Matter of Andrew T., 67 N.Y.2d 296 (1986)

In cases of adoption of children born out of wedlock, a natural father must demonstrate a substantial relationship with the child, evidenced by both financial support and communication, to have the right to veto the adoption.

Summary

This case concerns the adoption of Andrew, a child born out of wedlock. The mother and her husband sought to adopt Andrew without the consent of the natural father, Mark. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the natural father had established a sufficient relationship with the child to have the right to withhold consent to the adoption. The court held that the father must satisfy both the support and communication provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) to establish his right to consent. Because the lower courts did not consider whether Mark satisfied the support provision, the case was remitted for further consideration.

Facts

Mark T. is the natural father of Andrew, born out of wedlock in 1977. Mark and Andrew’s mother, Catherine H., lived together for several years but never married, separating in 1979. Catherine married Timothy De V. in 1982 and sought to adopt Andrew with Timothy. Mark opposed the adoption. After the separation, Catherine eventually moved to New York with Andrew, while Mark resided in California. The lower courts found that Mark maintained constant telephone communication with Andrew and Catherine. They also found his financial condition precluded travel from California to New York, and that Catherine refused to allow him to see Andrew when he visited New York. Furthermore, after her marriage to Timothy, Catherine discouraged all contact between Mark and Andrew.

Procedural History

The Family Court initially dismissed the adoption petition, finding that Mark’s refusal to consent barred the adoption because he had not evinced “an intent * * * to forego his parental rights.” The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the natural father, Mark, demonstrated a substantial relationship with his child, Andrew, by satisfying the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d), specifically both the support and communication provisions, to establish his right to withhold consent to Andrew’s adoption.

Holding

No, because the lower courts failed to consider whether Mark satisfied, or was excused from satisfying, the threshold support provision of Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d)(i), the case was remitted to the Family Court for further consideration.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) requires a natural father to show that he has “maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child” as manifested by both (i) the payment of a fair and reasonable sum toward the child’s support and (ii) either monthly visits or regular communication with the child, depending on the father’s ability to visit. The court clarified that only after the natural father satisfies both the support and communication provisions does the court proceed to determine whether he forfeited that right by evincing “an intent to forego his * * * parental * * * rights and obligations.” The Court acknowledged the affirmed findings that Mark maintained constant telephone communication with Andrew and Catherine and that Catherine impeded Mark’s attempts to see Andrew. The court stated, “These affirmed findings may justify a conclusion that Mark met the communication requirement of section 111 (1) (d) (iii), and did not abandon his child within the meaning of section 111 (2) (a).” However, because neither the Family Court nor the Appellate Division considered whether Mark satisfied the support provision, the Court remitted the case. The court considered it premature to address Mark’s equal protection argument, given the disposition. The court’s analysis reflects a strict adherence to the statutory requirements for establishing a father’s right to consent to adoption, underscoring the importance of both financial support and communication in demonstrating a substantial parental relationship. This case is significant because it clarifies the two-pronged test for establishing a father’s right to consent to an adoption under New York law and emphasizes the necessity of evaluating both support and communication elements independently.