2024 NY Slip Op 06290

The New York City Human Rights Law’s prohibition against marital status discrimination in housing does not extend to unmarried couples seeking the same benefits as married couples, requiring a legally recognized marriage for such benefits.

Summary

The case concerns a dispute over an apartment in a cooperative building following the death of a shareholder. The shareholder’s long-time unmarried partner claimed that the cooperative board’s refusal to treat her as a “spouse” under the lease, entitling her to an automatic transfer of the shares, constituted marital status discrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the NYCHRL’s prohibition against marital status discrimination does not encompass denying benefits to unmarried couples that are afforded to married couples. The court focused on the plain meaning of “marital status,” the structure of the NYCHRL, and legislative history, concluding that the law requires a legal marriage to trigger benefits tied to spousal status.

Facts

Maryann McCabe lived with David Burrows for 13 years in his cooperative apartment in New York City. The cooperative lease provided for an automatic transfer of shares to a shareholder’s spouse upon death. Burrows and McCabe were not married. After Burrows’ death, McCabe sought to acquire Burrows’ shares under the “spouse” clause, but the cooperative board refused, considering her an unmarried partner. The board offered to consider her as a family member instead, but ultimately rejected her application. McCabe claimed the board’s actions constituted marital status discrimination under the NYCHRL.

Procedural History

McCabe initiated an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which denied the petition and dismissed the case. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the cooperative board discriminated against McCabe based on her marital status by refusing to treat her as a “spouse” under the lease for the purpose of automatic transfer of shares.

Holding

1. No, because the NYCHRL’s prohibition against marital status discrimination does not extend to unmarried couples and requires legal marriage for benefits tied to spousal status.

Court’s Reasoning

The court examined the meaning of “marital status” within the NYCHRL, referencing prior cases. It found that the plain meaning refers to the legal condition of being single, married, divorced, or widowed, not to the identity or situation of one’s partner. The court relied on the 1973 legislative history when marital status was added, highlighting that it was added to address housing denials based on an individual’s marital state (single, married, divorced etc.) and not about the identity of the individual’s partner. The court contrasted this with “partnership status,” added in 2005, and the 2016 amendment concerning “caregiver status,” suggesting these distinctions demonstrate that the NYCHRL does not automatically equate unmarried partners with spouses. The court also considered the 2005 and 2016 amendments which the Court construed as not overruling prior case law, which had established that marital status discrimination did not cover those with whom the individual chose to live. The court also emphasized the specific wording of the lease and that the denial was based on the lack of a legal marriage.

Practical Implications

This case clarifies that, under the NYCHRL, an unmarried partner does not automatically receive the same rights and benefits as a legal spouse. The court’s ruling will impact how similar cases are analyzed, reinforcing the need for a formal marriage to trigger certain housing-related benefits, particularly in cooperative settings. Landlords and cooperative boards can continue to make distinctions based on the legal status of a relationship (married or unmarried) when it comes to automatic transfer clauses or other provisions. This decision influences the interpretation of anti-discrimination laws in the context of housing, and demonstrates the importance of explicit legal definitions and formal documentation, such as a marriage certificate.