Matter of Corey L. v. Michael K., 45 N.Y.2d 383 (1978)
In adoption proceedings, abandonment by a natural parent requires legally sufficient evidence of a purposeful relinquishing of parental obligations, and the ‘best interests of the child’ cannot substitute for a finding of abandonment.
Summary
This case addresses the burden of proof required to terminate a natural parent’s rights in an adoption proceeding based on abandonment. The New York Court of Appeals held that while statutory amendments aimed to ease the burden of proving abandonment, they cannot override constitutional limitations on terminating parental rights. The Court emphasized that abandonment requires legally sufficient evidence of a purposeful relinquishing of parental obligations, including interest, presence, affection, care, and support. The ‘best interests of the child’ standard only applies after abandonment is established, and cannot be used as a substitute for a finding of abandonment.
Facts
The natural mother and father divorced in 1971, with the mother granted custody of their son, born in 1969, and the father ordered to pay $25 per week in child support. The father was in the Air Force from 1970 to 1973 and visited the child during leaves. After his discharge in October 1973, until the adoption hearings began in October 1975, he visited the child two or three times and called approximately four times. He stopped paying support in October 1972. The mother remarried in May 1973, and she and her new husband filed for adoption in May 1974.
Procedural History
The Family Court found the father had abandoned the child, relying on infrequent contact and failure to pay support. The court also considered a report from the Department of Social Services stating that adoption was in the child’s best interest. The Appellate Division affirmed, emphasizing that insubstantial contact does not preclude a finding of abandonment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the evidence presented was legally sufficient to establish that the natural father abandoned his child, thereby justifying the termination of his parental rights and allowing the adoption to proceed without his consent.
Holding
No, because the evidence did not demonstrate a purposeful abandonment of parental obligations by the natural father, and the ‘best interests of the child’ cannot be the primary factor in determining abandonment.
Court’s Reasoning
The court recognized the legislative intent to ease the burden of proving abandonment, but stressed that this could not override constitutional protections for parental rights. The court stated, “Even where the flame of parental interest is reduced to a flicker the courts may not properly intervene to dissolve the parentage”. The court emphasized that amendments to section 111 of the Domestic Relations Law were “designed to override the ‘flicker of interest’ test and thereby ease the burden on the party seeking to prove abandonment”. However, this provision only applies if a finding of abandonment is thwarted by some insignificant contact. The court reasoned that the lower courts improperly considered the period between the filing of the petition and the hearing in their abandonment determination. The court pointed out that the relevant period of alleged abandonment was a relatively short eight months following the father’s discharge from the military. The court also found the failure to furnish support significant, but not determinative, especially considering the father’s limited income during that period. The court stated that “Abandonment, as it pertains to adoption, relates to such conduct on the part of a parent as evinces a purposeful ridding of parental obligations and the foregoing of parental rights — a withholding of interest, presence, affection, care and support. The best interests of the child, as such, is not an ingredient of that conduct and is not involved in this threshold question.” The Court firmly rejected the argument that the “best interests of the child” should be paramount in determining abandonment: “Under section 111 of the Domestic Relations Law as applied to the instant facts, the consent of the natural father or an abandonment was a prerequisite to the judicial termination of his parental relationship.” Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissed the adoption petition, and remitted the matter to Family Court for further proceedings regarding custody or visitation.