People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 62 N.Y.2d 317 (1984)

At a parole revocation hearing, a parolee has a right to confront adverse witnesses, but this right is not absolute and may be dispensed with upon a specific finding of good cause by the hearing examiner, based on a careful balancing of the parolee’s rights, the nature of the evidence, the utility of cross-examination, and the State’s burden in producing the witness.

Summary

McGee’s parole was revoked based on a parole officer’s report stating that McGee failed to report as required. The parole officer who prepared the report had left the Division of Parole, and the report was admitted as a business record without allowing McGee to cross-examine the author. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the report was admissible as a business record, the failure to allow McGee to confront the former parole officer without a specific finding of good cause violated McGee’s due process rights. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the right to confrontation with the practical burdens on the state.

Facts

McGee was on parole and required to report to his parole officer every two weeks. He allegedly failed to report on July 9, 1980, and all subsequent dates until December 3, 1980. A parole violation report was prepared by McGee’s parole officer. Prior to the parole revocation hearing, the parole officer who prepared the report left the Division of Parole. At the hearing, the report was introduced as evidence of the violation, with the current parole officer laying the foundation. McGee was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the author of the report.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding the parole violation report was improperly admitted and that McGee’s due process rights were violated. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the report was inadmissible as a business record. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the parole violation report was properly admitted as a business record under CPLR 4518.
2. Whether McGee’s due process rights were violated when the parole violation report was admitted without affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the report’s author.

Holding

1. Yes, because there was a continuing violation of the terms of parole up to the time that the report was prepared, providing substantial evidence that the report was made within a reasonable time of the violation.
2. Yes, because the hearing officer did not make a specific finding of good cause to dispense with the need to produce the witness whose statements comprised the only evidence offered by the State, violating McGee’s due process rights.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals found that the parole violation report was admissible as a business record since the violation was ongoing up to the report’s creation. However, it affirmed the granting of habeas corpus relief on due process grounds, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which establishes the minimum due process requirements for parole revocation hearings, including the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless good cause is specifically found for not allowing confrontation. The court emphasized that “in almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” While acknowledging that parole revocation hearings are not equivalent to criminal trials, the court stressed the importance of the confrontation right in enhancing the fact-finding process. The hearing officer must carefully weigh the preference for confrontation, whether confrontation would aid the fact-finding process, and the burden on the State in producing the witness. The court noted that the State’s only reason for not producing the parole officer was that he was no longer employed by the Division of Parole, which, without further consideration, did not constitute good cause. Because the hearing officer failed to make a specific finding of good cause to dispense with the production of the witness, a due process violation was presumed.