New York Law Review

Tag: Medical Malpractice

  • Young v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 A.D.2d 725 (1982): Applying the Continuous Treatment Doctrine in Medical Malpractice

    Young v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 A.D.2d 725 (1982)

    To invoke the continuous treatment doctrine and toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case, a patient must demonstrate a timely return visit to the doctor to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment; a significant lapse in time between treatments breaks the continuity.

    Summary

    This case addresses the continuous treatment doctrine in the context of medical malpractice. The plaintiff sued the defendant doctor for malpractice relating to a surgery performed in 1974. After being discharged in 1976, the plaintiff did not see the defendant again until 1979. The court held that the significant gap between treatments broke the continuity required to toll the statute of limitations under the continuous treatment doctrine, thus barring the plaintiff’s claim. The decision emphasizes the necessity of a timely return visit to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment.

    Facts

    The plaintiff underwent nose surgery performed by the defendant doctor in 1974.

    She was discharged by the defendant on January 14, 1976.

    On February 24, 1979, the plaintiff returned to see the defendant, complaining about breathing difficulties and a concave indentation in her nose.

    There was no contact between the plaintiff and the defendant or any other physician regarding her nose between January 14, 1976, and February 24, 1979.

    Procedural History

    The defendant doctor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s malpractice claim was time-barred.

    The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations.

    The lower court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case when there is a significant lapse in time between the initial treatment and the subsequent visit.

    Holding

    No, because the required continuity has not been established through “a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the required continuity of treatment necessary to toll the statute of limitations. The court emphasized that a substantial period of time passed between the plaintiff’s discharge in 1976 and her return visit in 1979. This break in time was fatal to her claim. The court cited McDermott v. Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 406, stating that the continuous treatment doctrine requires “a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment.”

    The court distinguished the facts from cases where the continuous treatment doctrine was successfully invoked, emphasizing the absence of any contact between the plaintiff and the defendant (or any other physician) concerning her nose during the almost three-year period. The court suggested that while a visit for the sole purpose of ascertaining the patient’s condition might not qualify as continuous treatment, the dispositive factor was the lack of any contact during the extended period. Even if the 1979 visit was not a mere “ploy to revive the time-barred action” (Florio v Cook, 65 AD2d 548, affd 48 NY2d 792), the absence of ongoing contact negated the claim of continuous treatment.

    The decision highlights the importance of a timely return visit by the patient and reinforces the principle that a significant lapse in treatment severs the continuity required for tolling the statute of limitations.

  • Etra v. Matta, 61 N.Y.2d 455 (1984): Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Physicians

    Etra v. Matta, 61 N.Y.2d 455 (1984)

    A non-resident physician’s limited contacts with New York, such as consulting with a New York physician and providing an experimental drug as part of treatment initiated outside New York, are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in a New York medical malpractice suit.

    Summary

    This case addresses the limits of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident physician in a medical malpractice action. The New York Court of Appeals held that a Massachusetts physician, Dr. Lown, who treated a patient in Massachusetts and consulted with a New York physician after the patient returned to New York, did not have sufficient contacts with New York to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Dr. Lown’s actions, including providing an experimental drug and consulting with the New York doctor, were incidental to the treatment initiated in Massachusetts and did not constitute transacting business in New York.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs’ decedent sought treatment from Dr. Lown in Massachusetts for a heart condition. Dr. Lown prescribed an experimental drug, Aprindine. After discharge, the patient returned to New York and was treated by Dr. Matta, a New York physician, to whom Dr. Lown referred the patient. Dr. Lown continued to consult with Dr. Matta via phone and letter regarding the Aprindine regimen and allegedly sent an additional supply of the drug to the patient in New York. The patient was later admitted to a New York hospital and died shortly after Aprindine treatment was discontinued.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs sued Dr. Matta and the drug manufacturer in New York, alleging that the decedent’s death was caused by a side effect of Aprindine. Dr. Matta impleaded Dr. Lown, alleging Dr. Lown failed to inform him of the drug’s precise side effects. Dr. Lown moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Division agreed with Dr. Lown. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding no basis for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Lown in New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Dr. Lown’s contacts with New York, including consulting with Dr. Matta and providing Aprindine, constitute transacting business within the state under CPLR 302(a)(1), thus subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in New York. Whether Dr. Lown contracted to supply goods or services in New York, within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1), subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in New York.

    Holding

    No, because Dr. Lown’s contacts were insubstantial and did not amount to transacting business within New York as contemplated by CPLR 302(a)(1). No, because the provision of Aprindine was incidental to medical treatment rendered primarily in Massachusetts and was not the type of transaction the legislature intended to cover under CPLR 302(a)(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Dr. Lown’s contacts with New York were insufficient to constitute a transaction of business within the state. The court emphasized that Dr. Lown had referred the patient to a New York physician, and his subsequent communications and provision of the drug were merely consultative. The court cited McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268 and Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v McTamney, 89 AD2d 540, affd 59 NY2d 651, to support the principle that the contacts must be substantial to warrant subjecting a non-domiciliary to suit in New York. Regarding the supply of Aprindine, the court stated that the amendment to CPLR 302(a)(1) was “not meant, in our view, to cover a transaction of this nature…The incidental provision of a drug, as part of a course of treatment rendered in another State, cannot be said to fall within the contemplation of the statute so as to confer personal jurisdiction over the physician.” The court focused on the limited nature of Dr. Lown’s involvement in New York, emphasizing that the primary treatment occurred in Massachusetts, and his subsequent actions were merely ancillary to that treatment. The court implied that allowing jurisdiction in such a case would unduly burden physicians who treat patients from other states.

  • Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269 (1981): No Duty of Care Owed to Unconceived Child for Preconception Tort

    Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269 (1981)

    A tort committed against a mother before a child’s conception does not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the child if that tort caused injury to the child during gestation; foreseeability alone is insufficient to establish a duty of care to a child conceived after a negligent act.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a child does not have a cause of action for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a tort committed against the mother before the child’s conception. The court reasoned that recognizing such a cause of action would extend tort liability beyond manageable limits and lead to undesirable policy consequences, such as defensive medicine. The court emphasized that foreseeability alone is not the determining factor in establishing a legal duty. The court balanced the need to provide remedies for injuries with the need to avoid artificial and arbitrary boundaries of liability.

    Facts

    In 1971, Ruth Albala underwent an abortion at Bellevue Hospital, during which her uterus was perforated due to alleged medical malpractice. In 1975, Ruth conceived Jeffrey Albala. Jeffrey was born in 1976 with a damaged brain. Jeffrey’s lawsuit alleged his brain damage was a direct result of the negligent perforation of his mother’s uterus during the abortion performed years prior to his conception.

    Procedural History

    Jeffrey Albala commenced an action in 1978, claiming damages for brain damage allegedly caused by the 1971 malpractice on his mother. The Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, holding that no cause of action exists for a preconception tort under New York law. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tort committed against the mother of a child before conception gives rise to a cause of action in favor of the child if the tort allegedly caused injury to the child during gestation.

    Holding

    No, because extending liability to preconception torts would require extending traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds and lead to undesirable policy consequences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court declined to recognize a cause of action for preconception torts. The court distinguished this case from Woods v. Lancet, where a child was allowed to sue for prenatal injuries, because in that case, the child existed in utero at the time of the tort. The court noted that foreseeability alone is not sufficient to establish a duty of care. Quoting Tobin v. Grossman, the court stated, “foreseeability alone is not the hallmark of legal duty for if foreseeability were the sole test we could not logically confine the extension of liability”. The court expressed concern that recognizing such a cause of action would open the door to unlimited hypotheses and staggering implications, creating perimeters of liability that cannot be judicially established in a reasonable and practical manner. The court also raised concerns about encouraging “defensive medicine,” where physicians might avoid potentially life-saving treatments to avoid liability for potential harm to future offspring. The court acknowledged the desire to provide relief to those who have suffered but emphasized that the law cannot provide a remedy for every injury. The Court distinguished Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs, a products liability case, noting that strict liability without fault eliminates the need to establish manageable bounds for liability.

  • Topel v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 55 N.Y.2d 682 (1981): Medical Malpractice and Professional Judgment in Psychiatric Care

    55 N.Y.2d 682 (1981)

    In psychiatric malpractice cases, a doctor’s decision concerning a patient’s treatment plan, including the level of observation, is considered a matter of professional judgment and will not result in liability absent evidence of a deviation from accepted medical practice negating factors considered by the physician.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extent to which a psychiatrist can be held liable for the suicide of a patient. The Court of Appeals held that the decision to reduce constant observation of a suicidal patient to 15-minute intervals was a matter of professional judgment, considering factors like the patient’s reaction to surveillance and the potential for rehabilitation. The court affirmed the dismissal of the case, finding that the plaintiff’s expert testimony failed to negate the factors the doctor considered, and thus did not establish a prima facie case of malpractice. A strong dissent argued the decision undermined established medical malpractice principles.

    Facts

    Harold Topel, a New York City detective, was admitted to Long Island Jewish Medical Center after two suicide attempts by strangulation. He was diagnosed with severe psychotic depression and placed under the care of Dr. Harold Levinson. Initially, Topel was under constant observation due to his high suicide risk. However, after a few days, Dr. Levinson reduced the observation to 15-minute intervals, citing the patient’s agitation and the potential benefits of an open ward environment for electroshock therapy. Topel then committed suicide by hanging himself with his police belt while alone in his room.

    Procedural History

    Topel’s widow sued Dr. Levinson and the hospital for medical malpractice and wrongful death. The trial court dismissed the complaint after a jury verdict for the plaintiff, finding the plaintiff had not made out a case on the law. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Centeno v. City of New York. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the psychiatrist’s decision to reduce constant observation of a suicidal patient to 15-minute intervals constituted a deviation from accepted medical practice, thereby establishing a prima facie case of malpractice.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to reduce the observation was a matter of professional judgment, considering multiple factors, and the plaintiff’s expert testimony failed to adequately negate those factors, preventing the establishment of a prima facie case of malpractice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a hospital cannot be held liable for implementing a treatment plan prescribed by the attending physician. With regard to the physician, the court acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing between medical judgment and deviation from accepted medical practice. It emphasized that Dr. Levinson considered several factors in his decision, including Topel’s reaction to constant surveillance, the potential for his heart condition to be aggravated, the gesture-like nature of his prior suicide attempts, the rehabilitative aspects of an open ward, and the increased likelihood of obtaining consent for electroshock therapy. The court stated that the plaintiff’s expert testimony failed to adequately negate these factors, thus not establishing that the doctor’s judgment deviated from good medical practice. The court warned against subjecting every medical judgment to the “second guess of a jury,” emphasizing the need to respect a physician’s professional judgment when it is based on a reasoned consideration of relevant factors. Judge Fuchsberg’s dissent strongly criticized the majority’s reliance on Centeno v. City of New York, arguing that it undermines established medical malpractice principles. The dissent argued that the plaintiff presented a strong prima facie case of malpractice by showing that the doctor’s treatment deviated from the accepted medical standard of care, and this deviation caused the patient’s death. He pointed to the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert who stated that the proper treatment of this patient included constant observation. The dissent argued that disagreement between professional experts in itself creates a factual issue for the jury’s determination. The dissent further criticized the majority for substituting its own judgment for that of the treating physician, noting its lack of medical expertise. He concludes that it is not the court’s role to determine what constituted accepted medical practice.

  • Davis v. Caldwell, 54 N.Y.2d 176 (1981): General Verdicts and Insufficient Evidence in Medical Malpractice

    54 N.Y.2d 176 (1981)

    When a jury returns a general verdict on multiple theories of liability, the verdict must be reversed if the evidence is insufficient to support one or more of those theories.

    Summary

    Joan Davis underwent a bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy performed by Dr. Elethea Caldwell at Strong Memorial Hospital. Subsequently, the Davises sued Dr. Caldwell and the hospital, alleging the surgery was unnecessary. The trial court presented five theories of liability to the jury: erroneous diagnosis, failure to perform a biopsy, unnecessary operation, failure to follow accepted medical standards, and failure to obtain informed consent. The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the evidence was insufficient to support the erroneous diagnosis and unnecessary operation claims, and the general verdict made it impossible to determine if the jury relied on those unsupported claims, a new trial was required on the remaining theories.

    Facts

    Joan Davis underwent a bilateral subcutaneous mastectomy performed by Dr. Caldwell. Prior to the surgery, a mammogram suggested possible carcinoma, but pathological studies post-surgery revealed no malignancy. Two years prior, cancerous tissue had been removed from Mrs. Davis’ right breast via biopsy. Dr. Wende Logan diagnosed “Bilateral mastopathy with calcification suspicious of carcinoma” before the surgery. Mrs. Davis had previously refused a mastectomy when cancer was detected earlier.

    Procedural History

    The Davises sued Dr. Caldwell and Strong Memorial Hospital. The trial court submitted five theories of liability to the jury, which returned a general verdict for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order due to insufficient evidence supporting some of the liability theories presented to the jury.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff can stand when the jury was instructed on multiple theories of liability, and the evidence was insufficient to support one or more of those theories.

    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the theories of liability based on erroneous diagnosis and the performance of an unnecessary operation.

    3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the theories of liability based on failure to perform a biopsy and failure to obtain informed consent.

    Holding

    1. No, because it is impossible to determine whether the verdict was based on a theory lacking sufficient evidentiary support.

    2. No, because the evidence did not show that Dr. Caldwell made the erroneous diagnosis or that the surgery was unnecessary given the patient’s history and mammogram results.

    3. Yes, because the plaintiffs presented expert testimony indicating that performing the mastectomy without a prior biopsy deviated from accepted medical practice and that the patient was not adequately informed about the preventative nature of the surgery or the option of a biopsy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that when a jury is presented with multiple theories of liability and returns a general verdict, the verdict cannot stand if the evidence supporting one or more of those theories is insufficient. The Court found no evidence that Dr. Caldwell made an erroneous diagnosis; the diagnosis was made by Dr. Logan. Regarding the unnecessary operation claim, the Court noted the patient’s history of cancer and the suspicious mammogram results, stating that “Absent medical expert evidence offered by plaintiffs, of which there was none, that the surgery was unnecessary in the circumstances present, the claim predicated on such a contention should have been dismissed”. Regarding the failure to perform a biopsy, the Court noted expert testimony indicating it was a departure from accepted medical practice. The Court also found sufficient evidence of a lack of informed consent, as the plaintiffs testified they were not adequately informed about the preventative nature of the surgery or the alternative of a biopsy. The court referenced CPLR 4401-a regarding expert medical testimony supporting the qualitative insufficiency of consent. The Court emphasized that the jury could have based its verdict on the unsupported theories, necessitating a new trial. The court noted that the testimony presented a question of credibility regarding the conversations with the doctors, but that this did not change the fact that the plaintiffs presented a case for submission to the jury on the claim of lack of informed consent. The court quoted testimony from the defendant’s plastic surgeon that a consent to such an operation without disclosing the doubtfulness of its benefit could not be based on adequate information, thus, not an informed consent. The court also cited testimony that it would be improper medical practice to obtain a patient’s consent on the basis of advice that she had cancer when in fact she did not.

  • Bernstein v. Bodean, 53 N.Y.2d 520 (1981): Scope of Questioning Medical Malpractice Panel Members

    Bernstein v. Bodean, 53 N.Y.2d 520 (1981)

    When a medical malpractice panel’s recommendation is admitted into evidence, panel members called as witnesses may be examined on any matter that reasonably assists the jury in assessing the recommendation’s probative value, focusing on their participation in the panel.

    Summary

    In a medical malpractice case, after a medical malpractice panel recommended no liability, the plaintiff called the panel’s physician members as witnesses but was restricted in questioning them about the basis of their opinions. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s limitations were too restrictive. The statute allowing panel recommendations into evidence aims to aid the jury in reaching a verdict. Therefore, panel members can be questioned on any matter that helps the jury assess the recommendation’s probative worth, but this examination is limited to their panel participation and cannot turn them into general expert witnesses.

    Facts

    Deborah Bernstein suffered from a rare malignancy. She underwent extensive treatment from several physicians, including the defendants. A medical malpractice panel was convened before trial. The panel unanimously recommended “there is no liability on the part of said defendants.” This recommendation was read to the jury at trial.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action. After the medical malpractice panel issued its recommendation, the case proceeded to trial. The trial court limited the scope of questioning of the physician panel members. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for a new trial, finding the restrictions on questioning the panel physicians were too restrictive.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Section 148-a of the Judiciary Law, specifically subdivision 8, the examination of a medical malpractice panel member called as a witness is limited, and if so, what is the scope of examination contemplated and permitted by the statutory phrase “with reference to the recommendation of the panel only”?

    Holding

    Yes, the examination is limited, because the examination of panel members can only be comprehended as in furtherance of the legislative objective and thus a means to assist the triers of fact to assess the probative worth of the panel’s recommendation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the purpose of allowing the panel’s recommendation into evidence was to assist the jury in reaching a verdict, not to supplant its role. The statute explicitly states that the recommendation is not binding on the jury. The examination of panel members is intended to help the jury assess the probative worth of the panel’s recommendation. The statute authorizes examination as to any matter which may reasonably assist the triers of fact in judging the significance and probative worth properly to be accorded the panel’s recommendation. This includes the procedures followed by the panel, materials considered, deliberation processes, and the education, training, and experience of panel members concerning the issues involved. However, the statute contains the restrictive adverb “only.” This means that examination shall not be permitted as to the qualifications of the panel member generally but shall be exclusively focused on his qualifications related to and his participation in the panel recommendation. Nor may he be asked to express opinions on hypotheses other than those before the panel. “In short he is not to be made an expert witness on behalf of any litigant, but may be examined only with respect to the panel recommendation.” The Court also emphasized the Trial Judge’s role in supervising the trial, including the scope and manner of questioning witnesses. The Court noted the constitutional arguments regarding Section 148-a but declined to address them since the case was being remitted for a new trial and the issue might not arise again. Because the trial court impermissibly restricted the scope of the plaintiff’s examination of the physician panel members, the verdicts in favor of the physician defendants were set aside.

  • Koehler v. Schwartz, 48 N.Y.2d 807 (1979): Establishing Causation in Medical Malpractice for Unsuccessful Procedures

    Koehler v. Schwartz, 48 N.Y.2d 807 (1979)

    In medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s deviation from accepted medical practice was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; mere deviation from a physician’s routine practice, without proof that the deviation caused or enhanced the possibility of the unsuccessful outcome, is insufficient to establish liability.

    Summary

    Mary Koehler sued Dr. Schwartz for malpractice after he unsuccessfully attempted to abort her pregnancy. Koehler argued that Dr. Schwartz deviated from standard practice by failing to use a sharp curette after applying a suction device, or by delaying informing her that the abortion was unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict for the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were the cause-in-fact of the unsuccessful abortion or of any claimed emotional injuries. The court emphasized that expert testimony was needed to establish causation, and that evidence presented did not show the alleged deviations contributed to the failed abortion.

    Facts

    Defendant, Dr. Schwartz, attempted to perform an abortion on plaintiff, Mary Koehler. The abortion was unsuccessful. Plaintiff claimed Dr. Schwartz was negligent in two ways: (1) by not using a sharp curette following the suction device and (2) by delaying notification that the abortion had failed. Plaintiff alleged that this negligence caused her extensive emotional and psychic injuries. Defense experts testified that either the suction method or the sharp curette were acceptable and customary practices, and that both procedures were not required.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed the jury’s verdict, finding insufficient evidence to support the claim of medical malpractice. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s failure to use a sharp curette following a suction device, in attempting to perform an abortion, can be considered medical malpractice when there is no expert testimony demonstrating that this omission caused the unsuccessful abortion.

    2. Whether the defendant’s delay in notifying the plaintiff of the unsuccessful abortion was an independent cause of the plaintiff’s emotional and psychic injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no evidence establishing that the omission of the sharp curette caused or enhanced the possibility of an unsuccessful abortion; expert testimony was required to establish the causal link, which was absent in this case.

    2. No, because the delay in notification was not shown to be an independent cause of any of the plaintiff’s injuries or damages, including emotional and psychic damages; a conclusion that earlier notification would have changed the outcome would be based on speculation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the defendant may have routinely followed procedures exceeding customary practice, the failure to adhere to these added precautions only amounts to negligence if it caused or enhanced the possibility of the unsuccessful abortion. The court emphasized that expert testimony was needed to establish causation, stating, “Whether and to what extent use of a sharp curette might contribute to the success of the procedure is not a matter of common knowledge which a lay jury could decide in the absence of expert testimony.” The court noted that the defendant’s own testimony indicated the curette was used to minimize post-operative complications, not to facilitate the procedure itself. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the failure to use a sharp curette was a cause-in-fact of the unsuccessful abortion.

    Regarding the delayed notification, the court found that while it might have exacerbated damages, it was not an independent cause of injury. The court reasoned that finding the delay as the cause of emotional distress would be speculative, especially given the plaintiff’s testimony that she could not have endured a second abortion. The court concludes, “plaintiff simply has not established that her injuries resulted from anything other than the failure of the abortion, regardless of when she received notification.”

  • Doyle v. City of New York, 48 N.Y.2d 950 (1979): Application of the Continuous Treatment Doctrine in Municipal Claims

    Doyle v. City of New York, 48 N.Y.2d 950 (1979)

    The continuous treatment doctrine, which tolls the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases, does not apply to routine pediatric examinations where the patient appears to be in perfect health.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to an infant’s routine pediatric examinations to extend the time to file a notice of claim against the City of New York. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine was inapplicable because the infant’s visits were for routine checkups and not related to any specific condition or complaint. Therefore, the application to file a late notice of claim was denied because it was not made within the statutory period of one year after the event upon which the claim was based.

    Facts

    An infant claimant sought to file a late notice of claim against the City of New York. The claim stemmed from an unspecified event. The infant had visited the hospital for routine pediatric examinations. The claimant argued that these visits constituted “continuous treatment,” which should toll the statutory period for filing a notice of claim.

    Procedural History

    The claimant applied for leave to file a late notice of claim. The lower court granted the application. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The City of New York appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the infant’s routine pediatric examinations constitute “continuous treatment” for the purpose of tolling the one-year statutory period for filing a late notice of claim against a municipality under General Municipal Law § 50-e.

    Holding

    1. No, because the continuous treatment doctrine applies only when the course of treatment is related to the same original condition or complaint, and the infant’s visits were for routine examinations while appearing in perfect health.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the continuous treatment doctrine was inapplicable in this case. The court relied on the principle established in Borgia v. City of New York, stating that the doctrine applies only “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint.” The court distinguished the case from situations involving ongoing treatment for a specific ailment. Here, the infant’s visits were “merely for routine pediatric examinations, the infant appearing during this period to be in perfect health.” Citing Davis v. City of New York, the court concluded that the continuous treatment doctrine should not be applied in such circumstances. The court emphasized that extending the doctrine to cover routine checkups would broaden its scope beyond its intended purpose, which is to protect patients who continue under a doctor’s care for a specific condition. This decision reinforces the importance of timely filing notices of claim against municipalities and clarifies the limited scope of the continuous treatment doctrine.

  • Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1977): Recovery for Emotional Distress and Expenses Related to a Child’s Birth Defect

    Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1977)

    In a case of alleged medical malpractice for failure to diagnose a fetal defect, a cause of action may exist for the parents’ emotional distress and expenses related to raising the child with the defect, but the court did not reach the issue of whether a child can recover for wrongful life when the defendant’s failure to perform a test was within the permissible exercise of medical judgment.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, parents of a child born with Cri-du-chat syndrome, sued the defendant doctors for medical malpractice, alleging that the doctors failed to perform an amniocentesis during pregnancy, which would have revealed the child’s chromosomal defect and allowed the parents to make an informed decision about terminating the pregnancy. The court declined to rule on the complex legal questions of whether parents can recover for emotional distress and the costs of raising a disabled child or whether a child can recover for “wrongful life” because the defendant’s actions were within the bounds of permissible medical judgment at the time.

    Facts

    The plaintiff mother consulted with the defendant doctors for genetic counseling during her pregnancy. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently failed to advise and perform an amniocentesis. The plaintiffs asserted that this procedure would have revealed that the child was afflicted with Cri-du-chat syndrome, a chromosomal defect causing severe physical and mental retardation. The parents claimed that if they had known about the defect, they would have obtained an abortion.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision to dismiss the six causes of action was appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s failure to perform an amniocentesis constituted medical malpractice, considering the medical history of the patient and the state of medical knowledge in 1969 regarding the amniocentesis test, or was it instead a permissible exercise of medical judgment?

    Holding

    No, because the defendants’ failure to perform the test was a permissible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from accepted medical practice at the time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs did not raise an issue of fact to counter the defendants’ evidence that their failure to perform the amniocentesis was within the bounds of permissible medical judgment. The court cited Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, which establishes that a physician is not liable for negligence if they exercise their best judgment in applying their skill and knowledge. Because the defendants’ actions were deemed a permissible exercise of medical judgment based on the medical information available at the time (1969), the court did not address the broader legal questions presented by the case. The court stated, “our review of the record does not demonstrate that an issue of fact was raised by the plaintiffs in the face of the uncontroverted showing by the defendants that, on the basis of the patient’s medical history and the state of medical knowledge regarding the use of the amniocentesis test in 1969, the defendants’ failure to perform the test was no more than a permissible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from then accepted medical practice”. The Court avoided deciding the novel issues concerning “wrongful life” and the extent of the duty owed by physicians in such circumstances, because the factual predicate for reaching those issues was absent.

  • Golini v. New York Pepsi-Cola Scholarship Fund, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 733 (1975): Exclusivity of Workers’ Compensation Remedy for Employer-Provided Medical Care

    36 N.Y.2d 733 (1975)

    When an employer provides medical services to an employee as incidental to employment, the remedy for medical malpractice by a co-employee physician is exclusively under Workers’ Compensation Law, even if some treatment occurs off the employer’s premises.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued a Pepsi Cola Company physician for malpractice, alleging negligence caused the death of her husband, a Pepsi executive. The physician provided medical services to the executive as part of his employment benefits. The court held that the plaintiff’s remedy was exclusively under the Workers’ Compensation Law because the medical services were incidental to the executive’s employment. The location of the treatment (whether on or off company premises) was deemed irrelevant. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, finding no evidence of a private doctor-patient relationship outside of the employment context.

    Facts

    Ernest Golini, an executive at Pepsi Cola Company, received medical treatment from the company’s medical department, including from the defendant, a licensed physician employed by Pepsi as an associate director. Treatment occurred both at the Pepsi Cola building and at University Hospital, where the defendant treated Golini daily for almost six weeks. The defendant received a salary and benefits from Pepsi. While the defendant saw private patients in the same office, there was no evidence Golini engaged him on that basis or compensated him directly for services.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff commenced the action in 1966. The lower court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division upheld the grant of summary judgment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee’s remedy for medical malpractice against a co-employee physician is exclusively under the Workers’ Compensation Law when the medical services were provided as incidental to employment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the medical services were furnished to the decedent as incidental to his employment, making the Workers’ Compensation Law the exclusive remedy, as per Garcia v. Iserson, even if some treatment occurred off the employer’s premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in Garcia v. Iserson, which held that the Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy when an employee is injured due to the negligence of a co-employee while acting within the scope of their employment. The court emphasized that the medical services provided to Golini were incidental to his employment with Pepsi Cola. The court found no evidence to suggest that Golini and the defendant had a private doctor-patient relationship independent of Golini’s employment. The court stated that “the mere fact that, here, some of the treatment performed by defendant was not on premises of the employing concern does not alter the relationship or constitute a distinction of relevance.” The court also addressed the plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment was premature because facts were exclusively within the defendant’s knowledge, stating that the plaintiff had not shown she had been deprived of full disclosure, and therefore, the motion should not be denied on that ground.