New York Law Review

Tag: Matter of Felix

  • Matter of Felix v. Board of Trustees, 81 N.Y.2d 878 (1993): Interpreting Salary Increases for Police Chiefs under General Municipal Law § 207-m

    Matter of Felix v. Board of Trustees, 81 N.Y.2d 878 (1993)

    General Municipal Law § 207-m requires a police chief’s salary to increase only when the base salary of the highest-ranking subordinate position increases, not for individual pay increases earned by a subordinate rising through the ranks.

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of General Municipal Law § 207-m, which mandates salary increases for police chiefs when the base salary of their highest-ranking subordinate increases. The petitioner, the Chief of Police of the Village of Dolgeville, argued that he was entitled to additional pay increases equal to the sum of pay increases received by his subordinate as he rose through the ranks. The court held that § 207-m is intended to prevent salary compression between police chiefs and their subordinates due to increases in the base salary of the subordinate position, not due to individual advancements and associated pay increases. Therefore, the petitioner’s claim was denied.

    Facts

    The petitioner was the Chief of Police of the Village of Dolgeville. The highest-ranking subordinate position in his department was Patrolman Grade I. The Patrolman Grade I position was vacant when salary increases were instituted for that position. Officer Scott Stefanec later filled the position, having risen through the ranks from Patrolman Recruit to Patrolman Grade I. The Chief of Police received pay increases each time the base salary of the Patrolman Grade I position increased, even when vacant.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner sought additional pay increases based on the sum of increases received by Officer Stefanec as he progressed through the ranks. The lower court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether General Municipal Law § 207-m mandates that a police chief receive an additional pay increase equal to the sum of the increases received by a subordinate as that subordinate rose through the ranks to become the highest-ranking subordinate.

    Holding

    No, because General Municipal Law § 207-m is intended to prevent salary compression resulting from increases in the base salary of the highest-ranking subordinate position, not from individual pay increases earned as a subordinate progresses through the ranks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the purpose of General Municipal Law § 207-m is to prevent salary compression between police chiefs and their subordinates. The statute was designed to ensure that when the *position* of the highest-ranking subordinate receives a raise, the police chief also receives a raise to maintain a proper salary differential. The court emphasized that the salary compression problem does not arise from an individual’s rise through the ranks and consequent pay increases, but rather from an increase in the *base salary* for the highest-ranking subordinate *position*. The court stated that “section 207-m is best interpreted to require that the head of the department receive a salary increase whenever the base salary of the highest ranking subordinate *position* is increased, whether or not the position itself is filled.” The court concluded that the petitioner had already received all that he was entitled to under the statute. The court referenced legislative history (Bill Jacket, L 1977, ch 827, Mem Supporting A 7913) and opinions of the State Comptroller (1986 Opns St Comp No. 86-23; 1984 Opns St Comp No. 84-20) to support its interpretation of the statute’s intent.

  • Matter of Felix v. New York City Transit Authority, 61 N.Y.2d 708 (1984): Public Officer’s Law and Arbitrator’s Power

    61 N.Y.2d 708 (1984)

    An arbitrator’s award in a disciplinary proceeding should be confirmed unless the arbitrator exceeded their powers; a guilty plea to a ‘violation’ under the Penal Law, as opposed to a ‘crime,’ does not trigger the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether an arbitrator exceeded their power by not ordering the dismissal of a New York City Transit Authority employee who pled guilty to disorderly conduct after being charged with official misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator did not exceed their power because a plea to disorderly conduct, a violation under the Penal Law, does not constitute a conviction of a crime involving a violation of oath of office under Public Officers Law § 30, which would mandate forfeiture of public office. The court emphasized the distinction between a ‘violation’ and a ‘crime’ as defined in the Penal Law.

    Facts

    A New York City Transit Authority employee (petitioner) was found guilty by an arbitrator of releasing an impounded car without authority and filing a false report, among other charges. The petitioner was initially indicted on a charge of official misconduct (Penal Law § 195.00) but pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). Considering the petitioner’s prior good record, the arbitrator imposed a penalty of suspension without pay, resulting in a loss of salary and holiday pay.

    Procedural History

    Special Term held that the arbitrator did not exceed their powers by not ordering the employee’s discharge. The Appellate Division agreed with Special Term’s decision. The City appealed, arguing that the employee forfeited their office under Public Officers Law § 30 due to the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arbitrator exceeded their powers by failing to order the petitioner’s discharge, given that the petitioner pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct after being indicted on a charge of official misconduct, and whether this plea triggered the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30.

    Holding

    No, because disorderly conduct is classified as a ‘violation’ under the Penal Law, not a ‘crime,’ and therefore does not trigger the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30, which requires a conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of the oath of office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning centered on the interpretation of Public Officers Law § 30 (subd 1, par e), which states that a public office becomes vacant upon a public officer’s conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of their oath of office. The court emphasized that the definition of a ‘crime’ is determined by the Penal Law. According to Penal Law § 10.00, a ‘crime’ is defined as a misdemeanor or a felony, explicitly distinguishing it from a ‘violation.’ Since disorderly conduct is classified as a ‘violation’ under Penal Law § 240.20, it does not qualify as a ‘crime’ under Public Officers Law § 30.

    The court further reasoned that even though the petitioner was initially accused of acts violating their oath of office, they were only convicted of disorderly conduct. None of the acts falling within the definition of disorderly conduct are directly connected to a violation of the oath of office. The court acknowledged the practice of plea bargaining but reiterated that the forfeiture provision of Public Officers Law § 30 is triggered only by a ‘conviction’ of a crime, not a mere accusation or a plea to a violation. The court stated, “what triggers the forfeiture provision of section 30 is only a ‘conviction’. Though a guilty plea is a ‘conviction’ under that section, petitioner’s plea was to a violation rather than to a crime.”