Matter of Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403 (1990)

For an attorney to be automatically disbarred in New York based on a felony conviction in another jurisdiction, the elements of the foreign felony must be ‘essentially similar’ to a felony in New York, requiring more than a superficial resemblance.

Summary

This case addresses whether an attorney’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter in Texas warrants automatic disbarment in New York. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Texas felony was not ‘essentially similar’ to the New York felony of vehicular manslaughter because the Texas statute required a lower level of intoxication and did not require proof of a culpable mental state, whereas New York requires criminal negligence in addition to intoxication. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order of disbarment, emphasizing that automatic disbarment is only warranted when the out-of-state felony is substantially similar to a New York felony.

Facts

Appellant Johnston, an attorney, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Texas after being involved in a fatal car accident. Under Texas law, she was found to have caused the death of an individual while operating a motor vehicle in an intoxicated state. The Texas statute defined intoxication as not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties. Based on this conviction, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee sought to have Johnston automatically disbarred in New York.

Procedural History

The Departmental Disciplinary Committee applied to the Appellate Division to have Johnston’s name removed from the roll of attorneys based on Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b) and (e), which mandates automatic disbarment for attorneys convicted of felonies. The Appellate Division granted the application and ordered Johnston’s disbarment, finding the Texas felony essentially similar to New York’s vehicular manslaughter statute. Johnston appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the Texas felony of involuntary manslaughter, as defined in Texas Penal Code § 19.05 (a) (2), is ‘essentially similar’ to the New York felony of vehicular manslaughter, as defined in New York Penal Law § 125.12, such that automatic disbarment is warranted under Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (e).

Holding

No, because the Texas and New York felonies differ significantly in the level of intoxication required and the necessary proof of a culpable mental state; the Texas felony does not require proof of criminal negligence, while the New York felony does.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas and New York statutes to determine if they were ‘essentially similar.’ The Texas statute required only that the driver not have the normal use of their mental or physical faculties due to voluntary intoxication, and proof of intoxication causing death was sufficient to establish the offense. The New York statute, however, required a higher degree of impairment constituting ‘intoxication’ and also required proof of criminal negligence, meaning the driver failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The court noted that, in New York, merely being ‘impaired’ by alcohol is insufficient for a vehicular manslaughter conviction; criminal negligence must also be proven. The court emphasized, “It has long been the rule in this State that proof of intoxication alone is insufficient to establish criminal negligence and that the People must also show that the ‘intoxication affected [the defendant’s] physical and mental capacity to the extent that it caused him to operate his vehicle in a culpably reckless manner’.” Because the Texas statute did not require proof of criminal negligence and had a lower threshold for intoxication, the Court found the two felonies were not ‘essentially similar,’ and therefore automatic disbarment was not warranted. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings, meaning a disciplinary hearing would be required to determine the appropriate sanction.