New York Law Review

Tag: Marriage Rights

  • Matter of Diaz, 80 N.Y.2d 910 (1992): Civil Death and the Capacity to Marry

    Matter of Diaz, 80 N.Y.2d 910 (1992)

    A marriage entered into by an incarcerated life-sentence inmate is void from its inception because the legislative declaration of civil death under Civil Rights Law § 79-a imposes a complete disability to enter into a valid marriage.

    Summary

    This case concerns an article 78 proceeding initiated by a life-sentence inmate, Diaz, challenging the New York State Department of Correctional Services’ (DOCS) determination that he was not legally married for the purpose of participating in the Family Reunion Program. Diaz entered into an out-of-state proxy marriage during his incarceration. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that DOCS correctly applied Civil Rights Law § 79-a. The court reasoned that a life-sentence inmate is under civil death and therefore lacks the capacity to enter a valid marriage. Thus, the proxy marriage was deemed invalid from its inception.

    Facts

    Diaz was a life-sentence inmate incarcerated in New York State. During his incarceration, Diaz entered into a proxy marriage in another state. Diaz sought to participate in the Family Reunion Program offered by DOCS. DOCS determined that Diaz was not legally married under New York law because of his life sentence.

    Procedural History

    Diaz initiated an Article 78 proceeding challenging DOCS’ determination. The Appellate Division refused to annul the DOCS determination. Diaz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether DOCS properly applied Civil Rights Law § 79-a as the basis for concluding that petitioner’s out-of-State proxy marriage entered into during petitioner’s life-term incarceration was invalid.

    Holding

    Yes, because a marriage entered into by an incarcerated life-sentence inmate is void from inception because the legislative declaration of civil death under Civil Rights Law § 79-a imposes a complete disability to enter into a valid marriage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Civil Rights Law § 79-a, which declares a person sentenced to life imprisonment civilly dead. Citing Ferrin v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 71 NY2d 42, the court stated that this civil death imposes a “complete disability to enter into a valid marriage.” The court reasoned that because Diaz was serving a life sentence, he was civilly dead at the time he entered into the proxy marriage. As such, he lacked the legal capacity to marry, rendering the marriage void from its inception. The court explicitly stated, “A marriage entered into by an incarcerated life-sentence inmate is void from inception because the legislative declaration of civil death under Civil Rights Law § 79-a imposes a *911 complete disability to enter into a valid marriage.” Therefore, DOCS’ determination was correct, and the Appellate Division’s order was affirmed. The decision underscores the continuing impact of civil death statutes on the rights of incarcerated individuals, specifically their ability to enter into legally recognized marital relationships. The decision also emphasizes the principle that individuals deemed civilly dead lack the capacity to contract or exercise certain legal rights, including the right to marry.

  • Ferrin v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 71 N.Y.2d 42 (1987): Civil Death and the Right to Marry

    Ferrin v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 71 N.Y.2d 42 (1987)

    An inmate serving a life sentence is considered civilly dead under New York Civil Rights Law § 79-a, which imposes a complete disability to enter into a valid marriage during their incarceration, unless paroled.

    Summary

    Donald Ferrin, an inmate serving a life sentence, sought a judicial declaration that his marriage to Susan, solemnized while he was in jail, was valid. The Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) had denied his application to participate in the Family Reunion Program, arguing that the marriage was not legal under Civil Rights Law § 79-a, which declares life-sentenced inmates civilly dead. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that Civil Rights Law § 79-a prohibits inmates serving life sentences from entering into valid marriages while incarcerated unless paroled. The court rejected the argument that the repeal of Domestic Relations Law § 6(2) removed the bar to such marriages and emphasized the legislature’s intent to maintain this restriction.

    Facts

    Donald Ferrin was serving a 20-years-to-life sentence. While incarcerated at Dutchess County Jail, he purportedly married Susan in December 1977. He was later transferred to a correctional facility where he participated in the Family Reunion Program with Susan.

    In 1984, after being transferred to another facility, Ferrin’s application to continue participating in the Family Reunion Program was denied by DOCS, citing Civil Rights Law § 79-a, stating his marriage was not considered legal.

    Procedural History

    Ferrin and his wife sued for a declaration that their marriage was valid.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint.

    The Appellate Division modified the judgment to declare in favor of DOCS, stating that Ferrin could not legally marry and that estoppel was not applicable against the State and affirmed the dismissal.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Civil Rights Law § 79-a prohibits an inmate serving a life sentence from entering into a valid marriage while incarcerated.

    2. Whether the State should be estopped from challenging the validity of the marriage because it was solemnized by a chaplain at a public jail.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Civil Rights Law § 79-a declares a person sentenced to life imprisonment civilly dead, imposing a disability to enter into a valid marriage during incarceration, except while on parole.

    2. No, because estoppel is not applicable against the State in these circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected Ferrin’s argument that the repeal of Domestic Relations Law § 6(2) removed the legal impediment to a life-term prisoner entering into a valid marriage. The court found that the 1981 amendments repealing Domestic Relations Law § 6(2) were intended only to clarify that an existing marriage is not automatically dissolved when one spouse is sentenced to life imprisonment; it does not apply to marriages entered into after the life sentence has been imposed. The court noted that the Sponsor’s Memorandum stated the purpose of the amendment was to “clarify the present law to insure that an already existing marriage of a person sentenced to life imprisonment is not automatically dissolved by the imposition of the sentence.”

    The court also relied on the plain language of Civil Rights Law § 79-a itself, which states that a civilly dead person “may marry while on parole, or after he has been discharged from parole”. According to the court, to interpret the statute to mean that civil death does not affect a person’s capacity to marry would render the “parole” clause meaningless. The court stated: “In interpreting this statute we are bound to accept the Legislature’s deliberate retention in the statute of the parole clause which, in order to have meaning and purpose, compels the conclusion that civil death of an incarcerated lifer precludes marriage.” This indicates a legislative intent to maintain the prohibition on marriage for incarcerated lifers.

    The court also rejected the estoppel argument based on previous holdings. The Court noted that any competing policy arguments or reasons for ending the vestiges of civil death for lifers are matters for the Legislature, not the courts, to resolve.