New York Law Review

Tag: Material Witness

  • People v. Grannum, 175 A.D.2d 686 (1991): Missing Witness Rule and Materiality of Testimony

    People v. Grannum, 175 A.D.2d 686 (1991)

    A missing witness charge is warranted when a party fails to call a witness under their control who possesses material, non-cumulative evidence relevant to a critical issue in the case, and the opposing party demonstrates that the witness’s testimony would likely contradict or cast doubt on the proponent’s evidence.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of rape, but the conviction was overturned due to the trial court’s refusal to provide a missing witness charge regarding the complainant’s husband. The Court of Appeals determined that the husband’s testimony was material because it could provide insight into the complainant’s physical condition immediately after the alleged rape, an issue central to determining whether the intercourse was consensual or forced. The conflicting testimonies regarding the complainant’s injuries warranted the charge because the husband’s observations could either corroborate or contradict the existing evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant admitted to having intercourse with the complainant but claimed it was consensual. A friend of the complainant testified that when the complainant arrived at her home after the incident, she was “high” and excited and spoke about having had sex with the defendant. This friend also observed that the complainant’s lip was swollen, her blouse buttons were missing, and her pants zipper was broken. A police officer who interviewed the complainant several hours later noted more severe injuries, including a swollen and bloodshot eye, a bruised shoulder, and a swollen lip and cheek. The complainant’s husband did not testify at trial regarding his observations of her condition when she returned home the morning after the alleged rape.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a missing witness charge concerning the complainant’s husband, given his potential knowledge of her physical condition immediately after the alleged rape.

    Holding

    Yes, because the husband’s testimony was material to a critical issue in the case—the nature and extent of the complainant’s injuries immediately following the alleged rape—and could have contradicted or corroborated existing evidence regarding whether the intercourse was consensual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a missing witness charge is appropriate when the uncalled witness possesses knowledge about a material issue already presented to the jury. Here, the conflicting testimonies regarding the complainant’s injuries made her husband’s observations material. The court highlighted the differences between the friend’s account of the complainant’s condition shortly after the incident and the police officer’s later observations. The court noted that while corroboration is not strictly required in rape prosecutions, the husband’s testimony could have confirmed the People’s evidence of forcible compulsion given the conflicting accounts and impeachment of the complainant. The court also emphasized that the People failed to argue that the husband’s testimony would be cumulative at trial, precluding them from raising that argument on appeal. The court cited People v. Wright, 41 NY2d 172, 176, emphasizing that the defense counsel was entitled to comment on the People’s failure to call the husband as a witness and to receive an appropriate jury charge on his absence. The court stated, “[T]hus, it appeared complainant’s husband was knowledgeable about a material issue in the case: whether the physical injuries sustained by complainant, as observed by Officer Reilly many hours after the alleged rape, were also observed by him when complainant returned home before reporting the crime.” The court emphasized the importance of the husband’s testimony given the complainant’s fear of her husband and his anger towards her association with the defendant, suggesting a potential bias that could influence his observations and testimony. The missing witness rule allows the jury to infer that the uncalled witness’s testimony would not support the party’s version of the facts; the court found that this inference was particularly relevant and appropriate in this case.

  • People v. McCartney, 38 N.Y.2d 618 (1976): Securing Out-of-State Witnesses Under the Uniform Act

    38 N.Y.2d 618 (1976)

    Under the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases (CPL 640.10), a trial court’s decision to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness is discretionary and requires the requesting party to demonstrate the materiality and necessity of the witness’s testimony.

    Summary

    McCartney pleaded guilty to robbery after his confession was deemed admissible. He appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to compulsory process when the trial court refused to compel a Maryland State trooper’s attendance at his suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the decision to compel an out-of-state witness under the Uniform Act is discretionary and requires a showing of materiality, which McCartney failed to demonstrate. The Court emphasized the need to balance the defendant’s right to witnesses with the potential burden on the out-of-state witness.

    Facts

    McCartney was interrogated by New York State Police in a Maryland jail. He later sought to suppress statements he made during the interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. He requested the court to compel the attendance of a Maryland State trooper, Officer Miles, who was allegedly present during the interrogation. The prosecution presented testimony from Investigator Anderson of the New York State Police who conducted the interrogation. Another New York State Police officer who was also present during defendant’s interrogation, Senior Investigator Capozzi, although available to the defendant, was not called upon to testify.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied McCartney’s request to compel the Maryland trooper’s attendance. McCartney pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to issue a certificate under CPL 640.10(3) to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness at a pretrial suppression hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness is discretionary, and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness’s testimony was material and necessary to his case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Sixth Amendment guarantees compulsory process, it does not constitutionally require a state to compel the attendance of witnesses beyond its jurisdiction. The Uniform Act, while valid, is not constitutionally mandated. The Court emphasized that the Act should be applied uniformly across states that have adopted it, and that a key requirement for compelling an out-of-state witness is a showing of materiality. The burden of demonstrating materiality rests on the party seeking to compel attendance. The Court stated that unsupported statements of materiality are insufficient. The court stated, “Unsupported statements that the witness is material or necessary are not sufficient to require the Trial Judge to grant an application under CPL 640.10 (subd 3).”

    The court found that McCartney failed to meet this burden. He argued that discrepancies existed between the testimony of Investigator Anderson and Senior Investigator Capozzi (who testified at his brother’s hearing), but he did not point out any specific discrepancies or call Investigator Capozzi to testify at his own hearing. Moreover, the trial court found that Officer Miles was only “in and out” of the room and did not observe any significant portion of the questioning. The Court highlighted that the process of securing an out-of-state witness is “drastic” and represents an incursion on the witness’s liberty. Therefore, a trial court’s decision to deny a request under CPL 640.10(3) is discretionary and should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The Court concluded no abuse of discretion occurred in this case.