New York Law Review

Tag: Matter of Cohen

  • Matter of Cohen, 635 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1994): Enforceability of Agreement to Make Mutual Wills When One Will is Revoked

    Matter of Cohen, 635 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y. 1994)

    An agreement to make mutual wills is unenforceable when one party revokes their will with the other party’s consent, as there is no unjust enrichment to justify imposing a constructive trust.

    Summary

    Harry and Rae Cohen executed mutual wills in 1982, agreeing to leave half their estate to Harry’s relatives and half to Rae’s, with the wills being irrevocable without mutual consent. Harry died in 1986, and Rae, claiming she couldn’t find his will, was appointed administrator of his estate. Harry’s nephew sought to probate a copy of the will or enforce the agreement. The court denied probate due to presumption of revocation but imposed a constructive trust on the estate based on the agreement. The Appellate Division modified this, limiting the trust. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Harry’s will was deemed revoked with Rae’s consent, Rae wasn’t unjustly enriched, and the agreement couldn’t be enforced.

    Facts

    1. Harry and Rae Cohen, a childless couple, executed mutual wills in April 1982, each establishing a trust for the surviving spouse, with the remainder to be divided equally between relatives of Harry and Rae.
    2. The wills devised the residue of the estate to the surviving spouse outright.
    3. Simultaneously, they entered a written agreement making the wills irrevocable except with mutual consent, designating the legatees as third-party beneficiaries.
    4. Harry died in December 1986; Rae claimed she couldn’t find his will and was issued letters of administration.
    5. Harry’s nephew, a legatee under the will, sought to probate a copy of the will or enforce the agreement.

    Procedural History

    1. The Surrogate’s Court denied probate of the will due to the presumption of revocation but enforced the agreement, imposing a constructive trust on the entire estate.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of probate but modified the constructive trust, limiting it to the portion of the estate not passing outright to Rae under the original will.
    3. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an agreement to make mutual wills is enforceable through a constructive trust when one of the wills is deemed to have been revoked by the testator.

    Holding

    1. No, because the surviving spouse did not receive the estate as a result of the agreement but rather due to intestacy following the revocation of the will, and therefore was not unjustly enriched.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that prior cases enforcing agreements to make mutual wills involved situations where the first party to die performed the agreement by not revoking their will. The surviving party then breached the agreement by disposing of the estate inconsistently with the original agreement. The key principle is that equity prevents the surviving party from benefiting from the first party’s performance and then breaching the agreement. This is essentially a particular application of preventing unjust enrichment, a necessary element for a constructive trust. In this case, because the lower courts found that Harry’s will was revoked, Rae did not benefit from Harry’s performance of the agreement. Instead, she took the estate through intestacy. Therefore, there was no unjust enrichment to justify imposing a constructive trust. The court stated, “[T]o permit the one who survives to gain the benefits of the joint will and then to flout its provisions in violation of the promise made to the other ‘would be a mockery of justice’”. The court also noted that the designation of the legatees as third-party beneficiaries did not change the outcome, as Rae effectively assented to the revocation of Harry’s will when she applied for letters of administration. This precluded the third-party beneficiaries from asserting any vested rights under the agreement.

  • Matter of Cohen, 49 N.Y.2d 772 (1980): Upholding Agency Credibility Determinations in Unemployment Cases

    Matter of Cohen, 49 N.Y.2d 772 (1980)

    An administrative agency’s assessment of witness credibility and the inferences drawn from evidence are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s determination. The Board had found that the claimant, Cohen, had not terminated a prior disqualification from receiving benefits due to misconduct because he was not genuinely employed by Crown Tex Corporation. The Board rejected testimony from Cohen, his wife (a bookkeeper at Crown Tex), and the company’s assistant secretary, finding it unbelievable given suspicious circumstances. The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s credibility assessment was supported by substantial evidence and should not have been overturned.

    Facts

    Cohen was previously disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits due to being discharged for misconduct. He reapplied for benefits, claiming he had worked at Crown Tex Corporation long enough to end the disqualification. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board investigated Cohen’s claim. Cohen, his wife, and the assistant secretary of Crown Tex testified that he was employed there. The Board noted that Cohen earned exactly the amount needed to break his disqualification and that there was no clear economic reason for his temporary employment. The Board also found Cohen made misrepresentations about his employment when reapplying for unemployment benefits.

    Procedural History

    The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that Cohen was not genuinely employed by Crown Tex and had not terminated his disqualification. Cohen appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s decision. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s determination that Cohen was not employed by Crown Tex, and thus had not terminated his prior disqualification, was supported by substantial evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s assessment of witness credibility and the inferences it drew from the evidence were supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Division should not have disturbed the Board’s finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that an administrative agency’s findings of fact, including credibility determinations, are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, citing Labor Law, § 623 and Matter of Fisher [Levine], 36 NY2d 146, 149-150. The court deferred to the Board’s judgment in discrediting the testimony of Cohen, his wife, and the assistant secretary, noting the suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged employment. The court highlighted that the Board is empowered to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw inferences from the evidence presented. The court reasoned that once the Board discredited the testimony supporting Cohen’s employment claim, there remained sufficient evidence to support the finding that Cohen’s prior disqualification remained in effect. The court concluded that because the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Division erred in overturning it. The Court effectively stated that the role of the judiciary is not to re-weigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, but rather to ensure that the agency’s decision is rationally based on the record.