Matter of Baby Girl S., 666 N.E.2d 1047 (N.Y. 1996)

An extrajudicial adoption consent that is promptly withdrawn by the birth parent before any overt manifestation to a third party does not trigger the formal revocation mechanism of the Domestic Relations Law.

Summary

This case addresses whether a birth mother’s privately signed adoption consent, immediately revoked before being shared with a third party, triggers the statutory revocation process under New York’s Domestic Relations Law. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a consent, immediately nullified by the birth mother, does not invoke the statutory revocation mechanism. The court reasoned that the law contemplates some overt manifestation to a third person for an extrajudicial consent to be operative, to protect the interests of all parties involved. The decision emphasizes the need for careful consideration by birth parents before executing consents, but also recognizes that immediate nullification prevents the consent from having legal effect.

Facts

The birth mother (respondent) signed an extrajudicial consent for adoption. Immediately after signing the consent, the birth mother notified her attorney of her decision to revoke it and keep her child. The potential adoptive parents (appellants) sought to enforce the adoption based on the initial consent.

Procedural History

The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a lower court decision regarding the validity of the adoption consent.

Issue(s)

Whether an extrajudicial adoption consent, signed by a birth mother but immediately revoked before any overt manifestation to a third party, triggers the formal revocation mechanism of Domestic Relations Law § 115-b.

Holding

No, because the Domestic Relations Law contemplates some overt manifestation to a third person for an extrajudicial consent to be operative, and a document that is immediately nullified does not implicate the protected interests of others under the statute.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that interpreting the law to mean that every privately signed and immediately withdrawn consent triggers the formal revocation mechanism would be absurd. The court emphasized that the Domestic Relations Law refers to the adoptive parents and the court in which the adoption proceeding has been or is to be commenced, indicating that some overt manifestation to a third person is necessary for an extrajudicial consent to be operative. The court stated, “While such consents surely must be scrupulously weighed by birth parents before they are executed, a document that is immediately nullified may not implicate the protected interests of others under the statute.” The court explicitly stated that this analysis does not add a delivery requirement to the statute, but rather clarifies the circumstances under which the statutory revocation process is initiated. The court found the birth mother’s prompt notification to her attorney of her intent to keep the child sufficient to nullify the consent before it became operative.