Matter of George, 22 N.Y.3d 322 (2013)
A judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and prior warnings from the State Commission on Judicial Conduct regarding similar behavior are an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct.
Summary
Glen R. George, a non-lawyer Justice of the Middletown Town Court, sought review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that sustained two charges of misconduct and recommended his removal from office. The first charge involved presiding over a traffic case involving a long-time friend and former employer without disclosing the relationship. The second involved ex parte communications with a prospective litigant. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, finding that the misconduct warranted removal, especially given a prior Letter of Caution from the Commission addressing similar conduct.
Facts
Justice George had a long-standing personal and professional relationship with Lynn Johnson. Johnson received a traffic ticket and appeared in Justice George’s court. George presided over the case without disclosing his relationship with Johnson. Johnson claimed a discrepancy on the ticket, and George dismissed the ticket sua sponte without notifying the prosecutor. Separately, a prospective litigant contacted the court intending to sue a neighbor. George engaged in ex parte communications, discouraged the litigant from pursuing the claim, and expressed views favoring the neighbor. The litigant later filed a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Conduct.
Procedural History
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a Formal Written Complaint against Justice George. After a hearing, the Commission sustained both charges of misconduct. The Commission determined that Justice George’s conduct violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and warranted his removal from office. Justice George sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether Justice George’s conduct, specifically presiding over a case involving a friend without disclosure and engaging in ex parte communications with a prospective litigant, constituted judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.
Holding
Yes, because Justice George failed to disqualify himself in a proceeding where his impartiality could reasonably be questioned and engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications, and because a prior warning from the Commission regarding similar behavior was an aggravating factor.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found that Justice George’s decision to hear a case involving a friend and former employer without disclosing the relationship violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, which require a judge to disqualify himself in proceedings where impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The court emphasized that the perception of the seriousness of the case is irrelevant to the duty to recuse or disclose a relationship. The court also noted that the prior Letter of Caution from the Commission regarding similar behavior involving Johnson’s daughter-in-law was a significant aggravating factor. The court quoted the prior warning: “Because of your long relationship with the Johnson family, you should have considered whether presiding over [those] cases gave the appearance that you could not be impartial.”
The court also condemned Justice George’s ex parte communications with the prospective litigant, finding that his statements discouraged the litigant from pursuing his claim. The court cited 22 NYCRR 100.3 (B) (6), stating that “[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications…concerning a pending or impending proceeding.” The court found that this conduct was antithetical to the role of a judge and created the impression of bias.
The Court of Appeals concluded that, despite Justice George’s long tenure, the serious nature of the misconduct, particularly in light of the prior warning from the Commission, warranted his removal from office. The court stated, “Hypertechnical arguments— such as the view that petitioner had no duty to recuse himself or disclose the relationship because Johnson sold the company to his sons in 1997 or because the Commission did not specifically direct petitioner to recuse himself in future cases involving the Johnson family—fail to appreciate a judge’s continuing obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”