New York Law Review

Tag: Material Element

  • People v. Day, 73 N.Y.2d 208 (1989): Determining When Consecutive Sentences Are Permissible

    73 N.Y.2d 208 (1989)

    Under New York Penal Law § 70.25(2), consecutive sentences are permissible when offenses arise from separate and distinct acts, and when the statutory definition of one crime does not include the other as a material element.

    Summary

    Defendant Day was convicted of attempted grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal possession of a forged instrument. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the attempted grand larceny conviction, arguing it was a separate crime. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the offenses were separate acts and that the possessory crimes were not material elements of the attempted larceny. The court clarified that for sentencing purposes, one offense is a material element of another only if the statutory definition of the second crime includes the first as a necessary component.

    Facts

    Day, a precious metals broker, received checks worth approximately $221,000 from an associate. These checks, originally payable to the “City Collector,” had been stolen and the payee altered to “Intercity Collector’s Ent. Inc.” Day deposited the checks into his company’s account. The checks were discovered to be stolen, and Day was arrested while attempting to withdraw the account’s balance.

    Procedural History

    Day was convicted in the trial court of attempted grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal possession of a forged instrument, and received consecutive sentences for the larceny conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for attempted grand larceny, arguing that the crimes of conviction were part of the same act or that the possessory offenses were material elements of the attempted grand larceny, thus violating Penal Law § 70.25(2).

    Holding

    No, because the criminal actions constituted more than a single act, and the possessory counts do not constitute material elements of the larceny count according to the pertinent statutes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25(2), which mandates concurrent sentences for offenses committed through a single act or when one offense is a material element of another. Citing People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, the court stated that punishment for separate and distinct acts violating multiple Penal Law sections is permissible, even if arising from a single transaction. The Court emphasized that for sentencing purposes, a material element exists only if the statutory definition of one crime necessarily includes the other. The court reasoned that the possessory offenses (possessing stolen property and forged instruments with intent) are distinct from attempted grand larceny (attempting to steal property over a specified amount). "[T]he commission of one offense is a material element of a second for restrictive sentencing purposes if, by comparative examination, the statutory definition of the second crime provides that the first crime is also a necessary component in the legislative classification and definitional sense." Since the statutes define these crimes separately, consecutive sentences were permissible. The court also noted that factual interdependence is a discretionary factor for the sentencing court to consider when deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. The court stated, ” ‘The test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent’ ”.

  • People v. Grega, 72 N.Y.2d 489 (1988): Amending Indictments and Material Elements of Robbery

    People v. Grega, 72 N.Y.2d 489 (1988)

    A trial court does not constructively amend an indictment in violation of a defendant’s rights when the jury is instructed that they can find the defendant guilty even if the stolen property differs from what was specified in the indictment, provided the nature of the property is not a material element of the crime.

    Summary

    The defendant was indicted for first-degree robbery, accused of stealing jewelry and money. At trial, he testified he stole cocaine instead. The trial court instructed the jury they could convict even if the stolen items were drugs. The New York Court of Appeals held that this instruction did not constructively amend the indictment because the specific type of property stolen isn’t a material element of robbery under New York law, as long as ‘property’ was indeed stolen. The court emphasized that the discrepancy arose from the defendant’s own testimony.

    Facts

    Shaniqua Montgomery reported that the defendant stole jewelry and money from her apartment on October 18, 1979, while displaying what appeared to be a firearm. At trial, Montgomery testified the defendant took two watches, gold chains, and $70. The defendant testified he was seeking heroin from Montgomery and forcibly took cocaine from her purse instead, denying the theft of money or jewelry.

    Procedural History

    The Bronx County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for first-degree robbery. At trial, the court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty even if they found he had stolen drugs rather than “money or jewelry.” The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree robbery but convicted him of third-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court constructively amended the indictment by instructing the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of robbery even if they found that he had stolen drugs rather than “money or jewelry” as specified in the indictment, thereby violating the defendant’s right to indictment by a grand jury under the New York State Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the particular nature of the property stolen is not a material element of the crime of robbery under New York law, and the discrepancy between the indictment and the proof at trial was caused by the defendant’s own testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the charges against him, satisfying due process and fair notice requirements. The indictment specified the date, victim, and the use of a weapon in forcibly stealing property. The court emphasized that under CPL 200.70, subd 1, amendments to indictments are permissible for matters of form, time, place, and names, provided they do not change the prosecution’s theory or prejudice the defendant. Robbery, as defined in Penal Law Article 160, merely requires the forcible stealing of “property,” broadly defined in Penal Law § 155.00(1). The court noted that the defendant’s own testimony created the discrepancy between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. The court stated, “Most importantly, it must be remembered that, unlike the cases relied upon by the defendant (e.g., Stirone v United States, 361 US 212; People v Geyer, 196 NY 364), any discrepancy between the indictment and the proof at trial was caused by the defendant voluntarily taking the stand in his own behalf and admitting that he committed a different version of the robbery than was alleged in the indictment.” The court concluded that the charge to the jury provided no basis for overturning the conviction of third-degree robbery.