make drug purchases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because being a narcotics addict does not automatically absolve a person from criminal responsibility for their actions; the state has the power to punish antisocial behavior by drug addicts, so long as the addiction has not rendered the individual incapable of understanding the nature of their actions or that the actions were wrong.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished the case from Robinson v. California, which prohibited punishing someone for the status of being a narcotics addict. Here, the defendants were punished for the distinct crimes of larceny and burglary, not for their addiction. The court recognized that extreme cases of drug addiction could render individuals incompetent, absolving them of criminal responsibility, but “mere * * * narcotics addiction will not * * * of [itself] justify acquittal.” The court cited the Penal Law, stating the defendants did not assert they lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequence of their conduct or that their conduct was wrong. The court acknowledged the inadequacy of prison confinement as a means of rehabilitation but upheld the legislature’s power to punish theft and robbery, stating imprisonment was not cruel or unusual punishment. The court noted the state’s comprehensive program to combat drug addiction, including civil commitments and treatment options for addicts accused or convicted of crimes, but found that neither defendant qualified for such treatment due to prior felony convictions. The court referenced a Wisconsin case, De Vougas v. State, which held that it was up to the legislature to determine whether to empower a court to commit a person for treatment for drug addiction rather than sentence them to prison as punishment for the crime. Ultimately, the court deferred to the legislature’s judgment in addressing drug addiction and affirmed the convictions.