New York Law Review

Tag: Marijuana

  • People v. Finley, 10 N.Y.3d 647 (2008): Defining ‘Dangerous Contraband’ in Prison

    10 N.Y.3d 647 (2008)

    Small amounts of marihuana, even when possessed by inmates in detention facilities, do not automatically constitute “dangerous contraband” under New York Penal Law § 205.00(4) and § 205.25(2); rather, the item must have characteristics creating a substantial probability of causing death, serious injury, escape, or major threats to institutional safety.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether possessing small amounts of marihuana in prison constituted the felony of promoting prison contraband in the first degree. The Court held that such small amounts of marihuana do not automatically qualify as “dangerous contraband.” The Court reasoned that a broad interpretation would nullify the misdemeanor offense of promoting prison contraband in the second degree and that the legislative history indicated a narrower definition was intended. The Court emphasized that for an item to be considered “dangerous contraband,” its characteristics must create a substantial probability of causing death, serious injury, escape, or other major threats to the facility.

    Facts

    In People v. Salters, an inmate’s girlfriend was caught attempting to smuggle 9.3 grams of marihuana into a correctional facility. In People v. Finley, an inmate was found with three marihuana joints in a correctional facility. In both cases, the inmates were charged with promoting prison contraband in the first degree, a felony, based on the assertion that the marihuana was “dangerous contraband.” The prosecution argued that the marihuana could be used in a manner that endangered the safety and security of the detention facilities.

    Procedural History

    In Salters, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to reduce the charges to a misdemeanor and the Appellate Division affirmed the felony conviction. In Finley, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony charge but allowed a jury charge on the lesser-included misdemeanor; the Appellate Division affirmed the felony conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether small amounts of marihuana, such as those possessed by the defendants, constitute “dangerous contraband” under Penal Law § 205.00(4) and § 205.25(2), thereby justifying a felony conviction for promoting prison contraband in the first degree.

    Holding

    No, because the term “dangerous contraband” requires a showing that the item is likely to cause death or serious injury, facilitate an escape, or bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security. The small amounts of marihuana in these cases did not meet that standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the statute distinguishes between “contraband” and “dangerous contraband,” with the latter carrying more severe penalties. The Court emphasized that the term “use” in the definition of dangerous contraband refers to the application or employment of the item. The Court rejected the People’s argument that any item that could lead to altercations and inmate disobedience should be considered dangerous contraband, as this would effectively nullify the misdemeanor crime of promoting prison contraband in the second degree. The Court relied on the legislative history of the prison contraband provisions, noting that the felony offense was originally intended to address items that could endanger life or limb. The Court stated, “We therefore conclude that the test for determining whether an item is dangerous contraband is whether its particular characteristics are such that there is a substantial probability that the item will be used in a manner that is likely to cause death or other serious injury, to facilitate an escape, or to bring about other major threats to a detention facility’s institutional safety or security.” The Court also noted the Marihuana Reform Act of 1977, which decriminalized possession of small amounts of marihuana, indicating a more lenient legislative approach. The Court concluded that the small amounts of marihuana in these cases did not present a substantial probability of causing the harms associated with “dangerous contraband.” Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that in Salters, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the 9.3 grams of marihuana could be sold or bartered, potentially leading to violent altercations. However, Judge Pigott concurred that the trial court erred by not charging the lesser included offense.

  • People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 255 (1973): Validity of Anticipatory Search Warrants

    People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 255 (1973)

    A search warrant may be issued in advance of the imminent or scheduled arrival of seizable property at the place to be searched, provided there is strong evidence that the property will arrive and be in the specified location when the warrant is executed.

    Summary

    This case addresses the validity of “anticipatory” search warrants, which are issued before the contraband or evidence arrives at the location to be searched. The New York Court of Appeals held that such warrants are permissible if there’s substantial probability that the seizable property will be on the premises when searched. The court reasoned that encouraging the use of warrants, even anticipatory ones, is preferable to warrantless searches. The court emphasized that the evidence supporting the warrant must demonstrate a high likelihood of future possession and that the warrant’s execution must be reasonably contemporaneous with the expected arrival of the property.

    Facts

    In Baker, a customs inspection in San Francisco revealed marijuana in a package addressed to Barbara Fay Baker in Buffalo. Postal authorities confirmed the contents upon its arrival in Buffalo. A warrant was issued on January 9, 1970, for a search scheduled for January 16, the expected delivery date.
    In Glen, an affidavit stated a package containing narcotics, addressed to Glen, was due to arrive at a bus depot. Glen had inquired about the package earlier that day. The warrant was issued on October 29, 1969. When the package wasn’t claimed, officers examined it, found marijuana, and returned it. Glen picked it up the next day and was arrested.

    Procedural History

    Both Baker and Glen were convicted of possession of drugs. Both challenged the search warrants in pre-trial motions to suppress the evidence, which were denied. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a search warrant may be validly issued prior to the imminent or scheduled arrival of seizable property at the place or with the person designated in the warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because neither the Constitution nor the relevant statutes prohibit issuing a search warrant in advance of the imminent or scheduled receipt of seizable property, provided that probable cause exists that the property will be present at the time of the search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment and the New York State Constitution require probable cause but do not explicitly prohibit anticipatory warrants. The critical factor is whether the evidence establishes a “substantial probability” that the seizable property will be on the premises when searched. The court distinguished these situations from warrants based on speculation about future crimes. In these cases, the crime was “in process,” with the necessary elements already set in motion. The court also addressed the statutory requirement that warrants be executed “forthwith”. It interpreted this to mean with “reasonable promptness” and allowed for a reasonable delay under the circumstances. It emphasized the desirability of encouraging police to seek warrants rather than conduct warrantless searches when feasible. Quoting United States v. Ventresca, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment requirements are “practical and not abstract” and that warrants should be scrutinized in a “commonsense and realistic fashion.” The court also addressed and dismissed Glen’s argument that a hearing should have been held on the motion to supress. Because Glen’s affidavits did not dispute the facts in the warrant application, the veracity of the affiant, or the manner in which the property was seized, a hearing was not required.