New York Law Review

Tag: materiality

  • People v. Perino, 18 N.Y.3d 88 (2011): Defining Materiality in Perjury Cases

    People v. Perino, 18 N.Y.3d 88 (2011)

    A false statement is material for perjury purposes if it directly proves a fact in issue, circumstantially supports a witness’s credibility regarding a main fact, or reflects on the matter under consideration, even if only concerning a witness’s credibility.

    Summary

    The defendant, a former police officer, was convicted of perjury for falsely answering questions during the trial of Erik Crespo, whom the defendant had interrogated. The defendant denied questioning Crespo about a shooting. The Appellate Division modified the conviction, finding two of the false statements immaterial. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant’s statements were material to the Crespo trial, particularly concerning the voluntariness of Crespo’s statements. The Court affirmed in part, holding that the defendant’s denial of questioning Crespo was material because it related to the spontaneity and voluntariness of Crespo’s statement to his mother.

    Facts

    The defendant, a police detective, interrogated Erik Crespo about a shooting without reading him his Miranda rights. Crespo confessed and recorded the interrogation. After the interrogation, Crespo told his mother, “He wants to know why I shot him.” At Crespo’s trial, the defendant testified that he never questioned Crespo and denounced a transcript of the interrogation as a fabrication. Crespo received a reduced plea offer because of the defendant’s false testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of perjury. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing two counts of first-degree perjury to third-degree perjury, finding the false statements about the gun were not material. Both the People and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals considered whether the remaining statements were material.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s false statement that he did not question Crespo was material to the Crespo trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statement was relevant to the jury’s determination of whether Crespo’s statement to his mother was truly spontaneous and voluntary or triggered by police conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a false statement is material if it is circumstantially material or tends to support the witness’s credibility. Quoting People v. Davis, 53 NY2d 164, 170-171, the Court noted that a statement that reflects on the matter under consideration, even if only as to the witness’ credibility, is material. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s denial of questioning Crespo was material because it pertained to the jury’s determination of whether Crespo’s statement to his mother was spontaneous and voluntary. The Court referenced People v. Lynes, 49 NY2d 286, 295 (1980), stating that the jury needed to determine if the statement was triggered by police conduct reasonably anticipated to evoke such a statement. The Court found that the Appellate Division’s modification regarding the gun-related questions was a factual determination and thus not reviewable. The Court also dismissed the defendant’s claim of a perjury trap.

  • People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996): Specificity of Discovery Requests and Brady Material

    People v. Scott, 88 N.Y.2d 888 (1996)

    When a defendant makes a specific request for Brady material, the prosecution’s failure to disclose such evidence is judged by the “reasonable possibility” standard of prejudice, meaning there’s a reasonable possibility the trial outcome would have differed had the evidence been produced.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction, arguing the prosecution failed to disclose Brady material – a “scratch” sheet referencing a polygraph examination of the sole eyewitness, Glenn Shaw. The defense had requested the polygraph report. The trial court granted a new trial, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the request not specific enough. The Court of Appeals held the request was specific, triggering the “reasonable possibility” standard. However, it ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal because polygraph results are inadmissible, and evidence suggested the witness was truthful.

    Facts

    Glenn Shaw, the only eyewitness, testified he saw the defendant with a handgun and others running from the victim’s house after hearing a gunshot. Before trial, the defense requested the polygraph exam report of a confidential informant. A “homicide bureau information sheet” (the “scratch sheet”) alluded to Shaw’s polygraph test, stating he was possibly withholding information. This sheet was not disclosed to the defense.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and weapons possession. He moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing a Brady violation. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the discovery request not specific, and the stricter “reasonable probability” standard was not met. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defense counsel’s request for “a copy of the report of the polygraph exam(s) given to the confidential informant showing date(s) of exam and all results” constituted a specific request for Brady material.

    2. Whether, assuming a specific request, the failure to disclose the “scratch sheet” warranted a new trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the request provided specific notice of the defense’s desire for the witness’s polygraph test results.

    2. No, because polygraph evidence is inadmissible, and other evidence suggested the eyewitness was truthful, so there was no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have differed had the document been produced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the defense’s request was specific because it provided particularized notice of the information sought, even if the defense didn’t know the document’s precise form. This specificity triggers the “reasonable possibility” standard for materiality under Brady. The Court cited People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, emphasizing that “heightened prosecutorial attention is appropriate” when the defense provides specific notice of its interest in particular material. However, the Court found that even under the “reasonable possibility” standard, a new trial was not warranted. The Court emphasized that “[a] polygrapher’s opinions regarding the witness’s veracity are not admissible evidence (see, People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217).” Additionally, the assistant district attorney who prepared the document had no recollection of its source, and other evidence suggested the witness was truthful. Therefore, the court found no reasonable possibility that the trial outcome would have changed had the document been disclosed.

  • People v.はありませんか Johnson, 53 N.Y.2d 95 (1981): Perjury Trap Doctrine and Grand Jury Investigations

    People v. Johnson, 53 N.Y.2d 95 (1981)

    A perjury indictment requires a showing of intentional falsity in response to a purposeful substantive inquiry and cannot be based on interrogation techniques designed solely to induce perjury.

    Summary

    Johnson, a police detective, was indicted for perjury for false testimony before a grand jury investigating bribery. The lower courts dismissed the indictment, finding a “perjury trap.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the questioning was a purposeful substantive inquiry into Johnson’s actions. The court emphasized that the Grand Jury sought to understand why Johnson stopped an undercover officer, and Johnson’s false statements about the incident were material to that investigation. The court rejected the argument that the prosecutor was obligated to further question Johnson or confront him with contradictory evidence, finding sufficient indicia of intentional falsity.

    Facts

    Detective Johnson stopped an undercover officer, Rizzo, who was investigating organized crime. Rizzo reported the incident, and Johnson was questioned by his superiors, to whom he gave a different account, denying he left his car. Later, Johnson testified to a grand jury investigating whether he was bribed to identify Rizzo. Johnson claimed he stopped Rizzo because he resembled a homicide suspect. During his testimony, he falsely attributed a statement about an assault to his superior, Lieutenant Gulley. Gulley and another sergeant later testified that they never made such a statement.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was indicted for perjury. The Supreme Court granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing People v. Tyler, finding the indictment was the result of a perjury trap. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the false statement for which Johnson was indicted was material to the grand jury investigation, thus satisfying an essential element of perjury in the first degree.
    2. Whether the perjury indictment represented a “perjury trap” by the prosecutor, warranting dismissal of the indictment under People v. Tyler.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the circumstances surrounding Johnson’s discussions with his superiors were critical for the Grand Jury’s evaluation of his testimony regarding the validity of his explanation for stopping Detective Rizzo.
    2. No, because the questioning here was a purposeful substantive inquiry and did not amount to the practice condemned in Tyler.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed materiality, stating that the false statement need not directly prove the fact in issue, but only needs to be circumstantially material or tend to support the witness’s credibility regarding the main fact. The court found Johnson’s false statement about Lieutenant Gulley’s statement was material because it pertained to the validity of Johnson’s explanation for stopping Rizzo. It had a direct bearing on whether Johnson’s conduct involved criminality.

    Turning to the perjury trap argument, the Court distinguished this case from People v. Tyler. The court stated that Tyler holds that a perjury indictment requires a demonstration of intentional falsity in response to “purposeful substantive inquiry” and cannot be predicated upon interrogation techniques that have perjury as the sole object. Here, the questioning was aimed at the substance of the meeting with Johnson’s superiors, not merely outward details. The court noted that Johnson volunteered the information about the assault allegation. The prosecutor’s repetition of the response seeking confirmation did not indicate an improper motive.

    The court emphasized that it need not adopt a rule that a perjury trap is found in every case where the prosecutor doesn’t confront the witness with a falsehood, as it would unduly restrict the Grand Jury’s investigatory process. The absence of further questioning about the false statement or confrontation with contrary evidence was not determinative, given the other indicia that the response was knowingly false. The Court concluded that the legal instructions to the Grand Jury were sufficient.

  • People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251 (1978): Perjury Prosecution Requires Materiality and Genuine Inquiry

    46 N.Y.2d 251 (1978)

    A perjury conviction based on Grand Jury testimony requires that the prosecutor demonstrate a palpable interest in eliciting facts material to a substantive investigation and not solely aim to trap the witness into giving a false answer.

    Summary

    A Supreme Court Justice, Tyler, was convicted of perjury based on his Grand Jury testimony regarding a meeting with a reputed criminal. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, holding that the perjury prosecution was improper because the prosecutor’s questioning focused on minor details without establishing the materiality of the meeting to a legitimate Grand Jury investigation. The court reasoned that the questioning appeared designed to trap the defendant into committing perjury rather than to uncover substantive crimes or official misconduct. The court also emphasized the prosecutor’s failure to adequately refresh the witness’s recollection before pursuing the perjury charges.

    Facts

    Tyler, a Supreme Court Justice, was investigated by an Extraordinary Grand Jury for his relationship with known gambling figures, including Raymond Marquez. Police officers testified that they observed Tyler meeting with Marquez and his wife at Patsy’s Restaurant. During Grand Jury testimony, Tyler initially denied communicating with Marquez since becoming a judge but later recalled the meeting. He described it as a brief, chance encounter, which differed significantly from the surveillance team’s account.

    Procedural History

    Tyler was indicted on four counts of perjury in the first degree. He was acquitted on one count and convicted on the remaining three. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictment. The Special Prosecutor appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a perjury prosecution may be based on false answers about peripheral details of a meeting, where the prosecutor demonstrates no palpable interest in eliciting facts material to the authorized substantive investigation of antecedent crime or official misconduct.
    2. Whether false answers about peripheral details of a single meeting may support a perjury prosecution without the prosecutor laying enough of a foundation to recall to the witness’ mind what, without some prodding, may have in truth escaped the witness’ recollection.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor exhibited minimal or no interest in establishing the materiality of the meeting, focusing instead on minor details, suggesting a primary aim to trap the witness into committing perjury.
    2. No, because the prosecutor failed to adequately confront the defendant with contradictory facts or otherwise stimulate his memory regarding details acquired from the surveillance team, before pursuing the perjury charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the primary function of the Grand Jury is to uncover crimes and misconduct for prosecution, not to create new crimes through perjury traps. The court emphasized that where the prosecutor shows no palpable interest in eliciting facts material to a substantive investigation of crime or official misconduct but tailors questioning to extract a false answer, a valid perjury prosecution should not lie. The court found that the prosecutor’s questioning focused almost exclusively on the logistical details of the meeting without making a sufficient effort to establish its materiality to the Grand Jury investigation. The court also criticized the prosecutor for failing to refresh the defendant’s recollection with facts from the surveillance team’s report before pursuing the perjury charges. The court cited the principle that the examiner has an “inescapable burden to provide a transcript which demonstrates that the witness is testifying falsely intentionally, rather than mistakenly, whether it is with respect to surrounding neutral details or to substantive matters relevant to an authorized investigation.” The court concluded that the interrogation amounted to an impermissible “perjury trap,” thus warranting the dismissal of the indictment as a matter of law.

  • People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909): Materiality as Essential Element of Attempted Subornation of Perjury

    People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909)

    Attempted subornation of perjury requires the false testimony solicited to be material to the issue in the underlying case; otherwise, it cannot constitute the crime of attempted subornation of perjury.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury for soliciting false testimony in a divorce case. The solicited testimony concerned an act of adultery different from the one alleged in the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the solicited testimony was immaterial to the issue presented in the divorce case. Since materiality is an essential element of perjury, an attempt to suborn immaterial testimony does not constitute attempted subornation of perjury. The Court clarified that an attempt to induce false testimony may be punishable under a separate statute concerning falsifying evidence, but not under the perjury statutes.

    Facts

    Frank J. Gould was the defendant in a divorce action brought by Helen K. Gould. The complaint alleged a single act of adultery committed by Frank J. Gould with an unknown woman in North Sydney, Cape Breton, Canada, on July 25, 1907.
    The defendant, Teal, attempted to procure false testimony from Mabel MacCauslan. Teal solicited MacCauslan to testify that in March 1908, she saw Frank J. Gould coming out of a bedroom in Bessie Van Doren’s apartment in New York City, suggesting adultery between Gould and Van Doren.
    The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery, at a different time and place, and with a different person than the act alleged in the divorce complaint.

    Procedural History

    The defendant, Teal, was convicted of attempted subornation of perjury in the trial court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reviewed the case based on exceptions to evidentiary rulings made during the trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person can be convicted of attempted subornation of perjury based on evidence that the solicited false testimony was not material to the issue in the underlying case.

    Holding

    No, because attempted subornation of perjury requires that the solicited testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury. Since perjury requires that the false testimony be material, soliciting immaterial testimony cannot constitute attempted subornation of perjury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that materiality is an essential element of perjury. The statute defines perjury as “willfully and knowingly testifies falsely, in any material matter.” Subornation of perjury requires inducing another to commit perjury; therefore, if the person suborned does not commit perjury, the suborner is not guilty of subornation.
    Attempted subornation of perjury, then, requires an act done with the intent to commit subornation of perjury, but failing to do so. The crime of subornation of perjury can only occur if the false testimony, if given, would have constituted perjury.
    In this case, the testimony Teal attempted to procure from MacCauslan was “irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial” to the issue in Gould v. Gould. The solicited testimony concerned a different act of adultery than the one alleged in the complaint.
    “If false testimony is not material it cannot support an indictment for perjury. The testimony upon which such a charge is predicated must be false ‘in any material matter.’”
    The Court rejected the argument that the testimony might become material if the complaint were amended, stating that the charge of perjury cannot depend on issues or events arising after the testimony is given. The Court also noted that the legislature had provided for cases where the false testimony is immaterial via a statute concerning “Falsifying Evidence.”