New York Law Review

Tag: Matter of Levy

  • Matter of Levy, 48 N.Y.2d 860 (1979): Automatic Disbarment for Federal Felony Conviction

    48 N.Y.2d 860 (1979)

    An attorney is automatically disbarred in New York upon conviction of a federal felony, even if that felony lacks a direct analogue in New York law, regardless of whether the conviction resulted from an admission of guilt or a plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

    Summary

    This case concerns the automatic disbarment of an attorney following a federal felony conviction. Levy was convicted of a federal felony under 15 U.S.C. § 645. The Appellate Division subsequently struck his name from the roll of attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment upon felony conviction, irrespective of whether the federal felony has a direct counterpart in New York law or whether the plea was entered without admitting guilt under North Carolina v. Alford. The court clarified that while the recent amendment to Section 90 does not apply, Levy could seek relief from the Appellate Division under the amended statute.

    Facts

    Appellant Levy, an attorney, was convicted of a felony under Section 645 of Title 15 of the United States Code. Levy entered his plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, meaning he did not explicitly admit guilt but acknowledged that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to convict him.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division struck Levy’s name from the roll of attorneys following his federal felony conviction. Levy appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney is subject to automatic disbarment in New York State pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4) upon conviction of a federal felony, regardless of whether the federal felony has a direct analogue in New York law or whether the plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

    Holding

    Yes, because Subdivision 4 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony, and this applies to federal felonies even without a New York analogue, and regardless of whether the plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v Alford.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the clear mandate of Judiciary Law § 90(4), which requires automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony. The court emphasized that prior interpretations of this section established that an attorney is disbarred upon conviction of a federal felony, even if that felony does not have a direct equivalent under New York law. The court cited Matter of Thies, 45 NY2d 865 and Matter of Chu, 42 NY2d 490 to support this interpretation.

    The court rejected Levy’s argument that the North Carolina v. Alford plea should preclude automatic disbarment. The court reasoned that, regardless of whether Levy admitted guilt, the conviction itself triggered the statutory sanction. The court stated: “Although appellant did not admit his guilt, nonetheless he stood convicted of a felony.”

    While the court acknowledged a recent amendment to Section 90, it clarified that the amendment did not apply to this specific appeal. However, the court noted that Levy could petition the Appellate Division for relief under the amended statute if he so chose.

    The court explicitly declined to address the issue of whether the federal offense had a New York counterpart, deeming it unnecessary to the disposition of the case and suggesting the Appellate Division should consider the question anew if a proper application were made.

  • Matter of Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279 (1975): Collateral Estoppel Bars Relitigation of Guilt in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

    Matter of Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279 (1975)

    An attorney convicted of a crime is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of guilt in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, although they may introduce evidence in mitigation or explanation of the conviction.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the extent to which an attorney, convicted of a crime, can relitigate their guilt during subsequent disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents an attorney from relitigating the issue of their guilt, as it was already determined in the criminal trial. However, the attorney retains the right to present evidence to explain or mitigate the circumstances of the conviction, influencing the severity of the disciplinary action. The court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings primarily aim to protect the public, not to punish the attorney.

    Facts

    An attorney (Levy) was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to pay illegal kickbacks to a union official, a federal felony. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him in the Appellate Division. At the disciplinary hearing, the attorney sought to testify regarding his innocence of the federal crime, despite his conviction. The Referee excluded this testimony.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initiated disciplinary proceedings following the attorney’s federal conviction. The Referee in the disciplinary proceeding excluded the attorney’s attempt to relitigate his guilt. The Court of Appeals reviewed this decision, focusing on the scope of permissible evidence in such disciplinary hearings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney, convicted of a criminal offense, can relitigate the issue of their guilt in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, or whether they are limited to presenting evidence in mitigation or explanation of the conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies, preventing the attorney from relitigating the issue of guilt which was already decided in the criminal proceeding. However, the attorney may present evidence to mitigate or explain the circumstances of the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which applies in criminal proceedings, also applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings. The court stated, “We perceive no reason why a member of the Bar should be accorded a significantly more favored position than are others in the application of this principle, particularly in a matter in which the public interest is at stake.” Relitigating guilt would be inefficient and potentially unjust, as the criminal trial already provided rigorous safeguards to ensure a fair outcome. The court explicitly departed from prior opinions suggesting attorneys could relitigate guilt in disciplinary proceedings. While guilt cannot be relitigated, attorneys can introduce evidence to explain or mitigate the significance of their criminal conviction. The court emphasized that the primary focus of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public. “Our duty in these circumstances is to impose discipline, not as punishment, but to protect the public in its reliance upon the presumed integrity and responsibility of lawyers.” The Appellate Division has discretion to determine what evidence is relevant to the nature of the offense and the appropriate penalty, balancing the public interest with the attorney’s right to due process.