Matter of County of Nassau, 46 N.Y.2d 54 (1978)

The term “transit facilities” encompasses any tangible means of moving people and things, and the provision of school pupil transportation and charter services available to the public constitutes a public use and purpose justifying the exercise of eminent domain.

Summary

This case concerns the County of Nassau’s attempt to acquire a bus company through eminent domain. The central issue was whether the county had the power to acquire transit facilities, specifically including those used for school transportation and charter services. The New York Court of Appeals held that the county possessed such power, interpreting “transit facilities” broadly and affirming that school pupil transportation and charter service available to the public constitutes a valid public use or purpose. The court emphasized that the wisdom of the county’s policy was distinct from its legal power to act.

Facts

The County of Nassau sought to acquire a bus company. The intended use of the acquired facilities included commuter and internal rapid transit, school pupil transportation, and charter services available to the public. Appellants challenged the county’s power to acquire the bus company through eminent domain, arguing that the use of transit facilities for school and charter services did not constitute a public use or purpose.

Procedural History

The lower court ruled in favor of the County of Nassau, affirming its power to acquire the bus company. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the County of Nassau and the Suburban Bus Authority have the power to acquire transit facilities, including acquisition by eminent domain, for purposes including school pupil transportation and charter services available to the public.

Holding

Yes, because municipalities, by Constitution and statute, have the power to acquire transit facilities, and that power, absent restrictive language, covers any tangible means of moving people and things; furthermore, school pupil transportation and charter service available to the public constitute a public use and purpose.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the constitutional and statutory grants of power to municipalities to acquire transit facilities are broad and without limiting definitions. The court refused to import restrictive language from other statutes related to “mass transportation” or “rapid transit.” It stated, “Words take their meaning from the context in which they are used.” The court further held that providing school pupil transportation and charter services available to the public constitutes a public use or purpose, relying on precedent such as Courtesy Sandwich Shop v Port of N. Y. Auth., 12 NY2d 379, 388-391 and Bush Term. Co. v City of New York, 282 NY 306, 316-317. It noted that public use is not limited to public need and that even if private enterprise could perform the services as well or better, it does not negate the public purpose. Citing Matter of City of New York [Ely Ave.], 217 NY 45, 57, the court stated that the public need or desirability is not generally subject to judicial review. The court acknowledged the appellants’ economic arguments about the wisdom of the county’s involvement but emphasized that such arguments do not establish a lack of power, stating: “To think so is to confuse policy with lack of power.”