New York Law Review

Tag: McManus v. Board of Education

  • McManus v. Board of Education, 87 N.Y.2d 183 (1995): Tenure by Estoppel When a School Board Artificially Extends Probationary Period

    McManus v. Board of Education, 87 N.Y.2d 183 (1995)

    A school board cannot artificially extend a principal’s probationary period by designating the initial period of service as “acting” or “temporary” and, thus, the principal may acquire tenure by estoppel if the board allows them to serve beyond the statutory three-year probationary period.

    Summary

    Joan McManus, a career educator, was appointed “Acting” Middle School Principal in July 1989. After a year, she was appointed to the position on a probationary basis for two years. The Board later stated this probationary period should be three years total. After serving three years in total, the Board terminated her employment. McManus argued she had acquired tenure by estoppel. The Court of Appeals held that the board could not artificially extend her probationary period by initially designating her as “acting” principal and that she had acquired tenure by estoppel by serving beyond the statutory three-year period.

    Facts

    Joan McManus, a certified school administrator, had been employed by the Hempstead Union Free School District for 26 years.
    In July 1989, the position of Middle School Principal became vacant, and in August 1989, the Board appointed McManus as “Acting” Middle School Principal.
    On August 17, 1990, the Board appointed her to the position with a two-year probationary period.
    In May 1991, the District sought advice from the NYS Department of Education regarding McManus’s tenure date and was informed that her probationary period began in August 1990 and that she was required to serve a three-year probationary period.
    In May 1993, the Superintendent informed McManus that he was not recommending her for tenure, and the Board voted to terminate her.

    Procedural History

    McManus initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Board’s resolution terminating her employment and to be restored to her position.
    Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
    The Appellate Division affirmed.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a school board can artificially extend a principal’s probationary period by designating the initial period of service as “acting” or “temporary,” thus preventing the acquisition of tenure by estoppel.

    Holding

    Yes, because a school board cannot undermine the policies behind the tenure system and artificially extend the probationary period by designating a position “acting” or “temporary”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a school district may not artificially increase the length of the probationary period established by state law, either directly or indirectly, by unduly delaying the formal appointment of a teacher (or administrator) to a particular position which that teacher in fact fills. The court stated, “Much like the petitioner in Ricca, Joan McManus was eventually appointed on a probationary basis to a position which she had been filling for almost a year. Inasmuch as probationary periods are employed to determine if appointees are ‘competent, efficient and satisfactory’ for purposes of recommending tenure, there is no reason why petitioner’s service following her initial appointment should be considered anything less than time accrued towards reducing the official three-year probationary period the statute requires.” The court emphasized that tenure evaluations can be made after three years regardless of the title under which the probationer serves, and a Board may not undermine the policies behind the tenure system and artificially extend the probationary period by designating a position “acting” or “temporary”. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Roberts v Community School Bd., stating that Roberts involved “Jarema” credit, which is not applicable to administrative personnel, whereas McManus filled a position left vacant and was not acting as a “substitute.” The court stated, “Petitioner cannot be estopped from asserting a state of facts that were known to all parties throughout the transaction. She is asserting a legal conclusion arising out of these facts, not seeking relief on the basis of something concealed from the Board, and a school board cannot be misled as to the legal significance of facts within its own knowledge.”

  • Matter of McManus v. Board of Education, 64 N.Y.2d 831 (1985): Aggregation of Probationary Period Reductions for Teachers

    Matter of McManus v. Board of Education, 64 N.Y.2d 831 (1985)

    The statutory reductions from the three-year probationary period for regular substitute teachers and for previously tenured teachers cannot be aggregated; the shorter of the two probationary periods governs.

    Summary

    McManus, a previously tenured teacher, was hired as a regular substitute and then granted probationary status. After being denied tenure, he argued he attained tenure by estoppel because his probationary period should have been reduced both by his prior tenure and his time as a substitute, resulting in a shorter probationary period than he actually served. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the reductions for prior tenure and substitute service are independent and cannot be combined. The shorter of the two potential probationary periods controls.

    Facts

    Prior to September 1, 1982, McManus had tenure as a high school science teacher in another district.
    On September 1, 1982, he was hired by the Board of Education as a regular substitute science teacher.
    After one term, he gained probationary status, effective February 28, 1983.
    The Board voted not to grant him tenure, terminating his services on February 27, 1985.

    Procedural History

    McManus initiated an Article 78 proceeding, seeking a declaration that he had acquired tenure by estoppel.
    Special Term agreed with McManus’s argument.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statutory reductions from the three-year probationary period for regular substitute teachers and for previously tenured teachers may be aggregated, allowing a teacher to claim the benefit of both reductions.

    Holding

    No, because neither the relevant sections of the Education Law nor their legislative history allows for such cumulation. Furthermore, allowing aggregation could eliminate the requirement of actual probationary teaching service. As the Court stated, the independent statutory maximums mean that “the shorter of the two probationary periods to govern in particular cases when both are applicable.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found no basis in the Education Law to permit aggregating the reductions in the probationary period for previously tenured teachers and regular substitute teachers. Education Law § 2509(1)(a) addresses probationary periods for substitute teachers, while § 3012(1)(a) addresses probationary periods for previously tenured teachers.
    The Court emphasized that each section independently starts with a three-year probationary term, and neither section suggests they can be combined. Combining the reductions could eliminate the need for any actual probationary teaching service, which is essential for evaluating a teacher before granting tenure.
    The Court highlighted the importance of probationary service, stating, “The necessity for a term of actual probationary teaching service — providing an opportunity to evaluate a teacher designated by the Board of Education as a candidate for permanent tenure before that critical determination is made — is evident in various sections of the Education Law”.
    The Court rejected the idea of judicially creating a minimum probationary period, stating that it would amount to judicial legislation. The Court acknowledged that the Legislature could explicitly allow for the double deduction if it intended to do so.
    Therefore, the Court concluded that the shorter of the two probationary periods should govern when both sections are applicable. In this case, McManus, as a previously tenured teacher, was subject to a two-year probationary period and was terminated before it expired; therefore, he did not acquire tenure by estoppel.

  • Matter of McManus v. Board of Education, 56 N.Y.2d 172 (1982): Interpreting Substitute Teacher Service Credit Towards Tenure

    Matter of McManus v. Board of Education, 56 N.Y.2d 172 (1982)

    The Commissioner of Education’s interpretation of Education Law § 2509(1)(a), allowing credit for substitute teaching service towards tenure only when rendered prior to the commencement of the first probationary period, is rational and reasonable and thus, must be upheld.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a teacher can apply substitute teaching service rendered after an initial probationary appointment towards acquiring tenure. McManus, a teacher, argued that his substitute service after an initial probationary period should be credited towards his tenure. The Commissioner of Education denied his claim, interpreting Education Law § 2509(1)(a) as allowing credit only for substitute service rendered before the first probationary period. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the Commissioner’s interpretation rational and consistent with the statute’s purpose of distinguishing between regular and substitute service, preventing inadvertent tenure acquisition.

    Facts

    McManus was appointed as a probationary science teacher from March 3, 1975, to June 30, 1976, when his position was terminated due to staff reductions.
    He then worked as a regular substitute teacher from September 1, 1976, to February 1, 1978, in the same district.
    He was reappointed to probationary status from February 1, 1978, until June 30, 1979, when his services were again terminated.
    McManus claimed entitlement to tenure by estoppel, arguing his substitute service combined with his probationary periods exceeded the three years required for tenure.

    Procedural History

    McManus appealed to the Commissioner of Education, who dismissed the appeal.
    McManus then initiated an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the Commissioner’s decision.
    Special Term dismissed the petition, upholding the Commissioner’s interpretation.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, but based its decision on a different rationale: that the substitute service must be for two full years to qualify for Jarema credit.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner of Education’s interpretation of Education Law § 2509(1)(a) is rational and reasonable in allowing credit for substitute teaching service towards tenure only when such service is rendered prior to the commencement of the first probationary period.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute requires interpretation, the Commissioner’s interpretation has been consistently applied, and there is a rational basis for it, namely, to preserve distinctions between regular and substitute service and prevent unintended tenure acquisitions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found Education Law § 2509(1)(a) ambiguous regarding whether the two-year substitute service provision was a ceiling or a threshold.
    Because the statute requires interpretation, the Court deferred to the Commissioner’s long-standing interpretation, which had been consistently applied for over 20 years.
    The Court emphasized the principle that “‘the practical construction that has been given to a law by those charged with the duty of enforcing it…takes on almost the force of judicial interpretation’” (quoting Matter of Lezette v Board of Educ., 35 NY2d 272, 281).
    The Commissioner’s interpretation was deemed rational as it aimed to distinguish between regular and substitute service, thereby limiting claims of tenure by estoppel acquired inadvertently.
    Since McManus’s substitute service occurred after his initial probationary appointment, he received no credit for it, and his total probationary service did not meet the three-year requirement for tenure.
    The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the substitute service must be for two full years, clarifying that credit could be earned for substitute service of less than two years. However, this point was moot as McManus’s substitute service was ineligible regardless because it followed his initial probationary appointment.